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Stewart E. Sterk, H. Bert and Ruth Mack Professor of Real Estate
Law and Director of the Center for Real Estate Law & Policy at the
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University
INTRODUCTION
Lynda Butler, Chancellor Professor of Law and Director, Property
Rights Project, William & Mary Law School
BUTLER. Each year, the Brigham-Kanner Prize is awarded to some-
one who has made significant contributions to our understanding of
property and its role in society. The prize is awarded to someone who
is thought deeply about property’s relation to the human condition
and about the importance of property rights to our political, eco-
nomic, and social systems. Prior recipients have included some of the
nation’s leading property scholars, a Supreme Court Justice, a highly
regarded practitioner, and a world-renowned Peruvian economist.
This year’s recipient, Stewart Sterk, is one of the most complete
scholars we have recognized. By complete I mean that he has ap-
proached the field of property totally and comprehensively. He has
taught and wrote about almost every key aspect of property as an
institution. General areas of his expertise include land use regulation,
property, trusts and estates, real estate transactions, and intellectual
property. His numerous publications address such topics as takings,
inheritance, the moral obligations of land owners, zoning finality,
servitudes, property and copyright, minority protection in residential
private governments, and exactions, just to name a few. A member of
the American Law Institute, Stew also has co-authored casebooks
on land use regulation and on trusts and estates.
Stew received both his undergraduate and law degrees from Colum-
bia University. After a clerkship, Stew began his academic career at
Cardozo School of Law. He has also visited at Columbia and the
University of Pennsylvania law schools.
In addition to writing scholarship that is rich with ideas, Stew
has won teaching awards for the Best Professor or Best 1L Professor
1
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so many times (at least fourteen) that he must have stirred up a bit
of envy among his colleagues.
What I find most impressive about Stew are the accolades that I
received from his peers once they learned that he was receiving the
award. One word in particular impressed me because it is not usu-
ally used to praise academics who are at the top of their game, and
that word is “generous”—generous as a colleague, as a co-author, as
a teacher, and as a person. Stew, we are deeply honored that you are
here to receive the Brigham-Kanner Prize. Please come forward.
STERK. It’s really very humbling to receive an award that, in the past,
has gone to such a cadre of really distinguished people. I very much
appreciate what the Brigham-Kanner Prize means, and I feel very
honored to receive it.
I would like to start by basically responding to the invitation, for
those of us who are academics, to learn from those of you who are
practitioners and say that, at least for myself, it’s really something
that makes this Conference particularly valuable—we always get an
opportunity to listen to the issues that are on the front lines, and it
really helps us and enriches us in the work that we do. So I really
thank the sponsors of this Conference for making that possible.
I don’t think today is really the day for dealing with the substance
of property law. Most of that is for tomorrow, and we’ll spend time on
that. But I do want to at least remind everyone that this year, for
better or for worst, it’s the fortieth anniversary of Penn Central.1 And
I want to raise that, in part, because for my career Penn Central has
played a doubly important role. First, it introduced me to the law of
takings. And second, it really provided me a gateway into my aca-
demic career.
I started my legal career as a law clerk to Judge Breitel in the New
York Court of Appeals, and while I was there one of the cases that
wound its way through the Court of Appeals was Penn Central. The
opinion fell to Judge Breitel, and I got assigned to put together a first
draft of this opinion. For those of you who remember, it was really
an odd opinion—for which I take neither credit nor blame because
it was really all the Judge’s idea. This opinion basically said that
the government really didn’t have to worry about Penn Central very
1. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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much because the government had contributed so substantially to
the value of Penn Central by running the subway lines through Grand
Central that, really, compensation was not necessary.2
Now, leaving aside the merits of that case, it really provided me
an education in and an introduction to takings—through the works
of Henry George3 at the insistence of the Judge. When I think about
Penn Central though, I marvel at how much the legal landscape has
changed over the last forty years. And if you remember what things
were like before Penn Central was decided, it wasn’t at all clear that
landmark preservation would be upheld. It wasn’t at all clear how
transferable development rights (“TDRs”) would be treated from a
taking’s perspective. And, at least in my home state under the law
of New York, it was not clear that there was any such thing as a
regulatory taking at all because the Court of Appeals had basically
held that when the government acted in a way that seemed to be
confiscatory, that was only a due process violation—it couldn’t be a
taking because all the government had done was to excessively use
the police power and the remedy was to strike down that ordinance.4
Whatever confusion Penn Central has generated since then, it at least
eliminated some areas of confusion.5
For me, Penn Central’s importance was not really doctrine. When
I entered the teaching market, there were no such things as visiting
assistant professors. There were very few fellowships out there.
Most people started an academic career by coming from practice or
coming from a clerkship. By the time I entered the teaching market,
every school was starting to ask for something called a “job talk”—a
presentation that talked about some legal issue. For me it made sense
to talk about Penn Central and the evolution of takings law in New
York. So I spent a lot of time preparing for this talk, and I’ll tell you,
I don’t have any idea what I said. Although I have no recollection of
2. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 327–37 (1977), aff’d,
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
3. See HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY 418–19 (4th ed. 1898) (arguing that all land
value is created by the community and that a single tax on land value “is the taking by the com-
munity, for the use of the community, of that value which is the creation of the community.”)
4. See Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y. 2d 587, 594 (1976).
5. In Penn Central itself, the Court expressly rejected the contention that government
could only engage in landmark regulation by compensating affected owners. 438 U.S. 104 at
131. The Court also established that a municipality could use TDRs to mitigate the impact
of a challenged regulation. Id. at 137.
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what I said during that talk, it must have gone reasonably well—
otherwise I wouldn’t be standing here now. But it shows how Penn
Central was important to my career development beyond its ordinary
doctrinal importance.
Now, I’d like to say that I started teaching property and I started
working in property because I had a passion for the subject as a re-
sult of my work on Penn Central and elsewhere. But that really isn’t
true. The truth is that I chose to teach property because it was the
first-year course in law school that I liked the least. The class I at-
tended had too much Hohfeld, it had too much of estates in land, it
had too much adulation of the then-recent landlord-tenant cases
that provided excessive tenant protection. I just thought, I don’t know
if I would be able to do well at anything else, but this is a course I can
probably do better than the class that I had. And that’s how I essen-
tially got into teaching property.
That’s how I got into teaching property, but over time I certainly
did develop a passion for the subject and for the material. Its impor-
tance to the human condition is absolutely critical. From a teaching
perspective, I recognize that property is probably the most impor-
tant teaching course of any in the first year (and I know people in
other areas might disagree). Why? Unlike civil procedure, torts, crimi-
nal law, and maybe even contracts, property is not solely focused on
litigation, and it is not solely focused on policy issues. Property allows
a teacher of law to get people focused on issues of negotiation, issues
of counseling, issues of drafting—issues that are critical to every law-
yer in the profession. And most people leave their first year without
having any sense of those issues outside of their property course. As
much as I’d like to say I’d like to teach other courses, too, I just can’t
imagine ever stopping teaching property.
On the scholarly front, I think to the extent that my scholarship—
which Lynda talked about—has made any impact at all, I would have
to thank many of the people in this room and many of the people
who have been past award winners of the Brigham-Kanner Prize.
They’ve been so generous and so kind in providing me guidance, both
in terms of their own work and in terms of their own personal com-
ments on what I have done. I am really grateful to all of you who
have done that over time.
Finally, I’d like to thank two other groups of people who’ve been
absolutely essential. One is the group of my Cardozo colleagues,
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several of whom are here, who have created a rich environment for
me to work in. And the second is my family who are here and who
have also provided support beyond anything that I could have other-
wise imagined.
Again, I would like to thank all of you for making this day neces-
sary, and I appreciate it very much. Thank you.

OPENING REMARKS: THE FEDERALISM DIMENSION 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY
STEWART E. STERK*
Thanks so much, Lynda, and I’m glad to be the excuse for such an
esteemed gathering of property lawyers.
I think what we’ll be talking about today, at least this morning,
is the respective roles of state and federal law, especially in takings
jurisprudence. The issue is of substantive importance in a variety of
takings cases. If you think about Murr v. Wisconsin,1 which the Su-
preme Court recently decided, it is an obvious example of where the
Court rejected the notion that state law should furnish the denomi-
nator in takings cases. But I would argue that aside from the sub-
stantive issues, the relative importance of state and federal law also
plays a role in issues like the wisdom of the Williamson County case.2
To the extent that you think that state law plays a heavy role in tak-
ings law, Williamson County makes a lot more sense than if you think
state law plays a relatively unimportant role in takings jurisprudence.
Now the existence of a federal role in takings jurisprudence, I
think everyone can see, is beyond dispute. The Takings Clause has
to have some federal content to the extent that it protects disruption
of expectations. How much disruption we can tolerate is going to be
a matter of federal law. Also, as Tom Merrill has established in his
prior work, the categories protected by the Federal Constitution are
also matters of federal law.3
The difficult question is, within those categories, what role should
state law have? We can think about this in a variety of circumstances.
For example, suppose a municipality were to enact an ordinance that
limited the rights of a riparian owner to take water out of a stream.
Should the takings claim arising out of that reduction in rights be
* H. Bert and Ruth Mack Professor of Real Estate Law and Director of the Center for
Real Estate Law & Policy at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University.
1. See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
2. See Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Bd. v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S.
172 (1985).
3. Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 952
(2000).
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a matter of federal law? Or should it depend on whether, for instance,
the jurisdiction might have a prior appropriation regime or, instead,
a reasonable use regime? My contention has been that state law ought
to play a significant role in that question and that we shouldn’t view
this as simply a matter of federal law. And certainly Justice Scalia’s
opinion in Lucas, which remanded for the determination of state nui-
sance law, suggests that there is a significant state law component
to takings jurisprudence.4 On the other hand, Justice Kennedy’s opin-
ion in Murr suggests that state law shouldn’t be dispositive, and there
is an important role beyond state law in figuring out what the base-
line is for takings cases.5
So today’s panelists are going to provide a variety of perspectives
on the role of state law. I think Jim Krier, who is going to start, may
talk a little bit about ideology and what role that might play in de-
termining the relevant roles of state and federal law in particular
cases. Tom Merrill is going to expand on his previously developed idea
that looking at this as a dichotomy between state and federal law is
a mistake and that instead we should recognize federal-patterning
definitions, which actually leave a significant role for state law. Molly
is going to talk about how state courts have frequently looked to the
laws of other states in their takings cases. And I think ultimately,
Michael Berger is going to argue that takings should be grounded
almost exclusively in federal law, and to a large extent, in natural law.
With that, I will turn it over to the panel.
Thank you.
4. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006–32 (1992).
5. See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1939–50.
WHAT’S FEDERALISM GOT TO DO WITH 
REGULATORY TAKINGS?
MICHAEL M. BERGER*
INTRODUCTION
Don’t get me wrong, some of my best friends are Federalists. It just
brings me up short when someone proposes to apply the concept of
federalism—namely, deference to state control1—to issues of funda-
mental rights, without first establishing and acknowledging the ex-
istence of a uniform federal baseline of constitutional protection,2
something Professor Michelman has called “a national constitutional
norm of regard for a specified class of individual rights.”3 I especially
* Partner, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips and co-chair of its appellate practice group. Quondam
adjunct faculty at the University of Southern California, Washington University in St. Louis,
University of Miami, and Loyola of Los Angeles Law School during the last forty-five years,
where I taught takings, land use litigation, and appellate practice. I was the Brigham-Kanner
Property Rights Conference Prize winner in 2014. I have argued four takings cases in the U.S.
Supreme Court and participated as amicus curiae in many of the important takings cases
since 1980. I would like to thank James Burling, Robert Thomas, and Professors David Shapiro,
Gideon Kanner, and Janet Madden, who provided helpful reviews and comments while this
piece was being written.
1. Acknowledging, of course, as Professor Fallon put it, that “[t]here is no agreed-upon
definition of constitutional federalism,” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the
Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 439 (2002) [hereinafter
Fallon, Conservative Paths], whether to defer to state control is the concern of this paper.
2. See, e.g., John Echeverria, Horne v. Department of Agriculture: An Invitation to Reex-
amine “Ripeness” Doctrine in Takings Litigation, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 10735 (2013) [hereinafter
Echeverria, Horne]; Kathryn E. Kovacs, Accepting the Relegation of Takings Claims to State
Courts: The Federal Courts’ Misguided Attempts to Avoid Preclusion Under Williamson County,
26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1999); Eric A. Lindberg, Multijurisdictionality and Federalism: Assessing
San Remo Hotel’s Effect on Regulatory Takings, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1824–25 (2010) (noting
that “the values of federalism outweigh concerns that jurisdiction stripping equates to rights
stripping”); Michael R. Salvas, A Structural Approach to Judicial Takings, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 1381 (2012); Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurispru-
dence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 206 (2004) [hereinafter Sterk, Federalist Dimension]. Examining
these commentaries and others, Professor Rose distinguishes between the academic literature
of takings law, which “fairly drips with federalism” and modern judicial output, which “ha[s]
not even bothered to give these federalism concerns the back of their hand.” Carol M. Rose, What
Federalism Tells Us About Takings Jurisprudence, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1681, 1683, 1694 (2007).
Interestingly, however, from the standpoint of property lawyers, the Supreme Court’s expan-
sion of federalism in other fields has been accompanied by a “toughened judicial scrutiny of gov-
ernmental action under the Takings Clause.” Fallon, Conservative Paths, supra note 1, at 460.
3. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas
and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 306 (1993).
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get this feeling when some of those proposing such state deference con-
cede that “state courts have had a somewhat checkered record” in
protecting the rights of property owners.4 As someone who has prac-
ticed constitutional property law in California for the last half century,
I may be jaundiced (or, perhaps, simply beaten up) but that “check-
ered” conclusion is vastly understated (at least as it applies to Califor-
nia).5 The idea of handing over complete control of constitutional
protection to the tender mercies of courts that can thumb their judicial
noses at the U.S. Supreme Court as easily as California has6 makes
my blood run cold.7 And why should other states not jump on the
California band-wagon (as California continuously shows what it
4. Sterk, Federalist Dimension, supra note 2, at 206. More generally, as one commentator
noted, “[L]eaving such decisions to the states . . . has served more to inhibit individual liberty
than to advance it.” Owen Lipsett, The Failure of Federalism: Does Competitive Federalism
Actually Protect Individual Rights?, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 643, 645 (2008).
5. The California judiciary’s hostility to property owners has been an open secret for
many years. See, e.g., WILLIAM FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS
218, 227 (1995) (“The California Supreme Court in the late 1960s and early 1970s actively
reduced the development rights of landowners” to the point where “the California court stopped
development at every turn.” (format changed from original)); David L. Callies, Land Use Con-
trols: An Eclectic Summary for 1980–1981, 13 URB. LAW. 723, 724 (1981) (“We all know the
California courts won’t let landowners/developers build anything!”); RICHARD BABCOCK &
CHARLES SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED 293 (1985) (wondering why a developer would
“sue a California community when it would cost a lot less and save much time if he simply slit
his throat”). Professor Sterk cavalierly suggests that anyone who buys land in California
simply “assumes the risk” of hostile treatment. Sterk, Federalist Dimension, supra note 2, at
265. I could go on, but I suspect that, by now, you see what passes for constitutional property law
on the left coast. For extended discussion of the California Supreme Court’s war on property
rights, see Gideon Kanner & Michael M. Berger, The Nasty, Brutish and Short Life of Agins
v. City of Tiburon, 50 URB. LAW. 1 (2019).
6. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (“Our conclusion on
this point is consistent with the approach taken by every other court that has considered the
question, with the exception of the California state courts.”); First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 311 (1987) (“[T]he California courts have decided
the compensation question inconsistently with the requirements of the Fifth Amendment.”);
Kanner & Berger, supra note 5.
7. It seems fair to focus on California, as land use litigation qualifies as a spectator sport
there. Pound for pound, there is more of it there than anywhere else. That is doubtlessly a by-
product of a judiciary that permits government regulators free rein to do as they please. For
example, two knowledgeable commentators (whose viewpoints are generally supportive of
regulators) observed that “[i]n California, the courts have elevated governmental arrogance
to a fine art.” BABCOCK & SIEMON, supra note 5, at 263. Nationally, Professor Rose believes
that takings jurisprudence “vacillates between letting legislatures do what they like, on the
one hand, and disdainfully dismissing legislative action on the other.” Rose, supra note 2, at
1684. Nonetheless, she believes that “disdain has the momentum” because of “a rising distrust
of governmental initiatives, no matter what the level of government or type of legislative body
from which they emerge.” Id. at 1684, 1696.
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can get away with), even though they may be more rational now?8 As
if to prove my point, Professor Sterk has opined that, after the Su-
preme Court decided First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles—holding that the Fifth Amendment mandated
compensation as the remedy for a regulatory taking as a matter of
overriding federal law (thus overruling California’s contrary conclu-
sion)—“a number of state courts have developed doctrines designed
to eviscerate the damages remedy.”9 If nothing else, such state court
mutinies demonstrate the need for more Supreme Court interven-
tion and a clearer system of uniformly applied standards.10
I. THE U.S. CONSTITUTION PROVIDES A FLOOR OF
PROTECTION—STATES CANNOT PROVIDE LESS
A central point of our Constitution in general—and its Bill of
Rights, in particular—is to provide a baseline to protect all the rights
of all citizens, with individual states having the discretion to provide
more, but never less protection.11 So, let’s get to the bottom line of this
8. Many of California’s harebrained ideas eventually roll downhill to other states. See
Editorial, California Prays to the Sun God, WALL STREET J., May 12–13, 2018, at A12 (“California
is often where bad ideas spring to life these days, and they’re worth highlighting lest they
catch on in saner precincts.”). The article focused on a new California mandate to install solar
panels on all new homes at a time when housing is already priced out of reach of ordinary
citizens. This is hardly new. In my early days as an airport-noise lawyer, I noted a California
city seeking to simply ban loud aircraft noise by city ordinance, much to the amusement of
others. See Michael M. Berger, Nobody Loves an Airport, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 631, 682 (1970).
9. Sterk, Federalist Dimension, supra note 2, at 246 n.188 (citing cases from New
Hampshire, New Jersey, and even California—showing that California has failed to accept the
lessons from the U.S. Supreme Court). As the initial draft of this article was being written, the
California courts did it again. They disregarded the clear holding in First English, 482 U.S.
304, that the Fifth Amendment protects against temporary as well as permanent takings. A Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal denied relief to a property owner because, even though an easement had
been taken and compensation would have been mandatory had it been permanent, the regulatory
body had the power to eliminate or ameliorate the easement condition, making it “only” tempo-
rary. (Surfrider Found. v. Martins Beach 1, LLC, 14 Cal. App. 5th 238 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).)
There was no reference in the opinion to First English. Both the California and United States
Supreme Courts denied review.
10. See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 52 (1995) [hereinafter SHAPIRO, FED-
ERALISM] (noting that on “a more practical level, the states do not appear to have served as
a bulwark of individual and group rights and interests”).
11. Joslin Mfg. Corp. v. City of Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 676–77 (1923) (holding that a
state is “powerless to diminish” rights but may increase them). See also Mills v. Rogers, 457
U.S. 291, 300 (1982) (noting that the U.S. Constitution provides “minimum” protection to which
all are entitled); Rex E. Lee, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Legacy of Garcia, 1996
BYU L. REV. 329, 330 (“[T]he constitutional division of authority can rightfully claim to pro-
tect the governed from governmental overreaching and arbitrariness.”).
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article at the outset. If there is a role for federalism, it lies in providing
a mechanism for the states to provide more protection to individuals
than the U.S. Constitution mandates. Period.12 In the Supreme Court’s
words, “the Constitution divides authority between federal and state
governments for the protection of individuals.”13 More specifically:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain sub-
jects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them
as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right to life,
liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of wor-
ship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.14
Professor Akhil Amar summarizes it simply: “[T]he federal Consti-
tution stands as a secure political safety net—a floor below which state
law may not fall.”15 As Justice Story explained, the primary reason
12. When I began writing this piece, I had no idea how vast the literature on federalism was.
The depth of my ignorance was confirmed when I read David Shapiro’s work from the mid-1990s
concluding that he “found that the extent of published material germane to these issues is vast
and . . . growing at what seems an exponential rate.” SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM, supra note 10, at 6.
If Professor Shapiro “could not hope to read all of the relevant literature in one lifetime,” I must
conclude there is no hope for me, given the even greater bulk of material that has built up in
the intervening decades. Id. Hopefully, I have managed to hit at least some of the high spots.
13. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992).
14. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (emphasis added). Note
that “property” was included matter-of-factly in the list of protected rights. Governmental
apologists dispute the propriety of constitutional protection for property owners by definitional
denigration. See, e.g., Andrew W. Schwartz, No Competing Theory of Constitutional Interpre-
tation Justifies Regulatory Takings Ideology, 34 STAN. ENV. L.J. 247, 295 (2015) (claiming that
property rights are not “fundamental”). They are wrong, of course, as no Supreme Court case
has ever gone that far. Even Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), noted that state
courts, under state constitutions, could restrict the state and local power of eminent domain
further than the Fifth Amendment. See also Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th
Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.) (“The men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that govern-
ment might do too little for the people but that it might do too much to them. The Fourteenth
Amendment, adopted in 1868 at the height of laissez-faire thinking, sought to protect Americans
from oppression by state government . . . .”); additional authorities cited infra note 58.
15. Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article
V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1100 (1988) (emphasis added); Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of
Federalism: “Converse—1983” in Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1230 (1994) [hereinafter Amar,
Five Views] (“Rightly understood, ‘federalism’ should protect citizens and limit government abuse
. . . .”). See also Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1139–41 (1991) (noting that the purpose of the Bill of Rights could be best understood as
protecting the people from unresponsive or corrupt governmental officials); Gideon Kanner,
2019] WHAT’S FEDERALISM GOT TO DO WITH TAKINGS? 13
why the Supreme Court is our ultimate constitutional arbiter is “the
importance, and even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout
the whole United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the
constitution.”16 Any conflicting state law is simply “without effect.”17
In other words, as the Supreme Court classically held in Marbury v.
Madison,18 it is the Supreme Court’s job to see that other organs of
government remain true to the Constitution19 so that, as Professors
Fallon and Meltzer classically expressed it, we have a constitutional
structure “adequate to keep government generally within the bounds
Condemnation Blight: Just How Just is Just Compensation?, 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 765 (1973)
[hereinafter Kanner, Condemnation Blight]. “[I]t seems safe to say that the Constitution— or at
least the Bill of Rights—was the product of the framers’ fear of an overreaching government,
and their desire to protect individual citizens from governmental excesses. . . . [T]he purpose
of the . . . Bill of Rights . . . was to protect the people from the government, not vice versa.” Id.
at 784. Other learned commentators concur. See, e.g., JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 1.6(c), at 19 (5th ed. 1995) (“State courts are always free to grant
individuals more rights than those guaranteed by the Constitution, provided [they] do[ ] so on the
basis of state law.”) (emphasis added); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491, 496 (1977) (“State constitutions
too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required
by . . . Federal law” even when state protections are “identically phrased.”); Eric R. Claeys,
Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1558–59 (2003)
(“Federal takings guarantees set a constitutionally guaranteed floor, not a constitutionally
mandated ceiling. . . . [states] can develop state takings law to bring more clarity and fairness
to the takings protections in their states.”) (emphasis added).
16. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347–48 (1816) (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted). Of course, as Professor Michelman put it, “giving federal judges the last
word on the meanings of laws emanating from state authorities . . . seems to be a gross
contravention of Our Federalism.” Michelman, supra note 3, at 305. And so it is, which is why
the federalism concept has lost its authority, at least in this sphere. As one observer put it,
federalism “lacks a coherent vision of when national authority or state authority should be
exercised, as well as a clear understanding of the true worth of federalism.” Barry Friedman,
Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 324 (1997).
17. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,
60–61 (1968). As the Supreme Court put it directly, all state powers are “limited by the inhi-
bitions of the 14th Amendment.” Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190, 196 (1933). See the
cases collected in Michael M. Berger, The California Supreme Court—A Shield Against Govern-
mental Overreaching: Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 9 CAL. W. L. REV. 199, 220 n.107 (1973).
18. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
19. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616, n.7 (2000) (“No doubt the political
branches have a role in interpreting and applying the Constitution, but ever since Marbury this
Court has remained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text.”); Alan R. Greenspan, The
Constitutional Exercise of the Federal Police Power: A Functional Approach to Federalism, 41
VAND. L. REV. 1019, 1037 (1988) (“Since the time of Marbury v. Madison, the rule of the Supreme
Court has been to measure congressional action against the yardstick of the Constitution.”).
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of law.”20 That job would include protecting the rights of property own-
ers from the depredations of state and local government.21
A critical inquiry would be to determine whether that baseline
preservation of rights succeeded. In other words, how did the divi-
sion of authority between national and state governments work in
the protection of individual rights? Professor Shapiro has this som-
ber summary:
[I]t is hard to quarrel with the conclusion that the historical re-
cord, viewed in its entirety, fails to support the existence of state
autonomy as a critical means of protecting against abuse of gov-
ernmental power. On the contrary, national power has had to be
continually invoked in order to protect our freedom against state
infringement.22
So, what’s federalism got to do with regulatory takings? Frankly,
not much.
“Federalism” is not some magic bullet or sacred incantation that can
automatically sweep away anything that conflicts with its core con-
cepts. Quite the contrary. Those who created this republic—including
those who believed most fervently in the idea of federalism—knew
that a strong, unified central government was essential if this na-
tion were to succeed. Remember, they had just lived through an effort
to establish a country with a weak center and strong extremities,
20. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Consti-
tutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1778–79 (1991).
21. The Founders saw the protection of individual property rights as “the first object of
government.” RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS—PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 7–18 (1985); THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78–79, 84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961); James Madison, Property, NAT. GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 267–68 (Univ. Press of Va. 1983). See Michael W. McConnell, Contract
Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship Between Individual Liberties
and Constitutional Structure, 76 CAL. L. REV. 267, 270 (1988) (“Protection of private property
was a nearly unanimous intention among the founding generation”); Mark W. Smith, A Con-
gressional Call to Arms: The Time Has Come for Congress to Enforce the Fifth Amendment’s
Takings Clause, 49 OKLA L. REV. 295, 298 (1996). For a general overview, see EDWARD J.
LARSON, THE RETURN OF GEORGE WASHINGTON (2014), in which the Pulitzer Prize–winning
historian examines the period between Washington’s resignation of his commission at the end
of the revolution through his first inauguration. The concerns expressed by Washington and
his contemporaries about squatters and other threats to property rights, along with the
excesses of some of the more radical democracies established in some of the states, surely
propelled the adoption of the system of government established by the Constitution.
22. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM, supra note 10, at 56.
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through the ill-fated Articles of Confederation,23 and understood too
well the centrifugal dangers in concentrating power on the periphery.24
As Judge Willett of the Fifth Circuit put it recently: “The infant na-
tion was floundering. The United States were anything but. America’s
first governing document, the Articles of Confederation, had created
a ‘league of friendship’ among states, but the former colonies hadn’t
coalesced into a country. A constitutional reboot was crucial.”25
A keen observer of this era of our history may have been under-
stated in concluding that, “[b]y 1787, a new generation of Americans,
having experienced firsthand the defects of state sovereignty under
the Articles of Confederation . . . challenged the small republic argu-
ment on the ground that a large republic could better protect liberty.”26
Much of the work solidifying the federal courts role of holding the
republic together, according to Professor LaCroix, came from Chief
Justice Marshall and Justice Story. Their zeal stemmed from their
“almost metaphysical belief in the federal judicial power as at once
proceeding outward from the center and connecting the peripheries
23. As noted in the classic Hart & Wechsler text, “[b]y all accounts, the prevailing structure
of ‘national’ government, the Articles of Confederation, had proved inadequate to the chal-
lenges confronting the new nation.” RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1 (7th ed. 2015). See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra
note 15, § 1:6 (“Because the Articles [of Confederation] deprived the central government of any
real power over the individual states, a host of problems arose . . . .”); SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM,
supra note 10, at 15 (noting the “dissatisfaction with [the] weak central government that led
to a call for a convention”); Smith, supra note 21, at 299 (noting that “it was . . . the failure of
the Articles of Confederation to fulfill its property-protection purpose that led to the con-
vening of the Constitutional Convention and the adoption of the Constitution”).
24. See Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federal-
ism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 353 (noting the difference between the Constitution
and the Articles of Confederation, which expressly provided for state sovereignty); A.C. Pritchard
& Todd J. Zywicki, Constitutions and Spontaneous Orders: A Response to Professor McGinnis,
77 N.C. L. REV. 537, 543 (1999) (concluding that the “sovereign role of the states under the
original Constitution reflected contemporary political reality, not conscious design”).
25. Don Willett, Happy Constitution Day, If You Can Keep It, WALL STREET J., Sept. 17,
2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/happy-constitution-day-if-you-can-keep-it-1537129604.
26. Joan Yarbrough, Federalism and Rights in the American Founding, in FEDERALISM
AND RIGHTS 57, 60–61 (Elles Katz & Alan Tarr, eds., 1996). Intriguingly, although it has gen-
erally been the case that political conservatives were the staunch supporters of federalist theory,
liberals began to discover its attractiveness as the Supreme Court grew more conservative.
E.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 501 (1995); Shubha
Ghosh, Reconciling Property Rights and States’ Rights in the Information Age: Federalism, the
“Sovereign’s Prerogative” and Takings After College Savings, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 17, 21 (1999).
Illustrative is Justice Brennan’s paper on the use of state law to protect individual rights.
Brennan, supra note 15, at 489.
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back to the center, thereby countering the omnipresent threat that
the federal republic would revert to a confederation.”27
Thus, notwithstanding that “every schoolchild learns [that] our
Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the
States and the Federal government,”28 those same schoolchildren also
learn that federal law is paramount when the two systems diverge.
This is because the Constitution contains the provision popularly
known as the Supremacy Clause embedded in its heart. This provi-
sion declares forcefully:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall
be made in pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme law of the
land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any-
thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding.29
Thus, states bear a “coordinate responsibility” to protect all Ameri-
cans’ federal rights because the federal-supremacy concept makes
federal laws “as much laws in the States as laws passed by the state
legislature.”30
And then came the Fourteenth Amendment, which added sub-
stantially to that initial understanding. To the extent that the Bill
of Rights may have had its origins in federalist theory, changes oc-
curred as the nation matured.31 It is hard to ignore the fact that the
27. Alison L. LaCroix, Federalists, Federalism, and Federal Jurisdiction, 30 L. & HIST.
REV. 205, 210 (2012).
28. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991).
29. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added). “The Federal Government holds a decided
advantage in this delicate balance: the Supremacy Clause.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
460 (1991). As an early opinion put it: “The Constitution is certain and fixed; it contains the
permanent will of the people, and is the supreme law of the land . . . . It says to legislators,
thus far ye shall go and no further.” Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 308,
311 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795). See also SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM, supra note 10, at 22 (noting that the
Constitution leaves “no doubt whatever that in the event of any conflict between federal and
state authority, federal authority (if valid and properly exercised) will prevail”); Frank B.
Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 3 (“The primary constitutional provi-
sion on the states’ relationship with the central government is found in the Supremacy Clause,
which explicitly subordinates state authority.”).
30. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990). See also Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130,
137 (1876) (explaining that both state and federal courts must enforce “the laws of the United
States”); Justin Lipkin, Federalism as Balance, 79 TUL. L. REV. 93, 98 (2009) (collecting cases).
For a state court to fail to comply with federal law would render the Supremacy Clause “with-
out meaning or effect, and public mischiefs, of a most enormous magnitude, would inevitably
ensue.” Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. [1 Wheat.] 304, 342 (1816).
31. See Kurt T. Lash, Two Movements of a Constitutional Symphony: Akhil Reed Amar’s
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Civil War intervened, for example,32 and the distrust of too much
centralized power, which had been the catalyst for the Bill of Rights,
morphed into a similar distrust of state governments. As Professor
Shapiro summarizes:
The outcome of the Civil War settled on the battlefield the theo-
retical debates over the asserted rights of state nullification and
secession—rights that, in the view of many, were plainly inconsis-
tent with the Union as originally established. And in the wake
of the Civil War, extending into the present century, a series of
constitutional Amendments went even farther to solidify federal
power and to reduce the “structural” role of the states in the
operation of the federal government.33
The decades between the adoption of the Bill of Rights and the end
of the Civil War showed a clear shift from the ideals of federalism to
the protection of individual liberty.34 Professor Michelman expressed
this shift with typical bluntness:
It’s an old story, after all, that Reconstruction inscribed into
American constitutionalism a rather sharp break . . . between an
older federalistic regard for the jurisprudential severalty and
The Bill of Rights, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 485, 489 (1999) (affirming that “the meaning of the Bill
of Rights shifted from an expression of federalism to one of individual liberty” through
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and arguing that incorporated rights must be un-
derstood according to their public meaning in 1868); see also JAMES ELY, THE GUARDIAN OF
EVERY OTHER RIGHT 83–105 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing takings law in the nineteenth century).
Even strong believers in federalism have acknowledged the shift, noting that federalism
“worked well enough for the first century and a half of our history.” Ernest Young, Federalism
as a Constitutional Principle, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1059, 1065 (2015).
32. See Paul A. LeBel, Legal Positivism and Federalism: The Certification Experience, 19
GA. L. REV. 999, 1023 (1985) (“[T]he American Civil War seemingly laid to rest the ideal that
[different notions of right and wrong] would be officially implemented according to geographic
location.”); Amar, Five Views, supra note 15, at 1231 (“At least that much was established at
Appomattox . . . .”). Even a staunch defender of federalism as a guarantor of power to state
and local government had to concede (albeit grudgingly) that “the Framers’ original rationale
for federalism has arguably been superseded to a degree by the subsequent adoption of the Bill
of Rights, as later supplemented by the Fourteenth Amendment, defining an extensive set of
individual liberties protecting citizens from government at all levels.” John D. Echeverria, The
Costs of Koontz, 39 VT. L. REV. 573, 596–97 (2015) [hereinafter Echeverria, Koontz].
33. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM, supra note 10, at 28.
34. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: Balancing Federalism Concerns and
Municipal Accountability Under Section 1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 539, 546 (1989) (concluding
that “[b]y the end of the Civil War, Congress was prepared to work a constitutional revolu-
tion.”); Lash, supra note 31, at 489–98.
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semi-sovereignty of the States and a newer liberal-universalist
regard for basic human rights to be guaranteed by national power
against state neglect or oppression.35
After the Civil War concluded, Congress was confronted with sub-
stantial evidence that freedmen and former slaves were being seri-
ously mistreated by local courts and government agencies.36 Thus,
those who created the Fourteenth Amendment were writing against
a long history of state abridgement of fundamental rights.37 Congress,
comprised of a group of legislators, naturally first sought to cure the
problem with legislation. Ultimately, however, Congress “deemed
these legislative remedies insufficient. Southern resistance, Presiden-
tial vetoes, and [the Supreme] Court’s pre–Civil-War precedent per-
suaded Congress that a constitutional amendment was necessary to
provide full protection . . . .”38 The Congress that framed the Four-
teenth Amendment thus had no doubt “that the amendment would
bind the states to enforce personal liberties enumerated in the Bill of
Rights.”39 They expected the new amendment to add a broad, new
35. Michelman, supra note 3, at 303 (1993); see also LAURENCE TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 549 (2d ed. 1988).
36. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 160
(1998) [hereinafter AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS]. This conclusion is clear from the debates over
adoption of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 363–64 (1983). As this article
is focused on property rights, it is interesting to note that a major issue facing Congress at the
time was the widespread denial of property rights to the former slaves. CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 94, 475, 588 (1866); Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, H.R. REP.
NO. 30, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. II, at 243 (1866). “Equality in the enjoyment of property rights
was regarded by the framers of that [Fourteenth] Amendment as an essential pre-condition to
the realization of other basic civil rights and liberties which the Amendment was intended to
guarantee.” Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10 (1948) (emphasis added). This concept, of course,
formed the basis for Professor Ely’s book, THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT (2007). Even
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), not generally viewed as particularly protective
of property owners’ rights, says that states may place “further restrictions on [the] exercise
of the takings power” and contains a caution against government rationalizations that are
merely “pretextual” rather than actual. Id. at 489, 490–491 (Kennedy, J., concurring). As
usual, whenever Kelo is cited a warning is needed. The decision nowhere defines what it means
by “pretext,” and lower courts have searched in vain for a way to enforce this limitation—or
even determine what qualifies as “pretext.” See Ilya Somin, The Judicial Reaction to Kelo, 4
ALBANY GOV’T L. REV. 1, 35–36 (2011).
37. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 256 (1866) (Rep. Jehu Baker).
38. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 775 (2010). The early case of Barron v.
Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833), held that the Bill of Rights was applicable only to the federal
government. Backers of the Fourteenth Amendment made it clear that their purpose was to
“overturn the constitutional rule that [Barron] had announced.” Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
39. Lash, supra note 31, at 1326. No one in either house of Congress expressed any
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constitutional guarantee designed to secure “the civil rights and
privileges of all citizens in all parts of the republic”40 and to keep
“whatever sovereignty [a State] may have in harmony with a repub-
lican form of government and the Constitution of the country.”41
With state certification of its three post–Civil War constitutional
amendments, Congress had the power to move.42 It swiftly enacted
legislation that has been widely seen as applying Bill of Rights pro-
tections directly to state and local governments. As the Supreme Court
itself acknowledged: “[T]he chief congressional proponents of the Four-
teenth Amendment espoused the view that the Amendment made
the Bill of Rights applicable to the States.”43 Indeed, by setting a
constitutional floor securing individual rights, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment “fundamentally restructured the relationship between individ-
uals and the States.”44 That “restructured relationship” included a
full-throated application of the Bill of Rights guarantees to state and
local governments. As the Court repeatedly said, “the Court [decades
ago abandoned] the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies
to the States only a ‘watered-down, subjective version of the individual
guarantees of the Bill of Rights.’”45 Rather, they are to be enforced
disagreement with this central precept. AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 36, at 187; Michael
W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founder’s Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1501
(1987) (noting that the “premise of the Fourteenth Amendment” was that it would
establish/ensure the federal government, rather than the states, as the primary insurer of
individual liberties).
40. JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39TH CONG., REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE
ON RECONSTRUCTION, 1st Sess. xxi (1866).
41. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088 (1866) (Rep. Woodbridge).
42. The Fourteenth Amendment provided the constitutional basis that had been lacking
before. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 775 (2010). As Professor Ackerman put it,
the post–Civil War amendments represented a transformation of the American political order,
a constitutional departure from ordinary political give and take. Bruce A. Ackerman, The
Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1044 (1984).
43. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 762. Moreover, the proponents’ “well-circulated speeches” in-
formed the states and the public at large that the amendment was meant to “enforce con-
stitutionally declared rights against the States.” Id. at 833 (Thomas, J., concurring).
44. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). The
intent of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers was thus to “restrain the power of the States
and compel them at all times to respect these great fundamental guarantees.” CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (Sen. Howard). They sought, in other words, to protect all of “the
personal rights guaranteed and secured by the first eight amendments to the Constitution.”
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 762 n.9 (2010).
45. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1964); McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 744
(2010). This, of course, condenses the long road to full Bill of Rights incorporation. Slow to
implement because of the Supreme Court’s preference for striking down laws as violations of
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against the states by the same standards that protect those rights
against federal encroachment.46 In the context of property rights, one
might view the guarantees as “a body of norms extruded by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments’ protections for private property—a sort
of minimum content of property law imposed upon all the States by
force of the Federal Constitution.”47 This is no more than acknowl-
edgement of our “constitutional culture,” based on the common under-
standing that the contents of a “bundle of rights” is acquired along
with a title to land.48 As Professor Somin explained:
The assumption that property rights are merely the creation of
state law without any intrinsic meaning in federal constitutional
law is a flawed one. In reality, the institution of private property
long predates the existence of American states, or indeed modern
states of any kind. The text, original meaning, and historical un-
derstanding of the Takings Clause are in large part based on nat-
ural law notions of property rights that hold that such rights have
a moral basis and origin independent of state law. It is true that
the Supreme Court has noted that “[p]roperty interests, of course,
are not created by the Constitution” but instead ‘”stem from an
independent source such as state-law rules.” But it has never
held that state authority in this field is unlimited or that state
law is the exclusive source of the definition of property rights.49
substantive due process, incorporation gained strength as substantive due process fell out of
favor. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 15, at 361–66; TRIBE, supra note 35, at 772–74.
46. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10; McDonald, 561 U.S. at 744.
47. Michelman, supra note 3, at 320; see also Amar, Five Views, supra note 15, at 1232
(noting that “[b]oth ‘states’ rights’ and ‘national rights’ exist to promote, and must ultimately
yield to, citizens’ rights that the Constitution creates or declares”).
48. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026–29. See Amar, Five Views, supra
note 15, at 1244 (“Of course, the federal constitution . . . establishes a minimum baseline—a
floor—that state judges must respect . . . .”). See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E.
Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions When the Fourteenth Amendment Was
Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition? 87 TEX.
L. REV. 7 (2008), for an exhaustive analysis of constitutional belief in the states at the time
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption.
49. Ilya Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 53, 86 [hereinafter
Somin, Federalism]. The absolutist position is typified by Andrew W. Schwartz, supra note
14, at 294. Schwartz treats as an absolute state “prerogative” the ability “to define where
private property rights begin and the state’s power ends.” Id. That overstates the Supreme
Court’s decisions, which consistently say that property rights come from independent sources
“such as” state law but not exclusively state law. Schwartz knows this, which is why he opens
his screed by calling current fifth amendment law “a misunderstanding of the [Takings] Clause”
and calls for the Supreme Court to jettison the regulatory taking concept wholesale. Id. at 248.
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Note that the Supreme Court’s familiar phrasing (that property rights
come from sources “such as” state law) does not restrict those sources
to “state law.” As shown by Professor Somin, there are other sources.
Professor Sterk seems to disagree, concluding that the Supreme
Court’s “unusual dependency” on state law in takings cases is justified
by federalism without explaining why—other than to show that the
Penn Central50 standards are so vague they provide only the most gen-
eral guidance rather than actual rules.51
Professor Sterk seems amenable to protecting identifiable groups
of individuals against predation by others but limits the groups to
those that seem to him to need and/or deserve special attention:
An independent uniformity-based justification for Supreme
Court review would rest on the possibility that a particular state
or group of states might reject the premises behind the constitu-
tional right or value. Consider, as illustrations, abortion rights
in the Bible Belt, the right to bear arms in urban states, or equal
protection in the South before the civil rights movement. In each
case, legislation that transgresses constitutional limits might
not rest on any process failure, but simply on local disagreement
with norms that otherwise enjoy national acceptance. To the
extent that state courts reflect state values, state courts might
not adequately safeguard constitutional rights. In instances like
these, Supreme Court review might be necessary to assure uni-
form enforcement of federal rights.
There is little reason to invoke this justification in takings
cases.52
50. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
51. Stewart E. Sterk, The Demise of Federal Takings Litigation, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
251, 289 (2006) [hereinafter Sterk, Demise]. Reliance on Penn Central puts one on a slope that
is not only slippery, it is dangerously one-sided with preordained results. As Professor Sterk
concluded with understatement, “Penn Central hardly serves as a blueprint for a municipality
or a court seeking to conform to constitutional doctrine.” Sterk, Federalist Dimension, supra
note 2, at 232. In his words, “Whenever the Court conducts a Penn Central analysis of a state
or local regulation, the regulation stands.” Id. at 253. Even a staunch defender of local govern-
ment concludes that, when one side wins all the time, there is something wrong with the rule.
John D. Echeverria, Is the Penn Central Three-Factor Test Ready for History’s Dustbin?, 52 LAND
USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3 (2000). That Penn Central provides a less-than-satisfactory template
has been demonstrated elsewhere. See, e.g., Gideon Kanner, Making Laws and Sausages: A
Quarter Century Retrospective on Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 13
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 679 (2005); Kanner & Berger, supra note 5 (collecting authorities).
52. Sterk, Federalist Dimension, supra note 2, at 236.
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His reasons for not including property owners in such demonized
groups ring a bit hollow. They can be boiled down to this statement:
“And if background state law is so hostile to the institution of prop-
erty, landowners would have few investment-backed expectations
worthy of protection.”53 Really?54 Why is that hostility less worthy
of dealing with than the ones he appears to prefer? It seems a question
of whose ox is turning on the spit, that’s all. It is picking and choos-
ing among rights to protect and deciding, in classic Orwellian fash-
ion, that some rights are more equal than others. It shows the need
for a national-baseline standard.55
When Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it did so in order to
place a buffer—specifically, a federal buffer—between the people,
and state government and its officials. As the Supreme Court plainly
held: “[T]he central purpose of the Reconstruction-Era laws is to
provide compensatory relief to those deprived of their federal rights
by state actors”56 by “interpos[ing] the federal courts between the
States and the people, as guardians of the people’s federal rights.”57
As Professor Kanner put it:
[T]he government can and usually does take care of itself, while
individual citizens are all too often deprived of a proper measure
of their rights by the government which is supposed to serve
53. Id. As for hanging one’s hat on “investment-backed expectations,” remember Hodel
v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987). There, in striking down the congressional action that eliminated
Native Americans’ right to dispose of property upon their death, the Court ruled in favor of
the property owners, although neither they nor their ancestors had any “investment[s]” in the
property or any “investment-backed expectations” about their ability to use or devise it in the
future. Nonetheless, the elimination of that important property right was a taking that could
not be accomplished by legislative fiat. Investment is a key but hardly the only one.
54. I would like to thank Justice Breyer for demonstrating the proper usage for this
technical, legal expression. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2386 (2018) (“Really?”) (Breyer, J., dissenting). It is apparently de rigueur. At the oral argu-
ment in Timbs v. Indiana, Justice Gorsuch bearded the counsel for the government with the
comment, “[H]ere we are in 2018 . . . still litigating incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Really?
Come on, General.” Transcription of Oral Argument at 32, Timbs v. Indiana, 138 S. Ct. 2650
(2018) (No. 17-1097). See infra note 89.
55. For criticism of Professor Sterk’s use of federalism in this context, see R.S. Radford
& Jennifer Fry Thompson, The Accidental Abstention Doctrine: After Thirty Years, the Case
for Diverting Federal Takings Claims to State Court Under Williamson County Has Yet to Be
Made, 67 BAYLOR L. REV. 567, 614 (2015).
56. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 141 (1988).
57. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972) (emphasis added). Professor Amar has
catalogued the ways in which judicial review under the Bill of Rights during Reconstruction
became a primary mode of protecting the rights of vulnerable minorities. See generally AMAR,
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 36.
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them. Hence, the courts have implemented constitutional guar-
antees so as to interpose a shield between the citizen and gov-
ernmental harshness.58
To effectuate those goals, Congress intended to “throw open the
doors of the United States courts” to those who had been deprived
of constitutional rights “and to provide these individuals immediate
access to the federal courts.”59 Surely Congress did not simultane-
ously intend to install state courts or agencies as some sort of insti-
tutional gatekeepers, with a veto power capable of blocking property
owners from federal courts. The idea is too absurd to ascribe even
to Congress. Professor Sterk has called “counterintuitive” the idea
“that federal takings claims must be litigated in state court.”60 It is
that. And more. Or, perhaps, less.
If there is a reported high court decision in the last century that
exemplifies all of the worst aspects attributed to federalism (albeit,
in the fashion of Lord Voldemort, federalism is never discussed by
name therein), it would be Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank.61 There, purportedly in the name of
“ripening” federal claims for federal court litigation, the Supreme
Court held that a claim raising property issues under § 1983 was not
“ripe” for litigation in federal court until the plaintiff property owner
had first sued in state court and had lost under the state’s equiva-
lent of the Fifth Amendment. That theory is wholly antithetical to
the underlying basis of § 1983. Far from being “thrown open,” the fed-
eral courthouse doors were slammed shut to regulatory taking victims
by the Williamson County ripeness rule.62
58. Kanner, Condemnation Blight, supra note 15, at 785; see David L. Callies, Kelo v. City
of New London: Of Planning, Federalism, and a Switch in Time, 28 U. HAW. L. REV. 327, 343
(2006) (showing that the Bill of Rights was “designed . . . as a shield against majoritarian
excesses at the expense of an otherwise defenseless minority”).
59. Patsy v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 504 (1982) (emphasis added).
60. Sterk, Demise, supra note 51, at 300. Notwithstanding, he has expressed the view that
“federalism concerns support this effective delegation of federal takings jurisprudence to state
supreme courts.” Id. at 288.
61. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
62. See J. David Breemer, You Can Check Out but You Can Never Leave: The Story of San
Remo Hotel—The Supreme Court Relegates Federal Takings Claims to State Courts Under a Rule
Intended to Ripen the Claims for Federal Review, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 247, 248 (2006).
Decided in the midst of a raging national debate over the proper remedy for regulatory takings,
one that the Supreme Court had repeatedly ducked, Williamson County had been described
as “a critical mechanism for avoiding a controversial issue.” Sterk, Demise, supra note 51, at 259.
Indeed it is. For an example of this scholarly substantive debate, compare Norman Williams
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There are two key matters to note about Williamson County.
First, it is not based on federalism. Read the case as many times as
you like; the concept of federalism does not rear its head. Second, it
is based on a misguided concept of ripeness. I say “misguided” be-
cause it is clear from the text of the opinion that the Court believed
(or at least the words it chose plainly said) that compliance with its
new template would “ripen” the matter for federal court litigation.
That is, it would ensure that a case would be properly set up for
federal courts to deal with on the merits. There could be no other
rational meaning for “ripeness.” The Court’s clearly expressed expec-
tation was that the merits would be dealt with in federal courts—
albeit at a later date than the property owner desired. Anything less
bleeds the concept of “ripeness” of all meaning.
Parse the words for yourself. One thing that Williamson County’s
words seemed chosen to make clear is that the Court was (a) deciding
whether a claim was yet ripe for litigation in federal court and (b)
noting there were things which first had to be done in state court,
after which the federal-constitutional claims would be ripe for federal
court litigation.63
The Court’s analytical section begins with the announced conclusion
“that [the] respondent’s claim is premature.”64 Please note that the
word chosen was “premature” not “moribund.” Prematurity necessarily
means that something is yet to be done to make the matter mature, or
jurisdictionally “ripe.” The Williamson County opinion then goes on to
say that, because of the lack of both a final administrative decision
and the absence of an attempt to seek compensation in state court, the
“respondent’s claim is not ripe.”65 Please note again that the phrase
chosen was “not ripe” rather than “dead.” Absence of ripeness means
that things need to—and can—be done to make the matter ripe.
Throughout the opinion, the Court returns to these twin concepts,
emphasizing and reemphasizing the purely temporal nature of its
holding, and repeatedly saying that such cases can be ripened and
then litigated in federal court:
et al., The White River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REV. 193 (1984) (advocating injunctive relief
only) with Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Thoughts on the White River Junction
Manifesto: A Reply to the “Gang of Five’s” Views on Just Compensation for Regulatory Taking
of Property, 19 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 685 (1986) (advocating compensatory relief).
63. See Breemer, supra note 62, at 250.
64. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 185 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 186 (emphasis added).
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A second reason the taking claim is not yet ripe is that respondent
did not seek compensation through the procedures the State has
provided for doing so. . . . Similarly, if a State provides an adequate
procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner
cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until
it has used the procedure and been denied just compensation.
. . . .
. . . until [plaintiff] has utilized that procedure, its taking claim
is premature.66
Indeed, the plain message of Williamson County is that claims that
are generated because a local government agency has violated rights
protected by the due process and just compensation guarantees do
not even arise until after conclusion of the state court litigation:
[A] property owner has not suffered a violation of the Just Compen-
sation Clause until the owner has unsuccessfully attempted to
obtain just compensation through the procedures provided by the
State for obtaining such compensation . . . . Likewise, because the
Constitution does not require pretaking compensation, and is in-
stead satisfied by a reasonable and adequate provision for obtain-
ing compensation after the taking, the State’s action here is not
“complete” until the State fails to provide adequate compensa-
tion for the taking.
. . . . 
. . . even if viewed as a question of due process, respondent’s
claim is premature.67
66. Id. at 194–95, 197 (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 195, 199 (emphasis added). I have cited this provision in the opinion as though
it facially makes sense. However, cases abound in which property owners were compelled to
wait for many years to get a court hearing, hardly making the “remedy” either “reasonable” or
“adequate.” See, for example, the authorities collected in Michael M. Berger, Property, Democ-
racy, & the Constitution, 5 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 45, 85–87 (2016) [hereinafter
Berger, Property]. In the meantime, the property owner has neither the property nor its mone-
tary equivalent, something the Constitution guarantees victims of governmental takings. E.g.,
Phelps v. U.S., 274 U.S. 341, 344 (1927); Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. U.S., 261 U.S. 299, 304
(1923). See also United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751 (1947) (holding that “the land
was taken when it was taken and an obligation to pay for it then arose”). The way that in-
terest rates have stagnated for many years, the idea of recouping the “time value of money”
through the addition of interest for all those years is literally laughable.
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The opinion ends as it began, with this conclusion: “In sum, respon-
dent’s claim is premature, whether it is analyzed as a deprivation of
property without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, or
as a taking under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.”68
Thus, Williamson County is replete with the twin concepts of “not
yet” and “not until.” There is no rational way to read Williamson
County without the realization that the Court anticipated that
property owners could satisfy those requirements and could render
their claims ripe for federal court litigation. If the Court meant
“never,” it could easily and plainly have said so.69
In short, the only justification presented by Williamson County
for sending regulatory taking litigation to state courts was to prop-
erly season the litigation, not to end it. And it was not to serve some
unrelated, and unstated, issue like federalism.70 If that had been the
point, it would have been clearly stated. Williamson County thus
stands as a “puzzling exception” to ordinary rules of federal jurisdic-
tion.71 Moreover, having created the prerequisite of state court
litigation as a “ripening” agent, nothing prevents the Court from
rounding out that prerequisite by excusing the need for compliance
with “full faith and credit” requirements, which are wholly antithet-
ical to the Williamson County ripening concept.72
How does this ripeness rule fit with the Supreme Court’s general
view of federal court jurisdiction? The foundational guidance was pro-
vided by Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, in which he
had the Court proclaim as forcefully as possible, “We have no more
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to
68. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 200 (emphasis added).
69. See Radford & Thompson, supra note 55, at 582. Even defenders of local government
agree that this is the clear import of the Supreme Court’s words. E.g., Echeverria, Horne, supra
note 2, at 10736 (noting that Williamson County plainly “implies” the claim “could become ripe
in the future once the plaintiff or the defendant has taken steps that ripen the claim”).
70. See Ronald D. Rotunda, The New States’ Rights, the New Federalism, the New Com-
merce Clause, and the Proposed New Abdication, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 869, 924 (2000)
(noting that “[t]he Framers created federalism not simply or primarily to protect the states
but to protect the people”). For a contrary view, see Schwartz, supra note 14, at 296. The
problem at the core of Schwartz’s thesis is his assertion that “federalism concerns lie at the
root of Williamson” when the word “federalism” does not appear in Williamson County at all.
71. Sterk, Federalist Dimension, supra note 2, at 255.
72. See England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 521–22 (1964) (allowing
the “reservation” of a federal issue for federal court litigation following conclusion of state
court litigation). Why the Court refused to allow such a pragmatic resolution in takings cases
has never been satisfactorily explained.
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usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason
to the constitution.”73 Although the Court has developed methods by
which it can use discretion to decline the exercise of jurisdiction (for
example, the various abstention doctrines), these are carefully cab-
ined. Professor Shapiro summarizes the concept this way: “Authority
to act necessarily implies a correlative responsibility . . . [preferring]
that a court should entertain and resolve on its merits an action
within the scope of the jurisdictional grant.”74 While such discretion
necessarily tempers the universality of the Cohens cry of “treason,”75
the Court’s recent repetition of its “virtually unflagging” obligation to
hear cases within its jurisdiction76 shows that Chief Justice Marshall’s
belief still holds sway.
Section 1983 is one of the most consequential laws passed by Con-
gress.77 It was enacted to enforce the protections intended by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Its goal was a significant restructuring of
the relationship between citizens and local and state officials, with
the courts of the United States acting as guarantors of federal
rights.78 In other words, the “dominant characteristic” of such § 1983
actions is that “they belong in court.”79 And, by that, the Court
plainly intended to focus on “belong[ing]” in federal court because it
emphasized that the judicial remedy exists “independent of any other
legal or administrative relief that may be available as a matter or
federal or state law.”80
73. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. [6 Wheat.] 264, 404 (1821);see England, 375 U.S. at 415
(noting “fundamental objections to any conclusion that a litigant who has properly invoked
the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court to consider federal constitutional issues can be
compelled without his consent and through no fault of his own to accept instead a state court’s
determination of those claims.”). The Supreme Court has described the federal courts’ obli-
gations to hear and decide cases within their jurisdictions as “virtually unflagging.” Susan B.
Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2347 (2014); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Com-
ponents, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014).
74. David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 575 (1985)
[hereinafter, Shapiro, Jurisdiction]. Although noting some room for discretion, Professor
Shapiro explains that the exercise of jurisdiction can be neither “uncontrolled or whimsical”
but must be consonant with the Marbury v. Madison determination (5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803)) of a general obligation to decide cases within jurisdiction. Id. at 579.
75. Shapiro, Jurisdiction, supra note 74, at 570.
76. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238–39 (1972).
77. It has been viewed as the source of authority to “make federal common law.” Gerhardt,
supra note 34, at 557.
78. See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 238–39.
79. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 50 (1984).
80. Id. (emphasis added). There is simply no way to reconcile that direct holding of Burnett
with the “ripeness mess” prevailing in regulatory taking cases because of the Supreme Court’s
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In the Supreme Court’s stirring words:
We yet like to believe that wherever the Federal courts sit, human
rights under the Federal Constitution are always a proper sub-
ject for adjudication, and that we have not the right to decline the
exercise of that jurisdiction simply because the rights asserted
may be adjudicated in some other forum.81
To those who have found their property rights regulated into near
or total oblivion since Williamson County, the Court’s words ring
hollow.82 Those words need to have life breathed back into them by
overruling Williamson County and once again “throw[ing] open the
doors of the United States courts” for “immediate access.”83 It is pos-
sible that the Court is prepared to do just that. As this is being writ-
ten, the Court granted certiorari for the sole reason of considering the
validity of Williamson County’s mandate to try regulatory taking
cases in state courts.84
High time. As recently as a decade or so ago, commentators have
noted that “recent takings jurisprudence thus appears to have aban-
doned citizens to the states and denied them necessary recourse with
respect to challenging takings in federal court.”85 But pendula swing.
demand in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), that takings cases—and they alone among Section 1983 cases—are
required to abandon their right to a federal forum in exchange for trial in state court under
state law. See also McNeese v. Bd. of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 672 (1963) (rejecting the idea
that “assertion of a federal claim in a federal court must await an attempt to vindicate the
same claim in a state court”); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472–73 (1974) (“When federal
claims are premised on [Section 1983] . . . we have not required exhaustion of state judicial
or administrative remedies . . . .”).
81. McNeese, 373 U.S. at 674 n.6 (emphasis added) (quoting with approval).
82. Criticism of Williamson County, 473 U.S. 172, began almost as soon as it was
published and has continued apace. See, e.g, Michael M. Berger, Anarchy Reigns Supreme, 29
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 39 (1985); Breemer, supra note 62, at 305 (noting the case
was “a mistake from the start”). More recently, an influential federal appellate judge
concluded that the upshot of Williamson County is that “[w]ith the exception of the Supreme
Court’s certiorari jurisdiction, the state courts are now the exclusive protectors of private
property owners against takings effected by state and local authorities.” William A. Fletcher,
Kelo, Lingle, and San Remo Hotel: Takings Law Now Belongs to the States, 46 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 767, 778 (2006).
83. Patsy v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 504 (1982).
84. See Knick v. Township of Scott, 862 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct.
1262 (March 5, 2018). For the outcome, see infra Epilogue.
85. Lipsett, supra note 4, at 658; see also Fletcher, supra note 82, at 776–78. Indeed, three
decisions from 2005 were seen by a prominent federal appellate judge as signaling “a substantial
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A few years later, the Supreme Court issued a series of property rights
decisions that all favored property owners and even, in some in-
stances, belittled or made fun of arguments raised by governmental
defenders.86 As I have noted elsewhere, some of those pro–property
rights decisions were either 9–0 or 8–1, showing that this shift of
opinion was more than merely the conservative Justices ganging up
on the liberals.87
II. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT SUPPLANTED FEDERALISM 
IN THIS CONTEXT
Along with the other Civil War amendments, the Fourteenth
Amendment “fundamentally altered our country’s federal system.”88
Although the Court acted slowly and selectively—that is, incorporat-
ing Bill of Rights guarantees one at a time, rather than in bulk—
“almost all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights” now apply to state
and local government as well as the federal government.89 In decid-
ing whether to incorporate each of the Constitution’s fundamental
rights, the Court focused on two questions: whether the right in ques-
tion “is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty,”90 and whether
it is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”91
change—entirely in the direction of relegating takings issues to the political and legal judgments
of the states.” Id. at 776.
86. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015), and 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013)
(denigrating government ripeness arguments); Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 134 S.
Ct. 1257 (2014) (criticizing the Solicitor General for raising an argument that was contrary to an
argument on which he had prevailed in the past); Berger, Property, supra note 67, at 96–105 (not-
ing inter alia Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 521 (2012)) (giving
no credence to the “sky is falling” argument regularly raised by government lawyers that their
agencies will not be able to do their jobs if exposed to fiscal responsibility for the outcomes).
87. Berger, Property, supra note 67, at 96–105. Curiously, one prominent commentator
insists that these 8–1 and 9–0 decisions demonstrate that the Supreme Court has “incorrectly”
read its own Williamson County decision and, indeed, that one of them “boosted the cause of
anti-federalism.” Schwartz, supra note 14, at 296, 297. With all the respect due it, unanimous
Supreme Court votes in repeated cases outweigh the views of one disgruntled practitioner.
88. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 754 (2010).
89. Id. at 764. Recently, the Court determined that one of the last remaining parts of the
Bill of Rights—the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause—is similarly incorporated.
Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019). At the oral argument, the two newest Justices
ridiculed the idea that anything substantive in the Bill of Rights was not incorporated. Justice
Gorsuch said, “Really? Come on, General.” Transcription of Oral Argument at 32, Timbs v.
Indiana, 138 S. Ct. 2650 (2018) (No. 17-1097). Justice Kavanaugh said, “Isn’t it just too late
in the day to argue that any of the Bill of Rights is not incorporated?” Id. at 33.
90. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767.
91. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). An extensive analysis
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In enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress simultaneously
enacted 42 U.S.C. § 198392 and brought to the forefront the Constitu-
tion’s Supremacy Clause, making it binding on the states. The validity
of § 1983 has been too oft affirmed to be in doubt.93
So what was the point of § 1983? As Professor Gerhardt summa-
rized it, “[T]he fourteenth amendment shifted the primary responsibil-
ity for protecting civil rights from the states to the federal government,
and section 1983 represented the efforts of the Forty-Second Con-
gress to make this shift a reality.”94 A § 1983 case sweeps within its
ambit all governmental actions that impair Bill of Rights protections.
Section 1983 was intended to provide “a uniquely federal remedy”95
with “broad and sweeping protection”96 so that individuals in a wide
variety of factual situations would be able to obtain a federal remedy
when their federally protected rights were abridged.97 The statute
must be broadly and liberally construed to achieve its goals.98 Its
“goals” have been straightforwardly stated: “to provide compensatory
relief to those deprived of their federal rights by state actors”99 by
“interpos[ing] the federal courts between the States and the people,
as guardians of the people’s federal rights.”100
One might say, in other words, that the whole point of § 1983 was
to grant federal courts the authority and duty to provide protection
of federal rights.101 In Professor Shapiro’s words, “[T]he post–Civil
of state constitutional provisions at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted appears
in Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions when
the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in American
History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7 (2008). For an analysis of state takings clauses, see
id. at 72. For an analysis of right of access to courts, see id. at 74.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018). Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment granted Congress
“the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5.
93. Indeed, the Supreme Court long ago “shed any reluctance to hold that rights guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights met the requirements for protection under the Due Process Clause.”
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 764–65.
94. Gerhardt, supra note 34, at 562.
95. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972).
96. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 543 (1972); Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969).
97. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 50, 55 (1984).
98. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 105 (1989); Lake
Country Estates v. Tahoe Reg. Plan. Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 399–400 (1979). See Gerhardt,
supra note 34, at 548.
99. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 141 (1988).
100. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 243.
101. See Gerhardt, supra note 34, at 613 (discussing the Supreme Court’s policy in Monell
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War legislation of which this statute was a part dramatically altered
the relations between the states and the federal government . . . by
giving the federal courts authority they did not previously possess.”102
Section 1983 was intended by Congress to expose municipalities and
local officials to “a new form of liability.”103 Properly so. “The purpose
of Congress is [to be] the ultimate touchstone” for analyzing the rela-
tionship between state legislation and § 1983.104 Anything “incom-
patible with the compensatory goals of the federal legislation”105
cannot stand. The question, in other words, is whether a state action
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.”106 Allowing states to erect
any obstacles to federal court access violates this precept. In some
cases, the federal courts have created doctrines that restrict their
own jurisdiction.107 Even allowing for the validity of such self-im-
posed limitations, nothing permits the states to create restrictions
of their own.
Some apologists for local government believe that the courts need
to take into account the impact of the costs of liability on government
before too readily compensating citizens for injuries inflicted. Charac-
teristic of this group is John Echeverria, who asserted that if the
Supreme Court paid more attention to the costs to be imposed on local
government, it “might well” reach a “different outcome.”108 This, of
course, is contrary to settled Supreme Court holdings that “costs can-
not outweigh the constitutional right”109 and that “one who causes a
loss should bear the loss.”110 It is also contrary to the Supreme Court’s
v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that struck a balance between the
accountability of municipalities in federal court for their constitutional violations and the
degree to which they are subject to federal court supervision).
102. Shapiro, Jurisdiction, supra note 74, at 584.
103. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 259 (1981).
104. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
105. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 143 (1988).
106. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971).
107. For example, this is demonstrated with the various forms of “abstention.”
108. Echeverria, Koontz, supra note 32, at 573. Paying more attention to governmental
costs had already been considered. Indeed, saving the government money had been the ex-
press basis for the California Supreme Court’s rule. See People v. Symons, 54 Cal. 2d 865 (1960);
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25 (1979). The United States Supreme Court directly dealt
with that in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
311 (1987), and rejected the concept.
109. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972).
110. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 654 (1980).
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recent rejection of the government’s “sky is falling” arguments in
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States.111
A state law, regardless of its intent, cannot “thwart the congres-
sional remedy”112 or subvert Congress’ clear goals in following its
mandate to enforce the rights created and protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The courts have not hesitated to strike down state
policies that do so.113 That is why the Supreme Court warned expressly
that the rights of property owners need to be protected by the judi-
ciary against the “cleverness and imagination” of state government
word games.114
This theory of protecting federal rights in federal courts dates to
the founding of the republic (that is, it predates adoption of either
the Fourteenth Amendment or § 1983) and makes it clear why
Williamson County is historically and doctrinally mistaken. As James
Madison bluntly put it, “[A] review of the constitution of the courts
in the many states will satisfy us that they cannot be trusted with
the execution of federal laws.”115 As the Supreme Court expressed
it long ago: “The constitution has presumed . . . that state attach-
ments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests might
sometimes obstruct or control, or be supposed to obstruct or control,
the regular administration of justice.”116 That feeling intensified after
the Civil War, leading to adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which seemed to “signal a popular intent to expand the powers of fed-
eral judges (if only to protect the rights of individuals against racist
southern juries).”117
111. Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 521 (2012); see supra
note 86.
112. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 (1980).
113. See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 739 (2009) (“A jurisdictional rule cannot be used
as a device to undermine federal law, no matter how evenhanded it may appear.”); Felder v.
Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 153 (1988) (striking down the state-notice-of-claim statute).
114. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987).
115. Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 836 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also
Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 87 (1809).
116. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347–48 (1816). The Reconstruction
Congress “displayed no solicitude for state courts.” Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 363 (1983).
Far from it, the “debates over the 1871 Act are replete with hostile comments directed at state
judicial systems.” Id. at 363–64. That this may have restricted “rights” otherwise held by the
individual states was necessarily considered in the debates and negotiations leading to the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, during which some choices were eliminated. “The
enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table.”
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008).
117. Lash, supra note 31, at 501.
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Williamson County’s state court–litigation mandate inverted this
basic building block of federal property right protection: it interposed
state courts to shield municipalities from federal accountability. As
the Second Circuit put it in Santini v. Connecticut Hazardous Waste
Management Service,118 it is ironic that “the very procedure that
[Williamson County] require[s] [plaintiffs] to follow before bringing
a Fifth Amendment takings claim . . . also preclude[s] [them] from
ever bringing a Fifth Amendment takings claim.”.119 Compounding
that irony, property owners have found themselves shunted right back
to the very courts that Congress intended to shield them from when it
enacted § 1983.120 It is no answer to say that it is “more effective if
takings litigation is confined to one court system rather than two121
and then asserting that the choice of system goes to the states.122
That is wholly contrary to virtually all § 1983 decisions, which have a
distinct bias in favor of the federal courts. Having watched lower
courts and local governments experiment with that wrong-headed
view of the law in property cases, I believe it is time for the Supreme
Court to set things right by reasserting federal primacy.
Indeed, any requirement to file an unsuccessful suit to establish
that there is no remedy under state law would contravene not only
§ 1983 but subsequent congressional action as well. Since adopting
§ 1983, Congress has clearly reinforced the need for that bedrock civil
rights law. Any requirement for a suit for payment would be contrary
to congressional policy established in 1970 in the Uniform Reloca-
tion Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act, which
provides that the days when government could simply grab property
first and then say “sue me” to the aggrieved owner are over.123 That
118. 342 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 104 (Oct. 4, 2004).
119. Santini, 342 F.3d at 130; see also San Remo Hotel v. City and Cty. of San Francisco,
545 U.S. 323, 349 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment on behalf of four
Justices and urging eventual reconsideration of this anomaly).
120. See Lash, supra note 31, at 500–01 (noting the anti-racist basis of the Fourteenth
Amendment). But parochialism extends beyond racism. As two seasoned practitioners put it
in the land use context, “localisms, fiscal appetites, and xenophobia remain pervasive.” BABCOCK
& SIEMON, supra note 5, at 1. For further discussion of local parochialism against property
owners and land developers, see Berger, Property, supra note 67, at 61–63.
121. Sterk, Demise, supra note 51, at 300.
122. By what mode of “choice”? A coin flip?
123. Compare Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4601 (2018), with Stringer v. United States, 471 F.2d 381, 384 (9th Cir. 1973), and United
States v. Herrero, 416 F.2d 945, 947 (9th Cir. 1969) (“[T]o seize and say ‘sue me’ is high-
handed government conduct, and not to be favored.”). Some spokespeople for local-government
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Act makes it illegal for government agencies to require property own-
ers to sue for their just compensation. Rather, the duty is the govern-
ment’s to acquire whatever property interests are needed for the
public good, either by negotiation124 or, failing that, condemnation.125
Section 1983 was designed to provide a prompt, independent fed-
eral remedy with real compensatory redress. It is the Fourteenth
Amendment’s response to any lingering negative effects of federalism
on Bill of Rights guarantees.
III. STATE COURTS POSSESS NO MAGICAL ABILITY TO APPLY LOCAL
LAW THAT ALLOWS THEM TO EVADE FEDERAL COURT PROTECTION
OF FEDERAL RIGHTS
Regulatory takings are the only constitutional rights subjected to
a Williamson County–like diversion to state court. That property own-
ers have been singled out is clear.126 As one commentator concluded,
“The state compensation portion of [Williamson County] finds no
parallel in the ripeness cases from other areas of the law.”127
control view the “right” to sue, pleading with courts to provide recompense, as a remedy. E.g.,
Echeverria, Koontz, supra note 32, at 584. That is plainly out of line with congressional policy.
Filing suit is a last resort when government defies the law and takes property without paying.
It should not be seen as displacing the government’s duty to pay ab initio. The U.S. Solicitor
General evidently disagrees. In a recent letter brief filed post argument in Knick, he urged
that mere government refusal to acknowledge its action as potentially effecting a taking could
not itself be a taking. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 138
S. Ct. 1262 (2018) (No. 17-647). At oral argument, however, the Chief Justice had forcefully
told counsel that takings occur at the moment of impact of the regulation. Transcription of
Oral Argument, Knick, 138 S. Ct. 1262 (No. 17-647).
124. See 42 U.S.C. § 4651(1).
125. See 42 U.S.C. § 4651(8). The Act provides succinctly: “No Federal agency head shall
intentionally make it necessary for an owner to institute legal proceedings to prove the fact
of the taking of his real property.” Id. To make this a truly “uniform” law, as its title had
advertised, the policies in Section 4651 were made applicable to the states—by directing that
federal funds could not be spent on state projects unless the state agreed to comply with these
policies. 42 U.S.C. § 4655.
126. See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 2.24, at 2–32 (5th ed. 2003)
(concluding that “[t]he Supreme Court has adopted a special set of ripeness rules to determine
whether federal courts can hear land use cases”); John Delaney & Duane Desiderio, Who Will
Clean Up the “Ripeness Mess”? A Call for Reform so Takings Plaintiffs Can Enter the Federal
Courthouse, 31 URB. LAW. 195, 196 (1999) (showing that “the ripeness and abstention doc-
trines have uniquely denied property owners, unlike the bearers of other constitutional rights,
access to the federal courts on their federal claims”).
127. Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Courts, 48 VAND.
L. REV. 1, 23 (1995).
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No parallel, indeed.128
There are two possible bases on which such discrimination might
rest. First, as property law is generally said to be based on the cus-
toms and practices of localities, it might be thought that the courts
that are closest to the action would be more familiar with and thus
better able to apply the law for all citizens. Second, some misguided
aspect of federalism might create the belief that each state should
be responsible for its own law. Neither holds water.129
First, it is certainly appropriate for the Federal Constitution to
lay a protective baseline, what Professor Michelman referred to as
“a uniformly binding body” of constitutional property law:
It could be perfectly reasonable to say that the Federal Constitu-
tion mandates upon the States a minimum content of property law,
a common substrate, while all the rest of property law, elabora-
tions and superstructures that give law its concrete shape and con-
tent, are given by the diverse positive laws of the several States.130
The Ninth Circuit has explored this issue in depth and held that
there is “a ‘core’ notion of constitutionally protected property into
which state regulation simply may not intrude without prompting
Takings Clause scrutiny.”131 The existence of this “constitutional
core” means that states can neither enlarge, restrict, or prohibit
property rights without violating such core precepts. Because such
property rights are deeply engrained in our general common-law
tradition, they are “protected by the Takings Clause regardless of
whether a state legislature purports to authorize a state officer to
abrogate the common law.”132
128. See Michael M. Berger, “Ripeness” Test for Land Use Cases Needs Reform: Reconciling
Leading Ninth Circuit Decisions Is an Exercise in Futility, 11 ZONING & PLANNING L. REPORT
57 (Sept. 1988).
129. See San Remo Hotel v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 350 (2005)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment and finding no “longstanding principle of comity
toward state courts in handling federal takings claims existed at the time Williamson County
was decided, nor that one has since developed”).
130. Michelman, supra note 3, at 321. Professor Hills notes that the “federal substrate”
may be found by “relying on the common law of property to determine whether some restriction
on land use inheres so deeply in title as to define federally protected ‘property.’” Roderick M.
Hills, Jr., The Individual Right to Federalism in the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
888, 904 (2006). Professor Sterk apparently disagrees, invoking a shade of federalism in
justification. See Sterk, Federalist Dimension, supra note 2, at 288.
131. Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1200 (9th Cir. 1998).
132. Fowler v. Guerin, 899 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2018). See, for example, Nixon v. United
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Moreover, and somewhat paradoxically in light of this theory, fed-
eral court protection is routinely provided in some land use cases—
but only those involving aspects of the Bill of Rights other than the
Fifth Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause. Federal court First
Amendment cases abound, for example, in which the validity of local
land use ordinances regulating or zoning for (or against) “adult en-
tertainment” has been challenged.133 There is no requirement of first
presenting the issues to state courts, even though they implicate the
same zoning policies and land use ordinances as do other land use
cases—and, indeed, as do any regulatory takings cases. Cases are
thus decided in federal court, based on “local community standards,”
without initial state court suits.
Similarly, whether an artistic or literary work is obscene under
the First Amendment is determined by “contemporary community
standards” and “applicable state law.”134 Free speech claims under
the First Amendment are similarly tied to local conditions, about
which local judges and officials might be thought better informed.
Yet the federal courts routinely adjudicate them.135
To paraphrase Justice Brennan’s classic dissent in San Diego Gas
& Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,136 if federal judges can routinely de-
termine land use aspects involving the boundaries of “adult entertain-
ment” regulations, why can’t they do the same when the regulation
in question restricts wholesome community needs, such as housing?137
States, 978 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1992), in which the court held that the papers produced and
collected during President Nixon’s term of office were the personal property of the President
himself, based in large part on the history of how each president since Washington had
treated such papers. For anyone interested in the process to reach this decision, the opinion
is highly recommended. The court discusses the idiosyncrasies of each president in his treatment
of the papers accumulated during his term. It makes for fascinating reading. In any event,
Congress changed the rule for succeeding presidents, so that all such papers now belong to the
people not the individual who temporarily inhabits the White House. It may be worth noting,
however, that each president since Nixon has established his own presidential library—at a
site of his choosing—and has “borrowed” the papers from the government to fill the library.
133. E.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v. Am. Mini
Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976). See San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 350 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
134. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
135. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
136. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S, 621 (1981).
137. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25, 32 (1979) (Clark, J., dissenting). Agins
was affirmed in its Supreme Court case, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), and disapproved in First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). For an extended
discussion, see Kanner & Berger, supra note 5.
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State court judges do not have a monopoly on measuring public
works against those local standards. Nor should it be conceded that
state courts are the appropriate place to “police local regulators”
through various forms of non-monetary relief.138 That battle ended
in 1987, when First English recognized that non-monetary remedies
fail to fulfill the federal constitutional-takings mandate.139
Federal judges have shown no hesitation to involve themselves in
local issues invoking the kind of neighborhood and family values
typically involved in regulatory taking cases. In a celebrated zoning
case, the Supreme Court concluded that
[in a] quiet place where yards are wide, people are few, and motor
vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project
addressed to family needs. . . . [i]t is ample to lay out zones
where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet
seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.140
In that case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had “start[ed]
by examin[ing]” the zoning ordinance with reference to “the interest
of the local community in the protection and maintenance of the
prevailing traditional family pattern.”141
Even after Williamson County,142 federal courts have relied on
Belle Terre143 as the authority for measuring zoning laws against the
blessings of wide yards and peaceful neighborhoods, with no concern
that they should not be adjudicating issues of state law.144 If it is
proper for federal courts to examine such intensely local and personal
issues in the context of zoning and proposed development, it cannot
become unacceptable when a landowner wants to challenge regula-
tory restrictions on constitutional grounds implicating the Fifth rather
than the First Amendment.
138. Sterk, Federalist Dimension, supra note 2, at 291.
139. First English, 482 U.S. at 311. See Michael M. Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution: The
Supreme Court Establishes New Ground Rules for Land-Use Planning, 20 URB. LAW. 735 (1988).
140. Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974). Belle Terre was, in Professor Kanner’s
words, “the sort of place where God would live if He could only afford it.” Gideon Kanner, Do
We Need to Impair or Strengthen Property Rights in Order to “Fulfill Their Unique Role”? A
Response to Professor Dyal-Chand, 31 U. HAW. L. REV. 423, 451 n.108 (2009).
141. Boraas v. Vill. of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 815 (2d Cir. 1973).
142. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
143. Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
144. See, e.g., Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington Twp., 309 F.3d 120, 135 (3d Cir. 2002).
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First Amendment cases dealing with the land use aspects of estab-
lishment of religion are also litigated in federal courts in the first
instance, even though they all involve intensely local issues.145 An
analysis of freedom of speech cases also shows deference to local condi-
tions but no need to defer to state courts to adjudicate these issues.146
As the Supreme Court itself has noted, federal courts routinely
review issues involving the exercise of a state’s sovereign preroga-
tive—including the power to regulate fishing in state waters, a
state’s power to regulate intrastate trucking rates, a city’s power to
issue bonds without a referendum, and a host of other matters under
local control.147
Moreover, other constitutional rights are not treated with the kind
of back-handed nonchalance meted out to regulatory taking cases.
Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure cases, for example, often
depend on local practices upon which local judges and law enforce-
ment officers could be said to have superior knowledge and localized
“expertise.”148 Indeed, “[w]hether a search is reasonable may depend
on conditions that vary from house to house and hour to hour. Yet fed-
eral judges routinely address these issues, and do not simply defer
to the views of local officials.”149
Many of the above-mentioned cases deal with parallel features of
the Bill of Rights. Notably, this includes the Due Process Clause,
routinely protected in federal court through 42 U.S.C. § 1983—even
against unconstitutional land use regulations. All sorts of local-
governmental issues are litigated in federal courts every day. And
they involve all aspects of the Bill of Rights—except the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Just Compensation Clause.
As Professor Somin put it: “If taken seriously, the federalism ratio-
nale for judicial deference on property rights applies to a wide range
of other constitutional rights. It therefore serves more as a general ar-
gument against federal judicial review of state policy than as a nar-
rowly targeted critique of judicial protection of property rights.”150
145. E.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997); Capital Square v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 459
U.S. 116 (1982); First Assembly of God v. Collier Cty., 20 F.3d 419 (11th Cir. 1994).
146. See Somin, Federalism, supra note 49, at 82.
147. Cty. of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 191–92 (1959) (collecting cases).
148. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).
149. Somin, Federalism, supra note 49, at 80. See also Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
323, 518 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
150. Somin, Federalism, supra note 49, at 87.
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More directly on point, federal courts are granted “diversity” juris-
diction over cases involving plain issues of state and local law where
the parties are citizens of different states and one party simply
prefers to litigate that state-law issue in federal court.151 As Justice
Douglas explained:
[T]he complexity of local law to federal judges is inherent in the
federal court system designed by Congress. Resolution of local
law questions is implicit in diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.
Since Erie . . . , the federal courts under that head of jurisdiction
daily have the task of determining what the state law is. The
fact that those questions are complex and difficult is no excuse
for a refusal by the District Court to entertain the suit.152
Why, then, are federal judges perfectly capable of deciding issues
of local land use law in a diversity case but abruptly lose that ability
when federal jurisdiction is invoked under § 1983?
Equally important, the Supreme Court itself has already recog-
nized that regulatory taking cases can be tried in federal court with-
out first being tried in state court. In City of Chicago v. International
College of Surgeons,153 the property owner filed suit in state court,
as instructed by Williamson County. But the City was not satisfied
with that venue and, invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), removed the case
to federal court before any substantive proceedings could be had in
state court under state law. The Supreme Court upheld that re-
moval. The Court saw nothing untoward in trying the case in fed-
eral court, with no previous proceedings in state court under state
law to guide the way.154 As made clear by R.S. Radford & Jennifer
Thompson, “[N]o one has advanced a federalism-based rationale that
151. U.S. CONST. art. III, cl. 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2018).
152. England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 426 (1964) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
153. 522 U.S. 156 (1997).
154. The Eighth Circuit later tried to reconcile Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), and City of Chicago v.
International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997), but gave up after finding the outcome
“anomalous” (Kottschade v. City of Rochester, 319 F.3d 1038, 1041 (8th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 825 (2003)) and then concluding that the way to resolve the resulting conun-
drum “[was] for the Supreme Court to say, not us.” Kottschade, 319 F.3d at 1041. Presumably,
the Court understood that need when it granted certiorari in Knick v. Township of Scott, 862
F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 1262 (2018) (No. 17-647) for the specific
purpose of reexamining the state court litigation requirement of Williamson County.
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explains why plaintiffs raising regulatory takings claims must be rele-
gated to state court, while defendants may elect to have the identical
claims adjudicated in federal court, should they choose to do so.”155
There is nothing so special about regulatory taking cases that
justifies insulating them from federal court review.
Second, there is nothing so inherent in the concept of federalism
that prevents federal courts from protecting the basic aspects of the
Bill of Rights against states and localities. When Chief Justice
Rehnquist penned his famous concurring opinion in San Remo
Hotel,156 urging that the state court litigation requirement of William-
son County be re-examined, he did not raise any issues of federalism
as standing in the way. In fact, he seemed rather contrite that he had
joined in the Williamson County opinion that had relegated this liti-
gation to state courts. In his words, “The Court today makes no claim
that any . . . longstanding principle of comity toward state courts in
handling federal takings claims existed at the time Williamson County
was decided, nor that one has since developed.”157 The late Chief Jus-
tice went on to point out that San Remo’s invocation that state courts
have greater familiarity with local land use disputes is not comparable
to “the type of historically grounded, federalism-based interests” that
justify the relegation of other claims to state court.158 The lower federal
courts have been similarly reticent to tie Williamson County’s state-
litigation requirement to any concern for federalism.159
155. Radford & Thompson, supra note 55, at 617.
156. San Remo Hotel v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005).
157. Id. at 350 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
158. Id.
159. Compare Wilkins v. Daniels, 744 F.3d 409, 418 (6th Cir. 2014); Miles Christo Religious
Order v. Twp. of Northville, 629 F.3d 533, 553 (6th Cir. 2010); Front Royal & Warren Cty. Indus.
Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275, 284 (4th Cir. 1998); Kuhnie Brothers, Inc. v.
Cty. of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516, 520 (6th Cir. 1997); and Millington Homes, Inv’rs, Ltd. v. City of
Millington, 60 F.3d 828, 832 (6th Cir. 1995); with Islamic Comty. Ctr. v. City of Yonkers
Landmark Pres. Bd., 742 Fed. Appx. 521 (2d Cir. 2018); Wayside Church v. Van Buren Cty.,
847 F.3d 812, 818 (6th Cir. 2017); Kurtz v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 758 F.3d 506, 512 (2d Cir. 2014);
Doe v. Va. Dep’t of State Police, 713 F.3d 745, 753 (4th Cir. 2013); Town of Nags Head v.
Toloczko, 728 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2013); SKS & Assocs., Inc. v. Dart, 619 F.3d 674, 676 (7th Cir.
2010); Guatay Christian Fellowship v. Cty. of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 979 (9th Cir. 2011);
Insomnia, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 278 Fed. Appx. 609 (6th Cir. 2008); Holiday Amusement Corp.
v. South Carolina, 493 F.3d 404, 409 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. 323);
McNamara v. City of Rittman, 473 F.3d 633, 641 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Professor Sterk, Sterk,
Demise, supra note 51, at 292–300); Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342, 348
(2d Cir. 2005); Signature Properties, Int’l Ltd. P’ship v. City of Edmond, 310 F.3d 1258, 1269
(10th Cir. 2002); and Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 95 F.3d 1359, 1366 (7th Cir. 1996).
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Indeed, in Felder v. Casey, the Court was told that it should rule
in the government’s favor out of some respect for “equitable federal-
ism,” that is, a belief that states needed to retain some measure of
control over their own litigation. The Felder decision rejected this
idea, concluding strongly that “it has no place under our Supremacy
Clause analysis.”160
Nor was the Felder opinion alone. In McDonald v. City of Chicago,161
the Court dealt expressly with the idea that federalism somehow
stands in the way of incorporating the Bill of Rights into those guaran-
tees vouchsafed against state and local government:
There is nothing new in the argument that, in order to respect
federalism and allow useful state experimentation, a federal con-
stitutional right should not be fully binding on the States. This
argument was made repeatedly and eloquently by Members of this
Court who rejected the concept of incorporation and urged reten-
tion of the two-track approach to incorporation. Throughout the
era of “selective incorporation,” Justice Harlan in particular, invok-
ing the values of federalism and state experimentation, fought
a determined rearguard action to preserve the two-track approach.
Time and again, however, those pleas failed. Unless we turn
back the clock . . . [the] argument must be rejected. Under our
precedents, if a Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental from an
American perspective, then, unless stare decisis counsels other-
wise, that guarantee is fully binding on the States and thus
limits (but by no means eliminates) their ability to devise solu-
tions to social problems that suit local needs and values.162
The Court has explicitly recognized that fully applying Bill of
Rights guarantees against the states might “to some extent limit the
legislative freedom of the States[, because] this [has] always [been]
true when a Bill of Rights provision [has been] incorporated.”163
160. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 150 (1988).
161. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
162. Id. at 784 (citations omitted).
163. Id. at 790. See also First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cty. of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (“We realize that even our present holding will undoubtedly lessen
to some extent the freedom and flexibility of planners and governing bodies of municipal cor-
porations when enacting land-use regulations. But such consequences necessarily flow from
any decision upholding a claim of constitutional right; many of the provisions of the Consti-
tution are designed to limit the flexibility and freedom of government authorities . . . .”).
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Indeed, the Supreme Court long ago applied the brakes to states’
ability to continuously redefine property rights so as to preclude
federal protection. In Lucas, for example, the Court quoted its clas-
sic decision in Mahon to voice its concern that, if taken too far, such
power to redefine would extend so far that “at last private property
[would] disappear[ ].”164
In other words, § 1983, a federal statute of uncommon strength
and adopted by Congress for the specific purpose of restricting the
ability of state and local government officials to impose on the rights
of ordinary citizens, has to prevail.165
Williamson County’s ripeness rule that has, for more than three
decades, diverted legitimate constitutional claims away from the
federal court system has no basis in history, precedent, or constitu-
tional exegesis.
CONCLUSION
Having failed to derail § 1983 on its inexorable journey to enforce
Bill of Rights guarantees against state and local governments, de-
fenders of the local public purse have sought to revive the myth of
federalism as the basis for stripping property owners—and only prop-
erty owners—of the right to seek federal court redress for violations
of federally protected rights. They are wrong. Federalism was never
strong enough to bear the weight of their arguments, and it has
become weaker over time. The invocation of federalism in this field
of law carries no more merit than it did after Brown v. Board of
Education,166 when some southern states tried to invoke the so-called
“interposition doctrine” and sought thereby to evade the constitu-
tional doctrine of equal protection in racial-desegregation cases.167
The Constitution was not drafted for an Orwellian world where
“some animals are more equal than others.” All rights protected by
the Constitution are entitled to federal court protection. We need to
stop pretending otherwise.
164. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
165. Felder, 487 U.S. at 153.
166. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
167. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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EPILOGUE
As this article was in the final stages of production, the Supreme
Court decided Knick v. Township of Scott. The question presented
in the petition for certiorari was the starkly procedural one “whether
the Court should reconsider the portion of Williamson County . . .
requiring property owners to exhaust state court remedies to ripen
federal takings claims.”168 Referring to some of the analysis in
Williamson County as “simply confused,” the Court concluded that
“its reasoning was exceptionally ill founded” and “unworkable in
practice” so that the only solution was to “overrule” the state court
litigation requirement.169
Much will be written about Knick but, for our purposes, these are
the major lessons:
• The state litigation requirement of Williamson County is
dead. RIP. Property owners with Fifth Amendment takings
claims can take them directly to federal court, just as all
other American constitutional claimants.170 
• The answer to the question posed in the title to this article
is precisely what we said it was: nothing.
168. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 138 S. Ct. 1262 (2018) (No. 17-
647), 2017 WL 5158056 (citation omitted). 
169. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2174, 2178–79 (2018).
170. See id.
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ABSTRACT
This Article considers what law should apply in resolving subsid-
iary questions that arise in the course of deciding takings cases under
federal constitutional law. It argues that there are three choices: fed-
eral constitutional law, state law, or a federal-patterning definition
that lays down certain general parameters as a matter of federal
constitutional law but otherwise follows state law if it is consistent
with these parameters. The article illustrates these choices by con-
sidering a recent Supreme Court decision, Murr v. Wisconsin,1 which
held that the horizontal dimensions of a “parcel of land” should be
determined, for takings purposes, as a matter of federal constitu-
tional law. It argues that the wholesale federalization of the issue
in this context was misguided. A better solution would be to adopt a
federal-patterning definition of “parcel,” which would largely resolve
the issue by looking to applicable state law unless affirmative evi-
dence shows that parcel boundaries have been manipulated to man-
ufacture a takings claim.
INTRODUCTION
Stewart Sterk has been a relatively lonely voice in arguing that tak-
ings cases should be resolved with greater attention to the role of
state law.2 I agree with him that state law has been ignored too
often. I would like to use this occasion to address one dimension of the
state-versus-federal-law question in takings jurisprudence. Specifi-
cally, I will consider whether subsidiary questions that arise in ad-
judicating takings claims should be resolved as a matter of federal
* Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Thanks to the par-
ticipants at the Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference at William & Mary Law School
and the Property Works in Progress Conference at Boston University School of Law, both in
the fall of 2018, for the helpful comments.
1. 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
2. Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114
YALE L.J. 203 (2004); see also James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of
Implicit Takings, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 35 (2016); Stewart E. Sterk, The Demise of Federal
Takings Litigation, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 251 (2006).
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constitutional law, state law, or some combination of federal and
state law. Because the right in question appears in the Federal
Constitution, federal constitutional law cannot be ignored. At the
same time, the subject of the right—private property—is generally
defined and protected by state law, suggesting that state law should
also play a role. The solution in many contexts, I will argue, is a
federal-patterning definition: a federal constitutional articulation of
how the question should broadly be resolved, leaving the specific de-
tails to be filled in as a matter of state law. I will illustrate the
relevant choices and offer an example of how the federal-patterning
definition might work by considering a recent Supreme Court deci-
sion, Murr v. Wisconsin, which held that the horizontal dimensions
of a “parcel of land” should be determined, for takings purposes, as
a matter of federal constitutional law.3 I will argue that wholesale
federalization of the issue in this context was misguided. A better
solution would be to adopt a federal-patterning definition of “parcel,”
which would largely resolve the issue by looking to applicable state
law unless affirmative evidence shows that parcel boundaries have
been manipulated to manufacture a takings claim.
I. STATE VERSUS FEDERAL LAW: THREE OPTIONS
Let me begin by broadly framing what I regard to be the relevant
inquiry. The Takings Clause, whether it applies to traditional eminent
domain or to regulatory takings claims, protects “private property.”4
The Takings Clause, of course, is part of the Federal Constitution
and as such, has been held to apply to both the federal government
and the states. So the right in question is one established by federal
constitutional law. Private property, which is the object of the right
established by the Clause, is primarily governed by state law. Indeed,
the Supreme Court is fond of quoting the line from Board of Regents
v. Roth that says property interests are “not created by the Constitu-
tion” but rather “are created and their dimensions are defined by ex-
isting rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law.”5 So the Takings Clause presents a situation in
3. 137 S. Ct. 1933.
4. “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.” U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
5. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). For repetitions of the
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which the Federal Constitution creates a right protecting an entitle-
ment that is primarily created and defined by state law. This means
the doctrine developed under the Takings Clause must inevitably
delineate, in some fashion, the respective roles of federal and state
law in protecting the constitutional right.
Perhaps the most obvious problem of delineation occurs when
there is some dispute about whether the interest to be protected con-
stitutes “private property” within the meaning of the Takings Clause.
Cases presenting this issue are relatively uncommon.6 The most
recent skirmishes of prominence involved cases that presented the
question whether interest earned on client funds deposited with a
lawyer is the private property of the client for takings purposes.7
(The Court held that the answer is “yes.”8)
I have previously argued that cases presenting this type of ques-
tion should not be resolved by asking what sorts of rights and privi-
leges are classified as “private property” as a matter of state law.9
Insofar as the quotation from Board of Regents v. Roth suggests that
this is how courts should proceed, it is misleading. Instead, it is neces-
sary to have some federal constitutional conception of the kinds of
interests that qualify as “private property” in order to decide which
entitlements are protected by the Takings Clause. I have called this
a federal constitutional “patterning definition” of private property.10
Armed with the relevant patterning definition, courts can then can-
vas a state’s law to see if it recognizes an interest that qualifies as
private property under the patterning definition. Such an approach
quotation in the takings context, see, for example, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992), Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984), and
Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980).
6. See generally DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 58–60 (2002)
(presenting a collection of cases from eminent domain and regulatory takings law that pose
the question of whether an entitlement is “private property”).
7. Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (2003); Philips v. Wash. Legal
Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998). 
8. Philips, 524 U.S. at 172. The later decision, Brown, adhered to the conclusion reached
in Philips about whether interest earned on client funds is the private property of the client
but held that no compensation was owed for taking that property because the money would
not have earned any interest absent the program. Brown, 538 U.S. at 235, 241.
9. Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885,
942–54 (2000).
10. Merrill, supra note 9, at 952–54. This approach was anticipated by my colleague
Henry Monaghan. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Of “Liberty” and “Property”, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 405, 435 (1977).
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is necessary, I have argued, in order to make sense of precedents
that tell us, for example, that ownership of land is a type of private
property covered by the Takings Clause but that government trans-
fer payments and tax breaks are not.11 In other words, we need some
federal constitutional principle that tells us what types of state-cre-
ated interests fall within the universe of “private property,” as that
term is used in the Constitution, before we can proceed to examine
state law.
I stand by what I have said on this score with respect to resolving
the threshold question of whether an asserted interest is or is not
private property protected by the Takings Clause. The objective of
this Article is to extend the inquiry to consider what I will call sub-
sidiary questions that arise once we decide that an interest is cov-
ered by the Takings Clause. These are questions that concern matters
such as whether the government has “taken” the property, whether
the taking is for a “public use,” and if the government action quali-
fies as a taking for public use, whether it has given the claimant
“just compensation” for the taking.
To illustrate, consider the question of whether the government has
given the claimant just compensation. The meaning of just compen-
sation could be resolved exclusively as a matter of federal constitu-
tional law, with courts specifying exactly what sorts of valuation
procedures all state and federal tribunals must use in fixing com-
pensation. Or, conceivably, courts could defer completely to state
law for determining what valuation procedures yield just compensa-
tion in any given context. Or (as I have argued in deciding whether
the claimant has an interest that qualifies as “private property”),
courts could articulate a general patterning definition of what con-
stitutes just compensation, which could then be used to determine
whether a particular state-valuation procedure satisfies this pat-
terning definition.
Those familiar with the Supreme Court precedent in this area
will recognize that the patterning-definition option best describes
11. With respect to land, see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, Inc., 505 U.S. 1003,
1017 n.7 (1992) (fee simple in land is clearly protected by the Takings Clause). On the lack
of takings protections for transfer payments, see Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social
Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 55–56 (1986). Taxes (and hence presumably the repeal of
tax breaks) have long been regarded as immune from takings challenges. See Koontz v. St.
Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 614–15 (2013) (“It is beyond dispute . . . that
‘[t]axes . . . are not “takings.”’”).
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the approach that has been taken with regard to determining whether
the government has provided just compensation. The Court has held
that just compensation generally means fair market value.12 But it
has not attempted to dictate, as a matter of federal constitutional
law, what valuation techniques state courts or other subordinate
tribunals must use in determining fair market value. The choice of
valuation procedures has largely been left to state law to specify.13
Indeed, we can see that the Court has, in one context or another,
embraced each of the three options for resolving subsidiary issues in
taking cases. As an example of the purely federal constitutional
approach, consider the distinction between appropriations and regu-
lations. Appropriations are governed by a per se rule—they are
categorically regarded as takings.14 Regulations are governed by a
multifactor test that rarely results in a finding of liability.15 The dis-
tinction was launched in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV,
which describes the relevant per se category as a “permanent physi-
cal occupation” of land.16 Subsequent cases held that the category
did not include schemes that prohibit landlords from terminating
tenancies, even if this can be said to result in a permanent (or at
least indefinite) occupation by the tenant.17 Then the Court held,
without much analysis, that the category includes public easements
imposed on private land, even though these entail rights of use as
opposed to permanent or indefinite occupations.18 Most recently, the
Court has extended the category to include personal property as
well as land and has redescribed the category as “physical appropria-
tions.”19 The relevant point is that each of these zigzags was an-
nounced as a proposition of federal constitutional law, with no
consideration given to the content of state property law.
12. See, e.g., United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 516–17 (1979); United
States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
13. For example, states have been allowed to adopt divergent rules with respect to
offsetting benefits (see 3 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 8A (3d ed. 2018))
and with respect to the undivided fee rule (4 id. § 12.05).
14. Horne v. Dept. of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426–30 (2015).
15. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
16. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426, 441 (1982).
17. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992); Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Fla.
Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245 (1987).
18. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385–86 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 832 (1987).
19. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2427.
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One must scratch a bit harder to identify an example of a pure-
state law approach to a subsidiary issue. One possibility is the
determination of the identity of the owner of a property. In various
contexts where property has been subdivided between surface and
subsurface rights or between landlord and tenant, or when there
has been a transfer from corporate ownership to shareholders or
from parents to children, the Court has unquestioningly accepted
the characterization of ownership under state law.20 Here we see the
gravitational force of the proposition that property rights are de-
fined and enforced as a matter of state law.
The patterning definition can be seen at work in fixing the methods
for determining just compensation, as previously discussed. Another
example is the nuisance exception to takings liability recognized in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.21 Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion was clear—controversially so—in stipulating that the excep-
tion applies only to government regulation of conduct regarded as
a public or private nuisance at common law.22 This characterization
of the nuisance exception constitutes a federal constitutional-pat-
terning definition. Federal constitutional law, according to Lucas,
limits the relevant category of laws that would satisfy the exception
to those that track the common law of nuisance. Having gone this
far in describing the exception, the Court then remanded the case to
the South Carolina courts for a determination of whether the con-
duct at issue—building a home on a barrier island exposed to hurri-
cane damage—would constitute a nuisance under South Carolina
common law.23 Thus we see the two basic elements that comprise
the patterning-definition approach: federal constitutional law de-
fines the general pattern of a particular state of affairs, and an in-
vestigation of state law determines whether that definition is satisfied
in a particular case.
20. For example in Loretto v. Teleprompter, the Court accepted, uncritically, the state law
proposition that the landlord has exclusive control over the roof of a building, and the tenants’
interest is confined to the particular unit in which the tenants hold the lease. 458 U.S. at 439.
Similarly, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the Court accepted, uncritically, the state law propo-
sition that the dissolution of a corporation for nonpayment of taxes effected a transfer of title
from the corporation to its shareholder. 533 U.S. 606, 614, 626–30 (2001).
21. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
22. Id. at 1029–31. Justice Kennedy concurred only in the judgment, objecting specifically
to this limitation. Id. at 1035.
23. Id. at 1031 (majority opinion).
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Before turning to the issue in Murr,24 a further observation about
the patterning-definition approach is warranted. In contrast to the
pure-federal option or the pure-state option, there are undoubtedly
different versions of the patterning-definition option. For present pur-
poses, I will distinguish between “thick” and “thin” patterning defi-
nitions. A thick definition is one in which federal constitutional law
does most of the work, leaving relatively little room for variations
based on state law. A thin definition is one in which federal consti-
tutional law imposes only a mild constraint on the range of permissi-
ble variations under state law. These, undoubtedly, describe points on
a continuum with many conceivable patterning definitions falling
somewhere in between.
II. MURR V. WISCONSIN
The Murr family owned two plots of land on the St. Croix River
in Wisconsin. Everyone agreed this land was “private property” pro-
tected by the Takings Clause. What Murr presented was a subsid-
iary question under Court-made takings doctrine that has played a
prominent role in regulatory takings cases: the extent or degree to
which the challenged regulation diminished the value of the claim-
ant’s private property.25 Diminution in value appeared in the Court’s
inaugural decision recognizing the possibility of a regulatory taking.26
It was reaffirmed as a factor of “particular significance” under Penn
Central’s ad hoc approach to identifying a taking.27 It is also the
critical factor under Lucas’s categorical rule for regulations that de-
prive an owner of all economic value.28
Diminution in value requires measuring what portion of economic
value has been lost because of a challenged regulation. In order to
perform this measurement, it is necessary to compare the value of the
property before adoption of the regulation with the value afterwards.
This, in turn, requires that we identify the unit of property that will
be used in making the before-and-after comparison. This has been
24. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
25. Id. at 1940, 1941–42.
26. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (“One fact for consideration . . . is the
extent of the diminution.”).
27. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
28. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016–17 & n.7.
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called the “numerator/denominator” problem.29 The “denominator” is
the relevant unit of property for purposes of analysis. The “numera-
tor” is the portion of value of that unit eliminated by the regulation.
Often there will be no issue about identifying the relevant unit of
property for purposes of measuring diminution in value. Suppose the
property is Blackacre, a perfectly square acre of land. The govern-
ment decides the land is the critical habitat of an endangered spe-
cies of toad and forbids all human activity on Blackacre in an effort
to save the toad. The denominator is Blackacre, and the diminution
in value caused by the endangerment order is the numerator.
In other circumstances, identifying the appropriate denominator
can pose quite a puzzle. Suppose the property consists of ten acres
of land. Suppose further that the owner would like to subdivide the
parcel into ten one-acre lots and sell them for single-family homes.
The government intervenes and decides that half of the tract—five
of the acres—is a wetland, which cannot be developed. Is this a loss
of fifty percent of the value of the ten-acre parcel, or is it a loss of
one hundred percent of the value of five individual lots?
Now consider a variation on the hypothetical. Instead of starting
with a ten-acre parcel, the developer acquires ten contiguous unde-
veloped one-acre plots with the intention of creating a subdivision
and selling the lots for homes. The government intervenes as before.
The same question is posed: is this a loss of fifty percent of the whole
or one hundred percent of half?
Murr presented a variation on the consolidation-of-separate-lots
problem. The Murr family bought two contiguous lots, Lot E and Lot
F, and built a cabin on Lot F. Lot E was held for investment and fu-
ture sale. After the lots were purchased by the senior Murrs but
before they were transferred to the children, the local zoning author-
ity adopted a rule imposing a minimum-lot-size restriction on future
development. The new rule prohibited development on lots the size
of Lot E if owned next to another contiguous lot like F. The Murrs
were permitted to build a fancy new home on the combined lots, but
were no longer able to sell Lot E to a third party for development into
a separate home. The Murrs argued that Lot E standing alone was
the relevant denominator, which would mean the minimum-lot-size
rule arguably generated a large diminution in value. The government
29. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987) (quoting
Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1992 (1967)).
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argued that Lots E and F together were the relevant denominator,
making the diminution relatively small.30
Previous decisions had offered some guidance as to how to define
denominators. The Supreme Court had seemingly settled on the no-
tion that in cases of land the denominator is the “parcel as a whole.”31
The significance of this, in the cases previously decided, is that one
cannot “conceptually sever” the parcel into subparcels, which are then
used as the denominator.32 There are ambiguities here, but I take
it that what the Court had meant in these cases is that one cannot
invoke a hypothetical severance of land in determining the denomi-
nator. Thus, one cannot divide a single parcel of land into surface
rights and as-of-yet unsevered air rights, and treat the air rights as
the denominator.33 Nor can one divide a fee simple of indefinite
duration into as-of-yet unsevered time-limited rights and residual
rights, with the time-limited rights serving as the denominator.34
One must take the actual holding of the claimant at the time of the
regulation to be the relevant denominator.35
In what follows, I assume that the injunction against conceptual
severance is properly regarded as part of a federal constitutional
30. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1941–42.
31. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130–31; Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331–32 (2002).
32. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 318 (quoting Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers
Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 644 (1993)). See generally Margaret Jane Radin, The
Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 1667, 1677 (1988).
33. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130–31.
34. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331–32.
35. Thus, I assume that if the Penn Central Corporation had previously severed the air
rights above Grand Central Station and transferred them to a third party, and the Historic
Preservation Commission had thereafter prohibited the third party from developing the air
rights, the relevant denominator would be the air rights. Similarly, if a property owner in the
Lake Tahoe region had previously entered into a three-year lease for purposes of developing
property, and the Regional Planning Commission imposed a three-year moratorium on de-
velopment, the relevant denominator would be the three-year lease. Keystone Bituminous
Coal might be thought to run counter to this reading, given that the Court declined to treat
a waiver of surface support, an actual holding of some of the mineral rights claimants in the
case, as a denominator. But the Court was careful to explain that “the support estate is
always owned by either the owner of the surface or the owner of the minerals.” 480 U.S. at
500–01. Thus the denominator was properly regarded as the mineral estate plus the waiver
of surface support, not the waiver of surface support standing alone. In any event, the Court
did not reach the diminution-in-value question because the case was brought as a facial
challenge to the statute and the record was “devoid of any evidence on what percentage of the
purchased support estates, either in the aggregate or with respect to any individual estate,
has been affected by the Act.” Id. at 501.
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definition of denominators. But the issue in Murr could not be an-
swered by invoking the rule against conceptual severance. The ques-
tion was how to define the “parcel as a whole” when a single owner
actually owns two contiguous lots. In other words, the question con-
cerned the proper definition of “parcel as a whole” along the horizon-
tal dimension. The Supreme Court had not spoken to this question.36
In developing an answer, none of the briefs identified the full
range of options. The Murrs and the State of Wisconsin argued that
the definition of parcel in this context should be resolved as a mat-
ter of state law. They disagreed about what state law required. The
Murrs maintained that each lot was a parcel.37 The State said that
under state law the two lots should be regarded as merged into one.38
St. Croix County, and the federal government appearing as amicus
curiae, argued that the horizontal dimensions of the parcel should
not be based on “legalistic distinctions” grounded in state law.39 Im-
plicitly, this meant that the parcel should be defined as a matter of
federal constitutional law. Interestingly, both briefs were quite coy
about acknowledging that the case posed a choice between federal
and state law. What is clear is that they were worried that developers
could manipulate the size and shape of individual parcels in order
to bolster takings claims if the matter were left to state law. As to
the content of the proper approach to defining the denominator in
this context, both litigants proposed a multifactor balancing test.40
The Justices split along similar lines. Justice Kennedy’s opinion
for the majority adopted a federal constitutional-law solution, which
took the form of a multifactor balancing test.41 Perhaps because the
briefs did little to develop the choice-of-law issue, Justice Kennedy
offered only a cursory justification for federalizing the question. Board
36. For a discussion of lower court cases that had struggled with the horizontal-definition
problem and various possible solutions, see John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the Denomi-
nator in Regulatory Takings Claims, 61 U. CHI L. REV. 1535 (1994).
37. Petitioners’ Brief at 24–32, Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) (No. 15-214),
2016 WL 1459199, at *24–32; Petitioners’ Reply Brief at 7–11, Murr, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (No. 15-
214), 2016 WL 4072806, at *7–11.
38. Brief for Respondent State of Wisconsin at 29–37, Murr, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (No. 15-214),
2016 WL 3227033, at *29–37 [hereinafter Brief for State of Wisconsin].
39. Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 20, 23, Murr, 137
S. Ct. 1933 (No. 15-214), 2016 WL 3398637, at *20, *23 [hereinafter Brief for the United States].
40. Brief for Respondent St. Croix Cty. at 52, Murr, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (No. 15-214), 2016 WL
3254214, at *52; Brief for the United States, supra note 39, at 20–22.
41. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1946–49.
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of Regents v. Roth and the many cases citing the primacy of state law
in creating and defining property were not mentioned.42 Instead,
Justice Kennedy stated that “the Court has expressed caution” about
the proposition that “property rights under the Takings Clause should
be coextensive with those under state law.”43 The only support for the
proposition that such “caution” was appropriate was a prior opinion
by Justice Kennedy holding that regulations in effect when property
is acquired do not automatically become background principles quali-
fying owner expectations.44 It is reasonably clear from the opinion
that the motive for opting for federal law, following the government
submissions, was fear of manipulation of denominators, or “games-
manship” to use Justice Kennedy’s term.45 In Justice Kennedy’s ex-
position, however, fear of government manipulation to defeat takings
claims received equal billing with fear of developer manipulation of
the size of parcels to manufacture takings claims.
Chief Justice Roberts, in dissent, clearly recognized the centrality
of the choice-of-law issue, and came down forthrightly in favor of
state law.46 The Chief Justice objected to federalizing the definition
of parcel on the grounds that this was contrary to precedent (namely,
the many references in the cases to Board of Regents v. Roth), and
(at least in the majority’s formulation) that this confused the question
of what property is at stake with the question of whether the regula-
tion constitutes a taking.47 He also suggested, briefly, that the con-
cern with manipulation was overblown.48 There was no discussion
in either opinion of the possibility of a federal-patterning definition.
My objective in the remainder of these remarks is to offer a different
solution to the numerator/denominator puzzle in the context of fixing
the horizontal dimensions of an interest in land. My proposal consists
42. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), and cases cited
supra note 5.
43. Id. at 1944.
44. Id. (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001)). The issue in Palazzolo was
whether a regulatory limitation on the use of property that was in effect when the title to the
property was acquired automatically eliminates any investment-backed expectation incon-
sistent with the regulation. 533 U.S. at 626–27. In keeping with Justice Kennedy’s balancing
proclivities, the Court held such a limitation was a factor to take into account, but was not
dispositive. Id. at 626.
45. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1948.
46. Id. at 1953–54 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 1953–56 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 1953 (“[S]uch obvious attempts to alter the legal landscape in anticipation of a
lawsuit are unlikely and not particularly difficult to detect and discern.”).
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of what I will characterize as a “thin” federal-patterning definition.
One part of the patterning definition consists of the rule prohibiting
conceptual severance. Only actual holdings should be considered, not
hypothetical holdings.49 The other part consists of the rule that actual
lot lines established under state law presumptively control, subject
to an exception if it can be shown that the lines have been deliberately
drawn to enhance the prospect of federal constitutional-takings liabil-
ity. This is a patterning definition rather than a pure-state law ap-
proach because it contains federal content—the rejection of conceptual
severance and the instruction to treat lot lines as established by
state law as presumptively controlling absent manipulation to cre-
ate liability. It is a thin rather than a thick patterning definition
because in nearly all cases the answers generated by these rules will
be grounded in state law, rather than federal constitutional law.
The justification for this proposed approach is in three parts. The
first consists of the argument that a purely federal definition of parcel
injects unnecessary complexity into regulatory takings cases. The
second, which is contingent on the form of the federal rule adopted by
Justice Kennedy, consists of the argument that a multifactor balanc-
ing test is particularly undesirable in determining the denominator
in this context. The third is based on concerns about manipulability,
cited by the government parties in the Murr case and echoed by
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion. Justice Kennedy’s worry about
government manipulation, I argue, can be handled by traditional
doctrine that would disregard state law that lacks a fair and sub-
stantial basis when used to defeat a federal constitutional right. The
government’s anxiety about developer manipulation can be handled
by building a narrow exception into the patterning definition that
would allow courts to disregard lots lines that have been manipulated
to manufacture a takings claim.
III. THE COMPLEXITY PROBLEM
My proposed federal-patterning definition would give lot lines as
established under state law presumptive effect in fixing the horizontal
49. Although the Court has not offered an explicit justification for the rule against con-
ceptual severance, the most plausible justification would seem to be a concern about potential
manipulation of denominators to bolster takings claims. In this respect, the rule against
conceptual severance is simply one manifestation of a larger patterning rule disallowing
attempts by landowners to manipulate denominators.
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dimensions of the whole parcel. One reason is to simplify the inquiry
and make it relatively easy for state regulators and state court
judges—the first-line enforcers of regulatory takings law—to com-
prehend and apply in fixing the denominator.
To begin, different states have adopted different approaches to de-
termining the horizontal boundaries of parcels of land. As Wisconsin’s
Brief pointed out,50 some states use metes-and-bounds surveys and
some follow the federal-rectangular survey. Regardless of which of
these basic survey methods is followed, urban land is typically divided
into blocks that are, in turn, divided into lots. So you have three differ-
ent systems that exist in various combinations in different states.
Moreover, states differ as to the legal requirements for establish-
ing parcel boundaries.51 Some require the formal recordation of plats
showing separate parcels in order to give legal effect to individual
lot descriptions by survey, others do not. Perhaps most relevant to
the Murr dispute, some states require the merger of lots as a matter
of law when certain things happen, such as contiguous lots coming
into common ownership. Others provide that merger occurs only
after a formal process initiated by an owner or others when previous
lot designations are canceled and new descriptions are issued.
Another consideration is that determining the scope of parcels by
these methods serves multiple purposes. Discrete parcels are nearly
always used for preparing property tax bills. They are also critical
in doing title searches, whether for purposes of preparing deeds of
sale, processing land in probate proceedings, or using land as collat-
eral for secured loans. They play a critical role in bankruptcy. For
example, if the Murrs’ plumbing company went bankrupt before the
lots were transferred to the Murr children, Lot F would be an asset
of the company in bankruptcy, but Lot E would not.52
The state law governing parcel identification also plays a critical
role in resolving boundary disputes and adverse possession cases.
And most relevantly, state rules for identifying parcels are used in
establishing zoning districts and in resolving requests for zoning
50. Brief for State of Wisconsin, supra note 38, at 6–7.
51. See, e.g., id. at 11–13.
52. Title to Lot F was held in the name of the Murrs’ plumbing company between 1963
and 1994, when it was conveyed to their children. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1940–41 (majority
opinion). Lot E was always owned by either the senior Murrs or their children. Id. at 1941.
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variances, amendments, or special use permits.53 There is much to
be said for using the same set of rules for all purposes. Under current
law, which relies on state law, this is possible.54 Adopting a special
federal definition of “parcel” for takings purposes would inevitably
mean that there would be two different legal regimes for defining
parcels, at least for some purposes.
Another factor to take into account is that local lawyers and offi-
cials will have developed significant expertise in applying the rele-
vant state-law rules for ascertaining the horizontal boundaries of
land parcels. There is, if you will, significant human capital invested
in understanding and applying these rules. In contrast, there is zero
expertise at this point in applying a special federal constitutional
definition of parcel.
Those of us who spend a lot of time thinking about regulatory
takings issues tend to forget how extremely episodic these cases are,
relative to the large mass of land transactions that raise other issues.55
Local property lawyers, state officials, and state judges will be familiar
with the state process for defining parcels. It makes sense to piggy-
back on this local knowledge. Takings cases are sufficiently rare that
no relevant expertise is likely to develop for applying a special fed-
eral constitutional definition of parcel if it diverges in any significant
way from the state definition. Moreover, since regulatory takings
challenges will emerge primarily out of fights over zoning, there are
particularly good reasons for using the same set of rules for zoning
purposes and for resolving occasional constitutional challenges to
zoning decisions.
IV. THE BALANCING -TEST PROBLEM
We also have to ask: what would a purely federal constitutional
definition of parcel look like? Judging by Justice Kennedy’s effort in
53. The Murr case arose on a denial of the family’s request for a variance from applicable
zoning regulations. Id.
54. Wisconsin statutory law would seem to point in this direction. See WIS. STAT. § 236.28
(2016) (“[T]he lots in [a] plat shall be described by the name of the plat and the lot and block . . .
for all purposes, including those of assessment, taxation, devise, descent and conveyance.”).
55. An interesting source in this regard is a fifty-state survey of takings law commissioned
by an ABA committee. See AM. BAR ASS’N CONDEMNATION, ZONING & LAND USE COMM., THE LAW
OF EMINENT DOMAIN: FIFTY-STATE SURVEY (William G. Blake ed., 2012). The survey reveals a
surprising dearth of authority in many states about how to handle regulatory takings claims.
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Murr, it is a kind of bouillabaisse put together from the catch of the
day. Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority said that “no single
consideration can supply the exclusive test for determining the de-
nominator.”56 Instead, a “multifactor standard” is required,57 one that
includes consideration of a state law’s treatment of the land along
with its physical characteristics and prospective value. But even these
factors were qualified by the Court. The state-law treatment is rele-
vant only if it is “reasonable.”58 The physical characteristics include
“the parcel’s associated topography, and the surrounding human
and ecological environment.”59 The prospective value must consider
benefits from the regulation such as “increasing privacy, expanding
recreational space, or preserving surrounding natural beauty.”60 The
ultimate question in every case is whether reasonable “expectations
about property ownership would lead a landowner to anticipate that
his holdings would be treated as one parcel, or, instead, as separate
tracts.”61 In short—in what may be the biggest understatement of all
regulatory takings jurisprudence—“the question of the proper parcel
in regulatory takings cases cannot be solved by any simple test.”62
I have an innate aversion to multifactor balancing tests. I always
suspect that they are a placeholder designed to provide a basis for
a decision when the proponent has no theory about how the matter
in question should be decided. What multifactor balancing amounts
to, in practice, is a delegation of authority to courts to decide mat-
ters ex post as they see fit. Such approaches have virtually no pre-
dictability. This invites litigation and makes it hard to settle cases.
It also undermines the central purpose of having a property regime
in the first place, which is to protect expectations about the control
and use of resources.
In this particular context, the multifactor approach also yields up
a kind of mind-boggling complexity. In effect, the federal definition of
parcel requires the use of a multifactor balancing test to define the
horizontal dimensions of a parcel, with no predetermined weight given
to any of the factors. This is just to figure out what the denominator
56. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945.
57. Id. at 1948.
58. Id. at 1945.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1946.
61. Id. at 1945.
62. Id. at 1950.
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should be for doing the numerator/denominator test. The numera-
tor/denominator test, in turn, is just one of three factors under the
Penn Central–multifactor balancing test. So in effect you have one
multifactor balancing test piled on top of another multifactor bal-
ancing test. To borrow Maureen Brady’s expression, Murr is “Penn
Central squared.”63
In Lucas-type cases, the effect of the multifactor test to define the
parcel is effectively to transform a subset of total takings cases (those
where there is some question about the horizontal scope of the parcel)
into de facto–Penn Central cases. If you hate Lucas and love Penn
Central, this is perhaps a good thing. But it seems like a backhanded
way to partially overrule Lucas, which has turned out to be a pretty
harmless precedent in practice.64 Either way, regulatory takings
law, which is already far too complicated and confusing, becomes
virtually incomprehensible to all but the most diligent student-note
writers. It will be utterly baffling to most local-land use lawyers and
state court judges. Given that the Supreme Court has done very
little in the forty years since Penn Central was decided to clarify the
factors it identified there,65 it is fanciful to think that the Court will
provide significant guidance to state court judges struggling to apply
the new federal constitutional definition of parcel.
The primary effect of the Court’s adoption of an ad hoc, federal
constitutional-balancing test for determining the horizontal dimen-
sions of the “parcel as a whole” will be to increase the costs of litigating
regulatory takings cases, magnify the uncertainty of the outcome,
and give the government another argument that can be used to de-
feat such claims. If a federal constitutional rule is imperative in these
circumstances, the rule adopted by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals—
that contiguous lots under the same ownership should always be
regarded as a single parcel—would be infinitely preferable.66 This
63. Maureen Brady, Penn Central Squared: What the Many Factors of Murr v. Wisconsin
Mean for Property Federalism, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 53 (2017); see also Nicole Stelle
Garnett, From a Muddle to a Mudslide: Murr v. Wisconsin, 2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 131.
64. See Krier & Sterk, supra note 2, at 87 (finding that only about 3.5 % of regulatory
takings cases involve Lucas-type claims and only about half are successful).
65. Thomas W. Merrill, The Character of the Governmental Action, 36 VT. L. REV. 649, 652
(2012).
66. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at A-1, Murr, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (reproducing the
opinion in Murr v. Wisconsin, No. 2013AP2828, 2014 WL 7271581 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 23,
2014) (unpublished)). The Court majority expressed doubt about whether the Court of Appeals
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would at least be relatively clear and would likely reduce the costs
of litigating regulatory takings claims. Sometimes a bit of over- or un-
derinclusiveness can result in more enforcement of constitutional
rights than a more fine-grained but confusing and costly approach.67
V. THE RISK OF MANIPULATION
Given these objections, what explains the Court’s decision to feder-
alize the law for determining the horizontal boundaries of parcels of
land for takings purposes? The short answer is that the government
parties in Murr, and the majority of Justices who joined Justice
Kennedy’s opinion, were worried about “gamesmanship.”68 Reading
the briefs, it is clear that the government lawyers were anxious about
manipulation by developers. Especially in the context of subdivision
development, developers have considerable discretion in drawing and
recording lot lines. The government lawyers worried that if the hori-
zontal scope of parcel is determined wholly as a matter of state law,
developers would be able to manipulate the denominator to manu-
facture plausible regulatory takings claims where they would other-
wise not exist.69
This is not a completely idle concern. The Solicitor General cited
several cases (including Lost Tree Village,70 where the government’s
petition for writ of certiorari was held for Murr) in which a devel-
oper sold off the vast majority of lots in a subdivision and then
brought a takings challenge against a development restriction on the
small number of remaining lots.71 Although these cases confirm that
the risk of manipulation is real, they do not tell us anything about
the magnitude of the risk. I would observe, in this connection, that
had adopted a bright-line rule, but said, “To the extent the state court treated the two lots as
one parcel based on a bright-line rule, nothing in this opinion approves that methodology, as
distinct from the result.” Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1949.
67. See Daryl Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 857, 920–26 (1999).
68. 137 S. Ct. at 1948.
69. See, e.g., notes 37–40 and accompanying texts. I refer throughout to manipulation by “de-
velopers,” since real estate developers will be the property owners most frequently involved in
regulatory takings disputes. But of course the principles discussed apply to all property owners.
70. Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 787 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
71. For other cases allegedly involving gamesmanship by developers, see Brief for the
United States, supra note 39, at 22–23.
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there is no evidence that the Murr family set about to manipulate
the demarcation of Lots E and F in order to generate a takings claim.
Rather than create federal constitutional rules to head off a per-
ceived risk of manipulation, which may or may not be a significant
problem, it would seem to be more prudent to wait until a case of
manipulation actually arises before determining whether a federal
definition is needed as a response.
A more general point is that, putting aside takings claims, manipu-
lation of lots lines is something that makes property in land a valuable
institution. Property is scalable, meaning one can add to or subtract
from existing property and still have property.72 Specifically, the abil-
ity of a landowner to subdivide the land into smaller lots or parcels
can enhance the value of the land. Similarly, the ability of an owner
to acquire contiguous lots and consolidate them into a larger tract can
also enhance the value of the land. This is a primary reason why state
law gives owners substantial freedom to add to and subtract from
existing rights in land, which is another way of saying that state law
gives owners the freedom to manipulate lot lines. What is a matter of
concern is the potential manipulation of lot lines to create or defeat
a constitutional claim for just compensation. It is important that in
devising some way to avoid this socially undesirable form of manip-
ulation we do not interfere with the socially desirable forms.
A second and related point is that manipulating denominators to
gin up takings claims is not a very promising way to make money in
real estate. Regulatory takings claims almost never succeed,73 and
they require a large investment of time and effort in litigation. A
much better way to make money is to plat a subdivision in such a
way as to sell lots to prospective purchasers at attractive prices. So,
one would expect that manipulation to create or defeat takings
claims would be relatively rare behavior.
A third consideration is that it is far from clear that local govern-
ments need a federal definition of parcel in order to protect themselves
from parcel-manipulating developers. If takings claims succeed based
72. See Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1713 (2012).
73. Empirical surveys of cases that apply the Penn Central-ad hoc test concur that only
about ten percent of claimants are successful. See Adam R. Pomeroy, Penn Central After 35
Years: A Three Part Balancing Test or One Strike Rule?, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 677 (2013); Krier
& Sterk, supra note 2, at 89.
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on challenges to local land use regulations, local governments are
the ones that have to pay. This should give them ample incentive to
develop rules or doctrines as a matter of state law that would disal-
low plats or plat amendments that seem designed to concoct takings
claims. For example, a plat that demarcates lots that exactly trace
the boundaries of a wetland could be disallowed. An analogy here is
the doctrine of abuse of rights, sometimes relied upon by state court
judges to refuse to enforce principles of law when they are manipu-
lated to extort money from others or otherwise engage in opportu-
nistic behavior.74 Under general principles of subsidiarity, it makes
sense to see if state law can head off manipulation rather than jump-
ing to federalization of a key component of property law.
Although the danger of manipulation by private developers was
the focus of the government lawyers in Murr, Justice Kennedy turned
the prospect of manipulation into a bidirectional concern. One danger
of using state law to define parcels, he wrote, is that a state might
define parcel to include multiple tracts only tangentially related to
each other or even all property owned by a person, anywhere in the
state. These sorts of moves would “improperly . . . fortify” the state
against takings claims.75 He cited no example of this happening in
the nearly one hundred years since diminution in value was intro-
duced as a relevant variable in takings cases. Given the general
hostility to takings of property by the government—as illustrated by
the widespread amendment of state laws in response to the Kelo
decision76—the posited fear of state manipulation of the concept of
parcel for the sole purpose of defeating takings claims strikes me as
far-fetched. Again, the proper response would seem to be to wait for
an actual case of such manipulation before deciding whether a fed-
eral constitutional response is warranted.
74. There is no formal doctrine of abuse of rights in the common law. See Anna di
Robilant, Abuse of Rights: The Continental Drug and the Common Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 687
(2010). Some have argued, however, that the principle is implicit in the law of equity. Joseph
M. Perillo, Abuse of Rights: A Pervasive Legal Concept, 27 PAC. L.J. 37 (1995). A prominent
common-law case thought to embody the principle is Edwards v. Allouez Mining Co., 38 Mich.
46 (1878) (Cooley, J.) (declining to enjoin a nuisance at the behest of a landowner who
purchased property in the hope of extracting a large payment from another property owner).
75. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945.
76. See generally ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND THE 
LIMITS OF EMINENT DOMAIN 141–64 (2015).
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VI. THE PATTERNING-DEFINITION ALTERNATIVE
It nevertheless remains true that five Justices in Murr were
convinced that manipulation of denominators was a sufficiently
worrisome prospect that the definition of parcel, for Takings Clause
purposes, could not be left to state law. The solution they adopted
was complete federalization. My view, to the contrary, is that the most
that is needed to handle the worry about manipulation is a thin
federal-patterning definition. In addressing the proper legal response
to potential risks of manipulation, one must divide the inquiry be-
tween government manipulation to defeat takings liability, and
developer manipulation to generate takings liability.
The risk of government manipulation is the risk that state legisla-
tures or courts will change or interpret state law in such a way as to
expand the scope of parcels—that is, expand the denominator—and
thereby shrink diminution in value. This is similar to the risk that
has episodically arisen in other contexts when state governments
have attempted to manipulate state law to evade or frustrate the
enforcement of federal rights.77 The time-honored way of policing
this kind of manipulation of state law is something called the “fair
and substantial basis” test.78 The test applies when some proposition
of state law is an antecedent to the enforcement of federal rights.
Federal courts, when they suspect that state law has been manipu-
lated to frustrate federal rights, will review a purported change in
or reinterpretation of state law to determine whether it has a “fair
and substantial basis” in pre-existing state law. Brantley Webb, in
a comprehensive note in the Yale Law Review, shows that the test
is only applied when there are strong reasons to suspect evasion of
77. For a general discussion of the many contexts in which the issue arises, see Henry
Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of State Law in
Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 1957–86 (2003).
78. The “fair and substantial basis” test was considered as a possible way of resolving
“judicial takings” claims in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of En-
vironmental Protection, 560 U.S. 702 (2010). Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion acknowledged
that the test has been used in cases that evaded the Court’s ability to review federal questions
(id. at 725–26) but argued that a better formulation, in the context of a judicial takings claim,
was whether the state court had eliminated an “established property right.” Id. at 726. His
proposed formulation failed to command a majority. In the context of a state manipulating the
state law of land boundaries in order to defeat a regulatory takings claim, the tried-and-true
test for dealing with evasions of federal rights seems appropriate.
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federal rights. When such evidence is missing, federal courts rou-
tinely defer to the state authorities’ understanding of state law.79
This seems to me to provide the answer to Justice Kennedy’s worry
about state-government manipulation of denominators to defeat
takings claims.
The problem of developer manipulation is different. Developers
have no power to change state law. Indeed, the danger of manipula-
tion in this context comes about from developers using state law in
a perfectly lawful manner to make changes in lot lines. Adjusting lot
lines is something that developers, like every landowner, have broad
discretion to do. The concern is that developers will use the discre-
tion conferred by state law in such a way as to shrink the horizontal
dimensions of lot lines, thereby reducing the denominator and making
it more likely that they can prevail in a regulatory takings claim.
What is needed is some legal basis for judges, when they confront
this kind of manipulation, to be able to deem the proper dimensions
of a parcel to be something other than what the developer would have
them to be. Because the problem here is created by the lawful use
of state law to generate a federal constitutional claim where none
should exist, the solution must come from federal constitutional law.
To the extent, then, that we credit the danger of developer manipu-
lation of lot lines—as did five Justices in Murr—the federal-patterning
definition of “parcel as a whole” must include the power to designate
the horizontal dimensions of a parcel to be other than what they are
under state law. The power to redraw lot lines in this fashion should
be exercised only when a court is convinced that the lot lines have
been manipulated by a developer in an effort to create or maximize the
plausibility of a regulatory takings claim. If not convinced that the
lines have been drawn in an effort to manipulate the takings inquiry,
the lot lines as established by the developer should be accepted as is
and should define the horizontal extent of the relevant parcel.
What kind of evidence should be considered in deciding whether
the lot lines are the product of developer manipulation? Obviously,
it will be rare to uncover “smoking gun” evidence of intent to draw lot
lines to bolster a takings case. At least this will be rare as long as
the attorney-client privilege exists. Two types of circumstantial
79. E. Brantley Webb, How to Review State Court Determinations of State Law in Con-
stitutional Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1192 (2011).
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evidence would seem to be sufficient to raise a red flag that manipu-
lation is likely occurring.
One type of evidence would be lot lines that are drawn to correspond
to the scope of a challenged regulation. For example, if a developer
challenges a building set-back regulation and establishes lot lines
that exactly correspond to the area required to comply with the set-
back provision, this would be strong evidence that the lots lines
have been established in an effort to declare the set-back regulation
a taking.80 The same would follow for lot lines that correspond to a
wetland, the critical habitat of an endangered species, or an open-
space requirement.
A second type of evidence would be lot lines drawn in such a way
that they have no plausible commercial value.81 Here the inference
of manipulation is less clear-cut. Sometimes developers make mis-
takes about what the market will find attractive. But if it appears that
lot lines have been drawn in such a way that they have no plausible
commercial value, this at least should give rise to further inquiry into
whether the motivation may have been to bolster a takings claim.
The main point is that these sorts of inquiries should be under-
taken only when the government has a legitimate basis for claiming
that lot lines have been manipulated in order to create or bolster a
claim of a regulatory taking. Such cases will be unusual. In the ordi-
nary, run-of-the-mill regulatory takings case, the lot lines established
under state law should be used in fixing the horizontal dimensions
of the “parcel as a whole” for the purposes of computing diminution
in value.
VII. THE PROPER DISPOSITION
Suppose I am right that Murr should have been resolved by adopt-
ing a thin federal-patterning definition that treats lots lines estab-
lished under state law as presumptively valid unless a court is
convinced that the lines have been manipulated to bolster a takings
claim. What, then, was the proper measure of the “parcel as a
80. See, e.g., Fee, supra note 36, at 1559.
81. This is Fee’s test for determining the horizontal scope of the denominator. See Fee
supra note 36, at 1557–62. He would evidently apply this test in all cases, whereas in my
formulation it would be relevant only as circumstantial evidence of developer manipulation.
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whole” in Murr? As previously indicated, there was no evidence the
Murrs acquired Lots E and F in an effort to manipulate the
numerator/denominator inquiry under federal takings law. Conse-
quently, there was no basis, under my proposed patterning defini-
tion, to disregard the relevant definition of parcel under Wisconsin
law. So how did Wisconsin law define the parcel in this case: Lot E
alone, or Lots E and F merged together?
It turns out that the answer was not very clear. The question boils
down to whether Wisconsin, or more accurately, St. Croix County,
had a rule of law requiring that contiguous lots be merged into a
single lot in circumstances like the one involving the Murrs. Wiscon-
sin’s brief relied on the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’s decision reject-
ing the family’s request for a variance. That decision said, at one
point, that under the relevant county-zoning rules Lots E and F were
“effectively merged.”82 But note carefully the qualifier: “effectively.”
What does effectively merged mean? Does it mean that the minimum-
lot size regulation had the same practical effect as if the lots had
been merged? This is not the same as saying they were merged as
a matter of law.
In the second decision by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals that
addressed the Murrs’ constitutional challenge, the court said flatly
that the transfer of Lot E to the Murr children “brought the lots
under common ownership and resulted in a merger of the two lots
under [the local ordinance].”83 But this decision, which was unpub-
lished, was based on the understanding that for regulatory takings
purposes contiguous lots must always be regarded as merged—an
idea expressly disapproved by the U.S. Supreme Court.84 The Wis-
consin Supreme Court declined to review either of the Court of
Appeals’ decisions in the Murr controversy.
82. Murr v. St. Croix Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 332 Wis. 2d 172, 184, 796 N.W. 2d 837, 844
(Wis. App. 2011). Several paragraphs later, the court stated: “[M]erger of adjacent sub-
standard lots that come under common ownership will preserve the environment in the same
ways that merger of lots already under common ownership would do. The failure to merge
would have the opposite effect, with no countervailing property value concern.” Id. at 184, 796
N.W. 2d at 844. This also falls short of saying that the lots were merged as a matter of law,
as opposed to “effectively merged” because of the prohibition of building on “substandard” lots
contiguous with another lot.
83. Murr v. Wisconsin, No. 2013AP2828, 2014 WL 7271581, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 23,
2014) (unpublished).
84. See supra note 66.
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In effect, there was no Wisconsin precedent, before the Murr con-
troversy arose, that ruled the St. Croix zoning ordinance required
a merger of contiguous lots as a matter of law. The County and the
National Association of Counties, as amicus curiae, argued at length
that merger provisions have a “long and rich” history and have never
been held to cause a taking.85 This is true but was beside the point.
The real question was whether Wisconsin, either through state stat-
ute, the local ordinance, state common law, or otherwise, had a man-
datory merger rule. As to that question, only one authority was cited
by the governments—the first Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision
in Murr. And that decision said only that the lots were “effectively
merged,” not that they were merged as a matter of law.86
In these circumstances, if the Court had concluded that under the
relevant federal-patterning definition the scope of the relevant parcel
was controlled by state law, the proper course was to remand the
case to the Wisconsin courts, with instructions for those courts to clar-
ify whether, under Wisconsin law, a zoning ordinance like the one in
St. Croix County requires the merger of contiguous lots as a matter
of law. Rather than adopting a federal constitutional definition of
parcel, which will only be a source of endless confusion and litiga-
tion, the U.S. Supreme Court should have asked Wisconsin’s courts
to clarify what Wisconsin law says about the scope of the relevant
parcel. The answer to this question would then establish whether
the denominator for the purpose of the regulatory takings claim was
one lot or two.
The last thing I should note is that the resolution of the relevant
denominator, under Wisconsin property law, would not resolve the
regulatory takings question. Even if it turned out that Wisconsin
law treated Lots E and F as distinct parcels, it would still be neces-
sary to show that the diminution in value caused by the minimum-
lot-size requirement caused a taking of Lot E. The County argued
that the highest and best use of Lot E was as an auxiliary holding
to Lot F—which, of course, is the current state of affairs. Both lots
are owned by the Murrs, and they have a variety of options for
developing the two lots together. But it does not appear that the
85. Brief of Amici Curiae National Ass’n of Counties in Support of Respondents, Murr v.
Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (No. 15-214), 2016 WL 3383223, at *5–10.
86. Murr, 332 Wis. 2d at 184, 796 N.W. 2d at 844.
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Wisconsin courts made a specific finding to this effect. The Supreme
Court suggested that the reduction in value was on the order of ten
percent, but this appears to be based on the assumption that Lots
E and F should be treated as merged into a single parcel.87 The
relevant question in determining the diminution in value, assuming
Lot E was a separate parcel, required more precisely focused evidence,
on remand. What was required was a finding of what Lot E would
fetch if it could be sold without restriction versus its value as an
auxiliary holding to Lot F. The relevant diminution in value, which
we will never know, was almost certainly not great enough to estab-
lish a taking under the Lucas version of the numerator/denominator
test, which requires a complete elimination of beneficial value. What
it would mean under the Penn Central version of regulatory takings
doctrine is, as always, deeply uncertain.
CONCLUSION
To summarize briefly, the horizontal dimensions of “the parcel as
a whole” should be determined under a thin federal-patterning def-
inition. That definition, as previous decisions have established,
prohibits conceptual severance. It should also permit courts to dis-
regard established lot lines if they have been adopted in an effort to
manipulate the regulatory takings inquiry. Otherwise, the horizon-
tal dimensions of the parcel should be determined by the way lot
lines have been configured under state law. In the Murr case, it was
unclear whether Wisconsin law would treat the Murrs’ two lots as
separate parcels or as a single, merged parcel. The case should have
been remanded to the Wisconsin courts for an answer. Even if Lot
E standing alone is the relevant parcel, it is far from clear that the
minimum-lot-size requirement was a taking, since the lot still had
significant value in its current or possible future use in conjunction
with Lot F.
Nothing I have said in this Article about the proper approach to
defining the denominator should be taken as an endorsement of the
diminution-in-value approach to regulatory takings. If anything, the
87. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1941 (citing the Wisconsin Circuit Court decision, Murr, 332 Wis.
2d, at 177–78, 184–85, 796 N.W. 2d, at 841, 844).
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hash the Court made of this question in Murr strongly supports the
conclusion that diminution in value is the wrong test for identifying
regulations that should be regarded as a taking requiring just
compensation. Here, as elsewhere, the path-dependent nature of the
Court’s constitutional jurisprudence has led the Court to burrow
deeper and deeper into a hole that should not have been dug in the
first place. But that is a topic for another day.88 My point here is
that the choice between state and federal law is inevitable given the
nature of the right created by the Takings Clause. And the Court
would be well served by giving more thought to the possibility of
intermediate solutions, such as the federal-patterning definition,
before federalizing bits and pieces of doctrine in this area.
88. For a condensed version of my own thoughts on this score, see Thomas W. Merrill, The
Supreme Court’s Regulatory Takings Doctrine and the Perils of Common Law Constitution-
alism, 34 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 1, 28–32 (2018).
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
DAVID L. CALLIES*
INTRODUCTION
Government ownership of land has always carried with it a series
of public obligations that collectively limit the use of such land (usually
for public rather than commercial or other private-like purposes) as
well as its transfer or disposal. Thus, if a government holds or ac-
quires a parcel of land, it may, for example, broadly use it for park,
recreation, or government-administrative functions (such as postal
services, fire and police stations, and other government offices). Also,
broadly speaking, a government may sell or lease such land if it is
found to be surplus, and typically it will be subject to no more than a
disposal statute or regulation, which may require a public auction or
other generalized offer to potential buyers or lessees. An exception
is land which the government formally holds in trust for the public,
subject to the public trust doctrine.
Broadly stated, the public trust doctrine provides that the govern-
ment holds certain submerged and adjacent lands, waters, and (in-
creasingly) other resources in trust for the benefit of its citizens,
establishing the right of the public to fully enjoy them for a variety
of public uses and purposes. Implied in this definition are limitations
on the private use of such water, land, or other resources, as well as
limitations on the government to transfer interests in those resources
to private parties, particularly if such transfer will prevent or ham-
per their use by the public. These limitations give rise to questions
including: (1) What is the distinction between the application of the
public trust doctrine and the truism that government always holds
land in trust for its citizens? (2) How and to what resources besides
water and lands immediately adjacent to water does the public trust
doctrine apply—does it apply to inland trails and trailheads, for
* FAICP, ACREL, Benjamin A. Kudo Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School
of Law, The University of Hawai‘i at Manoa. B.A., DePauw University; J.D., University of
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example? (3) What private uses can the government permit on public
trust water or land, short of sales or other transfers, which are gen-
erally prohibited—can the government permit private wharves for the
loading and the unloading of passengers or freight from private ves-
sels, for example? (4) Is public access to a public trust resource—like
a pathway across private land to a public beach, for example—
automatically a part of the public trust, or must that access be sep-
arately acquired by the government from the private landowner?
I. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE DEFINED
The public trust doctrine (“PTD”) may mean many things to many
people, but there is usually at least a sharp divide between the
common-law PTD universally associated with water, on the one hand
(with roots in Roman law as it was practiced in England and as it
came to the United States), and the universal principle that waters
and lands held by the government are usually, if not always, held in
trust for its citizens. Unfortunately, much literature and many courts
confuse the two, with serious consequences for the public and private
sector alike. For example, the common-law PTD has historically been
applied only to water and resources directly related to water (riparian
land, submerged land, and so forth), whereas the latter universal,
general trust principle extends (by state statute and constitution, in
many cases) to all manner of natural resources “owned” by the gov-
ernment. PTD resources are almost always held by—and are inalien-
able by—the government, and are limited to use by the public for
purposes such as fishing, fowling, and the like. Resources merely
held in general trust for the people are usually freely alienable and
useable for a variety of private and commercial purposes (usually ac-
cording to applicable public procurement law)1 such as mineral ex-
ploration and extraction, with caveats that holding such resources
for the public usually carries with it the need to preserve some sem-
blance of public use and enjoyment. Aside from this critical distinc-
tion, this Paper focuses entirely on the uses of, and access to, PTD
resources and the extent to which this formal designation is applicable
beyond the traditional trust resources of water and water-related land.
1. See DANIELLE M. CONWAY, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT (2012).
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II. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE BEYOND INTERESTS IN WATER:
NOT SO MUCH
There is little uniform application of the public trust doctrine among
the states. The doctrine was first recognized in American law in the
early nineteenth century in Arnold v. Mundy,2 which held that, like
England, submerged lands belong to the sovereign.3 Within a few de-
cades, the doctrine was expanded to include navigable waters.4 Thus,
the state owns and holds PTD waters that are navigable-in-fact, but
lands submerged beneath non-navigable waters can be owned pri-
vately.5 The doctrine has been expanded by some states, as certain
courts extended the doctrine to include non-navigable waters,6 ground
water,7 and (rarely) parklands.8
Many states have only extended the scope of the PTD beyond its
traditional common-law application covering navigable waterways
and tidelands to include more water resources, such as non-naviga-
ble waters, drinking water, groundwater, wetlands, all submerged
or submersible lands, and even public ownership of all water in the
state.9 In 2007 and 2008, for example, eight Great Lakes states en-
tered the Great Lakes—St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources
2. 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
3. Id. at 8, 32; see also Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845) (ruling that the
federal government held tidal-submerged lands in trust for future states prior to statehood).
4. See, e.g., McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Iowa 1, 18, 30 (1856); Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 484–85 (1988) (confirming that lands beneath both tidal and navi-
gable-in-fact waters were state-owned public trust lands).
5. See generally Michael C. Blumm, The Public Trust Doctrine and Private Property: The
Accommodation Principle, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 649, 650 (2010).
6. See, e.g., Montana Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont.
1984); State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659 (Ark. 1980); Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823 (S.D.
2004).
7. Infra notes 70–71 and accompanying text (for information about Hawai‘i and the
Waiahole Ditch cases). Vermont has statutes declaring that groundwater resources are held
in trust for the public, while the Great Lake States hold the lake water in trust for the public.
8. See, e.g., Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n of Chicago, 263 N.E.2d 11, 15 (Ill. 1970);
Friends of Van Cortland Park v. New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 2001).
9. For a meticulous summary of all fifty states’ public trusts, including PTDs and the
several issues they present, see Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern
Public Trust Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16
PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2007), and Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western
States’ Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an
Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53 (2010) [hereinafter Craig, Western States’ Public
Trust Doctrines].
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Compact, which, among other things, established a compact-wide PTD
whose scope reaches waters beyond the individual states’ common-
law doctrines.10 Among other things, such extensions of the public
trust doctrine have generated tensions between state PTDs and pre-
existing private-water rights—especially in the West where water is
generally less plentiful, prior appropriation rights dominate, and con-
veyances of water resources and the lands underlying them often pre-
date the states’ succession to federal public trust rights at statehood.11
Few states, however, have expanded their PTDs to include lands
and natural resources beyond water and the land beneath it. Al-
though around twenty states might claim to have done so in some
fashion—through language about holding resources in trust for the
public in state constitutions, statutes, or case law—few of these have
done so by expressly referencing the common-law public trust doc-
trine. Rather, they vaguely note that some resources are held in some
sort of “public trust.”12 These expansions of the general state lan-
guage about trusts for the public result in the coverage of wildlife and
other natural resources such as air and minerals. These expansions
have been mandated by constitutions and statutes as well as declared
by appellate courts. In 1998, for example, the Alaska Supreme Court
extended its PTD to cover all naturally occurring wildlife and miner-
als, based in part on several sections of the state constitution,13 but
it took a half step back the following year, describing the State’s
authority over wildlife and minerals to be merely trust-like but not
a formal enlargement of the State’s PTD.14 Iowa followed a similar
path, first suggesting that the State’s PTD extended to public re-
sources beyond water15 and then narrowing its interpretation so as not
to preclude the removal of natural timber from public lands adminis-
tered by the conservation board.16 The court noted that “[t]he purpose
10. Bridget Donegan, Comment, The Great Lakes Compact and the Public Trust Doctrine:
Beyond Michigan and Wisconsin Common Law, 24 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 455 (2009).
11. Craig, Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines, supra note 9.
12. Id. Such states include Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawai‘i,
Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. Id.
13. Baxley v. State, 958 P.2d 422 (Alaska 1998).
14. Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1031–32 (Alaska 1999).
15. Fencl v. City of Harper’s Ferry, 620 N.W.2d 808 (Iowa 2000); see also Larman v. State,
552 N.W.2d 158 (Iowa 1996).
16. Bushby v. Washington Cty. Conservation Bd., 654 N.W.2d 494 (Iowa 2002).
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of the public-trust doctrine is to prohibit states from conveying im-
portant natural resources to private parties” not the prevention of
forestry management.17 In Virginia, a federal court extended the PTD
“to protect and preserve” the state’s “natural wildlife resources” when
the state and federal governments sued for damages in the death of
waterfowl following an oil spill in the Chesapeake Bay.18
California, in its Fish and Game Code, proclaims that “[t]he fish
and wildlife resources are held in trust for the people of the state [but
not squarely through the public trust doctrine] by and through the
[D]epartment [of Fish and Game].”19 This provision has been upheld
by a California appellate court when it granted summary judgment
for private windmill operators in a suit brought by activists over bird
deaths caused by wind turbines.20 The court held that the plaintiffs
should have sued the County of Alameda, instead, as the responsi-
ble public agency.21 Connecticut, by statute, has created a public
trust in the state’s air and natural resources, and granted private
parties the right to sue both governmental and private entities to
protect them.22 An Ohio code section—apparently in an attempt to
justify laws regulating hunting—gives the state “title to all wild ani-
mals, not legally confined or held [privately] . . . in trust for the benefit
of all the people.”23 The code in West Virginia does the same and
specifically includes fish and amphibians.24 Hawai‘i’s constitution,
after declaring the need to balance conservation with self-suffi-
ciency, states that “[a]ll public natural resources are held in trust by
the State for the benefit of the people.”25 Michigan’s constitution ob-
liquely refers to the “public trust in air . . . or other natural resources”
when discussing a conservation fund26 but in practice follows a tra-
ditional form of the public trust doctrine. None of these courts or
legislatures specifically reference the public trust doctrine, however.
17. Id. at 497 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
18. In re Stewart Transp. Co., 498 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980).
19. CAL. FISH & GAME § 711.7 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 5 of 2019 Reg. Sess.).
20. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., 83 Cal Rptr. 3d 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
21. Id. at 606–07.
22. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-16 (West, Westlaw through the 2014 Supplement).
23. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1531.02 (West, Westlaw through Files 1 to 76 of the 130th
Gen. Assembly (2013–2014)).
24. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-3-3 (West, Westlaw through the 2014 Reg. Sess.).
25. HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
26. MICH. CONST. art. XI, § 40.
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New York arguably represents the most expansive of such public
trusts, so far. Under its constitution and statutes, New York’s forest-
preserve lands and specified state parks are forever inalienable and
to be kept in a natural state, with timber removal for any reason pro-
hibited.27 The New York Supreme Court, since 1871, has held that
municipalities hold parklands in trust for the public,28 and more
recently a host of opinions have reiterated that “[d]edicated park areas
in New York State are impressed with a public trust.”29 A state ap-
pellate court has even held that a municipal parking lot could be
within such public trusts if dedicated to public use by deed or legis-
lative act, but it was unwilling to consider use alone in that context:
“While a parcel’s continuous use as a public park or recreational
area may impress that parcel with a public trust by implication, the
petitioners have cited no authority for the proposition that a parking
lot may achieve public trust status through such means.”30
In Illinois jurisprudence, which also breaks from tradition, the PTD
applies not only to submerged lands but also to parks and conserva-
tion areas as long as they have been dedicated as such.31 Classifica-
tion of property as a “park” on a village land-use plan is insufficient
to trigger the PTD.32
To establish a right to a remedy under the [public trust] doctrine,
[a] plaintiff must allege facts showing certain property is held by
a government body for a given public use; the government body
has taken action that would cause or permit the property to be
used for purposes inconsistent with its originally intended public
use; and such action is arbitrary or unreasonable.33
Much less ambitious than New York or Illinois, Colorado’s con-
cept of “public trust” land extends to state school lands, which are
“held in a perpetual, inter-generational public trust for the support
27. N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERVATION LAW § 9-0301 (West, Westlaw
through L.2014, chapters 1 to 17).
28. Brooklyn Park Comm’rs v. Armstrong, 45 N.Y. 234 (1871).
29. Grayson v. Town of Huntington, 160 A.D.2d 835 (1990); see also Johnson v. Town of
Brookhaven, 230 A.D.2d 774 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
30. 10 E. Realty, LLC v. Incorporated Vill. of Valley Stream, 49 A.D.3d 764 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 907 N.E.2d 274 (N.Y. 2009).
31. Timothy Christian Sch. v. Vill. of Western Springs, 675 N.E.2d 168 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
32. Id. at 174–75.
33. Id. at 174 (quoting Paschen v. Vill. of Winnetka, 73 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1028 (1979)).
2019] THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 77
of public schools.”34 In Alabama, the state constitution creates a
“Forever Wild Land Trust” that buys and holds areas of natural
beauty in trust for the people, however the trustee is not the State
but an appointment board.35 Unquestionably, the most extreme exam-
ple of potentially expanding the public trust doctrine to lands with
no relationship to water comes from Hawai‘i, where plaintiffs seek-
ing to block the construction of the world’s largest reflecting tele-
scope just off the summit of the state’s 13,900-foot mountain, Mauna
Kea, have challenged its construction in part on public trust doctrine
grounds. The site is in an “astronomy precinct” on land leased by the
University of Hawai‘i from the State, and thirteen astronomical tele-
scopes are already built and operating in the precinct.36 In an earlier
concurring opinion dealing with due process, two justices of the state
supreme court specifically asked for thorough consideration of the ap-
plication of the public trust doctrine to the site, which is dozens of
miles from the nearest navigable water, and, of course—at thirteen
thousand feet—never submerged.37 However, in its subsequent opinion
upholding a state department’s granting a permit for the construc-
tion, the court failed to address the application of the PTD—as a
concurring justice correctly observed—but instead held only that all
public lands, like those on Mauna Kea, were held in some sort of
trust for the public.38 PTD in Hawai‘i, so far, applies only to water.
While a few commentators have suggested that the public trust
doctrine should be applied to some or all natural resources every-
where,39 few courts have accepted this extension. Thus, for example,
only the Supreme Courts of California, New Jersey, and Vermont have
gone so far as to declare the PTDs in their states are elastic and
34. COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 10.
35. ALA. CONST. art. XI, § 219.08.
36. In re Contested Case Hearing re Conservation District Use Application (Mauna Kea
II), 431 P.3d 752, 773–75, 143 Haw. 379, 400–03 (2018). See, for commentary on Hawai‘i’s
version of the public trust doctrine as well as an argument for more than one public trust
doctrine, Thomas W. Merrill, The Public Trust Doctrine: Some Jurisprudential Variations and
Their Implications, 38 U. HAW. L. REV. 261 (2016).
37. Mauna Kea Anaina Hou v. Bd. of Land & Nat. Res. (Mauna Kea I), 363 P.3d 224,
251–57, 136 Haw. 376, 403–09 (2015).
38. Mauna Kea II, 431 P.3d at 785–87, 773–75. 143 Haw. at 412–14.
39. Hope Babcock, Is Using the Public Trust Doctrine to Protect Public Parkland from Visual
Pollution Justifiable Doctrinal Creep?, 42 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (2015); Michael C. Blumm & Rachel
D. Guthrie, Internationalizing the Public Trust Doctrine: Natural Law and Constitutional and
Statutory Approaches to Fulfilling the Saxion Vision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 741 (2012).
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should evolve with the needs of the people they benefit.40 On the other
hand, in Sanders-Reed v. Martinez,41 the New Mexico court held that
the public trust doctrine did not empower the judicial branch to es-
tablish the best way to protect the atmosphere, citing decisions from
other jurisdictions who also refused to extend the PTD to the atmo-
sphere.42 Indeed, some states have refused to extend the PTD from
surface water to underground water.43
At least three states have recognized or created public trusts
separate from, and as alternatives to broadening the scope of, their
existing common-law PTDs. In Connecticut, the courts have applied
two notions of “public trust”: a common-law PTD “under which the
state holds in trust for public use title in waters and submerged lands
waterward of the mean high tide line,”44 and a statutory public trust
that “provides broadly that any person or corporation may maintain
an action for declaratory and equitable relief against the state . . . for
the protection of the public trust in the air, water and other natural
resources of the state from unreasonable pollution, impairment or
destruction.”45 Moreover, according to the state supreme court, both
types of “public trusts” are distinct from the principle that public
parks and beaches are held by municipalities “for the benefit of the
residents of the state.”46
As noted by one PTD scholar, “several states have extended the
concept of a public trust in waters to environmental protection,”
creating what she calls an “ecological public trust. California and
Hawai‘i have most extensively developed their ecological public trust
doctrines,”47 and they have done so by making law apart from the
40. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (en bank); Borough
of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972); Raleigh Ave. Beach
Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005) (reaffirming principle discussed in
Borough of Neptune City); State v. Cent. Vermont Ry., Inc., 571 A.2d 1128 (Vt. 1989).
41. 350 P.3d 1221 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
42. Id.
43. See Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Bd., 237 Cal. Rptr. 3d 393 (Cal. Ct. App.
2018).
44. Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 815 A.2d 1188, 1192–93 n.4 (Conn. 2003)
(quoting Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552 (Conn. 2001)).
45. Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. City of New London, 925 A.2d 292 (Conn. 2007)
(quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-16 (West, Westlaw through the 2014 Supplement))
(internal quotations and ellipses omitted).
46. Alves, 815 A.2d at 1193 n.4.
47. Craig, Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines, supra note 9, at 71.
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traditional common-law doctrine related to waterways and tidelands.
In 2008, the California Supreme Court decided that there are
two distinct public trust doctrines[:] . . . the common law doc-
trine, which involves the government’s affirmative duty to take
the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of
water resources . . . [and] a public trust duty derived from stat-
ute, specifically Fish and Game Code section 711.7, pertaining
to fish and wildlife.48
Arguably, Hawai‘i boasts four public trusts: (1) a navigable-waters
PTD under traditional common law; (2) a Native Hawaiian “public”
trust derived from Hawaiian history and culture under which chiefs
and, later, the monarchy held all water in trust for the people; (3) a
statutory public trust set out in the State Water Code, which incor-
porates both (1) and (2) and, among other things, provides for a Com-
mission on Water Resource Management to regulate uses of both
groundwater and surface water via an often contentious permitting
process; and (4) a constitutional public trust over the lands returned
by the federal government at statehood, benefiting Native Hawaiians
and the public at large.49 All four public trusts are supported under
Hawai‘i’s Constitution.50
In sum, courts, legislators, and state constitutions often declare
various lands and other resources to be held in trust for the public.
However, they rarely declare such land and resources to be subject
to the public trust doctrine.
III. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
While it is true that sometimes public property held in trust for
the public is subject to the public trust doctrine, the situation is some-
what different with respect to private property. There are two major
lines of cases: first, those cases in which a state was allowed to convey
48. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. California Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., 187 P.3d 888, 926
(Cal. 2008).
49. See Craig, Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines, supra note 9, at 86–88, 118–27
(discussing the complex nature and history of water, land, and the public trust in Hawai‘i);
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 174C-1 to -101 (West, Westlaw through Act 247 of the 2013 Reg. Sess.)
(setting forth Hawai‘i’s state water code).
50. HAW. CONST., art. XI, §§ 1, 7; id. art. XII, § 4.
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public trust lands to a private property owner because a public pur-
pose was still being served and the public trust lands were not ad-
versely affected by the conveyance, and second, those cases in which
a state conveyed, outright, lands held in the trust for the public.51
However, in the second line of cases, the private owners could only
use such lands insofar as the use was consistent with the public trust
doctrine. Regardless of which line of reasoning the courts adopted,
the main point appears to be that private use of public trust lands,
whether or not clearly subject to the public trust doctrine, is allowed,
so long as it furthers the purpose of the public trust.
A. Illinois Central and Private Interests
In the landmark 1892 case, Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois,52
the United States Supreme Court provided that a state
can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole
people are interested, like navigable waters and the soils under
them, so as to leave them entirely under the use and control of
private parties, . . . than it can abdicate its police powers in the
administration of government and the preservation of the peace.53
Illinois Central did provide that privatization of public trust doc-
trine resources could occur if the conveyance furthered a public pur-
pose and there was no substantial impairment of remaining trust
resources.54 Several cases have adopted these Illinois Central excep-
tions, notably in California with Boone v. Kingsbury (though this case
has not been cited by any other case, in California or elsewhere).55
In Boone, the California Supreme Court upheld leases given to pri-
vate parties to drill oil on trust lands, concluding that it would not
substantially interfere with the trust and noting that the State could
revoke the leases if there was substantial interference.56 In Wisconsin,
the state supreme court upheld the conveyance of submerged lands
of Lake Michigan to a private party because it was part of a larger
public scheme.57
51. See infra discussion in Part III.
52. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
53. Id. at 453–54.
54. Id.
55. 273 P. 797 (Cal. 1928).
56. Id. at 816.
57. City of Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 820, 830 (Wis. 1927); accord State v. Vill. of Lake
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Generally, in cases where a state has conveyed a public trust inter-
est, private parties are still burdened by the public trust doctrine.
After Illinois Central, the public trust doctrine did not require full
public ownership of lands; privatization was (and is) allowed as long
as the res publicum is maintained. Almost a century later, the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized that individual states may define the
lands held in public trust and recognize private rights in such lands.58
B. Examples of Private Interests in Public Trust (Doctrine) Property
Generally, as long as the property is not placed beyond the state’s
control and the private party is upholding the interests of the public
trust (doctrine), private use of public trust resources is allowed. Es-
sentially, the private party becomes the trustee for that particular
parcel. Should the private party cease to use the property in a way
that benefits the public trust, the state can reclaim that land, even
if it appears to be held by the private property owner in fee simple.
1. Alaska
A corporation and caretaker filed an action against a fisherman
for trespass in CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker.59 The Alaska Supreme
Court found that the corporation could not maintain the action against
the fisherman because, while the property had been conveyed by the
State to the private corporation, it was still subject to the public trust.
Thus, there was a continued public easement across the property.60
2. California
In 1971, the California Supreme Court decided Marks v. Whitney,61
recognizing that a landowner could have private interests (possession
and alienation) in public trust land but that interest was burdened
Delton, 286 N.W.2d 622 (Wisc. App. 1979); W. Indian Co. v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 643 F.
Supp. 869 (D.V.I. 1986). See also State v. S. Sand & Material Co., 167 S.W. 854, 856 (Ark.
1914) (upholding the legislature’s authority to sell sand and gravel, as it did not impair the
right of common enjoyment).
58. Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988).
59. 755 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1988).
60. Id.
61. 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971).
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by the public’s rights.62 Thus, private development or use was re-
strained if it was inconsistent with the public’s rights.63 This has been
followed by New York,64 South Carolina,65 and Michigan.66
In a more recent California Supreme Court decision, the court
found that there was continuous state supervision of public trust re-
sources, regardless of whether the property was in public or private
ownership.67 This principle has been followed by several other dis-
tricts; for example, in the Vermont cases cited below,68 as well as in
New Jersey69 and Hawai‘i.70 Courts following this doctrine do not elim-
inate private property but rather place conditions on it (e.g., should
the property no longer be used for the public trust, the state has a
right of re-entry).71 Thus, while private property interests are not
eliminated, they can be restricted, especially with respect to develop-
ment rights.72
3. Idaho
In Kootenai Environmental Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club,73 the
plaintiff environmental group sued to stop a private dock from being
62. Id.
63. Id. at 380–81.
64. Arnold’s Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, 35 A.D.2d 987, 993 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970) (ordering a land-
owner to remove fill he put in a bay).
65. McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119 (S.C. 2003) (denying
a takings claim concerning the denial of a fill permit for Myrtle Beach).
66. Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 65 (Mich. 2005) (holding that public trust gave the
public access to privately owned lands along the Great Lakes below mean high water mark).
67. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983).
68. See infra notes 97–105 and accompanying text.
69. Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 121 (N.J. 2005)
(requiring an upland private property owner to provide public access to the water even though
public use of the upland is subject to an accommodation of interest of the owner).
70. In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole I), 9 P.3d 409, 452, 454 (Haw. 2000)
(citing Mono Lake as instructive and indicating a preference to accommodate both instream
and offstream uses where feasible); In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole II), 93
P.3d 643, 658 (Haw. 2004) (noting that public and private water uses should be evaluated on
a case-by-case basis when considering the public trust).
71. See Waiahole I, 9 P.3d 409 (The court affirmed the authority of the state to grant non-
vested usufructuary rights to appropriate water even if the diversions harm public trust uses.
Courts and agencies are required to approve such diversions and to minimize harm to the
trust); Waiahole II, 93 P.3d 643 (affirming the same authority as Waiahole I); see also Ctr. for
Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., 83 Cal Rptr. 3d 588, 601 (Cal. App. 2008).
72. See Blumm, supra note 5, at 650.
73. 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983).
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built on a lake.74 The Idaho Supreme Court ultimately held that al-
though the grant to build the dock was subject to the public trust
doctrine, it did not violate the doctrine since there was a navigational
or economic necessity to justify the permit.75 Moreover, the court
found there would be no adverse effect on the property, navigation,
fish and wildlife habitat, aquatic life, recreation, aesthetic beauty,
or water quality.76
In subsequent cases, the State attempted to construct a public
beach, docks, and parking lot on property the landowner allegedly
owned in fee simple. Ultimately, the court concluded that the State
failed to demonstrate that the property in question was subject to
the public trust doctrine; therefore, the State was enjoined from its
construction since the plan exceeded the district’s rights under the
easement over the property.77
4. Illinois
A century ago, in People ex rel. Attorney General v. Kirk,78 the
Illinois Supreme Court found that the legislature had the power to
convey lands held under the public trust doctrine in order to build
boulevards and driveways, because the public interest was not im-
paired.79 Similarly, in a 2003 case the Illinois Supreme Court found
that collecting an admission fee did not ipso facto diminish or impair
the rights of the public in the trust.80 Although in that case it was
determined that there were no private interests at issue, presumably
if there was a private interest in public trust lands that involve charg-
ing a nominal fee, it would likely be upheld—so long as the public
interest was served and the rights of the public were not harmed.81
Worth noting and following is the erupting litigation in Illinois
that has attempted to block the location of the Obama Presidential
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1095.
76. Id. at 1095–96.
77. See Idaho Forest Indus., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Watershed Improvem’t Dist., 733 P.2d
733 (Idaho 1987), further reviewed in Idaho Forest Indus., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Watershed
Improvem’t Dist., 17 P.3d 260 (Idaho 2000).
78. 45 N.E. 830 (Ill. 1896).
79. Id.
80. Friends of Parks v. Chicago Park Dist., 786 N.E.2d 161, 168 (Ill. 2003).
81. Id.
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Library on Chicago lakefront parkland.82 Chicago is contesting the
objectors’ claims both that the parkland, having never been sub-
merged, could be subject to the public trust doctrine as interpreted
in the Illinois Central case and that such a quasi-public use would,
in any event, be inconsistent with the res publicum in the parkland,
noting that a museum and a planetarium already sit on such land.83
The issues are strikingly similar to those raised in Hawai‘i’s TMT
case,84 where the first issue—about the mountain failing to be subject
to the PTD because it had never been submerged—was studiously
avoided by the Hawai‘i Supreme Court. However the court clearly
and unanimously held that the telescope, to be built by a consortium
of universities, would, in any event, be an appropriate use not con-
flicting with a res publicum. It also noted that other telescopes were
already constructed on the summit and slopes of the state-owned,
mountaintop land.85
5. New Jersey
An interesting case is that of Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis
Beach Club,86 in which a private beach club charged its members a
fee to access the private beach.87 Basing its decision on Matthews v.
Bay Head Improvement Ass’n,88 the New Jersey Supreme Court found
that the private beach had to be opened to the public for a reasonable
fee (the amount to be determined later by the State).89 In a round-
about way, this could be construed as an example of a private use or
benefit of public trust land, especially if the members paid a differ-
ent fee structure than the public.
82. Protect Our Parks, Inc. v. Chicago Park Dist., No. 1:18-CV-03424, 2018 WL 2194256
(U.S.D.C./N.D. Ill. 2019).
83. See Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Protect Our Parks, Inc., 2018 WL 2194256 (filed Nov. 21, 2018).
84. See In re the Contested Case Hearing re Conservation District Use Application
(CDUA) for the Thirty Meter Telescope of the Mauna Key Science Reserve, SCOT-17-0000705
(Haw. 2018).
85. In re Contested Case Hearing re Conservation District Use Application (Mauna Kea
II), 431 P.3d 752, 773–75, 785–87, 143 Haw. 379, 400–03, 412–14 (2018).
86. 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005).
87. Id. at 121.
88. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvem’t Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
89. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d at 124.
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6. Rhode Island
In a Rhode Island case, a town sought to enjoin a ferry boat from
docking over a pond.90 The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
while the State had transferred all “right[s], title[,] and interest[s]”
of the pond to the town, the State did not relinquish its public trust
responsibilities.91 Because there was a state statute allowing the ferry
boat company exclusive jurisdiction over development and opera-
tions, the court ruled that the town could not enjoin the company’s
activities despite violations of the town’s zoning laws.92
7. Texas
In City of Galveston v. Menard,93 the Supreme Court of Texas up-
held the validity of a land patent for submerged beds, noting that
while ordinarily it is best to devote the State’s water interests to public
use, sometimes the public’s use and enjoyment of property can best
be fulfilled by allowing portions to be used for wharves and docks.94
In a subsequent case a century later, the State argued that it owned
certain submerged land as part of the public trust despite a patent
conveying that land to a private owner.95 Based on earlier decisions,
the court noted that where the grant was explicit as to its reserva-
tions (and did not include an encumbrance based on the public trust
doctrine), the State could not later assert an interest.96 The lands
were not encumbered by the public trust doctrine.
8. Vermont
In Vermont, the state’s supreme court ruled that although a rail-
road company held fee simple title to filled lands along the city’s
waterfront, it did not hold title free of the public trust doctrine; there-
fore the lands could only be used for purposes approved by the legis-
lature as public uses.97 Should the company use the lands for anything
90. Champlin’s Realty Assocs., v. Tillson, 823 A.2d 1162 (R.I. 2003).
91. Id. at 1167.
92. Id. at 1169.
93. 23 Tex. 349 (1859).
94. Id.
95. Natland Corp. v. Baker’s Port, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 52, 59 (Tex. App. 1993).
96. Id.
97. State v. Cent. Vermont Ry., Inc., 571 A.2d 1128 (Vt. 1989).
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but railroad, wharf, or storage purposes, the State would have a right
of re-entry.98 Quoting the California Mono Lake case, Vermont’s
high court stated:
the core of the public trust doctrine is the state’s authority as sov-
ereign to exercise a continuous supervision and control over the
navigable waters of the state and lands underlying those wa-
ters. . . . The corollary rule which evolved in tideland and lakeshore
cases bar[s] conveyance rights free of the trust except to serve
trust purposes . . . . [P]arties acquiring rights in trust property
generally hold those rights subject to the trust and can assert no
vested right to use those rights in a manner harmful to the trust.99
The Vermont court also cited a Massachusetts case involving early
nineteenth-century statutes granting a wharf company the right to
construct wharves in the Boston Harbor and hold them in fee sim-
ple.100 In 1964, a development company that had obtained the rights
to the wharves attempted to confirm the title in the lands beneath
them. The Massachusetts court ultimately decided that the develop-
ment corporation had title to the property, “but subject to the condi-
tion subsequent that it be used for the public purposes for which it
was granted.”101
In a 2001 case, the Vermont Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
State over a bank and condominium association.102 A project held in
condominium ownership had been developed over land that had
once been part of a lake (it had been filled in the 1800s). The project
was constructed on the land, and, ultimately, it was determined that
the land over which it was constructed was part of the public trust.
The bank and condominium association argued that the public trust
doctrine should be modified to recognize the power of the legislature
to convey public trust lands to private ownership.103 While recogniz-
ing that this power does technically exist, the court did not find that
the State clearly intended to convey the land free of the public trust
98. Id. at 1135.
99. Cent. Vermont Ry., Inc., 571 A.2d at 1132 (quoting Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior
Court (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983)).
100. Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356 (Mass. 1979).
101. Id. at 367.
102. Cmty. Nat’l Bank v. State, 782 A.2d 1195 (Vt. 2001).
103. Id. at 1197.
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obligations.104 Thus, the court affirmed that the bank and associa-
tion held the property subject to the state’s public-trust-doctrine
interest. While the property values decreased,105 presumably some
private use still existed (although the case is not clear).
In sum, private ownership and use of public resources impressed
with the public trust doctrine is allowed, so long as the private use
conforms to public trust purposes.
IV. ACCESS TO THE PUBLIC-TRUST-DOCTRINE RESOURCE
Above the mean high water mark, several theories have been
applied to give the public access to privately owned beach areas,
including prescriptive easements, implied dedication, custom, and ex-
tension of the public trust.106 This section focuses only on the exten-
sion of public trust doctrine, specifically those cases and secondary
sources discussing access to public-trust-doctrine resources.107 Trust
resources are often surrounded by privately owned property, raising
questions of the public’s ability to reach the resource.108 While some
jurisdictions hold that access to the resource is part of the public trust
doctrine, this access is limited,109 and government agencies employ
the police power to regulate access.110
104. Id. at 1198.
105. Id. at 1197.
106. Linda A. Malone, Public Rights in Beach Areas, in 1 ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF
LAND USE § 3:4 (2013).
107. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, Access to Public Waters-Beach Access, in LAW OF WATER
RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 8:32 (2013) (“Because there is no privilege to trespass on private
land to exercise a public right, the public may not enter on privately owned upland to reach
public rights. Access must either be over public land open to the public or by the permission
of the upland owner. . . . [T]he line between public rights and exclusive private property is
eroding. There are two primary reasons. One is the practical problem that a citizen exercising
a public right to use water cannot easily determine the water boundary. Also, some temporary
upland use may be necessary to enjoy the public right. Second, in addition to these practical
problems, there are pressures to expand access to public waters caused by a growing popula-
tion with an increasing taste for leisure. Courts and legislatures have responded both to the
practical problems and to the pressures by creating new public rights of access. These public
rights extend mainly to beaches, but limited rights to use the uplands bordering navigable
recreational streams exist in some states.”).
108. RICHARD G. HILDRETH & RALPH W. JOHNSON, OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW 94 (1983)
(“Preserving public recreational access rights in navigable waters has become one of the prin-
cipal uses of the public trust doctrine.”).
109. See, e.g., Township of Neptune v. State, 41 A.3d 792, 802 (N.J. App. Div. 2012) (holding
that the State is under no obligation to dredge channels in a body of water to ensure access).
110. See, e.g., State v. Oliver, 727 A.2d 491, 497 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (upholding
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Public trust access also has an equal-protection component: state
and local governments cannot allow some members of the public to use
the trust resource and deny others access without a rational basis.111
Issues regarding equal access most often arise when a public trust
resource is conveyed or leased to private parties, which inevitably,
to some extent, deprives other members of the public access.112 The
public’s right to use public trust resources bars the owners of prop-
erty contiguous to the resource from interfering with the public’s law-
ful access.113
Some states define the public trust doctrine as including the
protection of public access to navigable waters and of environmental
quality.114 In a series of cases, the New Jersey Supreme Court has
conviction of the defendants for surfing when the beach had been closed due to a hurricane
and stating that “[w]e need not, on these facts, determine the outer limits of such jurisdiction
[of the Borough of Spring Lake] or the further relationship between the Public Trust Doctrine
and territorial jurisdiction”); Sea Watch, Inc. v. Borough of Manasquan, 451 A.2d 192 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (holding that the municipality could charge a reasonable fee to use
a walkway).
111. Capano v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 530 F. Supp. 1254 (D.N.J. 1982). Applying New
Jersey law, the court held that the public trust doctrine did not require the defendants to permit
swimming on all of the beach areas of a city. Id. The city could not, however, allow a group of
nuns to use a particular beach while denying access to other members of the public. Id. Cf.
Secure Heritage, Inc. v. City of Cape May, 825 A.2d 534, 548 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003)
(holding that establishing limits on the number of beach passes and on the transferability of pas-
ses was non-discriminatory and did not violate the public trust doctrine); Jersey City v. State
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 545 A.2d 774, 783 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (finding no violation of
the public trust doctrine where a marina was to be open to the general public on a non-discrimi-
natory, first-come-first-serve basis, and commending that “[u]nsubsidized market-mechanism
price determination for berthing service does not alone imply invidious discrimination”).
112. ABKA Ltd. P’ship v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Natural Res., 635 N.W.2d 168, 182 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2001) (“In essence, a dockominium development attempts to offer a small class of boat
owners the exclusive and permanent right to own and to occupy a portion of public trust waters
and provides access to the waters to a select group of the public, which fails to satisfy the pur-
pose of the public trust doctrine.”); Kootenai Envtl. All., Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc.,
671 P.2d 1085, 1098 (Idaho 1983) (Bistline, J., concurring) (stating that a private yacht club
“is not a public purpose which is within the power of the state to grant under its trust duties
to the public which it serves”).
113. In re Ownership of Sanders Beach, 147 P.3d 75, 85 (Idaho 2006) (rejecting the argu-
ment by landowners of lakeside property that as part of their littoral rights they could exclude
the public from the area between the high and low water mark during periods when water did
not cover the area, on the grounds that this suggested littoral right “would be contrary to the
central substantive thought in public trust litigation”); South Dakota Wildlife Fed’n v. Water
Mgmt. Bd., 382 N.W.2d 26, 30 (S.D. 1986) (“[T]he riparian owner may not interfere with or
prevent the public’s use or lawful access.”).
114. See, e.g., State v. Sorensen, 436 N.W.2d 358 (Iowa 1989). In holding that the public
trust applied to land formed by accretion from the Missouri River, the court noted that the
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broadly defined public-access rights, requiring adjacent property
owners to provide that access.115 In Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea,116
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a municipality could not
discriminate between residents and non-residents when charging a
fee for the use of a municipally owned beach.117 The issue raised was
the right to ocean access under the public trust doctrine. The court
concluded that the doctrine “dictates that the beach and the ocean
waters must be open to all on equal terms.”118 The court reasoned
that the public trust doctrine requires the use of municipally owned
dry-sand beaches to facilitate access to trust resources.119
In 2003, Neptune City was affirmed when an appellate court held
that a provision of an ordinance banning the sale and transferability
of seasonable beach tags to the lodging industry “does not discrimi-
nate against non-residents nor does it offend the public trust doc-
trine.”120 However, the section of the ordinance banning the sale of
seasonable beach tags to hotels, motels, inns, and the like, while al-
lowing individuals to purchase transferable beach tags violated
equal protection.121
land was suited for public access to the river and took judicial notice “of the expanding involve-
ment of Iowans in recreational activities on or near navigable waters such as the Missouri
River.” Id. at 363. For a comprehensive analysis of this development, see Craig, Western
States’ Public Trust Doctrines, supra note 9. In DeWolf v. Apovian, No. 08 MISC 381982 HMG,
2012 WL 3139702 (Mass. Land Ct. 2012), adhered to on reconsideration, 2012 WL 6684766
(Mass. Land Ct. 2012), the Massachusetts Land Court held that the owner of a lot adjacent
to a lot on which a jetty is located had no easement to use the jetty, but that “the structure
and land between the mean high and mean low water marks remain subject to the rights of
the public encompassed within the Public Trust Doctrine.” Id. at *9. See also A. Dan Tarlock,
The Public Trust, in LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 8.18 (2013) (“Because the doc-
trine is almost entirely judge-made, in the early years of the environmental movements, lawyers
seized upon the trust as a basis for judicial review of all resource choices. As a result, the clas-
sic public trust is being merged with the traditionally unrelated assertion of state ownership
of water in trust for the people to produce judicial limitations on the exercise of all water
rights.” (citations omitted)).
115. For a complete overview of all New Jersey cases, see Thomas J. Fellig, Pursuit of the
Public Trust: Beach Access in New Jersey from Neptune v. Avon to Matthews v. BHIA, 10
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 35 (1985).
116. 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 54.
119. Id. See, e.g., Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571, 573 (N.J. 1978) (stating that
its holding in Avon did not apply only to the wet-beach area between low and high water); see
also Lusardi v. Curtis Point Prop. Owners Ass’n, 430 A.2d 881 (N.J. 1981).
120. Secure Heritage, Inc. v. City of Cape May, 825 A.2d 534, 548 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2003).
121. Id. at 549.
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The decision in Neptune City raises the question of whether the
same public beach access would be required if the dry-sand beach had
not been publicly held.122 In Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n,
the court answered this question affirmatively.123 There, an associa-
tion of property owners sought to restrict the public’s access to beaches
controlled by the association. Further expanding the public trust doc-
trine and access rights, the court held that the public must be afforded
reasonable access to the shore and a suitable area for recreation on
the dry sand, even if the public’s rights on private beaches are not co-
extensive with the rights they enjoy on municipal beaches.124 Ulti-
mately, the court required the owners association to open its beach
by offering membership in the association to the public.125
In Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc.,126 an
appellate court clarified Matthews, liberally holding in favor of pub-
lic access and requiring that the owners of a private beach provide
access across the dry sand for the public to enjoy trust resources.127
The court ignored the landowner’s claims that public access would
prevent the owner from generating a profit from serving its own
clientele, would require the landowner to provide lifeguard services
without charge, and would even address the fee that the landowner
could charge.128
On the other hand, some jurisdictions are adamant that access
across private land in order to reach a public trust resource is the
equivalent of an easement, requiring compensation to the affected
private landowner. Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire so
require. Perhaps the clearest of these judicial declarations comes from
Opinion of the Justices (Public Use of Coastal Beaches),129 in which
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire rejected a statutory attempt
to legislate access to public beaches across private property. Liberally
citing the Maine case of Bell v. Town of Wells130 (which was decided
122. Access to Trust Resources, in 1 STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4:19 (2013).
123. 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
124. Id. at 365–66.
125. Id. at 369.
126. 851 A.2d 19 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
127. Id. at 29 (rejecting the argument that no access was required because the public had
other means of reaching the sea, in part because of “the inconvenience associated with the
nearest available perpendicular access to the north”).
128. Id. at 29–30, 33.
129. 649 A.2d 604 (N.H. 1994).
130. 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989).
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on the constitutional right to exclude the public from private prop-
erty131), the New Hampshire court held that “[a]lthough the State has
the power to permit a comprehensive beach access and use program
by using its power of eminent domain, it may not take property rights
without compensation through legislative decree.”132 The court closed
by noting that “if the work is one of great public benefit, the public
can afford to pay for it.”133
CONCLUSION
In sum, there continues to be a lot of confusion between the public
trust doctrine and the concept of the government generally holding
property or resources in trust for its citizens. The former carries a
lot more public responsibilities with it. The latter does or does not,
depending upon the language of the constitution or legislation that
establishes the resource as either a different kind of trust or no trust
at all. It is also clear that despite suggestions and commentary to the
contrary, there is virtually no movement to extend the public trust
doctrine beyond its traditional association with and application to
water and water resources, submerged lands, and shoreland.134 More-
over, it is abundantly clear that many private uses of public trust re-
sources are routinely permitted so long as the res publicum of the
PTD is preserved and there is some public benefit to the private use.
Finally, most state courts that have considered the matter do not
extend the PTD to include the public’s right to access the PTD re-
source across private property. Courts in New England are particu-
larly clear that if the public wants access to a PTD resource across
private land, the public must pay for it.
131. Id. at 178 (“The interference with private property here involves a wholesale denial
of an owner’s right to exclude the public.”).
132. Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d at 611.
133. Id. (quoting Eaton v. B.C. & M.R.R., 51 N.H. 504, 518 (1872)).
134. The only true exception appears to be in New York, the courts of which extend the
PTD to public parks.

STILL IN EXILE? THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE
CONTRACT CLAUSE
JAMES W. ELY, JR.*
The Contract Clause is no longer the subject of much judicial solici-
tude or academic interest.1 Since the 1930s the once potent Contract
Clause has been largely relegated to the outer reaches of constitu-
tional law.2 This, of course, was not always the case. On the contrary,
throughout the nineteenth century the Contract Clause was one of the
most litigated provisions of the Constitution. In 1896, Justice George
Shiras astutely commented: “No provision of the constitution of the
United States has received more frequent consideration by this court
than that which provides that no state shall pass any law impairing
the obligation of contracts.”3 A brief survey of the evolution of con-
tract clause jurisprudence helps to put into perspective the current
desuetude of the Clause.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The first provision protective of contractual rights was contained
in the Northwest Ordinance of July 1787.4 Its adoption anticipated
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Mary on October 5, 2018. I want to thank Katie Hanschke of the Massey Law Library of
Vanderbilt University for her valuable research assistance. I also wish to thank David F.
Forte for his helpful comments on an earlier version of this Article.
1. Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution provides, in part: “No State . . . shall pass any . . .
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
2. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 237 (2016)
(“By the 1940s the political triumph of the New Deal and the accompanying growth of the
regulatory state relegated the contract clause to the periphery of constitutional law.”).
3. Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U.S. 118, 121 (1896).
4. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North-West
of the River Ohio, art. 2 (July 13, 1787) in 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,
1774–1789, 340 (“And, in the just preservation of rights and property, it is understood and
declared, that no law ought ever to be made or have force in the said territory, that shall, in
any manner whatever, interfere with or affect private contracts, or engagements, bona fide,
and without fraud previously formed.”); see Denis P. Duffey, The Northwest Ordinance as a
Constitutional Document, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 960 (1995); Matthew J. Festa, Property and
Republicanism in the Northwest Ordinance, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 409, 448–52 (2013).
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the move at the Constitutional Convention to fashion a constitu-
tional guarantee of agreements from state abridgements. Although
the Contract Clause was added to the Constitution late in the delib-
erations of the Convention and without much debate, prominent mem-
bers of that body stressed the importance of a prohibition on state
interference with contracts as a means of protecting contractual
stability and promoting commerce.5 The measure was undoubtedly
a response to the unhappy experiences with state debt-relief laws
passed during the post–Revolutionary Era.6 It bears emphasis that
the framers thought a specific ban on state abridgement of agreements
was so essential as to warrant adoption in the Constitution at the
same time they were arguing that a bill of rights was unnecessary.7
There were harbingers of robust contract clause jurisprudence even
before the advent of John Marshall as Chief Justice in 1801.8
At the same time, there were limitations on the reach of the pro-
vision. By its express language, the Contract Clause applied only to
the states and not to Congress. Thus, Congress was free to abridge
contracts should circumstances dictate and was expressly authorized
to enact bankruptcy laws.9 Moreover, as James Wilson pointed out
at the Constitutional Convention,10 the Clause only safeguarded ante-
cedent agreements against retroactive legislation and did not limit
state laws pertaining to subsequent agreements made after the
5. ELY, supra note 2, at 12–17.
6. ALLAN NEVINS, THE AMERICAN STATES DURING AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION,1775–1789
404–05, 537, 571 (1924); Stuart Bruchey, The Impact of Concern for the Security of Property
Rights on the Legal System of the Early American Republic, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1137–40;
James W. Ely, Jr., Economic Liberties and the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 45 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 673, 698–700 [hereinafter Ely, Economic Liberties].
7. Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 537
(1989) (“This was the Federalist effort to link the eighteenth century’s affirmation of indi-
vidual liberty with the rhetoric of contract and private property. Thus, the Federalists valued
market ‘freedom’ so highly that they forbade the states from ‘impairing the obligation of Con-
tract’ in the original 1787 Constitution, at a time when they believed an elaborate Bill of
Rights unnecessary.”).
8. ELY, supra note 2, at 22–29.
9. Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902) (Fuller, C.J.) (“The subject
of ‘bankruptcies’ includes the power to discharge the debtor from his contracts and legal lia-
bilities, as well as to distribute his property. The grant to Congress involves the power to
impair the obligation of contracts, and this the states were forbidden to do.”).
10. Remarks in the Federal Convention (August 28, 1787), in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF
JAMES WILSON 158 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007) (“Mr. Wilson. The answer
to these objections is that retrospective interferences only are to be prohibited.”).
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effective date of the law.11 The Clause had no prospective application
to future contracts.
The Contract Clause influenced the drafting of subsequent state
constitutions. Most states, as they revised existing or adopted new con-
stitutions, incorporated language to safeguard the security of agree-
ments. This development strengthened the high standing of contracts
in the constitutional order.12 State courts regularly enforced the con-
tract clauses in both federal and state constitutions throughout the
nineteenth century.13
Both John Marshall and his successor Roger B. Taney developed
the Contract Clause into a muscular restraint on state authority.
Marshall notably construed the provision to cover public as well as
private contracts.14 In a line of famous cases he ruled that the Contract
Clause reached state land grants,15 grants of tax exemption,16 and
corporate charters.17 Marshall also applied the provision to protect pri-
vate contracts in the face of state debt-relief laws.18 Taney moder-
ated the protection afforded corporations under the Contract Clause
by strict construction of the privileges contained in corporate char-
ters,19 but for the most part he built upon Marshall’s jurisprudence.
For example, the Court under Taney’s leadership repeatedly upheld
grants of tax exemption against state-legislative attempts to levy
taxes.20 In addition, Taney vigorously wielded the Contract Clause
to vindicate private contracts and sustain the contractual rights of
11. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 262 (1827); see also id. at 327 (Trimble,
J.) (commenting that the Contract Clause left the states “full liberty to legislate upon the
subject of all future contracts”); Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595, 603 (1877) (“The States may
legislate as to contracts thereafter made, as they may see fit. It is only those in existence
when the hostile law is passed that are protected from its effect.”).
12. Ely, Economic Liberties, supra note 6, at 702.
13. E.g., Jones v. Crittenden, 4 N.C. 55 (1814); People ex rel. Thorne v. Hayes, 4 Cal. 127
(1854), overruled in part by Hooker v. Burr, 70 P. 778 (Cal. 1902); Oatman v, Bond, 15 Wis. 20
(1862); The Homestead Cases, 63 Va. 266 (1872); Swinburne v. Mills, 50 P.489 (Wash. 1897).
14. ELY, supra note 2, at 32–43.
15. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
16. New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812).
17. Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
18. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
19. Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.)
420 (1837); see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, 112 (1991)
(“The real effect of the Charles River Bridge case was to give entrepreneurs what they bar-
gained for.”).
20. ELY, supra note 2, at 81–86.
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creditors. He explained that the Clause “was undoubtedly adopted
as a part of the Constitution for a great and useful purpose. It was to
maintain the integrity of contracts, and to secure their faithful exe-
cution throughout this Union, by placing them under the protection
of the Constitution of the United States.”21
The Civil War and Reconstruction generated a number of novel
contract clause claims as well as a number of issues similar to those
addressed in the antebellum years.22 The Supreme Court upheld the
validity of contracts, calling for payments in Confederate currency
and contracts for the purchase of slave property. It invalidated the
retroactive application of enlarged homestead exemptions that were
enacted in postbellum Southern states as impairments of anteced-
ent agreements.23 In the same vein, the Court sustained legislative
tax-exemption grants as within the shelter of the Contract Clause.24
It looked skeptically on a variety of legislative schemes to repudiate
municipal debt.25
Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 indirectly impacted
the role of the Contract Clause in the late nineteenth century.26 The
Contract Clause had been the primary vehicle for federal judicial re-
view of state legislation until this point. That would gradually change.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment opened the
door for an additional avenue of federal court review and in time
would partially eclipse the Contract Clause.27
In the late nineteenth century, courts and commentators lavished
praise on the pivotal role of contracts in the market economy and
the vital role of the Contract Clause. Justice William Strong insisted
21. Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311, 318 (1843).
22. James W. Ely, Jr., The Contract Clause During the Civil War and Reconstruction, 41
J. SUP. CT. HIST. 257 (2016).
23. James W. Ely, Jr., Homestead Exemptions in Southern Legal Culture, in SIGNPOSTS:
NEW DIRECTIONS IN SOUTHERN LEGAL HISTORY 289–314 (Sally E. Hadden & Patricia Hagler
Minter eds., 2013).
24. See, e.g., Wilmington R.R. v. Reid, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 264 (1872); Wash. Univ. v. Rouse,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 439 (1869); Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 430 (1869).
25. See, e.g., Bd. of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531 (1871); Von Hoffman v. City of
Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1867).
26. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in part, that no state shall “deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
27. ELY, supra note 2, at 155–57 (pointing out that in the late nineteenth century
railroads increasingly relied on the Due Process Clause rather than the Contract Clause in
challenges to state-imposed rate regulations).
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in 1878: “There is no more important provision in the Federal Consti-
tution than the one which prohibits States from passing laws im-
pairing the obligation of contracts, and it is one of the highest duties
of this court to take care the prohibition shall neither be evaded nor
frittered away.”28 State courts often expressed similar sentiments. The
Supreme Court of Alabama, for instance, declared in 1881 that the
purpose of the contract clauses in federal and state constitutions “was
to preserve sacred the principle of the inviolability of contracts against
that legislative interference which the history of governments has
shown to be so imminent, in view of the frequent engendering of popu-
lar prejudice, and the consequent fluctuations of popular opinion.”29
To be sure, courts continued to vindicate private contracts; for ex-
ample, striking down statutes that substantially impaired the rights
of mortgagees in mortgage contracts.30 At the same time, however,
the Contract Clause began to gradually fade in significance. This was
apparent in litigation involving public contracts. Although paying
lip service to Dartmouth College,31 the Supreme Court adhered to the
strict construction principle and moved away from the notion of in-
violate corporate charters.32 Moreover, the Court gradually embraced
the concept of an alienable police power to safeguard public health,
safety, and morals. Accordingly, a state could not relinquish such
power by entering a contract.33 State regulatory authority increas-
ingly prevailed notwithstanding language in public contracts or corpo-
rate charters. As the Contract Clause waned in significance, those
challenging state legislation came more and more to argue that the
challenged law constituted a deprivation of liberty or property, with-
out due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Contract Clause continued to decline in the early decades of the
twentieth century.34 The number of such cases before the Supreme
28. Murray v. City of Charleston, 96 U.S. 432, 448 (1878).
29. Edwards v. Williamson, 70 Ala. 145, 151 (1881).
30. E.g., Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U.S. 118, 129–32 (1896); Savings Bank of San Diego v.
Barrett, 126 Cal. 413 (Cal. 1899).
31. Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
32. ELY, supra note 2, at 152–55; HOVENKAMP, supra note 19, at 33 (observing that in the
late nineteenth century “the notion that a corporate charter was a contract according vested
privileges to the corporation substantially fell apart”).
33. See, e.g., Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878); Stone v. Mississippi, 101
U.S. 814 (1880); New York & New England R.R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U.S. 556 (1894).
34. ELY, supra note 2, at 192–93.
98 PROPERTY RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 8:093
Court dwindled. Even the protection afforded private agreements
began to erode. In 1905, the Supreme Court determined that private
as well as public contracts were subordinated to the alienable police
power. In other words, police power was paramount to any rights es-
tablished in agreements between private parties.35 It now appeared
that state lawmakers could abridge private arrangements whenever
they deemed it necessary. This point was underscored by litigation
emanating out of unprecedented rent-control laws enacted in several
cities following World War I. The laws were predicated upon the al-
leged existence of a public emergency in housing conditions.36 Land-
lords maintained that the rent-control laws abridged existing leases
in violation of the Contract Clause. In a cursory opinion, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes brushed aside this argument and upheld the New
York measure as a temporary response to address an emergency.37
Writing for four dissenters, Justice Joseph McKenna found a con-
tract clause violation. He asked, if states could invoke the police power
to override contracts, what other provisions of the Constitution might
similarly be subordinated to that power.38
The Great Depression of the 1930s and the political programs of
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal had a profound impact
on constitutional law. New Dealers called for expanded governmen-
tal intervention in the economy and sought to redistribute economic
power. This approach was in sharp contrast to the commitment to
limited government and the respect for private property that charac-
terized traditional constitutionalism.39 The Contract Clause was a
prominent casualty of this change in outlook.
The weakened state of the Contract Clause was vividly demon-
strated in the controversy over state laws imposing a moratorium on
mortgage foreclosures. As the system of mortgage financing largely
collapsed in the wake of the Depression, lawmakers in a number of
35. Manigualt v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905) (Brown J.); see also David P. Currie,
The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Protection of Economic Interests, 1889–1910, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 324, 334–35 (1985) (declaring that Manigualt “was perilously close to saying
that states could impair contractual obligations whenever they had a good reason”).
36. For the background of this controversy, see ROBERT M. FOGELSON, THE GREAT RENT
WARS: NEW YORK CITY, 1917–1929 (2013).
37. Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921).
38. Id. at 199–201.
39. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HIS-
TORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 125–41 (3d ed. 2008).
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states sought to protect homes and farms from foreclosure of delin-
quent mortgages. These laws harkened back to nineteenth-century
relief laws. Indeed, laws altering the terms of mortgages were rou-
tinely struck down during the nineteenth century as violations of
the Contract Clause. Nonetheless, a divided Supreme Court, in the
seminal and controversial case of Home Building and Loan Associa-
tion v. Blaisdell (1934), upheld a Minnesota moratorium law, reject-
ing a contract clause challenge.40 Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes stressed the existence of emergency conditions
and argued that the State’s overriding protective power could justify
interference with agreements.41 In time, his broad language opened
the door to virtually reading the Contract Clause out of the Constitu-
tion. To be sure, Hughes attempted to cabin the reach of his opinion
by setting forth some limitations. Among other criteria, he pointed out
that the Minnesota law was temporary in operation and protected
the security interest of the mortgagee.42 In a forceful dissent, Justice
George Sutherland noted that the Contract Clause was adopted during
a period of economic distress and strenuously denied that an emer-
gency furnished a reason for avoiding the restrictions of that provi-
sion. He presciently warned that the majority opinion paved the way
for further encroachments on both private and public contracts.43
To be sure, the Contract Clause did not disappear overnight. In the
late 1930s and early 1940s, the Supreme Court relied on the Clause
several times to invalidate state laws, suggesting that the scope of
Blaisdell might be confined.44 But it turned out, however, that
Blaisdell, in fact, delivered a near-fatal blow to the efficacy of the
Contract Clause. As the Roosevelt appointees gained control of the
Court, they treated Blaisdell as the governing authority and ignored
both the limitations expressed by Hughes and the subsequent deci-
sions that confined its application. The emphasis on emergency situa-
tions as a justification for contractual impairment, for example, was
40. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
41. Id. at 437–41.
42. Id. at 444–47.
43. Id. at 448.
44. E.g., Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362 (1941); Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass’n, 297 U.S.
189 (1936); W.B. Worthen v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935); W.B. Worthen v. Thomas, 292
U.S. 426 (1934); see David F. Forte, Forgotten Cases: Worthen v. Thomas, 66 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
705, 711–16 (2018) [hereinafter Forte, Forgotten Cases] (arguing that in these cases the
Supreme Court sought to narrow the emergency exception articulated in Blaisdell).
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specifically rejected.45 Instead, the New Deal Court stressed the legisla-
ture’s wide discretion to set economic policy and override contracts
via the police power without regard to emergency conditions. It repeat-
edly demonstrated a dismissive attitude toward the Contract Clause.
In effect, the Court adopted a balancing test, heavily weighted in favor
of state authority, in assessing violations of the provision. Largely
ignored and serving no meaningful purpose, the Contract Clause was
not invoked again by the Supreme Court for more than thirty years.
Despite this period of neglect at the federal level, the Contract Clause
retained some modest efficacy at the state level, where courts some-
times relied on contract clauses in state constitutions.
II. THE CONTRACT CLAUSE’S DOUBTFUL REVIVAL
In the late 1970s, the Supreme Court expressed a fleeting interest
in the provision46 but in so doing promulgated a convoluted multi-
factor test that did more to obfuscate than to clarify contract clause
jurisprudence.47 In practice, the analytical framework established
by the Supreme Court did more to uphold state regulatory authority
than protect the rights of contracting parties from state interference.48
As an aside, this multipart formula is reminiscent of the equally fuzzy
balancing test articulated in Penn Central to determine the existence
of a regulatory taking of property.49
45. Veix v. Sixth Ward Building and Loan Association, 310 U.S. 32, 38–40 (1940).
46. See, e.g., U. S. Tr. Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (invalidating repeal of covenant
in bond agreement); Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (striking
down law retroactively imposing change in company’s pension plan).
47. The current test asks three questions: (1) Has a change in state law operated as a
substantial impairment of a contract? (2) If the impairment is substantial, does the law serve
a legitimate public purpose, such as remedying a broad social or economic problem? (3) Are
the means chosen to accomplish this purpose reasonable and appropriate to the public
purpose? Energy Reserves Grp. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411–13 (1983).
For a discussion of the standard of review, see ELY, supra note 2, at 241–48.
48. Forte, Forgotten Cases, supra note 44, at 722 (cogently concluding that “all that re-
mains of the Contract Clause’s protective sweep is an asymmetric middle-tier test that has
little analytic benefit and virtually no legal effect”).
49. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1987); see Steven J.
Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings Test, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 601, 604
(2014) (finding Penn Central test to be incoherent); Gideon Kanner, Making Laws and
Sausages: A Quarter-Century Retrospective on Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 679 (2005); see also Steven J. Eagle, Land Use Regulation
and Good Intentions, 33 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 87, 138 (2017) (“In practice, the Penn
Central ad hoc, multifactor balancing test has not proved auspicious for property owners.”).
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To compound the muddle, the Supreme Court imposed a higher
standard of review when a state abridges its own contracts. It main-
tained that “complete deference” to a legislative determination of
reasonableness and necessity was inappropriate when the state’s
self-interest was involved.50 This dual standard is problematic on
several grounds. There is no textual or historical basis to differenti-
ate between the scrutiny given to private and public contracts.51
Moreover, the Court has never made clear what level of scrutiny is
appropriate for public contracts, and lower courts have wrestled with
this without guidance. Cases dealing with public-employee contracts
often raise the issue of the standard of review.
To be sure, some state courts have shown a willingness to more
vigorously enforce the constitutional ban on legislative impairment
of existing agreements.52 But the fact remains that the Supreme
Court has not invoked the Contract Clause to invalidate a state law
in over forty years. Little wonder, then, that in 1995 Judge Douglas
Ginsburg pictured the provision—along with other neglected parts
of the Constitution—as part of the “Constitution-in-exile,” provisions
“banished for standing in opposition to unlimited government.”53
III. THE CONTEMPORARY MUDDLE
The Supreme Court’s most recent foray into contract clause juris-
prudence, Sveen v. Melin, decided in June of 2018, did little to alter
this bleak scene.54 At issue in Sveen was a Minnesota statute that
50. U.S. Tr. Co. of New York, 431 U.S. at 22–23.
51. ELY, supra note 2, at 242; see also Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and
Property Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship Between Individual Liberties and Con-
stitutional Structure, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 267, 293–94 (1988) (“[T]he modern thrust of contracts
clause jurisprudence is precisely backwards. . . . [I]t is interference with private contracts that
lies at the heart of the clause.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Public Contracts, Private Contracts, and
the Transformation of the Constitutional Order, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 609 (1987)
(“[T]he modern Court has in effect turned the contract clause of both the framers and the
post–Charles River Bridge era on its head. The prior understanding was that private contracts
were protected from state interference with more rigor than public contracts.”).
52. Brian A. Schar, Note, Contract Clause Law Under State Constitutions: A Model for
Heightened Scrutiny, 1 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 123 (1997).
53. Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, 1995 REG. 79, 80 (1995) (reviewing
DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE
THROUGH DELEGATION (1993)).
54. Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815 (2018). I submitted an amicus brief in Sveen supporting
the respondent.
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automatically revoked the designation of a former spouse in a life
insurance policy upon the dissolution of a marriage.55 The law was
enacted after Sveen purchased a life insurance policy and named his
wife, at the time, as beneficiary. Following their subsequent divorce,
Sveen took no action to alter his beneficiary designation. The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the retroactive application of the
law to Sveen’s policy violated the Contract Clause.56 Admittedly, this
was not a topic likely to arouse deep public interest.
The Supreme Court disagreed and rejected the contract clause
claim. The Court majority, in an opinion by Justice Elena Kagan, ap-
plied the prevailing multipart test. Although conceding that “the law
ma[de] a significant change,” she nonetheless concluded that the
revocation statute did not “substantially impair” the pre-existing
contract.57 One could ponder whether there is a meaningful or merely
a semantic distinction between such wording. In any event, Kagan
offered several arguments to buttress her conclusion that the law
did not substantially impair the insurance contract. She reasoned
that the statute was designed to reflect the presumed intention of
the policyholder not to benefit a former spouse. Perhaps even more
telling, Kagan also emphasized that the policyholder could easily
avoid application of the law by redesignating the former spouse as
beneficiary.58 In short, the Court majority pictured the Minnesota
statute as simply a default rule that did not place an onerous bur-
den on the policyholder.59 By deciding the Sveen case on narrow
grounds, the majority had no occasion to consider the broader argu-
ment that the multipart test was inconsistent with the original under-
standing of the Contract Clause as well as its historical construction
by the courts, and therefore should be jettisoned.
55. State courts were divided as to whether retroactive application of revocation-upon-
divorce statutes ran afoul of the Contract Clause. Compare Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Schilling,
616 N.E.2d 893 (Ohio 1993), and Parsonese v. Midland Nat’l Ins. Co., 706 A.2d 814 (Pa. 1998),
with In re Estate of DeWitt, 54 P.3d 849 (Colo. 2002), and Mearns v. Scharbach, 12 P.3d 1048
(Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
56. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Melin, 853 F.3d 410 (8th Cir. 2017).
57. Id. at 1822.
58. Id. at 1823–24.
59. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals awarded the
proceeds of the insurance policy to the Sveen children. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Melin, 899
F.3d 953, 953 (8th Cir. 2018). Thereafter the Supreme Court of Alabama followed the ana-
lytical framework of Sveen and dismissed a contract clause attack on a revocation-on-divorce
statute. Blalock v. Sutphin, 2018 WL 5306884 (Ala. Oct. 26, 2018).
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Dissenting alone, Justice Neil Gorsuch maintained that the retro-
active application of the statute to an insurance policy purchased
before its enactment ran afoul of the Contract Clause.60 More impor-
tantly, he was receptive to a far-reaching re-examination of current
contract clause jurisprudence. He pointed out that historically the
Supreme Court had interpreted the provision to bar any legislative
interference with contracts.61 Further, Gorsuch declared that the cur-
rent multifactor test “seems hard to square with the Constitution’s
original public meaning.”62 Echoing Justice Hugo Black,63 Gorsuch
expressed concern that the Court had reduced the protection af-
forded agreements by the Contract Clause to an uncertain balancing
test. “Should we worry,” he asked, “that a balancing test risks invest-
ing judges with discretion to choose which contracts to enforce—a
discretion that might be exercised with an eye to the identity (and
popularity) of the parties or contracts at hand?”64
Even applying the current test, however, Gorsuch found a contract
clause violation. He insisted that the choice of a beneficiary was at
the heart of a life insurance contract and that a law undoing this
designation was a substantial impairment. Gorsuch added that this
impairment was not reasonable because the state could have achieved
its goal by more moderate and less intrusive means.65
Perhaps the Gorsuch-dissenting opinion will spark a fundamental
reconsideration of the Contract Clause by the Supreme Court. But
such an attitudinal sea change does not seem imminent. It is more
likely that the Justices will adhere to the pattern of generally ignor-
ing the provision and employing tests that make successful contract
clause claims very difficult. Even before Sveen, commentators pro-
claimed that the Contract Clause was virtually dead.66
60. Sveen, 138 S. Ct. at 1826 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 1827–28.
62. Id.
63. City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 533 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (“[C]on-
stitutional adjudication under the balancing method becomes simply a matter of this Court’s
deciding for itself which result in a particular case seems in the circumstances the more
acceptable governmental policy and then stating the facts in such a way that the considera-
tions in the balance lead to the result.”).
64. Sveen, 138 S. Ct. at 1827 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 1828–29.
66. See, e.g., Richard Funston, Requiescat in Pace: A Memorial to the Contract Clause, 3
TEX. S. U. L. REV. 12, 24 (1973) (“Swallowed up by due process, the contract clause is no longer
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Yet a eulogy for the Contract Clause, however diminished, seems
premature. The provision continues to figure in a surprisingly large
amount of litigation. Although the lower federal courts, following the
lead of the Supreme Court, have demonstrated little interest in enforc-
ing the Contract Clause, there are infrequent decisions which rely
on the provision to strike down state laws. Recently, for example, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated changes to an Indiana
teacher-tenure law with respect to layoffs as applied to already-
tenured teachers.67 Private contracts have also received occasional
protection. Some federal courts have looked skeptically at laws alter-
ing the rights of parties under existing franchise agreements.68 In
2017, for example, the district court in North Dakota found that an
overhaul of the state-farm-equipment-dealership statute substantially
impaired a pre-existing contract and amounted to a special-interest
law that did not serve a legitimate public purpose.69
It is important to remember that much of this contract clause
litigation has taken place at the state level. This has given state courts
the opportunity to consider the degree of protection afforded to con-
tracts under state constitutions.70 Virtually all states have their own
contract clauses, modeled after the federal provision. A threshold
question is whether state contract clauses are equivalent to the
federal provision or whether they confer enhanced protection. The
answer is not easy and generalization is difficult. State court opin-
ions do not always clarify whether they are relying on the Federal
Constitution, the state constitution, or both. At least twenty states
have taken the position that their state contract clause is inter-
changeable with the federal language and have expressly adopted
the multipart federal test.71 In contrast, a number of state courts
a source of litigation.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 890 (1987)
(commenting that “the clause is now for the most part a dead letter”); see ELY, supra note 2,
at 238.
67. Elliott v. Bd. of Sch. Trustees of Madison Consolidated Schs., 876 F.3d 926 (7th Cir.
2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2624 (2018).
68. See, e.g., Equip. Mfrs. Inst. v. Janklow, 300 F.3d 842 (8th Cir. 2002).
69. Ass’n of Equip. Mfrs. v. Burgum, No. 1:17-cv-151, 2017 WL 8791104 (D.N.D. Dec. 14,
2017), stay-pending appeal denied, 2018 WL 1773145 (D.N.D. Mar. 5, 2018).
70. For a classic argument calling for increased reliance on state constitutional law, see
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489 (1977).
71. ELY, supra note 2, at 251; see, e.g., CDA Dairy Queen, Inc. v. State Ins. Fund, 154
Idaho 379, 299 P.3d 186 (2013) (rejecting argument that Idaho contract clause provides
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have indicated that their state constitutions should be read to pro-
vide a more robust safeguard for agreements. Courts in Arizona,
Florida, Indiana, Texas, and Virginia, for example, have articulated
such a position.72 These differing approaches, of course, speak to the
larger issue of determining the extent state courts should construe
state-rights guarantees more broadly than federal doctrines.73
Although the majority of contract clause challenges in recent
years have been rejected, state courts have invoked the provision to
strike down legislation in a variety of situations. In 2016, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina ruled that a state law retroactively revoking
the tenured status of public school teachers violated the Federal Con-
tract Clause.74 It found that the elimination of tenure in favor of
terms-of-years contracts was a substantial impairment of contrac-
tual benefits pertaining to job security. The state justified the repeal
as a means of eliminating underperforming teachers. The court, how-
ever, concluded that this was not a reasonable means of achieving
a legitimate public purpose, in view of less drastic alternatives. Con-
sistent with the principle that the Contract Clause does not have
prospective application, the court confined its ruling to the repeal of
tenured status earned prior to the effective date of the statute and
did not bar application of the repeal law to probationary teachers.75
In sync with U.S. Trust,76 state courts have looked skeptically at
state efforts to evade their financial obligations. At issue in Maze v.
Board of Directors for Commonwealth Postsecondary Education
greater protection of agreements than the United State Constitution and adopting three-step
federal framework); Mearns v. Scharbach, 103 Wash. App. 498, 512, 12 P.3d 1048, 1055
(Wash. Ct. App. 2000), petition for rev. den. 143 Wash.2d 1101, 21 P.3d 291 (Apr. 10, 2001)
(“The two clauses are substantially similar and are given the same effect.”).
72. ELY, supra note 2, at 252–53; see, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Forbes/Cohen Florida
Props., 223 So. 3d 292, 299 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (“The Florida Constitution offers greater
protection for the rights derived from the Contract Clause than the United States
Constitution.”); see also Maze v. Bd. of Dirs. for Commonwealth Postsecondary Educ. Prepaid
Tuition Tr. Fund, 559 S.W.3d 354, 369 (Ky. 2018) (declaring that “Kentucky jurisprudence
takes a more restrictive view on the legislature’s power to impose changes to existing con-
tractual benefits and obligations than the pronouncements of the federal courts,” but applying
three-part federal test derived from U.S. Trust).
73. See Clint Bolick, State Constitutions: Freedom’s Frontier, 2016–2017 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 15, 21–23 (2017) (noting that state constitutional law may provide enhanced protection
for private-property rights and economic liberty, among other individual rights).
74. North Carolina Ass’n of Educators v. State, 786 S.E.2d 255 (N.C. 2016).
75. Id. For an analysis of this case, see Tommy Tobin, Far from a “Dead Letter”: The Contract
Clause and North Carolina Association of Educators v. State, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1681 (2018).
76. U.S. Tr. Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
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Prepaid Tuition Trust Fund, for example, were legislative changes
imposed retroactively on contracts made pursuant to the Kentucky
Affordable Prepaid Tuition Fund (“KAPT”).77 The program “allowed
families . . . to ‘lock in’ the current tuition rates for future attendance”
at Kentucky public universities.78 Financial miscalculations in ad-
ministering the program, coupled with significant tuition increases,
resulted in a “substantial unfunded liability.”79 In response, the legis-
lature adopted a series of amendments that placed time limitations
on KAPT contracts and curtailed the coverage for future tuition in-
creases.80 The effect was to devalue the economic benefits promised
in the KAPT contracts. The State sought to justify its actions as dic-
tated by “economic necessity.”81
The Supreme Court of Kentucky struck down the retroactive appli-
cation of the amendments because they extinguished the contractual
rights of KAPT-contract purchasers to promised benefits. Invoking
a stricter standard because the State was a party to the agreement,
it found that the retroactive amendments amounted to an impair-
ment of contract in violation of both the United States and Kentucky
Constitutions. Concluding that the legislature could not demon-
strate a legitimate public purpose behind the law, the court stressed
that lawmakers could not “self-servingly renounce” debts.82
Other retroactive changes in prevailing law have also triggered
contract clause scrutiny. For example, a Florida District Court of Ap-
peals invalidated a municipal resolution that prevented a commercial-
mall tenant from subleasing part of its leased space without the
approval of both the mall owner and the city. It concluded that the
resolution diminished the value of the contract and failed to serve
a public purpose.83 Moreover, the Supreme Court of Idaho struck
down a state law retroactively changing the formula governing the
distribution of workers compensation-fund dividends as a violation
of the state contract clause.84
77. Maze v. Bd. of Dirs. Commonwealth Postsecondary Educ. Prepaid Tuition Tr. Fund,
559 S.W.3d 354 (Ky. 2018).
78. Id. at 360.
79. Id. at 362.
80. Id. at 361–62.
81. Id. at 371.
82. Id. at 373.
83. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Forbes/Cohen Florida Props., 223 So. 3d 292, 300 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2017).
84. CDA Dairy Queen, Inc v. State Ins. Fund, 299 P.3d 186 (Idaho 2013).
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This brief survey of recent contract clause decisions in the lower
federal and state courts demonstrates that the Clause retains a
modest degree of vitality. But qualifications are in order. Few of
these cases present the kind of far-reaching contractual issues ad-
dressed by courts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
None called into question the pervasive regulation of the economy.
Indeed, both federal and state courts seemed, on the whole, more con-
cerned with upholding state police power than vindicating contrac-
tual arrangements.85
The most frequently litigated contract clause claims today arise
from the ongoing financial crises experienced by many states and
localities.86 Most commentators agree that the large and growing
shortfall in funding for public-employee pensions and health bene-
fits is a primary source of financial distress. There are estimates that
in the aggregate such pension plans are underfunded by five trillion
dollars.87 Faced with such staggering deficits, many state and local
governments have taken steps to trim benefits from both current
and retired public-sector employees.88 These moves have triggered
a torrent of litigation, alleging violations of the contract clauses in
both the state and federal constitutions. Given the malleable charac-
ter of the prevailing multifactor test, the uncertainty over the stan-
dard of review for alleged impairments of public contracts, and the
wording of different benefit schemes, it is hardly surprising that courts
have reached conflicting results. In these brief comments I cannot
assess the full range of these decisions.
As with any contract clause dispute, the initial inquiry is whether
the claimed employee benefits are contractual in nature. A number of
such claims in recent years have failed because courts have not found
an impairment of a contractual right to the particular benefit at issue.
In reaching this conclusion, courts have stressed that the principal
function of legislature is to establish policy, not make contracts.89 It
85. ELY, supra note 2, at 258–60.
86. For the background of this controversy, see James W. Ely, Jr., Public Employees and
the Curious Mini-Revival of Contract Clause Jurisprudence, 2 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS.
CONF. J. 37 (2013) [hereinafter Ely, Public Employees].
87. Sarah Krouse, State and Local Pension Woes Are Starting to Bite, WALL ST. J., July 31,
2018.
88. Id.
89. Dodge v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 302 U.S. 74, 79 (1937) (“The presumption is that
such a law is not intended to create private contractual or vested rights, but merely declares
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follows that only when state lawmakers express an unequivocal in-
tent to create contractual rights in a statute would such a law amount
to a binding contractual commitment.90
In 2019, the Supreme Court of California applied these principles
in a case arising out of a California law revising public-employee
pensions and eliminating the opportunity for public employees to
purchase additional retirement service credits. Plaintiffs challenged
the law as a violation of the contract clause in the California Consti-
tution. Citing both federal and state authority, the court stressed
that the primary function of legislatures was to determine policy,
inherently subject to revision, and not to make contracts. It found no
basis on which to conclude that the legislature intended to establish
a contractual right to purchase any additional retirement credit. Since
there was no contract, the court had no occasion to consider whether
the elimination of the purchase option amounted to an unconstitu-
tional impairment of contract.91
When a contract governing employee benefits is involved, courts
have split as to whether state alteration of such agreements have
run afoul of the Contract Clause. One line of cases has sustained
a policy to be pursued until the Legislature shall ordain otherwise. He who asserts the creation
of a contract with the state in such a case has the burden of overcoming the presumption.”)
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 466 (1985)
(declaring that the principal function of a legislature is not to make contracts but to enact
laws that establish policy, which are subject to revision).
90. See, e.g., Cranston Firefighters v. Raimondo, 880 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2018) (holding that leg-
islative modification of state pension plans for government employees did not run afoul of con-
tract clause because state had made no binding commitment); Dodd v. City of Chattanooga,
846 F.3d 180, 186 (6th Cir. 2017) (stressing “the fundamental assumption in Contract Clause
analysis that legislation merely expresses current government policy—and future legislatures
are free to change that policy—rather than creating contractual obligations,” and ruling that
municipal employee had no contractual right to default death benefit); Schwein v. Bd. of Ed.
of Riverview Cmty. Dist., 335 F. Supp. 3d 964 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (concluding that Michigan
Teacher Tenure Act did not grant teacher a contract and rejecting contract clause claim); Lake
v. State Health Plan for Teachers & State Emps., 825 S.E. 2d 645, 650–56 (N.C. Ct. App.
2019) (finding no contractual right to unalterable health insurance benefits); Terry v. State,
2017 WL 491930 at *5 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017) (noting “the existence of a presumption under
North Carolina law that no contractual rights are created by statute” and finding no con-
tractual right to future salary increases), review denied, 369 N.C. 751 (June 2017); State ex
rel. Horvath v. State Teachers Ret. Bd., 697 N.E.2d 644 (Ohio 1998) (employees had no
contractual rights to prospective benefits until benefits vested by the operation of law).
91. Cal Fire Local 2881 v. Cal. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 6 Cal. 5th 965, 435 P.3d 433 (2019).
The court differentiated between the opportunity to purchase additional retirement credit and
the implied contractual right for public employees to receive statutory pension benefits, be-
cause the later constitute a form of deferred compensation.
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legislative efforts to revamp employment contracts, granting deference
to legislative policy and stressing the severity of budgetary problems.92
Yet other decisions have concluded that such actions violated the
Contract Clause, reasoning that the reduction of employee benefits
was neither reasonable nor necessary and determining that less
weight should be given to state and municipal financial crises. This
line of cases highlights an ironic twist: having lectured for decades
that courts should not second guess social and economic policies,
some courts now take the position that they have the duty to probe
the reasonableness of legislative policy regarding public-employee
contacts.93 This approach clearly entangles courts in policy matters
and raises the troublesome question of whether public-employee
contracts are being singled out for more favorable treatment than
is accorded other agreements.94 It recalls Justice Gorsuch’s warning
that a pliable balancing test, in effect, confers on judges the discre-
tion to decide which agreements should be enforced.
IV. IMPAIRMENT DISTINGUISHED FROM BREACH OF CONTRACT
Although states are held to a higher standard of scrutiny when
abridging their own contracts,95 not every dispute over the meaning
of a public contract gives rise to a contract clause violation. It has
long been held that cases involving the construction of state agree-
ments with individuals do not, standing alone, implicate the Contract
Clause even if the state denies liability under the contract.96 Thus,
a breach of contract by the state, as distinguished from an impair-
ment, leaves the parties free to seek a remedy in the state courts.97
92. ELY, supra note 2, at 262.
93. Id.
94. See Nila M. Merola, Judicial Review of State Legislation: An Ironic Return to Lochnerian
Ideology When Public Sector Labor Contracts Are Impaired, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1179, 1211
(2010) (asserting that “enormous public interest . . . demands that strict scrutiny be applied
to laws that impair public sector labor contracts” and insisting that “public employees deserve
the utmost protection”).
95. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., St. Paul Gaslight Co. v. City of St. Paul, 181 U.S. 142, 149, 151 (1901) (finding
there was no impairment of contract with the municipality, and stating that “it follows that
the record involves solely an interpretation of the contract, and therefore presents no con-
troversy within the jurisdiction of this court”).
97. See Hays v. Port of Seattle, 251 U.S. 233, 237 (1920) (distinguishing between a law
violating a contract and one impairing its obligation, and asserting that if the contract at issue
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The absence of an effective remedy to enforce the contract, on the
other hand, might trigger contract clause review.
This rule found application in a 2018 decision by the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals.98 At issue was a Montana statute that altered
the price schedule for liquor sold to retailers by a state agency, pur-
suant to franchise agreements. The plaintiff liquor store had a ten-
year contract with the agency to purchase liquor at a fixed rate, and
was disadvantaged by the unilateral change. It brought suit alleging
both a breach of the contract and a contractual impairment in viola-
tion of the Contract Clause. Plaintiff contended that the state agency
had contractually promised not to alter the rates without the plain-
tiff’s consent. In its defense, the State maintained that the agree-
ment expressly provided that the established rate was subject to
modification by state law and therefore the price adjustment was
consistent with the terms of the agreement. Thus, there was a dis-
pute over the interpretation of the agreement. The court insisted
that “an interpretative disagreement over a contract” did not run
afoul of the Contract Clause.99 “At bottom,” the court observed, “the
parties’ arguments amount to dueling interpretations between the
parties over the proper meaning of their agreement.”100 It declared
that such a public-contract dispute did not impair the agreement so
long as the plaintiff could pursue a breach-of-contract claim against
the State for any injury suffered.101
Of particular interest, however, was the Ninth Circuit’s emphatic
rejection of Montana’s argument that a state could unilaterally
modify contractual terms as an exercise of its sovereign power. “An
assertion,” the court maintained, “that the state always has the uni-
lateral authority to modify the provisions of a contract is inconsistent
was still in force “its obligation remained as before, and formed the measure of [the] right to
recover from the state for the damages sustained”); E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Forest Preserve
Dist. of DuPage Cty., 613 F.2d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 1980) (“The Supreme Court in the context
of the contract clause has drawn a distinction between a breach of contract and impairment
of the obligation of the contract. The distinction depends on the availability of a remedy in
damages in response to the state’s (or its subdivision’s) action. If the action of the state does
not preclude a damage remedy the contract has been breached and the non-breaching party can
be made whole. If this happens there has been no law impairing the obligation of the contract.”).
98. LL Liquor, Inc. v. Montana, 912 F.3d 533 (9th Cir. 2018).
99. Id. at 537.
100. Id. at 539.
101. Id. at 538–39.
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with the requirements of the Contracts Clause . . . .”102 Although
recognizing that a state does not relinquish its sovereign power to
regulate by entering contracts, the court nonetheless stressed that
a state cannot avoid financial liability if a change in the law results
in financial harm to a contracting party.103 It added: “Again, if state
law did allow Montana unilaterally to modify contracts between it-
self and others without providing a damages remedy, then the federal
Contracts Clause would be squarely implicated.”104
V. PROSPECTS FOR REVITALIZATION
So we are left with a diminished Contract Clause that, although
frequently ignored, is occasionally trotted out in unpredictable and
unprincipled ways to oversee state laws.105 This is a curious result
for a provision that, as Lawrence M. Friedman has reminded us, was
framed to guarantee the stability of agreements.106
Yet the chances for a meaningful revival of the Contract Clause,
at least at the federal level, seem remote at the time of this writing.
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has endorsed tests that
virtually eliminate the Clause from the Constitution. The road to
reform will not be easy. Nonetheless, I propose some steps that would
make the judicial reconstruction of the Contract Clause more consis-
tent with its text, history, and purpose.
Any move to restore the provision as a significant restraint on
states’ interference with agreements should start with the abandon-
ment of the murky multiprong formula. This test, with its near-supine
deference to legislative decisions regarding agreements, falls woe-
fully short of achieving vigorous enforcement of the Clause. The
Constitution does not provide that states may abridge contracts
whenever they can devise a reason.
102. Id. at 541.
103. Id. at 541–42.
104. Id. at 541 n.7.
105. See Douglas W. Kmiec & John O. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the
Original Understanding, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 559 (1987) (observing that under the
current test “the Supreme Court has interpreted a constitutional provision that was designed
to provide certainty to contracting parties in a manner that maximizes the unpredictability
of its application”).
106. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 203 (3d ed. 2005).
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The second step is to employ the same standard of review for both
private and public contracts. Consistent with the text and historical
understanding of the Clause, all agreements should be on a level
playing field.
The third move would be to look skeptically at economic distress as
an excuse for laws interfering with contracts—whether mortgages,
debts, bonds, or benefits promised to public employees. This was the
position that generally prevailed before Blaisdell.107 It follows that
the Blaisdell decision should be overruled as out of step with the con-
stitutional ban on contractual impairment.
These brief proposals hardly resolve all the interpretative issues
pertaining to the Contract Clause, but they would put us on a path
to restore the Clause as a vital part of the Constitution.108
107. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cleveringa v. Klein, 249 N.W. 118, 124–28, 128 (N.D. 1933) (brush-
ing aside an argument that an economic emergency justified legislation enlarging the period
of redemption from mortgage foreclosure, and declaring that “[i]t must not be forgotten that
the right of private contracts is no small part of the liberty of the citizen”).
108. For a more complete analysis of my proposals, see Ely, Public Employees, supra note
86, at 56–60.
EMERGING ISSUES IN PROPERTY LAW
ROBERT H. THOMAS*
INTRODUCTION
I am a property lawyer, which means I am a civil rights lawyer
and a human rights lawyer. I say this because, as we all know,
private property is a civil right—and most importantly for today’s
discussion—a federal constitutional right. This is the context that
frames the subject of my portion of the panel at the Fifteenth Annual
Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference about emerging issues
in property law.
I’ll be focusing on recent trends in the courts, fitting these trends
into my internal matrix for property rights. That matrix places prop-
erty rights along a continuum ranging from the baseline property
rights—otherwise known as “common law,” “natural law,” “fundamen-
tal principles,” Lockean, “normative” (and what would an academic
conference be without at least one use of the term “normative”?), “re-
statement,” or whatever-you-want-to-call-them property rights—to
state-recognized and state-created property rights.
I. FUNDAMENTAL FEDERAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
The first and most fascinating of the emerging issues in property
law is whether certain property rights are immune from being re-
defined by state law, either by a state legislature or even a state
court.1 The Ninth Circuit recently addressed this question, conclud-
ing that the interest on state retirement accounts is not subject to
* Robert H. Thomas practices with Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert in Honolulu,
Hawaii. He received his LL.M. from Columbia University and his J.D. from the University of
Hawaii. He writes about takings and property law at www.inversecondemnation.com. In the
fall of 2018, he was the inaugural Joseph T. Waldo Visiting Chair in Property Rights Law at
the William & Mary Law School. This Essay is a slightly modified version of the remarks he
delivered on “Other Emerging Issues in Constitutional Protection of Property,” at the Fifteenth
Annual Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference in Williamsburg, Virginia (Oct. 5, 2018).
1. This is an issue left unresolved by the U.S. Supreme Court in Stop the Beach Renourish-
ment v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 560 U.S. 702 (2010). There, only four
Justices acknowledged the fact that certain aspects of how property is defined can only be
altered with the payment of compensation.
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a state court’s redefining it out of existence, because interest is a
“core” and “traditional” property right that the state cannot disavow
or define away.2 This was a very Blackstonian approach, one recog-
nized by Justice Marshall in his concurring opinion in PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins, where he wrote:
I do not understand the Court to suggest that rights of property
are to be defined solely by state law, or that there is no federal
constitutional barrier to the abrogation of common-law rights by
Congress or a state government. The constitutional terms “life,
liberty, and property” do not derive their meaning solely from the
provisions of positive law. They have a normative dimension as
well, establishing a sphere of private autonomy which government
is bound to respect.3
We have also seen this more recently—although less expressly—in
Murr v. Wisconsin, where eight Justices rejected Wisconsin’s argu-
ment that the State could define and redefine what counts as “prop-
erty” with a free hand.4 The majority in that case instead adopted
a multifactor test for the takings “denominator,” which in reality
defined the property claimed to have been taken as a matter of fed-
eral common law, an interest traditionally defined by reference to
state law.5 The dissenters rejected Wisconsin’s argument that state
law alone defined the property, concluding that even though a state’s
metes and bounds is the starting point in the parcel analysis, it isn’t
the only thing to look at.6 In short, one must ask if there are “back-
ground principles of federal law” in the concept of “property.” Like
Justice Marshall, I think so.
That is the first new emerging issue in property law, and the most
important in my view.
2. Fowler v. Guerin, 899 F.3d 1112, 1118 (9th Cir. 2018) (“We then held that there is ‘a
“core” notion of constitutionally protected property into which state regulation simply may not
intrude without prompting Takings Clause scrutiny.’ This ‘core’ is ‘defined by reference to tra-
ditional “background principles” of property law.’”) (citations omitted) (quoting Schneider v.
California Department of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)).
3. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93–94 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
4. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
5. Id. at 1948.
6. Id. at 1953 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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II. STATE-CREATED OR STATE-RECOGNIZED PROPERTY RIGHTS
If there is a federal baseline, the second emerging issue is to ques-
tion what happens when a state recognizes more rights, not less, as
“property.” Before we address this, I want to ask whether anything is
to be made of the fact that the Fifth Amendment is the only provision
in the Constitution that refers to “private property?”7 The other pro-
visions that mention property, such as the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments, only refer to “property”
without the “private” modifier.8 The following is one recent example
where this distinction may make a difference.
In In re Maui Electric Company,9 the Hawaii Supreme Court held
that the Hawaii Constitution’s provision guaranteeing a right to a
“clean and healthful environment” is “property.”10 But the District
of Columbia Circuit held the opposite in a case involving the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission. The court interpreted Pennsylvania’s
similar “clean air and pure water” constitutional provision, conclud-
ing that although the provision recognized the right to clean air and
water as “property,” that’s not really a “property” right.11 You can’t sell
it, you can’t exclude others from it, nor is there any value you can
place on it. As the court noted, “Even for entitlements, ‘[t]he hallmark
of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others,’ which
is ‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property.’”12 To the court, it was not truly
property, because it did not fall within the “traditional” concept of
property, and thus was not protected by the Due Process Clause. Are
there any federal baselines?
The provisions in the Hawaii and Pennsylvania Constitutions guar-
anteeing a clean environment are state-created entitlements like
state employment in Board of Regents v. Roth,13 that gives someone
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”).
8. See id. amends. V, XIV.
9. In re Application of Maui Elec. Co., 408 P.3d 1, 12–13 (Haw. 2017).
10. Id. at 23. For more on the Hawaii case, see Robert H. Thomas, Back to the Future of
Land Use Regulation, 7 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 109, 117–22 (2018).
11. Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. FERC, 895 F.3d 102, 109–10 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
12. Id. at 109 (quoting Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999)).
13. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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a “legitimate claim of entitlement.”14 This also includes entitlements
such as Kaiser Aetna’s Rivers and Harbors Act Permit,15 the alleged
cultural rights that were asserted by the objectors in the Hawaii
telescope case referred to by Professor David Callies in his panel at
the Fifteenth Annual Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference,16
and the procedural rights recently recognized by the Tenth Circuit
when it concluded that a city must inform an affected property
owner when the city declares her property to be blighted.17 In the
latter case, the court concluded that the city’s blight designation did
not have a direct impact on a property in the land (the blight designa-
tion was merely a designation).18 But the lack of notice of the blight
designation did have a direct impact on the property owner’s prop-
erty right to timely appeal the blight designation. Thus, the “property”
for purposes of due process was the state’s procedures.19
III. IS THERE A RIGHT TO HAVE THE GOVERNMENT 
PROTECT PROPERTY?
The next emerging issue in property law is whether there is either
a fundamental or federal property right—or a state-created property
14. Id. at 577.
15. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979) (“While the consent of
individual officials representing the United States cannot ‘estop’ the United States, it can lead
to the fruition of a number of expectancies embodied in the concept of ‘property’ . . .
expectancies . . . .” (citation omitted)).
16. In re Contested Case Hearing re Conservation Dist. Use Application (CDUA) HA-3568
for the Thirty Meter Telescope at the Mauna Kea Sci. Reserve, 431 P.3d 752 (Haw. 2018).
Professor Callies spoke on this case during his panel presentation. David L. Callies, Pre-
sentation on “Government Ownership of Land and the Limits upon Transfers or Sale: The
Public Trust Doctrine,” at the Fifteenth Annual Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference
(Oct. 5, 2018). For further discussion from Professor Callies on this topic, see David L. Callies,
The Public Trust Doctrine, 8 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROPERTY RIGHTS J. 71 (2019).
17. M.A.K. Inv. Grp., LLC v. City of Glendale, 889 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2018).
18. Id. at 1189.
19. Id. at 1182 (“Applying this intuitive rule, we conclude due process required Glendale
to provide M.A.K. with direct notice of the adverse blight determination. In contemporary
terms this means notice had to be mailed, emailed, or personally served. Without the minimal
step of actual notice, M.A.K. was left unaware of the potentially looming condemnation action,
and so had little reason to even investigate whether it could challenge the blight determination
that authorizes that action. As a consequence, M.A.K. lost its statutory right to review within
thirty days. In other words, M.A.K.’s ability to preserve its property right in the statutory right
of review depended on its knowledge of the simple fact the blight finding existed.”) (emphasis
in original).
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right—to have the government act to protect your property. Profes-
sor Timothy Mulvaney has explored this in his recent work on “non-
enforcement” takings,20 and in the courts we see this played out in
several recent, interesting cases.
The Federal Circuit’s decision in the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet
case addressed this question of government’s role to protect prop-
erty.21 Prior to reaching the Federal Circuit, the Court of Federal
Claims (“CFC”) held that the United States had taken property be-
longing to Saint Bernard Parish because the Corps of Engineers
constructed—and then failed to maintain—the Mississippi River-
Gulf Outlet Canal. Built decades ago, the channel amplified the effect
of Hurricane Katrina by serving as a bowling alley for the hurricane’s
force—with Saint Bernard Parish and New Orleans’s Ninth Ward
as the pins.22 The CFC awarded a very large compensation verdict,
and the government appealed to the Federal Circuit.23 That court,
in an opinion by Judge Timothy Dyk, reversed the CFC and concluded
that, as a matter of law, the federal government could never be liable
for a taking caused by its inaction24—thus adopting a categorical rule
in a flood case even though the Supreme Court in Arkansas Game25
told the lower courts it wasn’t fond of categorical rules.
We see a state court version of this ruling going the other way in
Maryland, where the court held that a local government’s failure to
enforce its septic tank regulations was the cause of sewage flooding in
a nearby campground.26 The loss due to flooding was held to be a
20. Timothy M. Mulvaney, Non-Enforcement Takings, 59 B.C. L. REV. 145 (2018) (arguing
that takings law should police the government’s decision to not enforce regulations on the
same grounds that it treats affirmative enforcement).
21. St. Bernard Parish Gov’t v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 687 (2015), rev’d, 887 F.3d
1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 796 (2019).
22. St. Bernard Parish Gov’t v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 687 (2015), rev’d, 887 F.3d
1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
23. St. Bernard Parish Gov’t v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 687 (2015).
24. St. Bernard Parish Gov’t v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“We
conclude that the government cannot be liable on a takings theory for inaction and that the
government action in constructing and operating [the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet] was not
shown to have been the cause of the flooding.”).
25. Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23 (2012) (holding that
government-induced flooding may give rise to a takings claim, even if the flooding is not
permanent).
26. Litz v. Md. Dep’t of Env’t, 131 A.3d 923, 931 (Md. 2016) (“Upon this review, it seems
appropriate (and, in this case, fair and equitable, at least at the pleading stage of litigation)
to recognize an inverse condemnation claim based on alleged ‘inaction’ when one or more of
118 PROPERTY RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 8:113
taking even though it was based on government inaction. We’ve also
seen this same issue playing out in the California litigations and the
resulting inverse condemnation claims resulting from the recent
devastating wildfires in Northern and Southern California.27 Fi-
nally, this question of government responsibility has also arisen in
lawsuits where taxicab medallion owners have sued local govern-
ments for not enforcing the same medallion regulations against ride-
sharing companies.28
To me, these are the most critical issues of “what is property?” and
“what does it mean?” that we should be following.
IV. TWO OTHER ISSUES: JUST COMPENSATION AND COVERING 
ALL LOSSES
Two other burgeoning issues are ripe for clarification. The first
concerns just compensation. It has been more than thirty years since
the Supreme Court has given us a just compensation case, and it is
not because the law of just compensation is remarkably clear.29 Two
competing threads in compensation law still have yet to be resolved.
First, is the purpose of the Just Compensation Clause to make an
owner whole—to award the “the full and perfect equivalent for the
property taken”30—or is it simply to pay the owner the fair market
value of the land alone?31 We know what the answer should be (the
former), but the courts just don’t seem to want to address it. The
second burgeoning issue is business losses associated with a taking.
This issue also covers the fees and costs an owner might incur in
defense of her property rights, especially when the government has
lowballed the valuation.
the defendants has an affirmative duty to act under the circumstances. Therefore, we hold,
as a matter of Maryland law, that an inverse condemnation claim is pleaded adequately
where a plaintiff alleges a taking caused by a governmental entity’s or entities’ failure to act,
in the face of an affirmative duty to act.”).
27. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, No. D074417 (Cal. Ct. App.
Nov. 13, 2018).
28. See, e.g., Glyka Trans, LLC v. City of New York, 76 N.Y.S.3d 585 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018).
29. See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24 (1984).
30. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
31. United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
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V. ONE LAST THING: WHAT IS A “TAKING?”
I cannot leave the discussion without asking the most fundamental
question the Supreme Court has left unresolved: what is a regulatory
taking? It’s been nearly one hundred years since the Court told us that
an exercise of a power other than eminent domain can result in a
taking, but the Court is still not sure what this power looks like. This
was most recently evidenced in the oral arguments in Knick v. Town-
ship of Scott,32 where it appeared that only two or three of the Jus-
tices even understand what an inverse condemnation or regulatory
takings lawsuit means, and what the property owners who raise
those claims really want. Most of the questions to counsel during the
oral argument on October 3, 2018, were scary because they reflected
the Justices’ wrong—and in some cases, bizarre—assumptions.33
I don’t see the Justices comparing apples to oranges but rather
think that they believe they are eating oranges when, in fact, they
have tangerines. Thus, the biggest issue I see is that the majority of
the Supreme Court does not understand eminent domain–law funda-
mentals. Lacking that analytical foundation, they end up operating
under a set of often-wrong assumptions. They assume, for example,
that the inverse condemnation and regulatory takings tangerines
are just like the eminent domain oranges they are used to biting
into. I do not have a lot of confidence in the Court’s ability to lead us
out of this doctrinal wilderness—or, at least, to not make it worse—
after October’s Knick arguments.
CONCLUSION
But enough of doom and gloom—please allow me to end on a more
positive note: hearty congratulations to Professor Stewart Sterk for
a well-earned Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Prize. Welcome to
the pantheon of the greats, Professor Sterk.
32. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 138 S. Ct. 1262 ((Jan. 16,
2019) (No. 17-647), 2019 WL 260998.
33. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, Knick v. Township of Scott, 138 S. Ct.
1262 (Oct. 3, 2018) (No. 17-647), 2018 WL 44776176 (“JUSTICE BREYER: Or we could go into
1331. But Williamson was decided 32 years ago. This is a very complicated area of law. Why
not let sleeping dogs lie? It’s called stare decisis.”).
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Although the eminent domain power is an attribute of the sover-
eign, there are instances in which a private licensee is delegated the
power for the acquisition of easements necessary to establish a lin-
eal corridor. For the purposes of this article, our examination of the
jurisprudence associated with the acquisition of lineal corridor
rights takes place in the “laboratory” of the federal district courts in
Florida. For it is there that a new interstate pipeline project, known
as the Sabal Trail Natural Gas Pipeline, resulted in the filing of ap-
proximately 263 condemnation cases for a lineal corridor of some
247 miles needed to construct a thirty-six-inch-diameter pipeline ca-
pable of transmitting up to one billion cubic feet of natural gas a day.
In review of these cases, some of which are yet pending appeals
before the Eleventh Circuit, we are able to observe how private prop-
erty rights are regarded when it is a private company wielding the
eminent domain power to acquire easement rights, which make
servient the estates of owners to a use of property that purportedly
diminishes the value of their remainder property due to fear or
stigma. Likewise, because some of these cases actually proceeded to
jury trial on the measure of compensation, a rare look is afforded as
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to exactly how, as gatekeeper, a trial judge must often balance
between admitting evidence that furthers the owner's entitlement
to a measure of compensation, which includes loss or severance dam-
ages resulting from fear or stigma, but preclude evidence where
under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 the probative value is out-
weighed by unfair prejudice or jury confusion. Within this context,
evidence as to the existence of fear or stigma is relevant and admis-
sible, while evidence as to the reasonableness of fear or stigma is
irrelevant and inadmissible. Topics discussed in this article include:
(a) the progression of federal courts in condemnation cases
under the Natural Gas Act1 to grant “immediate posses-
sion” in lieu of a delegated “quick-take” power;
(b) the federal courts’ application of state law instead of fed-
eral law as the choice of law that controls the measure of
compensation;
(c) the federal courts’ decision to use jury trials instead of com-
mission trials to determine the measure of compensation;
(d) the condemnor’s use of Daubert2 challenges to exclude or
limit testimony and evidence that is related to severance
damages resulting from fear or stigma;
(e) the condemnor’s objection to the testimony of the property
owner as to the quantification of severance damages re-
sulting from fear or stigma;
(f) whether jury trials result in a “fair” and “just” determina-
tion of the measure of compensation.
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INTRODUCTION
Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC, (“Sabal Trail”) is a joint venture
of Spectra Energy Partners, NextEra Energy, Inc., and Duke Energy,
which has now constructed an interstate pipeline to service electri-
cal power plants owned by Florida Power and Light (“FPL”) and Duke
Energy of Florida (“DEF”).3 More recently, Enbridge, Inc., acquired
Spectra Energy Partners. These large, private-energy companies have
3. See SABAL TRAIL TRANSMISSION, http://www.sabaltrailtransmission.com (last visited
Apr. 9, 2019).
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a combined value in excess of one hundred billion dollars.4 The 494-
mile project originates in Alabama, stretches through Georgia, and
terminates in Florida. Roughly 268 miles—247 miles of thirty-six-
inch-diameter pipe and 21 miles of twenty-four-inch-diameter pipe—
are located in Florida.5 The project traverses twelve Florida coun-
ties, including Hamilton, Suwannee, Gilchrist, Levy, Alachua, Marion,
Sumter, Lake, Polk, Osceola, Citrus, and Orange Counties.6 Now op-
erational, this new pipeline system is capable of transmitting more
than one billion cubic feet per day of natural gas at high pressure to
gas-fired power plants operated by FPL and DEF.7
Figure 1. Sabal Trail Natural Gas Pipeline Project8
4. See SPECTRA ENERGY, http://www.spectraenergy.com (last visited Apr. 9, 2019) (Spectra
Energy alone, via its merger with Enbridge Inc., has an enterprise value of $126 billion).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit No. 1: Sabal Trail v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County
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Sabal Trail will operate the thirty-six-inch-diameter pipe with a
maximum operating pressure of 1,456 pounds per square inch (“psig”)
typically buried three to four feet underground. The width of the
permanent easement is typically fifty feet. The widths of the tempo-
rary easement are typically twenty-five feet on either side of the
permanent easement. The use of these easements at the initial stage
of a project is intense, with clearing and grubbing, heavy construc-
tion, and environmental monitoring characteristic of lineal corridor
right-of-ways. During construction, all above ground structures and
trees are removed from both the permanent and temporary ease-
ment areas. This initial stage can last anywhere from one to three
years, in multiple phases.
Figure 2. Sabal Trail Pipe9
(Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-000178-JSM-PRL (M.D. Fla. Jan. 9, 2018). Photo
credit: FPL, http://www.FPL.com (2019); SABAL TRAIL TRANSMISSION, www.sabaltrailtrans
mission.com (2013).
9. Unless otherwise indicated, all photographs and figures in this article are the property
of the author and the Brigham Property Rights Law Firm (on file at the Brigham Property
Rights Law Firm).
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Once construction is completed, the pipeline is identified by bright
color markers at regular intervals in the “the line of sight” along its
centerline. Each marker has a posted warning and call information
in order to report any incidents. The pipeline route thereafter must
remain clear. So too, the owner loses the right to exclude others from
the permanent easement area and may not use the permanent ease-
ment area in any way that interferes with the use of the easement
holder. To remind owners of the servient estate imposed upon their
title ownership, Sabal Trail sends out a letter with the title “Notifica-
tion of Initial In-Service” that sets forth, in lay terms, “Information
for Landowners Who Have a Sabal Trail Pipeline Easement on Their
Property.” The document clearly indicates who’s the boss with respect
to the “requirements” for use of the pipeline right-of-way. All things
considered, this type of easement, considering the legal estate taken
and its use, can significantly change the character of the property
through which it passes.
Sabal Trail is now the third major interstate natural gas pipeline
system in Florida. Before Sabal Trail, there were only two major
interstate natural gas pipeline systems in Florida, known respec-
tively as Florida Gas Transmission Company System (“Florida Gas”)
and Gulfstream Natural Gas Transmission System (“Gulfstream”).
Florida Gas initially began pipeline acquisition and construction in
the early 1960s but has more recently expanded its original system
in the past two decades. So too, Gulfstream commenced its acquisi-
tion and construction in the early 2000s and has also expanded its
system in the past decade. With the exception of a few parcels in the
last expansion phase of the Gulfstream pipeline, if proceeding with
eminent domain, Florida Gas and Gulfstream filed their condemna-
tion cases in state courts. As will be further discussed below, Sabal
Trail filed its condemnation cases in federal courts, the first in-
stance in Florida that a lineal corridor project of this scope and na-
ture proceeded with eminent domain in federal courts, not state.
In nearly all pipeline easement acquisitions, there is a substantial
dispute as to the measure of compensation in so far as the issue of
damages to the remainder property is concerned—particularly when
purported damages result from proximity to the pipeline “in and of
itself,” based on market fear, perception, or stigma. Simply put, most
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in the pipeline industry maintain that, because the pipeline’s infra-
structure is located underground, severance damages of this kind or
nature are extremely minimal or non-existent. Their mantra is: out
of sight, out of mind. The industry maintains that property owners are
compensated sufficiently by pipeline companies that only pay a per-
cent of the fee value for the land acquired within the right of way
because there are no damages to the remainder property based upon
proximity to the pipeline. Property owners disagree. They contend that
a pipeline transmitting one billion cubic feet of natural gas a day just
three to four feet underground is a classic “Not-In-My-Backyard”
(“NIMBY”) use and that property encumbered with a natural gas
pipeline easement is less valuable than property not so encumbered.
Sabal Trail was able to acquire easements from 1,248 of 1,582
property owners in Florida through voluntary acquisition without
having to file eminent domain. Sabal Trail was not silent about its
success with “willing sellers” when filing its initial pleadings in fed-
eral court. In a sense, Sabal Trail considered the 263 property owners
who were made defendants in its federal condemnation case to be
“hold-outs” of sorts. Because they did not consent to voluntary acqui-
sitions, these owners were subjected to the exercise of eminent do-
main power. Before assuming these property owners failed to be
reasonable like those who consented to a voluntary acquisition with
Sabal Trail in lieu of filing of a condemnation case, the reader is en-
couraged to reserve judgment until reaching the end of this article.
Given the backdrop above, this article reports on what has occurred
and what is ongoing in federal courts regarding the Sabal Trail Natu-
ral Gas Pipeline project. It provides a vantage point by which the
jurisprudence associated with the acquisition of lineal corridors may
be surveyed, showing the contours of the exercise of eminent domain
when the condemnor is a private licensee. This should not only ben-
efit those who may find themselves engaged in like proceedings, but
it also sheds light on why the protection of private property rights
is not limited to only the initial questions relating to constitutional
public purpose, properly delegated authority, or reasonable neces-
sity, but also to the constitutional measure of compensation paid for
what is taken without consent.
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I. IMMEDIATE POSSESSION
A. Jurisprudential Development Under the Sage Precedent in
Federal District Courts
The sovereign power of eminent domain is not constitutionally
limited to a power only exercised by the sovereign government. In
certain instances, the power is delegated to quasi-public authorities
or even private, for-profit companies. In deference to interstate
commerce and the provision of utility infrastructure, Congress has
authorized the federal eminent domain power to be used by private,
for-profit companies by specific legislative acts.
Under the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”),10 a natural gas pipeline com-
pany that holds a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity
from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”)11 may
condemn property interests that are required for a pipeline project
when such property interests cannot be acquired by contract.
On February 2, 2016, FERC issued a Certificate of Public Conve-
nience and Necessity (“FERC Certificate”) to Sabal Trail. Thereaf-
ter, in March 2016, Sabal Trail—with respect to its need to complete
the acquisition of right-of-ways for a lineal corridor of 268 miles—
filed its 263 condemnation cases in federal court, 190 in the Middle
District of Florida and 73 in the Northern District of Florida.
In Florida, before the Sabal Trail project, natural gas pipeline
companies, after securing a FERC Certificate, would file their con-
demnation cases in state courts because under section 361.05 of the
Florida Statutes these companies were authorized to use “quick-take”
proceedings. In a “quick-taking,” a condemning authority may elect
to have a trial judge rule on the issues of public purpose and reason-
able necessity during the initial stage of a condemnation case. If the
trial judge finds that public purpose and reasonable necessity do
exist to constitutionally justify the taking of private property, the
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717z (2012).
11. FERC, through issuance of its certificate, governs over the public convenience and ne-
cessity that justifies the pipeline, its corridor selection, mitigation of environmental impacts,
and initial stage of construction. Once operational, the regulatory structure of the Pipeline
Safety Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 60101–60301 (2012), governs the use and safety protocols applied to the
easement area. This is overseen by the U.S. Department of Transportation (“DOT”), Pipeline
and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (“PHMSA”), and Office of Pipeline Safety.
2019] NATURAL GAS PIPELINE EASEMENTS 129
trial judge is then authorized to enter an “order of taking.” Such order
provides that, upon the initial deposit of a condemnor’s good faith es-
timate of value, both title and possession to any temporary or per-
manent easements are vested in the condemnor. Under such process,
the condemnor can proceed with its project without further delay.
The determination of the full measure of compensation is subse-
quently determined by jury trial. Additionally, the property owner who
withdraws the initial deposit is not thereby prejudiced in disputing
the measure of compensation; essentially, the monies deposited in
good faith are exchanged for the property taken. During this prelim-
inary stage of the proceedings, the trial judge may review, upon a
proper responsive pleading that challenges the taking, whether the
quality and quantity of the easement estate taken is reasonably ne-
cessary for the proposed project. Under the constitutional limitation
of reasonable necessity, a condemnor is not authorized to take a
greater or lesser estate than what is reasonably needed to accom-
plish the public purpose asserted in a complaint. As such, the “order
of taking” sets forth a legal description that includes the “grant of
easement” for both temporary and permanent easements vested in
the pipeline company, by quick-taking.
Notwithstanding the foregoing practice, following the decision of
the Fourth Circuit in East Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Sage,12 pipe-
line companies have been following a new “blueprint” for obtaining
injunctive relief from federal courts. Under this new blueprint, the
companies file in federal court for “immediate possession” at the initial
stage of proceedings rather than file in state courts under “quick-
take” proceedings. Procedurally, the pipeline companies file a Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment on a “right to take” while simulta-
neous filing a Motion for Preliminary Injunction for “immediate pos-
session.” These motions are filed contemporaneously with, the filing
of a Complaint for Condemnation of both temporary and permanent
easements that alleges public purpose and reasonable necessity.
Heretofore, the precedent in Sage has also been followed in the
Fourth and Eighth Circuit Courts, along with at least ten district
courts nationwide.13 Nevertheless, leading up to the Sabal Trail
12. 361 F.3d 808, 828 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 978 (2004).
13. See, e.g., Alliance Pipeline, L.P. v. 4.360 Acres, 746 F.3d 362, 368–69 (8th Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 245 (2014); Columbia Gas Trans., LLC v. 1.01 Acres, 768 F.3d 300,
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project, the new blueprint presented in Sage, available if filing in
federal court, has not been followed in Florida with interstate natu-
ral gas pipeline projects of the same magnitude. Prior to Sabal Trail,
neither the federal district courts in Florida nor the Eleventh Cir-
cuit had ruled in such a manner as to adopt the precedent in Sage.14
Therefore, in March 2016, Sabal Trail filed complaints in 263 cases,
together with contemporaneous Motions for Partial Summary Judg-
ments on a “right to take” and for “immediate possession.” To estab-
lish a “right to take,” Sabal Trail asserted that it had obtained its
FERC Certificate and had completed its Environmental Impact State-
ment (“EIS”) as part of its application with FERC. In order to move
for injunctive relief, Sabal Trail further asserted that the court should
use its equitable powers to grant “immediate possession” because
Sabal Trail had met the four-part test for injunctive relief.15 With
respect to the test for injunctive relief, perhaps the most controver-
sial part was Sabal Trail’s assertion of “irreparable harm” if they could
not proceed. Basically, the “emergency” that Sabal Trail sought to
have the court remedy was to avoid contractual penalties it had ne-
gotiated with other third parties, to whom Sabal Trail is to transmit
315–16 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 245 (2014); Columbia Gas Trans., LLC v. 1.092
Acres, No. 15-208, 2015 WL 389402, at *3–5 (D.N.J. Jan. 28, 2015); Texas E. Trans., LP v. 3.2
Acres, No. 2:14-CV-2650, 2015 WL 152680, at *4–7 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 12, 2015); Columbia Gas
Trans., LLC v. 10.5068 Acres, No. 1:15-CV-0360, 2015 WL 1470698, at *3–6 (M.D. Pa.
Mar. 31, 2015); Maritimes & Ne. Pipeline, LLC v. 6.85 Acres, 537 F. Supp. 2d 223, 225–27 (D.
Me. 2008); Nw. Pipeline Corp. v. 20’ by 1,430’ Pipeline Right of Way, 197 F. Supp. 2d 1241,
1246 (E.D. Wash. 2002); Guardian Pipeline, LLC v. 950.80 Acres, 210 F. Supp. 2d 976, 978–79
(N.D. Ill. 2002); Vector Pipeline, LP v. 68.55 Acres, 157 F. Supp. 2d 949, 951 (N.D. Ill. 2001);
Humphries v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1280 (D. Kan. 1999); Tennessee
Gas Pipeline Co. v. New England Power, 6 F. Supp. 2d 102, 104 (D. Mass. 1998), rejected on other
grounds by Dale v. Mo. Highways & Transp. Comm’n, 442 S.W.3d 143 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014);
USG Pipeline Co. v. 1. 74 Acres, 1 F. Supp. 2d 816, 825–26 (E.D. Tenn. 1998), rejected on other
grounds by Kansas Pipeline Co. v. 200’ by 250’ Piece of Land, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (D. Kan.
2002); N Border Pipeline Co. v. 127.79 Acres, 520 F. Supp. 170, 172–73 (D.N.D. 1981).
14. Since the filing of the Sabal Trail cases in federal courts in Florida in March, 2016, the
Eleventh Circuit has recently decided to follow the precedent in Sage holding that a prelimi-
nary injunction allowing “immediate access” before conclusion of condemnation proceedings was
legally permissible to an entity holding a certificate of public convenience and necessity.
Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. 6.04 Acres, 910 F.3d 1130 (11th Cir. 2018).
15. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65. “A district court may grant injunctive relief only if the moving
party shows that: (1) it has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable
injury will be suffered unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant
outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4)
if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.” Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d
1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
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natural gas. The risk to be averted was a delay that would otherwise
occur if, as in other condemnations wherein the “quick-take” power is
not included in the authorizing legislation, title and possession is not
vested until the conclusion of the proceedings wherein the measure
of compensation is determined.16
B. Sabal Trail Natural Gas Pipeline
While court records reflect that most private property owners in
the 263 cases filed responses to challenge the use of the precedent
in Sage, Sabal Trail was able to secure stipulations from the major-
ity owners immediately prior to the hearings, which were set on the
contemporaneous motions of a “right to take” and for “immediate
possession.”17 The exception was eleven property owners in the U.S.
Northern District of Florida who did contest the new blueprint of
“immediate possession” under Sage.18 These owners argued that the
court should have denied Sabal Trail’s motion for “immediate posses-
sion” because the U.S. Congress did not grant natural gas pipeline
companies the right to a “quick-take” power in the NGA.19 More spe-
cifically, the owners contended that the quick-take power is a separate
substantive right that must be expressly granted to a condemnor by
statute and that the Natural Gas Act provision authorizing condem-
nation does not create or establish any substantive rights for natu-
ral gas pipeline companies to exercise quick-take power.20 Citing to
a decision of the Seventh Circuit in Northern Border Pipeline Co. v.
16. This is also referred to as a “slow-taking.”
17. The consideration exchanged for the stipulations on the “right to take” and “immediate
possession” are not set forth in the court records and remain confidential.
18. See Complaint for Condemnation, Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, Answer, Response to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
Response to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and Order on Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Docs. 1, 4, 8, 22, 26, 27, 38, Sabal Trail
Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres in Levy County, Florida (Thomas Trust), 280 F. Supp. 3d
1331, No: 1:16-cv-00093-MW-GRJ (N.D. Fla. 2016) (Hon. Mark E. Walker, presiding).
19. See Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. 17.19 Acres, 550 F.3d 770, 774–75 (9th Cir. 2008)
(stating that “[a]ll courts examining the issue have agreed that the NGA does not authorize
the quick-take power, nor can it be implied, because eminent domain statutes are strictly
construed to exclude those rights not expressly granted”); see also United States v. Parcel of
Land, 100 F. Supp. 498, 501 (D.D.C. 1951) (The power to take possession prior to the payment
of compensation is referred to as the “quick-take” power.).
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2012).
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86.72 Acres of Land,21 the owners urged the court to adhere to the
substantive-entitlement principle explained in Northern Border be-
cause it properly construed the language and the intentions of Con-
gress found in section 717f(h) of the NGA. Additionally, the owners
contended that the grant of “immediate possession” pled by the pipe-
line company, unlike a “quick-taking,” neither required an initial
deposit of the condemnor’s estimation of value nor was it circum-
scribed by any formal vesting of title with a “grant of easement,” with
legally described boundaries or language that provided specific delin-
eation between the use of the easement holder vis a vis the underlying
fee owner. In response, Sabal Trail argued that the Environmental
Impact Statement (“EIS”), which accompanied the company’s FERC
Certificate, was sufficient to govern over the condemnor’s use of the
property during the initial stage of construction.22
Despite the challenge of the eleven property owners, the Northern
District Court granted partial summary judgment on Sabal Trail’s
motion regarding the “right to take” and its motion for “immediate
possession.”23 The court distinguished the case from the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Northern Border by pointing out that the pipeline
company had voluntarily filed its condemnation in state court, not
federal. Further, the court found the precedent of the Fourth Circuit
in Sage was more persuasive. Although recognizing that Congress
did not specifically authorize a “quick-take” power in the NGA, the
court found that “immediate possession” was a “practical substitute,”
reasoning that the four-part test for preliminary injunctive relief
21. 144 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 1998).
22. Essentially, as is typically the case in lineal corridor takings under most state juris-
dictions’ “quick-take” procedures, the reviewing court is there to determine whether the legal
quality and quantity of the estate sought for acquisition is reasonably necessary to accomplish
the public purpose pled by the condemning authority. Further, the condemnor’s use, particularly
the use that is associated with temporary construction easements, continues under the juris-
diction of the court, so that the owner is able to enforce any limitations set forth upon the
easement holder’s use, established by a formal vesting of legal title in an easement. With
“immediate possession,” which is granted without the vesting of any legal title to temporary
or permanent easements until the final judgement of the eminent domain proceedings, there
are only general, unspecific limitations on the pipeline company’s use, contained within
thousands of pages of the project’s Environmental Impact Statement, leaving the owner to
dispute whether enforcement is even available under the jurisdiction of the court or, instead,
whether it is only available through FERC administrative procedures.
23. Sabal Trail Transmission, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192660 (Hon. Mark E. Walker,
presiding).
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under rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure followed a more
stringent standard than even the requirements imposed on the fed-
eral government when they established “quick-take” authority under
its legislation, the Declaration of Taking Act (“DTA”).24
In considering Sage’s precedent, the court reasoned:
At the heart of the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning is the point that
“[a] preliminary injunction is, of course, ‘appropriate to grant
intermediate relief of the same character as that which may be
granted finally.’” Once the district court has established the gas
company’s right to condemn, the gas company is legally entitled
to possession upon the entry of final judgment. So long as the
requirements for a preliminary injunction are also satisfied, the
district court can then grant immediate possession “as a form of
intermediate relief.”25
Stated otherwise, upon establishing its “right to take” by means of a
partial summary judgment, the court found that the pipeline com-
pany was already “legally entitled to possession upon entry of final
judgment.” Reducing the issue to only a question of timing, the court
did not find any argument persuasive to otherwise delay granting
possession to Sabal Trail until after determination of compensation,
so long as the four-part test for preliminary injunction was also met.
The court further accepted the validity of the reasons set forth by
Sabal Trail when it defined its irreparable harm as follows:
To meet the May 1, 2017, in-service date, Sabal Trail must begin
preconstruction activities as soon as possible and these activities
must be completed in order to begin pipeline construction on
June 21, 2016. A pipeline project of the magnitude of the Sabal
Trail Project requires a complex and coordinated construction
process, with work activities being performed in sequential phases.
Temporarily stopping construction or moving around a parcel of
property not yet acquired would cause Sabal Trail to incur sub-
stantial costs and increase the risk of missing the May 1, 2017,
in-service date.26
24. 40 U.S.C.S. § 3114 (2019).
25. Id. at *22–23 (citations omitted).
26. Id. at *23–24 (citations omitted).
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In final summary, the 263 Sabal Trail cases filed in federal courts
in Florida have so far followed the new blueprint espoused in Sage’s
precedent.27 Before the end of June 2016, Sabal Trail had been
granted “immediate possession” in all 263 cases filed in federal courts
in Florida. While some of the cases of the eleven property owners
who challenged Sabal Trail’s simultaneous motions of “right to take”
and “immediate possession” are yet pending, no appeals have been
filed either on an interlocutory basis or following any final order in
any of the cases to challenge “immediate possession.”28
While it appears the precedent in Sage has been widely accepted
among federal district courts, a challenge arose in the Third Circuit to
using “immediate possession” as a substitute for what Congress did
not authorize in the NGA as a “quick-taking” power.29 The Third Cir-
cuit joined the Fourth and Eighth Circuit Courts in denying such a
challenge and granting the injunctive relief of “immediate possession.”
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari to review this
new challenge.30
II. CHOICE OF LAW FOR THE MEASURE OF COMPENSATION
A. Choice of Law for the Federal Rule of Decision for Determining
the Measure of Compensation
As demonstrated above, the federal courts in Florida showed a
pragmatic understanding of a natural gas pipeline company’s desire
to avoid a delay in proceeding with the construction of its project by
following the new blueprint espoused in Sage’s precedent as a prac-
tical substitute for “quick-taking” authority. Equally so, it is also
apparent that the federal courts in Florida showed their respect for
the constitutional rights of property owners to be justly and fairly
27. See, e.g., id. (citations omitted); see also Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 0.41 Acres,
No. 3:16-cv-274-TJC-JBT, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74768 (M.D. Fla. June 8, 2016) (Hon. Timothy
C. Corrigan, presiding); Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 0.06 Acres, No. 5:16-cv-199-Oc-32PRL,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68613 (M.D. Fla. May 25, 2016) (Hon. James S. Moody, Jr., presiding).
28. Such appeals are unlikely because, as a practical matter, even if prevailing on the
issue, the pipeline is already constructed.
29. See, e.g., Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Co. v. Permanent Easements for 2.14 Acres,
907 F.3d 725 (3d Cir. 2018); see also Lynda Like v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Co., No. 18-
1206 (2018) (cert. pet. filed).
30. See Lynda Like v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Co., No. 18-1206 (2018) (cert.
denied); see also Alliance Pipeline, LP v. 4.360 Acres, 746 F.3d 362, 368–69 (8th Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 245 (2014); Columbia Gas Trans., LLC v. 1.01 Acres, 768 F.3d 300,
315–16 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 245 (2014).
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compensated for Sabal Trail’s taking of temporary and permanent
easements without their consent.
As previously discussed, prior to the Sabal Trail project, pipeline
companies filed condemnation proceedings in Florida’s state courts
in order to avail themselves of “quick-taking” authority under sec-
tion 361.05 of the Florida Statutes, which would allow early vesting
and possession of title to avoid delays in project construction. How-
ever, following ten years of federal jurisprudential development that
now allows “immediate possession” at the early stages of condemna-
tion proceedings, the apparent incentive for companies like Sabal Trail
to file their condemnation proceedings in Florida’s state courts has
long gone. As such, pipeline companies now avail themselves of federal
courts in Florida instead of state courts, almost without exception.
Because the Sabal Trail project was the first instance in Florida
wherein a lineal corridor project of this scope and nature proceeded
with eminent domain in federal courts, a new issue emerged along the
lines of battle between condemnor and condemnee. Oddly enough, in
its broadest sense the issue touches on the principles of federalism
and the division of power between federal and state governments.
In regards to property rights, however, the issue is far more sig-
nificant to a condemnee than to a condemnor when a pipeline company
is afforded “immediate possession” at the early stages of condemnation
proceedings. This issue broaches whether the “measure of compensa-
tion” is determined by state property law or federal common law,
given that it is a private licensee exercising the eminent domain
power and not the federal government itself. As explained below,
the contrast between state and federal law, particularly with respect
to Florida law, is quite marked.
B. Differences Between State and Federal Law for Determining the
Measure of Compensation
In condemnation actions in Florida, under state law, the measure
of compensation is determined by Article X, Section 6, of the Florida
Constitution, which provides that:
No private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and
with full compensation therefor paid to each owner or secured by
deposit in the registry of the court and available to the owner.31
31. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6 (emphasis added).
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This differs from the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
which provides: “nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation”32
It is “fundamentally clear” from the Florida Supreme Court’s deci-
sions in Dade County v. Brigham,33 and Joseph B. Doerr Trust v.
Central Florida Expressway Authority,34 that the measure of compen-
sation includes the right to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.35 The
court in Doerr Trust, most particularly, identifies the right of an owner
to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs as an element that distin-
guishes the State’s measure of compensation, or full compensation,
from the federal measure, or just compensation. Indeed, Florida cases
interpreting full compensation emphasize that “the theory and spirit
of such guarantee is that owner shall be made whole so far as possible
and practicable.”36 Thus so, the state standard is recognized as being
more “expansive” than the federal just compensation measure.37
According to Florida law, the owner whose property is taken with-
out consent and who is necessarily made a defendant by an author-
ity that condemns the owner’s private property, should be paid the
necessary and reasonable cost of defending his or her property
rights, as part of the measure of compensation.38 If owners have to
pay out, from the compensation awarded for their property, the costs
of defending a condemnation action, it could not be said that the
owners were made whole or put in the same financial position after
the taking as they were before the taking.39 Likewise, the constitu-
tional measure of full compensation in Florida takes into account that
the owner should be placed on “equal footing” with the condemnor
regarding the reasonableness of the award of attorneys’ fees and
costs to be paid by the condemnor.40
32. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
33. 47 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 1950).
34. 177 So. 3d 1209, 1215 (Fla. 2015).
35. See id. at 1215.
36. See Brigham, 47 So. 2d at 603.
37. See Doerr Trust, 177 So. 3d at 1215, n.5.
38. See Brigham, 47 So. 2d at 604–605; Doerr Trust, 177 So. 3d at 1215 (citing Brigham,
47 So. 2d 602).
39. See Brigham, 47 So. 2d at 604–605; Doerr Trust, 177 So. 3d at 1215 (citing Brigham,
47 So. 2d 602).
40. See Brigham, 47 So. 2d at 603–04; see also Doerr Trust, 177 So. 3d at 1213, 1215–19. As
a recent example, in Doerr Trust, the Florida Supreme Court awarded additional attorneys’
fees to the property owner for “over-litigation” or “excessive litigation” on the part of the
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It doesn’t stop there. Other substantive law differences exist be-
tween full compensation and just compensation than just the require-
ment that the condemning authority pay for the owner’s attorneys’
fees and costs. This is, perhaps, most apparent to experienced trial
practitioners and can best be illustrated by a side by side comparison
condemning authority’s attorneys. See Doerr Trust, 177 So. 3d at 1215–19. There are pro-
visions within Florida’s Eminent Domain Code, chapters 73 and 74 in the Florida Statutes,
for the award of attorneys’ fees. See FLA. STAT. § 73.092. It sets forth different formulae for the
award of attorneys’ fees. Id. In most instances, it provides a benefit-based, result-oriented fee
calculated by applying a sliding-percentage scale to the difference between the condemnor’s
initial pre-suit offer to the property owner and the final amount agreed in settlement or de-
termined by jury verdict. See FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1).
However, the court in Doerr Trust recognized “where private property owners are forced to
defend against excessive litigation caused by a condemning authority, a mandatory statutory
formula that generates a fee award below that which is considered reasonable denies those
property owners their right to full compensation that is guaranteed by the Florida Consti-
tution.” Doerr Trust, 177 So. 3d at 1217. The court, therefore, held that when a condemning
authority engages in tactics that cause excessive litigation, the reasonable amount of attorneys’
fees should not be limited to the benefit-based statutory formula alone but should also include
additional fees for those hours incurred in defending against excessive litigation. Id. Accordingly,
the court awarded additional fees pursuant to an hourly-based lodestar formula for the time
expended by the owner’s lawyers to defend against excessive tactics on top of the fees awarded
from the benefit-based formula. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 73.092(1), (2).
In so doing, the court affirmed that it is the courts, not the legislature, that ultimately
determines the reasonable amount awarded for attorneys’ fees as part of the constitutional
measure of compensation. Doerr Trust, 177 So. 3d at 1216. Stated otherwise, even when the
legislature enacts a statute that sets reasonable parameters for such an award, it is the courts
that determine whether the operation of the statute “runs afoul of the constitutional guarantee
that private property owners receive full compensation for the taking of their property.” Id.
So too, in reaching its holding, the court in Doerr Trust emphasized the importance of “fair
play” in eminent domain proceedings, because of the inherent disadvantage to the property
owner and the understanding that the condemnor, in many instances, has “unlimited re-
sources.” See id. at 1216–17. Unlike litigation between private parties, a condemnation under
government power should not be a matter of “dog eat dog” or “win at any cost.” See id. at 1216
(citing Shell v. State Rd. Dep’t, 135 So. 2d 857, 861 (Fla. 1961)).
The reasoning in Doerr Trust echoes another oft-quoted decision of the Florida Supreme
Court wherein Justice Drew, in a concurring opinion, sagely wrote:
The fact that the sovereign is now engaged in great public enterprises necessitating
the acquisition of large amounts of private property at greatly increasing costs is
no reason to depart from the firmly established principle that under our system
the rights of the individual are matters of greatest concern to the courts. The
powerful government can usually take care of itself; when the courts cease to pro-
tect the individual—within, of course, constitutional and statutory limitations—
such individual rights will be rapidly swallowed up and disappear in the maw
of the sovereign. If these immense acquisitions of lands point to anything, it is
to the continuing necessity in the courts of seeing to it that, in the process of
improving the general welfare, individual rights are not completely destroyed.
Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Henry G. Dupree, Co., 108 So. 2d 289, 293 (Fla. 1959)
(Drew, J., concurring).
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of the proposed state and federal jury instructions that were submit-
ted by the parties in two Sabal Trail cases that proceeded to jury
trials in 2018.41
For example, under the Florida Bar recommended jury instructions,
the constitutional measure of full compensation is explained using
the following language derived from Florida case law: “The owner
is to be put in as good a position financially as he or she would have
been if the property had not been taken.”42 Further, under the state
constitutional measure of full compensation, fair market value does
not serve as the exclusive standard of measurement:
The constitutional requirement of full compensation means that
the landowner must be paid completely for the whole loss result-
ing from the taking. In most cases, it will be necessary and suf-
ficient to full compensation that the award constitute the fair
market value of the property. Although fair market value is a
reliable standard in determining the amount of full compensa-
tion to be paid to the owner, it is not the only standard. It is merely
a tool to assist you in determining what is full compensation as
guaranteed by the Florida Constitution. In determining full com-
pensation, all facts and circumstances that bear a reasonable
relationship to the owner’s loss must be taken into account.
Fair market value is the price that a seller willing, but not com-
pelled to sell, and a buyer willing, but not compelled to buy, would
agree on in fair negotiations with knowledge of all the facts. In
making your determination, you should take into account all fac-
tors that might fairly be considered and be reasonably given sub-
stantial weight in the bargaining between the seller and the buyer.
41. Cf., e.g., FLORIDA BAR, FLORIDA EMINENT DOMAIN PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 11.3(C),
(E), (F), (G), and (H) (10th ed. 2017), with 3A KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS (6th ed. 2019), ch. 154, Eminent Domain, §§ 154.30, 154.31; see,
e.g., Proposed Jury Instructions and Jury Instructions Entered, Docs. 106, 125, Sabal Trail
v. 3.921 Acres in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-00178-JSM-PRL
(M.D. Fla. 2018) (Hon. James S. Moody, presiding); Response to Motion in Limine, Exibits 1,
2, 3, & 4, Notice of Objection to Jury Instructions (Plaintiff), Order Overruling Objection to
Jury Instructions, Notice of Objection to Jury Instructions (Defendant), Order Sustaining
Objections to Jury Instructions, and Jury Instructions Entered, Docs. 123, 123 (1)-(4), 160, 161,
162, 163, 186, Sabal Trail v. 18.27 Acres in Levy County, Florida (Thomas Trust), No. 1:16-cv-
00093-MW-GRJ (N.D. Fla. 2018) (Hon. Mark E. Walker, presiding).
42. FLORIDA EMINENT DOMAIN PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 41, § 11.3(C).
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You may also consider the market of other comparable property
as of the date of the valuation and all other factors tending to
increase or reduce the value of the property that a prudent seller
and buyer would consider in negotiating a voluntary sale and
purchase of the property taken.
The property should be valued according to its highest and best
use. The phrase “highest and best use” means the highest and
most profitable use for which the property is reasonably adaptable
and needed, or is likely to be needed, in the foreseeable future.43
By comparison, a known treatise on federal practices and proce-
dures explains the constitutional measure of just compensation de-
rived from federal case law as follows: “The term ‘just compensation’
means the ‘fair market value’ of the property on the date of value.”44
Under the federal constitutional measure, just compensation and
fair market value are one in the same, with fair market value being
an exclusive standard:
“Fair market value” means the price in cash the property would
have brought on the date of value, considering its highest and
most profitable use, if then offered for sale in the open market
with a reasonable time allowed to find a purchaser.
Said another way, “fair market value” means the amount a fully-
informed, reasonable, and willing buyer would have paid and a
fully-informed, reasonable, and willing seller would have agreed
to accept in an arms-length transaction with both parties being
fully informed concerning all of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of the property and neither acting under any compulsion
to buy or sell.
In arriving at your determination of fair market value, you should
take into account all factors that could fairly be suggested by the
seller to increase the price paid, and all counter-arguments which
the buyer could fairly make to reduce the price. Your determina-
tion is to be made in the light of the opinions of the various wit-
nesses and all facts affecting value as shown by the evidence in the
case.45
43. Id. § 11.3(E).
44. O’MALLEY ET AL., supra note 41, § 154.30.
45. Id. § 154.31.
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From an experienced trial practitioner’s standpoint, the difference
is not insignificant. Just as the language differs between the two sets
of jury instructions, so does the available elements of persuasion for
a jury to consider. A closing argument under the state law’s set of
jury instructions is far different from a closing argument under the
federal law’s set of jury instructions. Compare, for instance, the state
standard that requires the jury to consider “the whole loss resulting
from the taking,” that “fair market value” is “a tool to assist you in
determining what is full compensation,” and that the “[o]wner is to
be put in as good a position financially as he or she would have been
if the property had not been taken” against the federal standard,
which, without further elaboration, the measure of compensation is
defined exclusively to be “fair market value.”
C. Sabal Trail Natural Gas Pipeline
Returning to illustrative example of the Sabal Trail project, it was
not long after the federal courts granted “immediate possession” when
two matters were set for both briefing and hearing with regards to the
24 cases in the Northern District and 49 cases in the Middle District:
(1) whether state or federal law controls over the measure of com-
pensation; and (2) whether Sabal Trail cases would be tried by jury
or commission.46 Because there is no express provision in the NGA
as to whether state substantive law or federal common law will con-
trol the source of law47 over the measure of compensation, Sabal
Trail sought to have the courts determine that federal law, using the
“just compensation” standard, would determine compensation.
Looking first to the condemnor’s side of the argument, Sabal Trail
argued that there is no difference between the federal government ex-
ercising eminent domain power and a private gas company exercising
the same federal power, which has been transferred to it by the NGA.
Sabal Trail primarily relied on the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
United States v. Miller48 which held that local law does not nor could
46. This article will examine both matters, starting with the first.
47. Courts interchangeably use the phraseology “source of law” or “choice of law” when
referring to the application of state or federal law with the “federal rule of decision” regarding
the measure of compensation.
48. 317 U.S. 369, 379–80 (1943).
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not affect questions of substantive right such as the measure of com-
pensation, which is grounded upon the Constitution of the United
States. Following this line of reasoning, Sabal Trail extended its ar-
gument to say that its federal power of eminent domain may not be
diminished or prescribed by state law. It added, as the U.S. Supreme
Court held in Kohl v. United States49:
If the United States have the power, it must be complete in itself.
It can neither be enlarged nor diminished by a State. Nor can
any state prescribe the manner in which it must be exercised.50
Thus so, as Sabal Trail contended, unless Congress explicitly subjects
the federal eminent domain power to state law, federal law controls.51
Looking next to the property owners’ side of the argument, the
owners initially noted that all of the cases relied upon by Sabal Trail
to establish that the federal eminent domain power can neither be
diminished nor prescribed by state law, such as United States v.
Miller,52 were also cases where the federal government is the con-
demnor. These were not cases in which a private company was autho-
rized by Congress to use the eminent domain power. In light of the
foregoing, the property owners’ argument focused on the following
question: What is the federal rule of decision as to the measure of
compensation when Congress is silent in the authorizing Act that
transfers the eminent domain power to a private company?
Regarding the Sabal Trail cases filed in Florida courts, counsel for
various property owners collectively responded in a joint briefing
that states substantive law should apply. Essentially, without the
same federal interests at stake when the condemnor is, in fact, the
federal government, the principles of federalism require that federal
common law yield to a state’s sovereignty over its own property law
when the eminent domain power is being used by a private, for-profit
licensee company. The property owners primarily relied on a case
decided by the former Fifth Circuit, dealing with the Federal Power
Act (“FPA”), over whether state substantive law or federal common
49. 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
50. Id. at 374.
51. See United States v. 93.970 Acres, 360 U.S. 328, 332–33 (1959).
52. 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
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law should control. The property owners argued that the case, Georgia
Power v. Sanders,53 was binding precedent on the subsequently formed
Eleventh Circuit and, therefore, binding on the district courts in
Florida, concerning Sabal Trail.54
In Georgia Power, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the question of
whether state substantive law or federal common law should apply
in a taking under the FPA. Because the FPA did not expressly de-
termine the question of which law should apply, the court undertook
an exhaustive analysis of the source of law issue, ultimately deter-
mining that Georgia’s state substantive law should apply. Upon
finding that no federal interests were at stake when private compa-
nies exercised the eminent domain power under the FPA, the court
decided that state law should be the substantive source of law for
determining the measure of compensation. Without any federal inter-
ests controlling, the licensee, private, for-profit company is required
to respect state sovereignty and, more particularly, the state’s law
of real property.
With the reasoning in Georgia Power being so compelling, oppos-
ing parties in the Florida district courts argued over the extent that
the FPA and NGA could be compared to one another. The district
courts found, in no uncertain terms, that the FPA and NGA were
similar, if not identical, in the context of congressional acts autho-
rizing private companies to use the eminent domain power without
provisions expressly relating to decisional law.55 Arguing that the
FPA and NGA are essentially identical, the property owners con-
tended that the same choice-of-law analysis in Georgia Power should
apply to the eminent domain actions initiated by Sabal Trail.
Furthermore, in surveying the prevailing jurisprudence on a na-
tional scale, the vast weight of persuasive law was in favor of the
53. 617 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
54. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206,1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Former
Fifth Circuit decisions rendered prior to September 30, 1981, are binding precedent within
the Eleventh Circuit).
55. In applying an incisive wit to a note in his opinion, Judge Mark E. Walker, United
States District Judge, rejected Sabal Trail’s argument that United States v. Miller was “strikingly
similar” to its case while also asserting that the NGA is nothing like the FPA by reasoning
that this was like saying “men’s soccer is ‘strikingly similar’ to bobsledding, yet not women’s
soccer.” See Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. Real Estate, No. 1:16-CV-063-MW-GRJ, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99370 *15–16, n.10 (N.D. Fla. June 6, 2017).
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application of state law to the measure of compensation when pri-
vate companies proceeded to exercise the eminent domain power
under the NGA. In fact, five federal circuits, including the Second,
Third (recently decided), Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits, previously
held that state substantive law should determine the measure of
compensation in like-kind cases.56 So too, eleven federal districts
agree,57 whereas only two federal districts have held to the contrary.58
As for the Sabal Trail cases, the federal district courts in Florida
followed the binding precedent of Georgia Power. A few days before
the hearing on this issue in the Middle District, the Honorable Mark
E. Walker of the Northern District issued an order denying Sabal
Trail’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, determining that
Florida state substantive law would supply the measure of compen-
sation, and deciding that defendants would be entitled to jury trials
56. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., LLC v. Permanent Easement for 7.053 Acres, No. 17-3700,
2019 U.S. LEXIS 21901 at *1 (3d Cir. 2019); Georgia Bison Pipeline, LLC v. 102.84 Acres, 560
Fed. App’x. 690, 695–96 (10th Cir. 2013); Rockies Express Pipeline v. 4.895 Acres, 734 F.3d
424, 429 (6th Cir. 2013); Columbia Gas Trans. Co. v. An Exclusive Natural Gas Storage Ease-
ment, 962 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 506 U.S. 1022 (1992); Winooski Hydroelectric
Co. v. Five Acres, 769 F.2d 79, 81–82 (2d Cir. 1985); Miss. River Trans. Corp. v. Tabor, 757
F.2d 662, 665 & n.2–3, 5 (5th Cir. 1985); Georgia Power v. Sanders, 617 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir.
1980) (en banc).
57. See Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. Booth, No. 1:16-cv-1418, 2016 WL 7439348,
at *5–6 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 22, 2016); Equitrans v. 0.56 Acres, No. 1:15CV106, 2016 WL 3982479,
at *2 (N.D.W. Va. July 22, 2016); N. Natural Gas Co. v. Kingman, 2 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1179
(D. Kan. 2014); Cadeville Gas Storage, LLC v. 10.00 Acres, 2013 WL 6712918, at *9–10 (W.D.
La. Dec. 20, 2013); Tex. Gas Transmission v. 18.08 Acres, 2012 WL 6057991, at *5 (N.D. Miss.
Dec. 6, 2012); Perryville Gas Storage, LLC v. Dawson Farms, 2012 WL 5499892, at *7–8
(W.D. La. Nov. 13, 2012); Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. Crawford, 746 F. Supp. 2d 905,
910 (N.D. Ohio 2010); Rockies Express Pipeline LLC v. 77.620 Acres, No. 08-cv-3127, 2010 WL
3034879, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2010); Maritimes & Ne. Pipeline, LLC v. 0.714 Acres, No. 02
-11054-GAO, 2007 WL 2461054, at *2 (D. Mass. Aug. 27, 2007); Portland Natural Gas
Transmission Sys. v. 19.2 Acres, 195 F. Supp. 2d 314, 319–20 (D. Mass. 2002); Florida Gas
Transmission Co. v. 9.854 Acres, No. 96-14-83-CIV, 1999 WL 33487958, at *1 (S.D. Fla.
May 27, 1999); Spears v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 932 F. Supp. 259, 260–61 (D. Kan. 1996);
Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. 104 Acres, 780 F. Supp. 82, 85–86 (D.R.I. 1991); Ozark Gas
Transmission Systems v. Barclay, 662 S.W. 2d 188, 193 (Ark. App. 1983).
58. See Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Permanent Easement for 7.053 Acres, No. 3:12-cv
-01477, 2017 WL 3727449 (M.D. PA. Aug. 30, 2017), rev’d, Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., LLC v.
Permanent Easement for 7.053 Acres, No. 17-3700, 2019 U.S. LEXIS 21901, at *1 (3d Cir.
2019); Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 252.071 Acres, No. ELH-15-3462, 2016 WL
7167979 (D. Md. Dec. 8, 2016); Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Permanent Easement for 1.7320
Acres, No. 3:CV-11-028, 2014 WL 690700 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2014). But see Equitrans v. 0.56
Acres, No. 1:15CV106, 2016 WL 3982479, at *2 (N.D.W. Va. July 22, 2016).
144 PROPERTY RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 8:121
(as opposed to commissions).59 The Honorable Timothy J. Corrigan of
the Middle District followed suit, adopting Judge Walker’s reasoning
in applying Florida state substantive law and in allowing jury trials.60
From the district court’s point of view, it was plain to Judge Walker
as a matter of fundamental property rights and given the weight of
overwhelming precedent that state substantive law should be the
rule of decision. In the opening paragraph of his opinion, Judge
Walker reasoned:
“[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights
is a false one. Property does not have rights. People have rights
[, such as t]he right to enjoy property without unlawful depriva-
tion . . . . That rights in property are basic civil rights has long
been recognized.” Those basic civil rights also dictate that pri-
vate property owners must be compensated when their property
is taken for public use.
This case presents a related, straightforward choice-of-law ques-
tion. What substantive law controls the amount of compensation
due to a private landowner for the taking of his or her property by
a private entity exercising federal eminent-domain authority—
federal or state law? If federal law controls, Defendants are not
entitled to litigation expenses. But if state law controls, they are.
. . . Eleventh Circuit precedent—and the overwhelming weight
of authority—teaches that state substantive law controls . . . .61
In concluding his opinion, Judge Walker aptly described the re-
lationship between the parties who find themselves on either side
of an involuntary taking:
Condemnation is not akin to marriage—it is far from a joyous
affair. (“Condemnation at best is an unhappy event aggravated
by . . . the subjective (and often unrealistic) beliefs of [both] parties
59. Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. Real Estate, No. 1:16-CV-063-MW-GRJ, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 99370 (N.D. Fla. June 27, 2017).
60. Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 1.127 Acres of Land, No. 3:16-CV-263-J-20PDB,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92003 (M.D. Fla. June 15, 2017).
61. Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. Real Estate, No. 1:16-CV-063-MW-GRJ, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 99370, at *2 (N.D. Fla. June 27, 2017) (quoting Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp.,
405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (citations omitted)).
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as to value and damage[s].”). Indeed, it is quite likely that neither
party will be enthralled with this case’s outcome; Defendants are
having their property unilaterally taken from them, while Plain-
tiffs are being forced to pay more for that property than they feel
law requires. But state substantive law governs the compensation
measure in eminent-domain condemnation proceedings brought
by private parties against private property owners. Florida’s “full
compensation” measure therefore applies here.62
Since the Northern and Middle District Courts in Florida decided
the issue, Sabal Trail has filed four appeals before the Eleventh Cir-
cuit seeking reversal of the lower courts’ rulings on the source-of-law
issue for determining the measure of compensation.63 Three of the
appeals followed with two full-jury trials, discussed below in greater
62. Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. Real Estate, No. 1:16-CV-063-MW-GRJ, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 99370, at *19 (N.D. Fla. June 27, 2017) (citations omitted) (quoting Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. Atchison, 400 F.2d 20, 24 (10th Cir. 1968)). It may be that Judge Walker’s description
of the constitutional estrangement is understated. Like a marriage dissolution, much depends
upon the conduct of the parties who are required to resolve the equities of a new real property
paradigm—the fee owner and an intervening owner who has forcibly taken over easement rights,
which allow the property to be engaged with an uninvited and, debatably, undesirable use.
Along the same lines, Judge Walker elsewhere displayed an understanding about how it
is that the condemnor gets what it wants with the accommodation of immediate possession,
which allows the condemnor to construct its pipeline without delay, while the owner is re-
quired to wait the determination of the measure of compensation at the same time as enduring
the condemnor’s exercise of the owner’s taken easement rights. He wrote:
This is an eminent domain case. Over a year has passed since this Court granted
Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s right to condemn
an easement through Defendants’ property to build a natural gas pipeline. Since
then, Plaintiff took possession of the subject property. Pipeline construction
began and ended. And now Plaintiff must compensate Defendants for the taking.
Plaintiff’s activities understandably caused significant heartburn for Defendants.
One Defendant described the “continued intrusion” on the property, including
Plaintiff’s practice of “fly[ing] the damn helicopter over there,” and “people coming
in . . . unannounced.” This Defendant also worried about the fact that Plaintiff put
the pipeline in the ground “less than a football field” away from his children’s
bedroom windows.
Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres in Levy County, Florida (Thomas Trust), 280
F. Supp. 3d 1331, 1333, No: 1:16-cv-00093-MW-GRJ (N.D. Fla. 2016) (citations omitted).
63. Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 2.468 Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida (Ryan
Thomas), No. 19-10722 (11th Cir. 2019); Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 1.401 Acres of Land
in Hamilton County, Florida (Violetta Lara), No. 18-15259-DD (11th Cir. 2019); Sabal Trail
Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.),
No. 18-11836-GG (11th Cir. 2018); Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres in Levy
County, Florida (Thomas Trust), 280 F. Supp. 3d 1331, 1333, No: 1:16-cv-00093-MW-GRJ
(N.D. Fla. 2016).
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detail. From the record of those two trials, it is quite evident how
the difference between the Florida measure of full compensation and
the federal measure of just compensation certainly raises the stakes
on how the issue of source of law is answered.64
The briefing at the appellate level before the Eleventh Circuit
delved even more deeply into the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in
Georgia Power and how principles of federalism undergird a consti-
tutional system of government in which federal and state govern-
ments share sovereignty.
Once again, the issue at bar in the Sabal Trail cases, as in Georgia
Power, is: “What is the appropriate federal rule or source of law for
‘determining the measure of compensation’ when a private licensee
exercises the power of eminent domain pursuant to a Congressional
statute which does not otherwise express the federal intent?”65 Apply-
ing the principles of federalism to the choice-of-law analysis requires
that the federal courts constrain the creation or application of “federal
common law” as a rule of decision, to the extent practicable, in order
to allow state law to continue to operate in substantive spheres that
have traditionally been state rather than federal domains. In this
instance, it has always been state law that defines property law and
property rights.66 Explained more precisely in the owners’ briefing
before the Eleventh Circuit:
With that said, it bears emphasis that the decision in Georgia
Power has deep Constitutional roots, and it is ultimately struc-
tural features of our Constitutional system that establish Florida
64. The first Sabal Trail case that proceeded to a jury trial, during the week of February 26,
2018, was styled Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County,
Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-00178-JSM-PRL (M.D. Fla. 2018) (Honorable
James S. Moody, presiding). The jury returned a verdict in the amount of $309,500, nearly
$5,000 less than the opinion of full compensation testified to by the owner’s appraiser. The
jury rejected the opinion of $56,800 testified to by Sabal Trail’s appraiser.
A second jury trial, involving two other cases, proceeded during the week of November 5,
2018. These cases were styled Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy
County, Florida (Thomas Trust), No. 1:16-cv-00093-MW-GRJ (N.D. Florida 2019), and Sabal
Trail Transmission, LLC v. 2.468 Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida (Ryan Thomas), No.
1:16-cv-00095-MW-GRJ (M.D. Fla. 2019) (Honorable Paul C. Huck, presiding). The jury re-
turned verdicts of $861,264 and $463,439, respectively, in excess of the amounts testified to
by the owners’ appraiser. This was in sharp contrast to the $34,000 and $5,100 testified to by
Sabal Trail’s appraiser.
65. Georgia Power v. Sanders, 617 F.2d 1112, 1113 (5th Cir. 1980).
66. See Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
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substantive law as the appropriate source for a federal rule of
decision concerning the measure of compensation owed to a land-
owner when a private party such as Sabal Trail, acting pursuant
to a federal statutory delegation of eminent domain authority,
takes private Florida land for use in a privately-owned and
operated infrastructure project.
Starting with the basics, the federal government is one of limited
and enumerated powers, and powers not delegated to the federal
government are reserved to the states. This system of dual sover-
eignty is referred to as federalism. Principles of federalism inform
choice-of-law analysis in the federal courts, because federal courts
do not recognize a “general common law,” and the creation and
application of “federal common law” is constrained and guided
by the principle that to the extent practicable, state law should
be allowed to operate in substantive spheres that have tradition-
ally been state rather than federal domains.67
Reasoning that laws of real property have historically existed within
the realm of a state’s sovereignty, the choice-of-law analysis that
extolls the principles of federalism favors the state’s control of the
rule of decision, in the absence of any compelling countervailing fed-
eral interests, when it is a private licensee that exercises the emi-
nent domain power.
Creating and defining the scope of property interests, especially
in real property, is a quintessential area in which state law has
historically provided the source of pertinent authority, including
in eminent domain cases adjudicated in the federal courts.
These basic principles of federalism were acknowledged and ap-
plied by the en banc court in Georgia Power, culminating in analy-
sis that emphasized the strength of the state interest in avoiding
displacement of its laws in settings where a private entity took
land from a private landowner pursuant to a federal statutory
delegation of eminent domain authority:
In analyzing the state’s interests in having its laws of com-
pensation apply when a licensee exercises the power of
67. See Brief of Appellee Sunderman Groves, Inc., at 30, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC
v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 18-11836-GG
(11th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted).
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eminent domain under Section 21 of the FPA, we begin
with the state’s interest in avoiding displacement of its laws
in the area of property rights, traditionally an area of local
concern. Since property has been viewed as a bundle of val-
uable rights and since the question of what constitutes prop-
erty is usually determined with reference to state law, we
think it consistent that the value of those rights also be
determined with reference to state law. Since states, as well
as the federal government, have an interest in providing
economical energy to their citizens, their laws of compensa-
tion, accommodating that interest with that of insuring
that their condemnee-landowner citizens are compensated
in accord with their (states’) views of what is just, are en-
titled to weight.68
The owners’ briefing before the Eleventh Circuit also addressed
the distinction between cases involving private, for-profit condemnors
and cases involving direct action by the federal government. Such
distinction is particularly pertinent to eminent domain cases under
the NGA, because the NGA’s primary aim was originally “to protect
consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural gas compa-
nies.”69 Manifest are the obvious differences between the federal
government exercising eminent domain power in its own name versus
a private corporation exercising eminent domain power under a
statutory delegation:
Federal actors are ultimately controlled by federal officials, sworn
to uphold the Constitution, charged with promoting the public
good, and held accountable by the voters on Election Day. Private
corporations such as Sabal Trail are not sworn to uphold the
Constitution, exist primarily to generate private profit, and are
accountable only to their shareholders, not to the public at-large.
Direct federal condemnations require expenditure of taxpayer
dollars; private corporate condemnors are spending corporate
money. Direct federal condemnations often require ongoing fed-
eral participation, via federal employees and contractors, in
construction and maintenance efforts; private condemnations do
68. See Brief of Appellee Sunderman Groves, Inc., at 30–32, Sabal Trail Transmission,
LLC v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 18-11836
-GG (11th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted) (quoting, in block, Georgia Power, 617 F.2d at 1123).
69. Sunray Mid-Con. Oil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 364 U.S. 137, 147 (1960).
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not. And in direct federal condemnations, the federal government
retains a continued ownership interest in the property taken; no
such federal ownership interest exists in relation to property
taken via eminent domain by a private corporate licensee. These
important differences reinforce the wisdom and continued vitality
of Georgia Power’s careful distinction between direct exercises
of eminent domain by the federal government, versus exercises
of eminent domain by private profit-seeking licensees such as
Sabal Trail.70
While it remains to be seen whether the Eleventh Circuit will affirm
the Northern and Middle District Courts in Florida on the source-of-
law issue, it would seem that Fifth Circuit’s en banc decision in
Georgia Power—notwithstanding being regarded as binding prece-
dent within the Eleventh Circuit—is an extremely well-reasoned
opinion, concerning the constitutional touchstones it followed before
reaching its ultimate conclusion.
Arising from the federal district court in Pennsylvania, another
appeal has just been decided by the Third Circuit within the same
time as the final stages of writing this article.71 In its decision, the
Third Circuit held that state law would supply the rule of decision
in determining the measure of compensation for condemnation under
the NGA. In setting forth the logical steps taken within its reasoning,
the Third Circuit affirmed the similar determination by the Fifth
Circuit in Georgia Power, decided under the analogous FPA. In de-
termining whether to apply federal or state law, the Third Circuit
first held that the interests of the federal government are weaker
when a private party is the condemnor, as opposed to the federal
government, denying the pipeline company's argument that United
States v. Miller,72 bound the Third Circuit to apply federal law, and
drawing a sharp distinction between the federal government and
private for-profit companies.73 Next, the Third Circuit undertook a
detailed Kimbell Foods choice-of-law analysis to determine whether
70. See Brief of Appellee at 34, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 1.401 Acres of Land in
Hamilton County, Florida (Violetta Lara), No. 18-15259-DD (11th Cir. 2019).
71. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., LLC v. Permanent Easement for 7.053 Acres, No. 17-3700,
2019 U.S. LEXIS 21901, at *1 (3d Cir. 2019).
72. 317 U.S. 369 (1943). 
73. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., LLC v. Permanent Easement for 7.053 Acres, No. 17-3700,
2019 U.S. LEXIS 21901, at *19–20.
150 PROPERTY RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 8:121
to “adopt state law or adopt a nationwide federal rule.”74 As its basis,
the Third Circuit rightly reasoned that federalism dictated state law
should apply unless a legislative intent to displace state law was
evident. Finally, the Third Circuit subsequently concluded that no
reason existed to fashion a nationally uniform federal rule, that in-
corporating state law would not frustrate the NGA’s objectives, and
commercial relationships based on state law would be upset by the
adoption of a uniform rule. Consequently, the Third Circuit held that
state law would supply the federal rule as to the measure of com-
pensation under the NGA.75 This decision is especially relevant (and
persuasive) to the Sabal Trail cases pending before the Eleventh
Circuit as Pennsylvania law provides greater compensation to prop-
erty owners, allowing the recovery of certain consequential fees and
professional fees not allowed under federal law, not dissimilar to
Florida “full compensation” standard.
III. COMMISSION OR JURY TRIAL TO DETERMINE 
MEASURE OF COMPENSATION?
A. Deciding Between a Jury or Commission Trial to Determine the
Measure of Compensation
It is a frequently debated point whether trials before a commis-
sion or a jury result in a more efficient or fair process in resolving
the question over the measure of compensation in federal takings
cases. Although there are exceptions, most practitioners represent-
ing governmental entities, like the U.S. Attorney’s Office, advocate
for commissions while those practitioners representing property
owners advocate for jury trials.
Commissions are thought by some to avoid protracted litigation
and protect against disparate awards to claimants.76 To others,
commissions, which espouse the uniformity of decision when con-
cerning real estate value as a virtue, appear most often to fix upon
the lowest common denominator in determining compensation. Those
74. Id. at *11; *23–34 (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
75. Id. at *35.
76. See The Taking: How the Federal Government Abused Its Power to Seize Property for a
Border Fence, T. Christian Miller, Kiah Collier & Julian Aguilar, TEX. TRIBUNE, December 14,
2017, http://www.texastribune.org/2017/12/14/border-land-grab-government-abused-power
-seize-property-fence.
2019] NATURAL GAS PIPELINE EASEMENTS 151
advocating for owners contend that, even if a right to jury trial is
not fundamental, jury trials best protect a fundamental civil right
of private ownership. Juries, rather than commissions, they urge,
provide a more effective “check and balance” on human nature, in
the exercise of eminent domain power for large-scale acquisitions.
Additionally, there have been a few instances in large-scale acqui-
sitions where condemnors seek to initially set their cases before
appointed commissioners and where property owners are represented
pro se before they can obtain both legal counsel and appraiser to tes-
tify. Thereafter, once it has been determined what is just in cases
with pro se litigants, it becomes difficult to persuade well-meaning
commissioners to decide any different.
The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71.1(h)(1)(B) governs over the
discretion a judge has in either impaneling a jury or appointing a
commission to determine the measure of compensation in federal
takings cases.77 The plain wording of Rule 71.1(h)(1)(B) establishes
the presumption that a jury trial should be granted when a timely
demand for one has been made. The Rule is express in providing that,
upon timely demand, “any party may have a trial by jury on the issue
of compensation.”78 This presumption holds unless and instead the
court orders that compensation shall be determined by an appointed
commission “because of the character, location or quantity of the
property condemned, or for other reasons in the interest of justice,”
a party will be granted trial by jury.79
The 1951 Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules explains the
rationale behind providing the court discretion to appoint a commis-
sion “because of the character, location or quantity of the property
condemned, or for other reasons in the interest of justice.”80 The con-
text in which the provisions of this Rule had changed was during the
federal court’s experience with the eminent domain cases associated
with Tennessee Valley Authority, a large-scale project of thousands
of acres with condemnation actions filed against thousands of indi-
vidual property owners.81 Following this experience, the Advisory
Committee on Rules found that the appointment of a commission
77. FED. R. CIV. P. 71.1(h)(1)(B).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 71.1(h) (1)(B) & (2)(A).
80. Id. See FED. R. CIV. P. 71.1(h), advisory committee’s notes on 1951 adoption.
81. Id.
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best served the “interest of justice” given (a) the acquisition of large
areas of similar kind with many owners, (b) the hardship on owners
who were made to travel long distances to the courthouse, (c) the
impractical situation of the jury also having to travel long distances
to view the properties acquired, and (d) the burden on the court’s
time being excessive.82
Often, practitioners on either side argue the criteria within the
Advisory Committee’s Note alongside the criteria set forth in the
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71.1(h)(1)(B). Some federal circuits
hold to a stronger qualification than the aforementioned presumption,
favoring jury trials over commissions. For example, the Eleventh
Circuit has previously held to only appoint commissions in extraor-
dinary or exceptional circumstances. In United States v. 320.0 Acres,83
the Fifth Circuit, as predecessor to the Eleventh Circuit,84 commented
as follows: “Although other courts have held that this discretion is
quite broad, in this Circuit we purport to adhere to the principle that
a commission is to be used only for exceptional cases.”85
Subsequently, in United States v. 5.00 Acres of Land,86 the Eleventh
Circuit also commented: “Trial by jury is the customary method of
fixing the value of land taken in eminent domain proceedings.”87
Further still, in the Eleventh Circuit, unsupported conclusions
regarding the required factors for a commission are not sufficient for
a commission appointment, which should be based on specific fac-
tual findings that set forth the extraordinary or exceptional circum-
stances.88
With respect to natural gas pipeline takings, the Eleventh Circuit
has more typically impaneled juries, not appointed commissions, to de-
termine the measure of compensation. Before the Sabal Trail project,
in 2004 the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida de-
nied the condemnor’s motion to appoint a commission and, instead,
82. Id.
83. 605 F.2d 762 (5th Circuit 1979).
84. Decisions of the Fifth Circuit issued before October 1, 1981, are binding precedent in
the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
85. 320.0 Acres, 605 F.2d at 828.
86. 673 F.2d 1244 (11th Cir. 1982).
87. Id. at 1247, n.1.
88. United States v. Buhler, 254 F.2d 876, 880 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v. 1146.32
Acres, 132 F. Supp. 681, 682 (S.D. Tex. 1955); United States v. 2,477 Acres, 259 F.2d 23, 26
(5th Cir. 1958); United States v. 4.43 Acres, 137 F. Supp. 567, 571 (N.D. Tex. 1956).
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granted the property owner’s demand for jury trial.89 However, as
stated before, the rules for commission appointments in other federal
circuits may not require as strong a qualification over setting aside
the presumption or the exercise of discretion.90
B. Sabal Trail Natural Gas Pipeline
The Sabal Trail cases recently decided in the Northern and Middle
District Courts of Florida display well the judicial reasoning and re-
spect for the fundamental nature of property rights in favoring trials
by juries over commissions. In the Northern District, the Honorable
Mark E. Walker expressed his opinion as follows:
Under Rule 71.1, this Court may appoint a three-person commis-
sion to determine the amount of compensation that Defendants
are due to be paid. It refuses to exercise that authority. Doing so
would unnecessarily waste the parties’ time and money. It would
also run counter to the “general rule” of trying the compensation
issue to a jury.91
But at an even more basic level, property rights have long been
recognized as sacred and fundamental. Arthur Lee, a Virginia
delegate to the Continental Congress, once declared that “[t]he
right of property . . . is the guardian of every other right, and to
deprive a people of this, is in fact to deprive them of liberty.”92
And that statement was no accident—the Supreme Court has
also stressed that property rights are just as fundamental as
others—including, again, the right to liberty. This Court tries all
kinds of cases before a jury—even the most trivial ones. So, no
89. In Gulfstream Natural Gas System, LLC v. 241.37 Acres, No. 8:03-cv-2626-T-30-EAJ,
Docket No. 87 (M.D. Fla. June 23, 2004), the U.S. District Court, Honorable James S. Moody,
presiding, made a specific finding that there was nothing exceptional in the character, loca-
tion, or quantity of the property to be condemned or any other reason in the interest of justice
that warranted the appointment of a commission. Id.
90. See, e.g., Rover Pipeline LLC v. Kanzigg, No. 2:17-cv-105, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
116296 (S.D. Ohio June 1, 2017); Rover Pipeline LLC v. 5.9754 Acres of Land in Defiance
County, Ohio, No. 3:17CV225, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114884 (N.D. Ohio July 24, 2017).
91. FED. R. CIV. P. 71.1, advisory committee’s note. (“[I]n the bulk of states a land owner
is entitled eventually to a jury trial[.]”); FLA. STAT. § 73.071(2016) (requiring a twelve-person
jury in “eminent domain cases”).
92. JAMES W. ELY JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 26 (2d ed. 1998).
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matter how busy this Court’s docket is, it will not deprive Defen-
dants of their property rights without the same opportunity.93
Likewise, in the Middle District, the Honorable Timothy J. Corrigan,
referencing Judge Walker’s opinion, set forth his own opinion below:
With respect to whether juries or a commission should try the
compensation issue, the Court honors the landowners’ request that
juries should be employed. As Judge Walker noted, commissions
can be expensive and time consuming. More basically, private
property rights are fundamental and landowners whose property
is being condemned should be able to avail themselves of a jury
trial whenever possible. The Court is confident that any logistical
concerns with jury trials can be readily resolved. Regarding cases
that are assigned to judges other than myself, I will leave it to each
judge’s informed discretion whether to use juries or a commission.94
While clearly following the prevailing rule of interpretation over the
exercise of discretion in the Eleventh Circuit, these district orders
which granted the request for jury trials, once again, gave tangible
evidence of the resolve of the federal judiciary to commit its resources
to respecting the constitutional rights of property owners to be justly
and fairly compensated for Sabal Trail’s taking of temporary and per-
manent easements. At the time that the two aforementioned orders
were entered, 73 of the original 263 cases filed by Sabal Trail in
Florida were yet pending in the Northern and Middle District Courts.
IV. FROM DAUBERT CHALLENGES TO EXPERT OPINIONS: EVIDENCE
OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES
A. Measuring Compensation with Severance Damages Resulting
from Fear or Stigma
When considering the rights of property owners subjected to the
eminent domain power, it is the constitutional imperative of “public
93. Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. Real Estate, No. 1:16-CV-063-MW-GRJ, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 99370, at *18,*19 (N.D. Fla. June 6, 2017) (citations to quoted material removed
to individual footnotes; see supra notes 90–91 and accompanying texts; other citations omitted).
94. Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 1.127 Acres of Land in Hamilton County, Florida,
No. 3:16-CV-263-J-20PDB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92003 (M.D. Fla. June 15, 2017) (citations
omitted).
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use” that garners the most attention in scholarly debate. Contrast-
ingly, the academy almost universally assumes that the measure of
compensation that the owner receives in condemnation cases is
“just” or “fair.”
It’s almost as if the measure of compensation to be paid for a
taking is automatic. Very little scholarship has been published on
the topic. After all, when it comes to real estate valuation, how can
it be that reasonable minds would possibly differ in how to justly or
fairly compensate an owner for a taking, particularly when the
interests being acquired are merely easement rights?
It may just be that NGA takings have unearthed the truth about
the difficulty of private property owners to contend with private, for-
profit companies with almost unlimited resources when such compa-
nies wield a power that is more often reserved for the government.
In nearly all pipeline easement acquisitions, there is a substantial
dispute about the measure of compensation in so far as the issue of
severance damages to the remainder property is concerned, particu-
larly when purported damages result from proximity to the pipeline
“in and of itself,” based on market fear, perception, or stigma. Most
pipeline companies contend, because the pipeline’s infrastructure is
located underground, severance damages of this kind or nature are
extremely minimal or non-existent. Their mantra is: out of sight, out
of mind. They maintain that property owners are compensated suf-
ficiently by pipeline companies, which only pay a percent of the fee
value for the land acquired within the right of way, because, as the
pipeline company argues, there are no damages to the remainder
based upon proximity to the pipeline in and of itself.
Property owners, however, disagree. They contend that a pipeline
transmitting one billion cubic feet of natural gas a day, just three or
four feet underground, is a classic “Not-In-My-Backyard” (“NIMBY”)
use and that the property encumbered with dominant use to an
easement holder that allows a natural gas pipeline easement is less
valuable than property not so encumbered. For example, under
Florida law, diminution in property value due to proximity may be
associated with uses such as junk yards, waste treatment plants, or
limited-access highways.95 The impact of fear or stigma on a real
property’s market value, in either its before or after condition, may
95. See Hubschman v. Board of County Comm’rs, 610 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
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also be associated with uses such as electric power lines or contami-
nated properties.96
While a majority of jurisdictions allow this category of loss to be
considered as part of severance damages to the owner for the remain-
der property, jurisdictions may differ on the type or kind of permis-
sible evidence that can be admitted before the finder of fact. In most
jurisdictions that allow this category of loss, the owner need not show
and, in fact, is rather forbidden to show evidence of scientific proof
or objective reasonableness relating to the fear or stigma.97 Evidence
96. See, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings, 518 So. 2d 895, 897–99 (Fla. 1987);
Finkelstein v. Dep’t of Transp., 656 So. 2d 921, 925 (Fla. 1995).
97. See, e.g., Jennings, 518 So. 2d at 897–99. The Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in
Jennings explains well the reasoning behind the limitations placed upon evidence of scientific
proof or objective reasonableness in eminent domain cases where a claim of severance damage
involves fear or stigma:
The experts’ scientific testimony introduced below was irrelevant to any fact at
issue. “The theory of allowing evidence of an expert witness to be received by the
triers of fact is to understand and determine an issue of fact.” The scientists who
testified below on behalf of the landowners added nothing to aid the jury in de-
termining the value of the taken property and any severance damages to the
remainder. Instead, the scientific testimony altered the focus of the trial and con-
fused the issue to be determined. Under the rule we adopt today, the reasonable-
ness of fear is either assumed or is considered irrelevant. We agree with the
observation made by the court in Willsey that “[a] certain amount of fear and a
healthy wariness in the presence of high voltage lines strikes us as eminently
reasonable.” We believe that a jury is certainly capable of determining whether
an experts’ valuation opinion is reasonable that explains the devaluation of
property adjacent to high voltage lines in part, because of the public’s fear of
health hazards. By the same token, we believe that a jury could also determine
the reasonableness of a valuation opinion which explains the devaluation of such
adjacent property on the grounds that, e.g., the buying public is fearful that
transmission lines attract alien beings in flying saucers. In short, whether a real
property expert’s valuation opinion is based on reasonable factors may be de-
termined by the jury without resort to other expert witnesses’ testimony or docu-
mentary evidence concerning the reasonableness of the buying public’s fears.
In addition to the fact that the scientific testimony introduced below was irrelevant
to any fact at issue and only tended to obfuscate the issue of full compensation,
we reject the intermediate rule for another reason. Under the guise of showing
the reasonableness of the public’s fear, the jury below was allowed to hear
testimony that the electric field from high voltage lines can produce a coupling
effect of electrical energy into the human body and that the result is a long-term
chronic effect. The jury was also allowed to hear that constant exposure to high
voltage electromagnetic fields promotes cancer in children and adults. This
irrelevant testimony is so inflammatory and prejudicial that we find a new trial
is warranted. If these dire scientific predictions do, in fact, transpire, those so
injured will have their day in court. Redress for future personal injuries is not
proper in an in rem eminent domain proceeding.
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of scientific proof or objective reasonableness is held inadmissible so
as to avoid having such evidence becoming the feature of a valuation
trial; instead, the sort of evidence that is admissible is the type or kind
of evidence that shows market participants perceive a diminution
in value when a property is encumbered by such use.98 In eminent
domain valuation cases, the admissibility of such evidence, therefore,
depends upon whether there is sufficient factual predicate to estab-
lish that fear or stigma impacts market value.99 In summary, to avoid
prejudice, the focus of testimony must be on the existence of fear and
its effect on value and not on the reasonableness of the fear itself.
While the foregoing discussion speaks to the admissibility of evi-
dence specific to the issue of fear or stigma in eminent domain valu-
ation cases, more generally, in federal litigation, challenge to expert
testimony is available on the basis of the standards set forth in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmacy, Inc.100 In Daubert, the Supreme
Court affirmed the “gatekeeper” role of trial courts by enunciating
a non-exhaustive list of factors for the admission of proffered expert
testimony into evidence.101 Following Daubert, practitioners in federal
litigation have grown accustomed to extensive motion practice based
upon Daubert challenges to expert testimony and evidence. Notwith-
standing the frequency in federal litigation concerning Daubert chal-
lenges, federal courts still find rejection of expert testimony is the
exception, rather than the rule.102 While extending the gatekeeping
role to “technical” and “other specialized” expert testimony, the Su-
preme Court has also reiterated that the Federal Rules of Evidence
702 inquiry was a “flexible” one and that the Daubert factors were
not a “definitive checklist or test.”103
In conclusion, we hold that any factor, including public fear, which impacts on
the market value of land taken for a public purpose may be considered to explain
the basis for an expert’s valuation opinion. Whether this fear is objectively
reasonable is irrelevant to the issue of full compensation in an eminent domain
proceeding. The introduction into evidence of independent expert’s scientific
testimony is, therefore, unnecessary and only serves to confuse the actual issue
before the jury.
Jennings, 518 So. 2d at 899 (citations omitted) (quoting Willsey v. Kansas City Power & Light
Co., 6 Kan. App. 2d 599, 614, 631 P.2d 268, 279 (1981)).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
101. Id. at 589 n.7, 593–95.
102. See, e.g., United States ex rel. TVA v. 1.72 Acres of Land, 821 F.3d 742, 749 (6th Cir.
2016).
103. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141, 150 (1998).
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In regards to NGA takings cases, therefore, the two layers that
combine to form a pipeline company’s typical challenge to expert
opinions submitted on behalf of owners for severance damages, are:
(a) objections to evidence of scientific proof or objective rea-
sonableness that is not market evidence and that, if ad-
mitted, may become a feature of a valuation trial; and
(b) arguments against the “reliability” of an expert’s opinion
under the Daubert standards.
With respect to damages relating to proximity, a proper inquiry
logically includes answering the question, “How close is too close?”
to what is perceived as a negative. This is true for takings of electric
transmission lines, limited-access highways, and, yes, natural gas
pipelines. Of course, if maintaining that the severance damages are
zero (as the pipeline companies are want to do), then an expert need
not ever answer the specific question, “How close is too close?” This,
too, shapes the evidentiary issues at bar in NGA takings cases.
The entirety of what the judicial system is charged to do is impor-
tant in protecting fundamental rights such as the right to own
private property. When rights in real property are taken for public
use or convenience, without the consent of an owner, for both tempo-
rary and permanent easements, the measure of compensation that
an owner receives is all that can be used to determine whether
constitutional principles are truly honored. Constitutional rights,
even those regarding compensation, balance the use of power and
protect individual liberty. Such underlying reality supercharges mixed
questions of law and fact in condemnation proceedings, including
those requiring evidence.
B. Sabal Trail Natural Gas Pipeline
In Florida, Sabal Trail took an extremely aggressive approach to
challenging expert testimony through both Daubert motions and
motions in limine. These were filed in nearly every one of the 73
cases yet pending in the Northern and Middle District Courts, re-
quiring no less than eight different district court judges to rule on
the evidentiary issues of the particular facts in the respective cases
before them. Notwithstanding, owners took the position that Sabal
Trail’s respective challenges went far beyond a “true Daubert chal-
lenge” and particularly so when Sabal Trail challenged the “level of
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comparability” of the appraiser’s selection of sales that are in direct
comparison to the subject property and sales that are considered
within a “paired-sales analysis” whereby properties with pipelines
(referred to as impact properties) are compared to similarly situated
properties without pipelines (referred to as non-impact properties).104
In summary, the federal courts’ rulings on evidentiary matters in
the Sabal Trail cases in Florida have been consistent on the following:
(a) that the use of the Potential Impact Radius (“PIR”) as a
means of allocating severance damages is inadmissible on
the premise that the probative weight of such evidence is
outweighed by its prejudice when considering that the
“reasonableness” of fear or stigma is not to become the
focal point of the jury when determining the measure of
compensation;
(b) that, with respect to any paired-sales analysis, an ap-
praiser’s consideration of impact sales, with pipelines, must
take into account the value of the fee owner’s interest in
the area that is encumbered by a pipeline easement prior
to a comparison with non-impact sales, without pipelines;
(c) that the level of comparability between the sales used in
the direct comparison or in the paired-sales analysis is
more a question of weight for the jury and less a question
of competency for the judge, so that, generally speaking,
the issue is not a proper subject matter for a Daubert
motion; and
(d) that the property owner may testify as to the after value
including quantification of severance damages if he or she
has a sufficiently strong foundation of personal knowledge
and experience that is more than just ipse dixit.
For example, with respect to the very first Sabal Trail case to ap-
proach trial, Sabal Trail filed a Daubert motion against both the defen-
dant’s appraiser and real estate economist with a motion in limine.105
104. See Columbia Gas Transmission LLC v. 76 Acres, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 12547, at
*16–19 (4th Cir. 2017); E. Tennessee Nat. Gas Co. v. 7.74 Acres in Wythe County, Va., 2007
U.S. App. LEXIS 11991, at *8–15 (4th Cir. 2007) (court denied a Daubert challenge to “drastic”
monetary adjustments between sales, recognizing that it would be a slippery slope to
determine what may or may not be a proper comparable prior to hearing the full expert tes-
timony); see also McCann Holdings, Ltd. v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. 608, 628 (2013) (ex-
plaining the methodology behind paired-sales analysis).
105. See Daubert Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony by Joshua Harris, Daubert Motion
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The owners filed their responses.106 After consideration, the Middle
District Court (Ocala Division), Honorable James S. Moody presiding,
granted Sabal Trail’s motion against the appraiser to extent that
the appraiser excluded testimony regarding: the PIR, as a means of
allocating damages, from the appraiser’s damage study; the failure
of the appraiser to deduct the value of the encumbered easement
interest of impact sales within the appraiser’s damage study (re-
ferred to as a “double-dip”); testimony concerning sales used for the
direct comparison in the before valuation; and testimony concerning
certain pairs of impact and non-impact sales in the appraiser’s
paired-sales analysis.107
More specifically, in the Sabal Trail cases in Florida, the owner’s
appraiser had considered the PIR a tool of allocation but not a direct
measure of the existence of or the extent that fear or stigma associ-
ated with pipelines applies to real estate. The PIR is defined by 49
C.F.R. § 192.903 as “the radius of a circle within which the potential
failure of a pipeline could have significant impact on people or prop-
erty.”108 In applying the formula set forth in the regulation, which
correlates both to the diameter and maximum-allowable operating
pressure of a pipeline, Sabal Trail’s thirty-six-inch-diameter pipe-
line with a maximum operating pressure of 1,456 pounds per square
inch has a PIR of 948 feet extending from the pipeline’s center.
To directly measure the existence of or the extent that stigma asso-
ciated with pipelines applied to real estate, the owner’s appraiser
to Exclude Expert Testimony by Matthew Ray, and Motion in Limine (Plaintiff), Docs. 50, 51,
68, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman
Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-00178-JSM-PRL (M.D. Fla. 2016).
106. See Response to Daubert Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony by Joshua Harris,
Response to Daubert Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony by Matthew Ray, Response to
Motion in Limine (Defendant), and Motion in Limine (Defendant), Docs. 54, 66, 75, 94, Sabal
Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves,
Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-00178-JSM-PRL (M.D. Fla. 2016).
107. Sabal Trail v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.),
No. 5:16-cv-000178-JSM-PRL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221692 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 23, 2017); see
also Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine and Denying Defendant’s Motion in Limine,
Doc. 98, Sabal Trail v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.),
No. 5:16-cv-000178-JSM-PRL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221692 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 23, 2017).
108. 49 C.F.R. § 192.903. In explaining the operations and safety of its pipeline, Sabal Trail’s
own website defines the Potential Impact Radius, or PIR, and its purpose. See Appendix to
Defendant’s Response to Daubert Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony by Matthew Ray, Exhibit
3, Doc. 67-3, Sabal Trail v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves,
Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-000178-JSM-PRL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221692 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 23, 2017).
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first prepared a market study using a paired-sales analysis. Once he
studied the market data to derive an opinion of damages that are
applicable to the subject property, the appraiser then used the PIR
to allocate damages within the 948-foot radius. Thus, if the remain-
der property was of substantial size, the only portion of the remainder
property identified as having a diminution in value was the area
most proximate to the pipeline, or within the PIR. For trial, the owner
intended to show exhibits of the subjected property identifying the
area within the PIR by a “purple overlay.”109 Notwithstanding the
foregoing, Judge Moody ruled that “extensive testimony regarding
the PIR was impermissible.”110
Likewise, Judge Moody was also clear that evidence concerning
media coverage of pipeline incidents or explosions would be imper-
missible at trial because of the risk of confusing the true issues for the
jury and because such evidence might become the feature of the trial,
as opposed to the determination of the amount of compensation.111
109. The owner contended that the instant case was distinguishable from other federal
district court opinions that excluded evidence of the PIR or other assumed “setback area[s]”
because the owner’s appraiser in the case at bar did, in fact, conduct a market study using a
paired-sales analysis to directly measure the existence of or extent that fear or stigma was
associated with pipelines. See, e.g., Texas Gas Trans’n, LLC v. 18.08 Acres, No. 2:08CV240-B
-V, 2012 WL 6057991, at *9 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 6, 2012); Transwestern Pipeline Co., LLC v.
46.78 Acres, No. 2:07-CV-02312 JWS, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 50609 (D. Ariz. Apr. 26, 2010),
aff’d sub nom. 473 F. App’x 778 (9th Cir. 2012); Rockies Exp. Pipeline, LLC v. 4.895 Acres, No.
2:08-CV-554, 2011 WL 1043493, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2011). Judge Moody was uncon-
vinced and held that extensive testimony regarding the PIR at trial was impermissible.
110. Sabal Trail v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.),
No. 5:16-cv-000178-JSM-PRL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221692 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 23, 2017).
111. Id. As part of a predicate to determining the existence of any fear or stigma in the
marketplace, the owner’s appraiser had included research articles on particular incidents
involving natural gas pipelines around the country and on highly publicized environmental
protests or problems arising specifically with the Sabal Trail Natural Gas Pipeline. For ex-
ample, the appraiser’s file included information from a special interest group opposed to Sabal
Trail’s pipeline with a summary of recent natural gas pipeline incidents or explosions throughout
the country, Other Hazards, SPECTRABUSTERS, http://www.spectrabusters.org/hazards/other
-hazards/ (last visited May 17, 2019); an article reporting on numerous protests against the
Sabal Trail Pipeline throughout Florida, Beth Kassab & Kevin Spear, Gas Pipeline Across Cen-
tral Florida Brings Cheap Energy and Protests, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 3, 2017, http://www
.orlandosentinel.com/news/environment/os-sabal-trail-pipeline-impact-20170329-story.html;
an article concerning a specific protest by two environmental demonstrators who crawled
within a section of the Sabal Trail Pipeline prior to installation Emily Speck, Protesters Re-
moved from Inside Sabal Trail Pipeline in Marion County, CLICKORLANDO.COM, Feb. 22, 2017,
http://www.clickorlando.com/news/protestors-removed-from-inside-sabal-trail-pipeline; and
an article concerning an “unauthorized barbeque” on an owner’s ranch property hosted by an
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Judge Moody also found fault with the owner’s appraisal because,
in comparing impact and non-impact properties in the paired-sales
analysis, the owner’s appraiser had not accounted for the value of the
fee owner’s interest in the area encumbered by a pipeline easement,
within each of the respective impact properties.112 While such a value
could be estimated as a percentage of the fee of the encumbered area,
this was not deducted and, therefore, would tend to inflate any per-
centage difference between impact and non-impact properties.113
Judge Moody referred to the oversight as a “double-dip.”114
More significantly, however, Judge Moody’s order left the owner
without any expert testimony as to severance damages, because the
judge found that the level of comparability between the impact and
non-impact sales in the appraiser’s paired-sales analysis was not
sufficiently reliable. Further, the order also excluded the owner’s
real estate economist from testifying.
Consequently, the owner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.115
Sabal Trail filed its response.116 Upon subsequent hearing, although
not setting aside his prior order, Judge Moody permitted the owner’s
appraiser opportunity to reappraise the property in order to address
the court’s concerns about the PIR and the double-dip issues, which
set forth the testimony and evidence with which the owner eventu-
ally proceeded to trial.117 In such fashion, in the subsequent trial,
the owner’s appraiser was able to testify to severance damages
agent of Sabal Trail who was hired to keep the property secure during construction activities,
Susan Salisbury, Eminent Domain and a BBQ: When They Cut a Pipeline Through Your
Land, PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 3, 2017, http://www.palmbeachpost.com/business/eminent-do
main-and-bbq-when-they-cut-pipeline-through-your-land/Xf431KevhdJQKIMFlz7rWO/. Judge
Moody reasoned in limine that risking the admittance of such evidence would confuse the jury
as to the true issue in the case and become a feature of the trial, which would then not focus
on compensation for the taking.
112. Sabal Trail v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.),
No. 5:16-cv-000178-JSM-PRL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221692 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 23, 2017).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Motion for Reconsideration (Defendant), Doc. 76, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC
v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-00178-
JSM-PRL (M.D. Fla. 2016).
116. See Response to Motion for Reconsideration (Plaintiff), Doc. 86, Sabal Trail Transmis-
sion, LLC v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-
cv-00178-JSM-PRL (M.D. Fla. 2016).
117. See Order Granting Motion for Reconsideration and Pretrial Hearing Transcript
(Nov. 16, 2017), Docs. 89 & 91, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake
County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-00178-JSM-PRL (M.D. Fla. 2016).
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resulting from fear or stigma based upon the appraiser’s paired-
sales analysis.118
In the other pending cases in the Middle District Courts, Sabal
Trail continued to file similar Daubert motions and motions in limine,
tailored to the facts of each respective case. The Honorable Timothy
J. Corrigan, in the Middle District (Jacksonville Division), was the
next judge to issue an order in the Sabal Trail cases. Similar to
Judge Moody, Judge Corrigan excluded the appraiser’s use of the
PIR and the double-dip issue on paired sales. He also ruled that the
appraiser was permitted to reappraise the property to remedy these
two issues. Unlike Judge Moody, however, Judge Corrigan did not
find any fault with the appraiser’s selection of sales that were con-
sidered in direct comparison to the subject property and sales that
were considered within a paired-sales analysis, noting that Sabal
Trail’s objections went to the weight of the appraiser’s testimony not
its admissibility.119 Unlike Judge Moody, Judge Corrigan also re-
served so as to rule at trial on the issue of the real estate econo-
mist’s opinion.120
All other judges in the Middle District (Jacksonville Division)
adopted the reasoning of Judge Corrigan’s order, in most respects.
Each of these orders, similar to the prior ruling by Judge Corrigan,
allowed the owner’s appraiser to reappraise the properties in order
to remedy the PIR and the double-dip issues.121
118. See Verdict (March 1, 2018), Trial Transcript (Feb. 26, 2018), Trial Transcript (Feb. 27,
2018), Trial Transcript (Feb. 28, 2018), Trial Transcript (March 1, 2018), and Final Judgment,
Docs. 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 133, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake
County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-00178-JSM-PRL (M.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2018).
119. See Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 1.823 Acres of Land in Hamilton County Florida
et al., Nos. 3:16-cv-267-J-32-TJC-MCR; 3:16-cv-276-J-32-TJC-JRK; 3:16-cv-314-J-32-TJC-
PDB; 3:16-cv-318-J-32-TJC-JRK, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89517 (M.D. Fla. May 30, 2018).
120. Id.
121. Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 1.127 Acres of Land in Hamilton County, Florida
et al., Nos. 3:16-cv-263-J-20-HES-PDB, 3:16-cv-269-J-20-HES-JBT, 3:16-cv-291-J-20-HES-
JRK, 3:16-cv-301-J-20-HES-MCR, 3:16-cv-303-J-20-HES-MCR, 3:16-cv-311-J-20-HES-JBT
(M.D. Fla. June 6, 2018) (Honorable Harvey E. Schlesinger, presiding); Sabal Trail Transmis-
sion, LLC v. 0.589 Acres of Land in Suwannee County, Florida et al., Nos. 3:16-cv-277-J-34-
MMH-JBT, 3:16-cv-300-J-34-MMH-PDB, 3:16-cv-302-J-34-MMH-PDB, 3:16-cv-317-J-34-
MMH-MCR, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129709 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2018) (Honorable Marcia Morales
Howard, presiding.); Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 0.587 Acres of Land in Hamilton
County, Florida et al., Nos. 3:16-cv-00268-HLA-JBT, 3:16-cv-00286-HLA-JBT (M.D. Fla.
Sep. 26, 2018) (Honorable Henry L. Adams, presiding); Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v.
.5871.401 Acres of Land in Hamilton County, Florida et al., No. 3:16-cv-00278-BJD-JBT (M.D.
Fla. Nov. 13, 2018) (Honorable Brian J. Davis, presiding).
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In the Middle District (Ocala Division), the Honorable Carlos E.
Mendoza also ruled on Sabal Trail’s similar motions. He, too, excluded
testimony concerning the PIR and the double-dip issues. He also did
not find fault with the remaining balance of the appraiser’s testi-
mony, finding the issue to be a matter of weight for the jury not ad-
missibility. Contrasting slightly from the opinions of other judges,
Judge Mendoza ruled the that testimony of the real estate econo-
mist would be limited only to the testimony concerning the expert’s
literature review and not his market survey of real estate brokers
that concerned fear or stigma.122
Finally, in the Northern District Court, the Honorable Mark E.
Walker initially held, in an order applicable to eight Sabal Trail cases,
that the PIR would be admissible as one of the factors that may be
considered by an appraiser in estimating severance damages.123 Later,
in subsequent orders applicable to all eight cases before the Northern
District Court—as two of the eight cases in the Northern District
Court moved closer to trial—Judge Walker clarified his reasoning with
respect to his prior ruling regarding the PIR. He expressed that he
intended to limit the evidence of the PIR in a similar fashion to the
rulings of the other judges in the Middle District.124
With respect to the testimony of the owner’s real estate econo-
mist, Judge Walker granted Sabal Trail’s Daubert motion only to
the extent that the expert could not refer to any specific quotes from
his focus group survey that were considered inflammatory or preju-
dicial.125 Later, Judge Walker elaborated upon his ruling by finding
that the expert real estate economist would be permitted to testify
in a more general fashion about his focus group survey regarding
his research on the existence of fear or stigma related to natural gas
122. Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 13.386 Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida et al.,
No. 5:16-cv-147-Oc-41-CEM-PRL, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 208633 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2018).
123. See Order Granting in Part Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony by Matthew Ray,
Doc. 55, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 1.76 Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida et al.,
No. 1:16-cv-00073-MW-GRJ (M.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2018).
124. See Order Regarding Matthew Ray, Doc. 125, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 18.27
Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida (Thomas Trust), No. 1:16-cv-00093-MW-GRJ (M.D. Fla.
Sept. 26, 2018); see also Order on Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine, Doc. 132, Sabal Trail Transmis-
sion, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida (Thomas Trust), No. 1:16-cv-00093-
MW-GRJ (M.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2018).
125. See Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony by Joshua Harris,
Doc. 56, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 1.76 Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida et al.,
Nos. 1:16-cv-00073-MW-GRJ (M.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2018).
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pipelines.126 As another basis for his ruling, Judge Walker stated
that testimony from a qualified expert on the subject may be helpful
to a jury.127
Judge Walker further addressed an additional challenge raised
by Sabal Trail objecting to some of the predicate facts upon which
the owner’s appraiser assessed damages that he considered resulted
from fear or stigma. Initially, Judge Walker addressed the issue upon
hearing;128 he summarized his oral ruling in a subsequent order.129
As part of the sales-comparison approach to value, an appraiser
will seek to verify facts, derived from public records or other data
sources, with the market participants who were knowledgeable about
a particular sales transaction. This typically involves the buyer, seller,
or real estate professional engaged by one of the parties involved in
the sale, such as a real estate agent, broker, or lawyer. In verifying
information with these market participants, the appraiser is also
seeking to confirm the motivations of the parties in the sale relevant
to the considerations exchanged between the parties and also their
perceptions about the real estate market in which they transacted.
Once again, when preparing a damage study using a paired-sales
analysis, the appraiser attempts to match the sale under investiga-
tion to sales of similarly situated properties within the same real
estate market but that differ in respect to the variable being mea-
sured. Thus, in the case of natural gas pipelines, the appraiser at-
tempts to isolate the variable as a natural gas pipeline encumbrance.
As part of the verification process, appraisers typically ask ques-
tions of market participants about their perspectives on the variable
being measured and, in this instance, whether a natural gas pipe-
line, in their opinion, would positively or negatively affect the use
or value of the property being transacted. These sorts of questions
are asked of both the impact and non-impact market participants.
126. See Order on Daubert Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony by Joshua Harris, Doc.
133, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida (Thomas
Trust), No. 1:16-cv-00093-MW-GRJ (M.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2018).
127. Id.
128. See Transcript of Hearing, Doc 130, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of
Land in Levy County, Florida (Thomas Trust), No. 1:16-cv-00093-MW-GRJ (M.D. Fla. Sep. 27,
2018).
129. See Follow-up Order on Daubert Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony by Matthew
Ray, Doc. 134, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida
(Thomas Trust), No. 1:16-cv-00093-MW-GRJ (M.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2018).
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Thus so, Sabal Trail sought to exclude the extent to which the
owner’s appraiser could testify on non-impact market participants’
perception of natural gas pipelines. The notion is that only buyers
and sellers of impact properties have personal knowledge or experi-
ence sufficient to express opinions of value concerning properties
encumbered by pipelines. Defense counsel argued that the market
for properties of the same highest and best use—within the same
geographic market and under the same market conditions—includes
both impact and non-impact buyers and sellers. To objectively ascer-
tain market perception, therefore, the appraiser should consider
verifications from both sets of market participants as well as con-
sider the price actually paid for respective properties.130 To limit the
appraiser’s consideration to only those market participants who
transact on impact properties would, therefore, artificially target
only those in the marketplace that accepted the condition of having
a natural gas pipeline encumbrance.131
In his follow-up order, Judge Walker only briefly stated that the
owner’s appraiser would be permitted to testify about his opinions.132
When explaining how he formed his opinions, the appraiser said he
contacted non-impact sales participants. As such, the appraiser would
130. Sellers of impact properties typically contend that pipelines do not diminish value
because they seek to sell their property at the same price as non-impacted properties. Likewise,
buyers of impact properties typically contend that the encumbrance of a pipeline easement
is neither perceived as a substantial negative nor a deterrent keeping them from choosing to
buy the property. In contrast, sellers and buyers of non-impact properties are typically uniform
in their beliefs that a natural gas pipeline encumbrance would, if introduced to their property,
negatively affect its use and value. Accordingly, they contend their non-impact properties are
more valuable than impact properties, all other property characteristics being equal. Apart
from these divergent verifications, the data shows that, in most instances when comparing
similarly situated properties, the impact property with a pipeline transacts at a price con-
siderably less than the non-impact property without a pipeline. This demonstrates that the
market for impact properties is often characterized by sellers who initially list their properties
at higher prices and buyers who thereafter negotiate a discount to secure a bargain.
131. Stated otherwise, because both supply and demand affect the price upon which proper-
ties transact, ascertaining whether there exists in the marketplace a negative perception
associated with pipelines to such an extent that it deters some market participants from
transacting on impact properties at all—if there is a sufficient supply of non-impact properties
available—is an extremely legitimate and relevant investigation for appraisers to undertake.
If limited to considering the verifications of only those market participants who are accepting
of the condition, the appraiser may not be fully informed as to how the demand for impact
properties is less than non-impact properties because some will not transact on impact properties
categorically due to fear or stigma associated with pipelines.
132. See Follow-up Order on Daubert Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony by Matthew
Ray, Doc. 134, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida
(Thomas Trust), No. 1:16-cv-00093-MW-GRJ (M.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2018).
2019] NATURAL GAS PIPELINE EASEMENTS 167
be permitted at trial to explain, in general fashion, whether market
participants involved with non-impact sales expressed concerns con-
sistent with those of impact sales but could not go into detail about
what individual sale participants told him.133 The appraiser was to
avoid hyperbole, specific example, quote, or comment, but was to focus
instead on the generalized impact he observed.134
Sabal Trail filed a Motion for Reconsideration.135 The owners re-
sponded.136 Sabal Trail argued that testimony from both the owner’s
appraiser and real estate economist, even in a general sense, should
not be admitted if derived from verifications with, or surveys of,
market participants; instead, the only form of admissible evidence
related to fear or stigma should be the market-sales data alone. The
owners argued that evidence should not be limited to only market-
sales data. On the one hand, to the extent that the evidence of the
appraiser’s opinion was being submitted for the purpose of showing
the reasonableness of fear or stigma, the owners agreed that such
evidence should be impermissible. On the other hand, to the extent
that the evidence was being submitted for the purpose of showing
the existence of fear or stigma, such evidence should be admitted.
While market-sales data is available to show that impact properties
with pipelines typically sell for less than similarly situated non-im-
pact properties without pipelines, the verifications of those sales
with both impact and non-impact market participants is submitted to
show the reason for the difference is related, in many instances, to
fear or stigma associated with the existence of a natural gas pipeline.
In ruling on Sabal Trail’s motion for reconsideration, Judge
Walker denied the motion finding admissible evidence relating to
fear or stigma is not limited to market-sales data.137 Judge Walker
reasoned that if an expert conducts a paired-sales analysis that
determines that properties impacted by a pipeline generally sell for
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See Motion for Reconsideration (Plaintiff), Doc. 140, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC
v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida (Thomas Trust), No. 1:16-cv-00093-MW-GRJ
(M.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2018).
136. See Response to Motion for Reconsideration (Defendant), Doc. 149, Sabal Trail
Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida (Thomas Trust), No. 1:16-
cv-00093-MW-GRJ (M.D. Fla. Oct. 22, 2018).
137. See Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, Doc. 154, Sabal Trail Transmission,
LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy, County, Florida (Thomas Trust), No. 1:16-cv-00093-MW-
GRJ (M.D. Fla. Oct. 23, 2018).
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less than properties not impacted by a pipeline, in order to establish
a proper foundation, the expert would have to explain why and give
some evidence of the existence of stigma if the expert wished to testify
that stigma was a reason for the decrease in value.138 The evidence
that is inadmissible is any attempts to explain the reasonableness
of such fear or stigma.139 To elucidate upon his prior ruling, Judge
Walker made clear that the appraiser would be permitted to testify
in the same manner on his opinions relating to the verifications of
both impact and non-impact sales participants.140 If impact sales
participants differed from non-impact sales participants, Sabal Trail
would be afforded the opportunity of cross-examination to highlight
such differences.141
In two of the four appeals pending before the Eleventh Circuit,
Sabal Trail seeks the reversal of Judge Walker’s evidentiary rulings
that are adverse to the company’s case.142 At the time of the writing
of this article, parties have yet to submit briefs in these two appel-
late cases.
V. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF A PROPERTY OWNER’S TESTIMONY
REGARDING SEVERANCE DAMAGES
A. Owner’s Testimony
The Federal Rules of Evidence 701 sets forth that a witness that
is not testifying as an expert but providing lay testimony may testify
138. Id. In applying incisive wit to yet another note in his opinion, Judge Mark E. Walker,
U.S. District Judge, conversely postulated that an expert witness is not permitted to testify
to an expert opinion if merely to pull reasons out of a hat like a magician’s rabbit (citing
popular social critique/rapper Skee-Lo who “famously wished that he ‘had a rabbit in a hat
with a bat.’” (citation omitted)). See Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, Doc. 154, at
3, n.3, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida (Thomas
Trust), No. 1:16-cv-00093-MW-GRJ (M.D. Fla. Oct. 23, 2018). The expert must have a founda-
tion as to the existence of stigma to justify his reasoning that it is such stigma that results in
a decrease in value. This is the sort of evidence that is admissible in cases regarding fear or
stigma as a component of severance damages. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings, 518
So. 2d 897–99 (Fla. 1987). This is separate and apart from any evidence as to the reasonableness
of such stigma, which is inadmissible. See id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida
(Thomas Trust), No. 19-10705 (11th Cir. 2019); Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 2.468 Acres
of Land in Levy County, Florida (Ryan Thomas), No. 19-10722 (11th Cir. 2019).
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in the form of an opinion. However, the opinion is limited to that
which is (1) rationally based on their own perception, knowledge, ob-
servation, or experience; (2) helpful to clearly understand the wit-
ness’s testimony or determine a fact in issue; and (3) not based on
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope
of Federal Rules of Evidence 702.143 The 2000 Advisory Committee
Notes on Federal Rules of Evidence 701 provides that a helpful ex-
ample of testimony within acceptable limits includes the owner of a
business who testifies to the value of or projected profits of the busin-
ess, without having to qualifying under Federal. Rules of Evidence
702 as an expert accountant, appraiser, or similar expert.
Federal Rules of Evidence 702 sets forth that a witness providing
expert testimony who is qualified by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify in the form of an opinion or other-
wise if (1) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine
a fact in issue; (2) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(3) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods;
and (4) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods
to the facts of the case. The 2011 Advisory Committee Notes on
Federal Rules of Evidence 702 provides that within the scope of the
rule are not only experts in the strictest sense of the word—for
example, physicians, physicists, and architects—but also the large
group sometimes called “skilled” witnesses, such as bankers or land-
owners testifying to land values.
In general, lay testimony in eminent domain cases has been held
to have probative value with respect to both the assessment of the
property in its before and after condition. For instance, in McCann
Holdings, Ltd. v. United States lay testimony from an area resident
and a plaintiff in another “rails to trails” case testified that the
public use trail “destroyed the enjoyment” of his property because
of the noise, crime, trespass, and the loss of the feeling of “seclu-
sion.”144 Unlike other expert witnesses, “the opinion of a landowner
as to the value of his land is admissible without further qualifica-
tion.”145 The purpose of the rule is that an owner “is deemed to have
143. FED. R. EVID. 701.
144. McCann Holdings, Ltd. v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. 608, 628 (2013).
145. See, e.g., United States v. 443.6 Acres of Land, 77 F.Supp.84 (S.W.D. North Dakota
1948); United States v. 3,698.63 Acres of Land, 416 F.2d 65, 66 (8th Cir. 1969) (Juries have
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sufficient knowledge of the price paid, the rents and other income
received, and the possibilities of the land for use, to render an opinion
as to the value of the land.”146 A landowner’s testimony about the
value of his land is admissible “despite the fact that he may have
been relying to some extent on hearsay.”147
The recourse available to a party challenging the owner’s testi-
mony is not to prevent the jury from hearing the owner’s testimony,
but to cross-examine the owner and present countervailing testimony.
“An owner’s opinion on value, however, is subject to attack through
cross-examination or independent evidence refuting the owner’s
estimate with the jury as fact-finder shouldering the responsibility
of judging the credibility of the witness, resolving the conflicting
evidence, and assessing the weight of opinion testimony.”148 When
trial courts get into trouble, it is when they improperly exclude an
owner from testifying.149 
The federal court’s opinion in District of Columbia Redevelopment
Land Agency v. Thirteen Parcels of Land150 well states well the proba-
tive value of the owner’s testimony in the context of eminent domain:
The owner does not testify as just another expert, but from his
unique position as the individual who stands to gain or lose the
most from the tribunal’s determination of the value of his prop-
erty. . . . [T]he right of the owner to testify is based, at least in
part, on the recognition of the subjective nature of value. Opinions
as to value differ, and the owner has a right to place all evidence
pertaining to the value of his condemned property before the
trier of fact.151
been allowed to attribute weight to land value opinions of farmer-owners of agricultural land
who have familiarity with the land and its productivity even though they lack experience in
real estate valuation and have not based their estimates on the sales of comparable property.);
United States v. 329.73 Acres of Land, 666 F.2d 281, 284 (5th Cir. 1981) (affirming verdict
based on landowner testimony even though testimony “was not based on any accepted method
of valuation”); United States v. Easements & Rights-of-Way over a Total of 3.92 Acres of Land,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101181, at *5 (E.D. Tenn., Sept. 24, 2010).
146. See United States v. 68.94 Acres of Land, 918 F.2d 389, 398 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing
NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 23.03, at 23–30 (1990)).
147. La Combe v. A-T-O, Inc., 679 F.2d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 1982).
148. Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690, 699 (5th Cir. 1975); see also Neff
v. Kehoe, 708 F.2d 639, 655 (11th Cir. 1983); Hessen v. Jaguar Cars, Inc., 915 F.2d 641 (11th
Cir. 1990).
149. LaCombe v. A-T-O, Inc., 679 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1982).
150. 534 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
151. Id. at 340.
2019] NATURAL GAS PIPELINE EASEMENTS 171
Within the Eleventh Circuit, “an owner of property is competent to
testify regarding its value.”152 However, “where the owner bases his
estimation solely on speculative factors, the owner’s testimony may
be of such minimal probative force to warrant a judge’s refusal even
to submit the issue to the jury.”153 The owner cannot simply “shoot
from the hip” or testify ipse dixit.154 While permitted to testify from
personal knowledge or experience, there must still be a sufficient
foundation upon which an opinion is constructed. Florida courts hold
to the same axiomatic standard that an owner can testify to the value
of his or her property in its “before” and “after” condition.155
B. Sabal Trail Natural Gas Pipeline
In Sabal Trail cases pending before the federal courts in Florida,
Sabal Trail has amplified its arguments against the admissibility of
a property owner’s testimony of the “after” values and, in particu-
larly, of the quantifications of severance damages. So much so, it is
worth further comment for the benefit of those practitioners who
may have an interest in cases involving severance damages relating
to fear or stigma.
Principally arguing from recent decisions of the Eleventh Circuit
in Williams v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC,156 and the Northern District
Court in Alabama in United States ex rel. TVA v. An Easement Right-
of-Way Over 6.09 Acres of Land,157 Sabal Trail argued that there
should be a heightened level of admissibility of an owner’s testimony
in cases involving fear or stigma in which the owners should have
personal knowledge or experience in buying or selling properties en-
cumbered with natural gas pipelines.
However, it seems that the holding and the facts in the Eleventh
Circuit’s opinion in Mosaic are more straightforward and routine than
Sabal Trail would admit as they are trying to establish an entirely
152. Neff v. Kehoe, 708 F.2d 639, 644 (11th Cir. 1983).
153. Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690, 699 (5th Cir. 1975), modified on
other grounds, 575 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
154. See, e.g., Hessen v. Jaguar Cars, Inc., 915 F.2d 641 (11th Cir. 1990); Gregg v. U.S.
Indus., 887 F.2d 1462, 1469 (11th Cir. 1989); Electro Servs., Inc. v. Exide Corp., 847 F.2d 1524,
1526 (11th Cir. 1988).
155. See Hill v. Marion Cty., 238 So. 2d 163, 166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); see also Trailer
Ranch, Inc. v. Levine, 523 So. 2d 629, 632 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
156. 889 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2018).
157. 140 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1262–64 (N.D. Ala. 2015).
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new landmark precedent. In truth, there is no surprising revelation
in the Mosaic case that would change the proper foundation for the
lay testimony of an owner. Quite simply, the Eleventh Circuit up-
held the district court’s exclusion of lay testimony under Federal
Rules of Evidence. 701 because the owner, Ms. Williams, lacked suf-
ficient personal knowledge or experience to testify to the value of
her home, which was allegedly subject to toxic substances emitted
from a nearby factory operated by Mosaic Fertilizer, Inc.158
Although Ms. Williams estimated her home had zero value, as any
sale would require a disclosure of toxins, there was no market evi-
dence presented in her case that would serve as a foundation for such
opinion.159 She, herself, did not try to sell her home or speak with an
appraiser or real estate agent to ascertain this value.160 No appraiser
testified on her behalf.161 The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion points out,
in fact, that Ms. Williams testified from her own knowledge, contrary
to her estimate of zero value, that homes in her neighborhood, includ-
ing one on the same block as hers, had sold.162 In accordance with
these particular facts and circumstances, the Eleventh Circuit in
Mosaic found that the district court did not err in excluding Ms.
Williams’s testimony because of a complete lack of foundation.
Likewise, apart from a very colorful narrative, the Northern District
Court in Alabama in 6.09 Acres disallowed testimony that both (a)
the land within either 200 to 225 feet of the electrical-transmission
easement had lost all of its pre-taking market value and (b) land be-
tween 200 and 550 feet had lost half of its pre-taking market value.163
The reason for excluding such testimony was because the owner
presented no foundation of market data, only speculation and con-
jecture, to support the decrease in value.164 In fact, the narrative
points to instances where the owner’s opinions completely lacked
any foundation in market data over sixteen times.165
As to the issue concerning the owner’s testimony, the Middle Dis-
trict Court (Ocala Division), Honorable James S. Moody, presiding,
158. See Mosaic Fertilizer, 889 f.3d at 1250–51.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. United States ex rel. TVA v. An Easement Right-of-Way Over 6.09 Acres of Land, 140
F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1269 (N.D. Ala. 2015).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1238, 1243, 1261–65.
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held that the owner would be permitted to testify as to the “common
sense” of how the pipeline affected the property.166 At trial, Sabal
Trail again challenged Judge Moody’s ruling concerning the owner’s
testimony but was unsuccessful in limiting said testimony. The owner
was permitted to testify about the value of the subject property in the
“after” condition and about the quantification of severance damages.
The issue was subject to further contest before Judge Moody. Fol-
lowing a jury trial on the measure of compensation, Sabal Trail filed
a Motion for New Trial.167 Before the owners responded, Judge Moody
denied the motion finding that there was no error in admitting the
owner’s testimony at trial.168
In the Northern District Court, Honorable Mark E. Walker, pre-
siding, denied in part Sabal Trail’s motion in limine to “exclude
landowner opinion quantifying [damages] that fails to meet the
requirements of Rules 701 and 702 or that is purely speculative.”
While agreeing with Sabal Trail that purely speculative testimony
should not be admitted, Judge Walker reasoned that an owner may
derive opinions from personal knowledge or experience. Addition-
ally, Judge Walker reasoned that, while a foundation for opinion
testimony is easy to establish when an owner’s opinion is more
general, a stronger foundation would be required when an owner
intends to give more specific opinions quantifying damages. As such,
Judge Walker held that the testimony of the owner would not be
permitted unless first establishing a foundation to support their
specific quantifications.169 The issue was subject to further contest
before Judge Walker. Following a jury trial on the measure of com-
pensation, Sabal Trail filed a Motion for New Trial.170 The owners
166. Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine and Denying Defendant’s Motion in
Limine, Doc. 98, Sabal Trail v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County (Sunderman Groves, Inc.),
No. 5:16-cv-000178-JSM-PRL (M.D. Fla. Jan. 9, 2018); see also Transcript of Hearing, Doc
100, Sabal Trail v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County (Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-
000178-JSM-PRL (M.D. Fla. Jan. 9, 2018).
167. Motion for New Trial (Plaintiff), Doc. 132, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921
Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-000178-JSM-
PRL (M.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2018).
168. Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake Count, No. 5:16-cv-
000178-JSM-PRL, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131092 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2018).
169. Order on Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine, Doc. 132, at 3–4, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC
v. 1.76 Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida, No. 1:16-cv-00073-MW-GRJ (M.D. Fla. Oct. 3,
2018).
170. Motion for New Trial (Plaintiff), Doc. 209, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 18.27
Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida (Thomas Trust), No. 1:16-cv-00093-MW-GRJ (M.D. Fla.
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responded.171 Judge Walker denied the motion finding that there
was no error in admitting the owner’s testimony at trial.172
Within three appeals that are before the Eleventh Circuit, Sabal
Trail seeks reversal of both Judge Moody’s and also Judge Walker’s
rulings on the owner’s testimony.173 The two jury trials in which the
respective owners presented testimony and evidence are discussed
in the last section of this article, which follows.
VI. JURY VERDICTS: FAIR OR JUST?
In this article, our examination of the jurisprudence associated
with the acquisition of lineal corridor rights has primarily peered
within the “laboratory” of the federal district courts in Florida. So far,
it has been noted how private property rights have been regarded as
the federal courts have established the substantive, procedural, and
evidentiary framework for determining the measure of compensa-
tion in the Sabal Trail cases. In review of federal case law nationwide,
however, the instances are few and far between of such condemna-
tion cases actually proceeding to a jury trial on valuation and later
becoming the subject of appellate review.
Regarding the Sabal Trail Natural Gas Pipeline, three Sabal Trail
cases in Florida have proceeded to two jury trials. It is here that the
principles behind a “fair” or “just” measure of compensation trans-
late from merely conceptual to actual flesh and bone.174 Thus, a rare
Dec. 14, 2018); Motion for New Trial (Plaintiff), Doc. 168, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v.
2.468 Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida (Ryan Thomas), No. 1:16-cv-00093-MW-GRJ
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 2018).
171. Response in Opposition to Motion for New Trial (Defendant), Doc. 214, Sabal Trail
Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida (Thomas Trust), No. 1:16-
cv-00093-MW-GRJ (M.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2019); Response in Opposition to Motion for New Trial
(Defendant), Doc. 173, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 2.468 Acres of Land in Levy County,
Florida (Ryan Thomas), No. 1:16-cv-00093-MW-GRJ (M.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2018).
172. Order Denying Motion for New Trial, Doc. 224, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v.
18.27 Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida (Thomas Trust), No. 1:16-cv-00093-MW-GRJ
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2019); Order Denying Motion for New Trial, Doc. 183, Sabal Trail Trans-
mission, LLC v. 2.468 Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida (Ryan Thomas), No. 1:16-cv-00
093-MW-GRJ (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2019).
173. See Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida
(Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 18-11836-GG (11th Cir. 2018); Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC
v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida (Thomas Trust), No. 19-10705 (11th Cir. 2019);
Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 2.468 Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida (Ryan Thomas),
No. 19-10722 (11th Cir. 2019).
174. In almost all of the 263 condemnation cases Sabal Trail filed in Florida, with only a
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look is afforded as to exactly how compensation is measured when
the federal court must balance allowing owners to assert claims for
damages resulting from fear or stigma, while not allowing the focus
of the trial before the fact-finder to become about the “reasonableness”
of the purported fear or stigma. Besides, it can be observed how pri-
vate property rights are treated when it is a private company wield-
ing the eminent domain power to acquire easement rights that makes
servient the estate of owners to a use of property that purportedly
diminishes the value of the remainder due to fear or stigma.
A. Industry Bias Reflected in Zero Damages
In Florida, study of the Sabal Trail cases has shown that Sabal
Trail retained three appraisers as expert witnesses. Each of these
three appraisers prepared damage studies using paired-sales analysis
which purportedly support their respective opinions of zero damages
from fear or stigma. Outside of paying a percentage of the fee value
for the areas encumbered by Sabal Trail’s temporary and permanent
easements, these appraisers do not find, in their respective analy-
ses, any diminution or loss in value to the owner’s remainder prop-
erty in the form of severance damages. For their appraisal services
regarding the Sabal Trail Natural Gas Pipeline, it has been con-
firmed, in depositions, that Sabal Trail paid their three appraisers
over $8.3 million dollars.175
Such tactics have also been referred to as an “industry-bias,” for
it is a repetitive position taken by private, for-profit, licensee natu-
ral gas pipelines in condemnation cases across the country. Equip-
ped with appraisals that show a consistent zero damages from fear
and stigma, Sabal Trail is able to negotiate from the lowest point
handful of exceptions, the pleading dockets reflect only that the respective cases were resolved
upon the parties reaching a settlement, agreeing to voluntary dismissal upon purchase of
easement rights by Sabal Trail, or upon Sabal Trail stipulating to issues triable to a jury. By
such means, the terms of the settlements or, more particularly, the specific amounts of compen-
sation upon which the parties agreed are not disclosed or otherwise subject to public record—
somewhat akin to “burying the lede.” Thus, it is only those cases which proceeded to jury trial
or which are otherwise subject to appeal before the Eleventh Circuit that afford a vantage
point from which to peer into how the parties specifically resolved their dispute over the
measure of compensation.
175. Brief of Violetta P. Lara, at 11, n.8, Sabal Trail v. 1.401 Acres of Land in Hamilton
County, Florida, No. 3:16-cv-00278-BJD-JBT, 2019 WL 1324199 at *6 (11th Cir. Dec. 18, 2018).
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conceivable in each and every case. This greatly benefits Sabal Trail
in its program of acquisition because, unless owners are prepared
to challenge such valuation by retaining their own lawyers and
appraisers to establish a new amount, they are left to negotiate from
the floor of zero damages.
Such bias is perhaps most on display when it is also discovered to
be the case that two of the three appraisers each have experience in
excess of twenty years working on natural gas pipeline projects,
nearly always working for the pipeline companies; appraising hun-
dreds, if not thousands, of easement parcels; and always arriving at
an opinion of zero damages for fear and stigma. Such professional
résumés remove any surprise as to what the appraisal opinion will
be when the appraisers are initially retained by Sabal Trail for its
project.176 Although admittedly counter-intuitive, these appraisers
insist that market data consistently shows zero damages from market
fear or stigma.177
Sabal Trail’s third appraiser, although not having the same track
record of working for pipeline companies, does have a history of being
a stalwart advocate for whichever side employs him, on a “first-come,
first-served” basis. Historically, as an expert witness, he has esti-
mated substantial damages when retained by private property own-
ers, in cases regarding the GATX Central Florida Pipeline, but now
he estimates zero damages from fear or stigma when retained by
Sabal Trail. The only difference, supposedly, is the type of gas found
in the pipe.
Nevertheless, all three appraisers have one thing in common: a
horribly flawed paired-sales analysis which serves as the basis for
their respective opinions of zero damages. Upon investigation and
research, it is readily apparent that the quality of the data is so poor
that their appraisal conclusions, as to severance damages, lack
credibility. So much so that it is almost inconceivable that a jury
176. See Transcript of Trial, Doc. 128, at 44, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres
of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-00178-JSM-PRL (M.D.
Fla. Feb. 27, 2018); Transcript of Trial, Doc. 129, at 10–24, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v.
3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-00178-
JSM-PRL (M.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2018); Transcript of Trial, Doc. 130, at. 145–48, Sabal Trail
Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.),
No. 5:16-cv-00178-JSM-PRL (M.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2018).
177. Id.
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would give such testimony any weight in determining the measure
of compensation.
Yet, if opposing the pipeline company’s estimate of the measure
of compensation, an owner is then required to run the gauntlet of
litigation, starting with discovery and motion practice prior to trial.
If surviving the time and expense of fighting a condemnor with un-
limited resources, the owner is then, of course, finally able to contend
with a jury on a level playing field. This has proven true in regards
to the jury verdicts in two recent trials, elaborated upon in greater
detail below.
B. Sunderman Groves, Inc.
The first Sabal Trail case in Florida that proceeded to jury trial
was tried the week of February 26, 2018, and is styled as Sabal Trail
Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida
(Sunderman Groves, Inc.).178
The owner of the property subject to Sabal Trail’s eminent do-
main taking is Sunderman Groves, Inc., a holding company whose
principals are Chuck and Jan Sunderman. Chuck’s grandfather came
to Florida in 1927 and assembled a tract of some five thousand acres,
leaving approximately one thousand acres to Chuck and Jan. Finding
that it was no longer feasible to replant citrus groves, the Sundermans
began to sell off portions of this remaining one thousand acres, pri-
marily as rural residential lots of ten acres to twenty acres. In the
past twenty-five years, the Sundermans have completed about forty
to forty-five of these transactions. Today, there are only a few re-
maining tracts from the 480 acres remaining that are still available
for sale, given topography and location. The property is located in
Bay Lake, Florida, a rural area in what is also known as a watershed
recharge area for the Green Swamp near the metropolitan area of
Orlando, Florida.
178. No. 5:16-cv-00178-JSM-PRL (M.D. Fla. 2016) (Honorable James S. Moody presiding).
A complete transcript of the trial can be found on the federal Electric Case File (“ECF”) as
Docs. 127, 128, 129, 130, Transcripts of Trial, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres
of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-00178-JSM-PRL (M.D.
Fla. Feb. 26–Mar. 1, 2018).
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Figure 3. Sunderman Groves Property
The property through which Sabal Trail acquired both temporary
and permanent easements is one of these remaining tracts totaling
39.11 acres, consisting of 26.8 acres uplands and 12.3 acres of wet-
lands. The tract is located on a paved road and has gently rolling
topography toward the rear of the property, which overlooks a wet-
land marsh. The neighboring properties include a white-steepled
church, and a farm with a rustic barn and small herd of cattle.
The overall aesthetic characteristics of the property are rural,
almost pastoral. Prior to the easement takings, the appraisers for
both Sabal Trail and the Sundermans identified the “highest and
best use” of the tract to be for rural, residential use, but they differ
on whether the tract could be subdivided into either two or three
lots. As depicted in the aerial photographs above, Sabal Trail’s ease-
ments cut diagonally through the center of the tract for a distance
of 1,336 feet. The permanent easement is fifty feet in width with the
temporary easements for construction purposes extending an addi-
tional twenty-five feet on either side.
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Figure 4. Sunderman Groves—Before Taking
After the easement takings, Sabal Trail’s pipeline is identified by
color markers at regular intervals along its centerline. It is in the
midst of developable area. Access to any developable portion of the
40-acre tract requires the owner to cross the pipeline easement.
There are also two above ground AC mitigation devices that are lo-
cated some distance apart from one another within the permanent
easement area. Sabal Trail operates the thirty-six-inch-diameter
pipe with a maximum operating pressure of 1,456 pounds per square
inch (“psig”), typically buried four feet underground. The pipeline has
the capacity to transmit one billion cubic feet of natural gas a day.
Upon final judgment, Sabal Trail’s easement will be publicly re-
corded and become part of the chain of title included in the title
report that is subject to the closing of any real estate transaction
The Sundermans, like other owners, received a “Notification of
Initial In-Service” letter from Sabal Trail, which outlines the dos
and don’ts associated with the permanent easement area. It basi-
cally confirms who’s the boss with respect to Sabal Trail’s dominant
rights over the owner’s now servient estate. What’s more, the letter is
printed with a logo urging everyone to “[k]now what’s below.”179
179. See Transcript of Trial, Doc. 129, at 216–17, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921
Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-00178-JSM-PRL
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2018).
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Figure 5. “Know What’s Below” Logo180
Regarding the details about the pipeline, the testimony and evi-
dence about fear or stigma, for the entire trial, was without any wit-
ness on the owner’s side of the case mentioning the word “explosion.”
Instead, Sabal Trail’s own expert engineering witness opened the door
through more detailed testimony about the condemnor’s use of the
easement by testifying about the “benefits” of natural gas as follows:
Q. What’s the purpose of the Citrus County Lateral?
A. To supply natural gas to a power plant.
Q. Are there any benefits that you are aware of for using
natural gas to create energy for power plants?
A. Yes, sir. It’s abundant. It’s a domestic fuel. It’s a clean
burning fuel, much cleaner than coal and oil.
Q. What do you mean by it’s a “clean burning fuel?”
A. It emits less carbon and greenhouse gases than the
other fuels.
Q. Any other benefits associated with using natural gas
for the creation of electricity? Sorry.
A. It has a very high BTU, which is a heat rating of the
gas, and it can fire turbines, basically what the power
plants are using.181
180. Defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 173, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres of
Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-00178-JSM-PRL (M.D.
Fla. Feb. 28, 2018). Image credit: PHMSA, http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov (2010); 811, http://
www.call811.com (last visited Aug. 5, 2019).
181. Transcript of Trial, Doc. 127, at 115–16, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres
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In cross-examination, Sabal Trail’s expert was asked to elaborate:
Q. All right. So would you say that 36 inches is a large di-
ameter pipe?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. All right. And it is brought onto the property, when
constructed, in sections?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How are those sections put together?
A. It’s steel pipe so the sections would be put together with
a[ ] welding process. We use certified welders, cer-
tified inspectors, and certified inspectors to oversee
the process.
Q. All right. Isn’t it true that this pipe will have a capac-
ity to have gas at a maximum pressure of 1456 PSI?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Could you describe for the Jury what PSI is?
A. Pounds per square inch.
Q. That’s high pressure, is it not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you indicated the natural gas has a high BTU.
What does that mean?
A. That means—it’s British Thermal Unit, which is ba-
sically the heat rating of the natural gas.
Q. Is it flammable?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is it transporting a capacity per day of one billion cu-
bic feet of gas?
A. Yes, it can.
Q. Is that what Sabal Trail is seeking to do?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So they are looking for customers, such as Duke Energy
or Florida Power and Light, they would like to be able
to push this gas through at the maximum capacity?
A. Yes, sir.182
of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-00178-JSM-PRL (M.D.
Fla. Feb. 26, 2018).
182. Transcript of Trial, Doc. 27, at 137–39, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres
of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-00178-JSM-PRL (M.D.
Fla. Feb. 26, 2018).
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Defense counsel also asked in cross-examination some details con-
cerning the pipeline markers:
Q. Okay. How many pipeline markers are on the subject
property?
A. I don’t know the exact number. I think there is around
four to six pipeline markers.
Q. All right. What does the pipeline marker say?
A. It basically is a communication tool that shows the
name of the company, what is in the pipeline, emer-
gency telephone numbers.
Q. What does it say, sir?
A. It says, “Sabal Trail Transmissions Natural Gas Pipe-
line,” and then it has our 188 number.
Q. Is there any term that’s also used on this marker?
A. “Caution, gas pipeline.”
Q. Is the word “warning” used?
A. Yes, sir.183
Figure 6. Sunderman Groves—After Taking
183. Transcript of Trial, Doc. 127, at 134–35, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres
of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-00178-JSM-PRL (M.D.
Fla. Feb. 26, 2018).
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Assuming that the portions of the transcript cited above fairly
represent the extent of the condemnor’s use of the taken property,
testimony and evidence of fear or stigma was not accentuated. It did
not become a feature of the trial. Rather, it is more likely the case
that the existence of any fear or stigma that may be associated with
the transmission of a tremendous volume of a flammable substance
such as natural gas, at a high pressure, proceeding through an in-
terstate pipeline buried four feet underground speaks for itself. As
such, it is not without reason to think that testimony and evidence
concerning that fear can be focused on what impact such fear or
stigma has on those who transact in the marketplace, without ac-
cusing the owner of “fear mongering” or “employing scare tactics” in
presenting its case for severance damages.
Figure 7. Sunderman Groves—After Taking
1. Appraisal Testimony
Moving to the presentation of the evidence of marketplace value
at trial—based on what he referred to as a “natural gas pipeline
study”— Sabal Trail’s appraiser (who was paid by Sabal Trail over
$4.1 million dollars for his appraisal services) concluded that there
was zero damages from fear or stigma. Based on a separate “bifur-
cation study,” however, the appraiser testified that there was 25%
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severance damages solely caused by the “physical bifurcation” of the
40-acre tract. Both studies employed a paired-sales analysis. His
total estimate of full compensation, therefore, was predicated on pay-
ment for the temporary easement at $5,000, the value of the perma-
nent easement at $8,100, and his 25% severance damage of the
remainder property at $43,700, for a total compensation of $56,800.
On cross-examination, it was shown that approximately two-
thirds of the data relied upon by Sabal Trail’s appraiser in his study
was data that he used in past pipeline cases that, in certain in-
stances, occurred ten years prior.184 This old, retread data seemed
too remote in time or distance to be considered applicable to current
market conditions or preferences.185 So too, much of the data, which
showed only little differences in price, did not include properties of
the same highest and best use for rural, residential use. Some of the
more current data relied upon by Sabal Trail’s appraiser needed
correction, and the data that was accurately reported or verified
showed that substantial differences in price existed between impact
184. In regards to time, it is reasonable to consider how market participants are more
informed today concerning pipelines than, say, ten years ago. One need only recall that Apple
introduced its popular iPhone in 2007. Information concerning pipelines is readily available
if asking either Siri (iPhone) or Alexa (Amazon) to search the internet.
185. For example, as part of his study, Sabal Trail’s appraiser paired sales within a 48-lot
equestrian subdivision named Sherman Woods Ranches in Okeechobee County, Florida. Of
the 48 lots, all of which were approximately ten acres in size, seven lots were subject to a
natural gas pipeline easement in favor of Gulfstream Natural Gas. Lot sales of all 48 lots
occurring in 2005 showed little difference in the approximate $300,000 paid for either impact
or non-impact lots. On cross-examination, however, it was questioned whether the peak real-
estate-market conditions in South Florida in 2005 were truly comparable to the subject’s
property market in Bay Lake, Florida in 2016. Further, it was shown that all 48 lots of the
Sherman Woods Ranches subdivision were sold within a six-hour time period in highly
promoted lot offerings to those in surburban areas that would want rural equestrian lots for
their horses. It was questioned whether, in this “frenzied” sale condition, any of the lot
purchasers were aware of the existence of a natural gas pipeline; to which the appraiser was
unable to confirm either a “yes” or “no” response. Moreover, it was shown that only three of
the48 lots have been developed since 2005, that many of the lots that sold for $300,000 were
later subject to default and foreclosure, and that current lot sales averaged around $30,000—
all of which adds up to the telltale characteristics of a “failed subdivision.” Finally, the defense
counsel asked Sabal Trail’s appraiser if his study of Sherman Woods Ranches was a fair
comparison to use in determining a just compensation for the Sundermans who owned
property in Bay County, Florida, with a 2016 date of taking. The appraiser responded that,
in his opinion, it was a fair comparison. See Transcript of Trial, Doc. 129, at 94–109, Sabal
Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves,
Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-00178-JSM-PRL (M.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2018); see also Transcript of Trial, Doc.
130, at 158–60, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida
(Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-00178-JSM-PRL (M.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2018). The jury, of
course, was free to accept or reject such expert opinion.
2019] NATURAL GAS PIPELINE EASEMENTS 185
properties with pipeline easements and non-impact properties with-
out pipeline easements.186
In summary, once the data relied upon by the expert to form his
opinion underwent the opportunity to “kick the tires” and be exam-
ined, it appeared that the appraiser’s conclusion of zero damages
from fear or stigma was simply because he “said so,” or ipse dixit.187
Additionally, once corrected, his more current data showed that the
appraiser’s loss estimate for bifurcation was understated.
By contrast, the owner’s appraiser testified that he considered the
language used by Sabal Trail in its easement that denoted the
easement holder’s dominant rights and the underlying fee owner’s
servient estate.188 In determining severance damages, he further
testified concerning his own paired-sales analysis in which he con-
sidered twenty-two pairs of impact and non-impact properties in
rural Florida counties—including Levy, Lake, and Marion Counties—
all of which had transacted within five years of the 2016 date of
taking. Considering the price differential between impact and non-
impact properties as well as the indication of loss in light of the pro-
perty characteristics derived from those respective pairings, the
owner’s appraiser estimated a 60% damage resulting from fear or
stigma associated with Sabal Trail’s taking of both temporary and
permanent easements running diagonally through the middle of the
Sundermans’ 40-acre tract.189 His total estimate of full compensa-
tion, therefore, was predicated on payment for the temporary ease-
ment at $15,013, the value of the permanent easement at $26.249,
and his 60% severance damage of the remainder property at $273,777,
186. Once corrected, the appraiser’s paired sales of residential five-acre tracts along Faye
Street bordering the Wekiva Basin State Preserve in Orange County showed a diminution in
value about 70% to 80% when the pipeline was placed, more or less, diagonally through the
middle of the impact five-acre tracts. See Transcript of Trial, Doc. 129, at 131–34, 136–43,
Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman
Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-00178-JSM-PRL (M.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2018); see also Transcript of Trial,
Doc. 130, at 162–64, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County,
Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-00178-JSM-PRL (M.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2018).
187. See Transcript of Trial, Doc. 130, at 164–65, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921
Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-00178-JSM-PRL
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2018).
188. See Transcript of Trial, Doc. 129, at 171–76, 213–21 Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC
v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-00178
-JSM-PRL (M.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2018).
189. See Transcript of Trial, Doc. 130, at 35–36, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921
Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-00178-JSM-PRL
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2018).
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for a total compensation of $315,039 (which was reduced to $312,839
after considering Sabal Trail’s project manager’s testimony of the
early release of the temporary easement, following the completion
of Sabal Trail’s construction).190
2. Owner’s Testimony
In addition, the property owner, Jan Sunderman, testified as to
both the before and the after value of the property, quantifying
severance damages based on her knowledge of the property and
personal experience in selling similar tracts over the previous twenty-
five years, from the larger, former citrus property.191 She further
testified to her familiarity with Sabal Trail’s easement holder’s
rights and her own “common sense” understanding of what the mar-
ket perception has been of Sabal Trail’s use, given her own knowl-
edge and experience with potential purchasers of residential, rural
properties over twenty-five years.192 In the before condition, she
considered the value of her property to be equivalent to $18,000 per
upland acre and $1,500 per wetland acre, or approximately
$500,000 if considering its highest-and-best use for three rural,
residential lots. After Sabal Trail’s taking, she considered the value
of her property to be diminished and equivalent to $140,000, with
the two front lots valued at $35,000 each and the remaining rear lot
valued at $70,000. In recognition of such loss, she testified as to the
measure of full compensation being, in her opinion, $360,000.193
3. Jury Verdict
After considering the respective lawyers’ closing arguments and
completing their own deliberations, the jury returned a verdict
specifically finding that Sabal Trail pay $17,800 for the permanent
easement taken, $10,000 for its temporary easement taken, and
$282,000 for severance damages, for a total measure of full compen-
sation of $309,500.194 It was apparent that Sabal Trail’s assertion of
190. See id. at 35–42.
191. See id. at 85–96.
192. See id. at 98–99.
193. See id. at 99–101.
194. See Jury Verdict, Doc. 126, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres of Land in
Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-00178-JSM-PRL (M.D. Fla.
March 1, 2018).
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zero damages from fear or stigma did not motivate the jury to sim-
ply “split the difference,” instead it returned a verdict in favor of the
property owner against the pipeline company.
Most assuredly, the baseline of an eminent domain proceeding is
drawn upon the basic constitutional understanding of the nature
behind the exercise of governmental power and of the need to estab-
lish limits to protect individual liberties; in this case, the civil right
of private ownership. In deciding whether the jury’s verdict in the
case of Sunderman Groves, Inc., was “just” or “fair,” consider how
the debate over the measure of compensation was framed by the
defense counsel in closing arguments for this case:
I asked you in voir dire, you might recall, [have] any of you—any
of you ever thought about property rights? Have you ever thought
about the virtue and value of owning property as a civil right?
Let me suggest to you that this exercise we have been a part of[,]
I hope will bring this home to you.
Private property ownership balances power. How is that? If you
think about our country and what makes it great, many would
point to our system of government when it works. But think
about it, our founding fathers were putting together our nation,
and how were they going to establish balancing power[,] because
that’s what Government has[?] The Government has power and
it’s supposed to be exercising it for the good of those it governs.
We have the Constitution. A social contract. People agree to be
governed, but the Government is limited in its power. That’s our
Bill of Rights. One of the Bill of Rights that we have is the right
to own private property, and when it is acquired for a public
purpose, then compensation needs to be paid. A compensation
that is just under our Federal Constitution and full under our
Florida Constitution.
Let’s think about that. How does it balance power? Our founding
fathers knew that power had to be exercised by people and people
have human nature, and even though they have good intentions
o[f] accomplishing the public good, there needs to be a way to
check and balance power. So, we have three branches of Govern-
ment, Executive, Legislative, Judicial. We are in the Judicial
Branch. Sabal Trail is exercising a government power for the good
of providing power to homes for electricity. They are a for-profit
company that will profit because of their efforts, their invest-
ment. That’s the energy industry. But when people have their
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property taken, the only means by which we can balance the
exercise of the eminent domain power is to have the Judicial
Branch make a decision, and the decision that is in your hands as
a jury working in the Judicial Branch is what is full compensation?
The Judge will be instructing you as to the law. These are not sug-
gestions. These are not guide[line]s. The jury instructions are the
law that you should apply, that you are under duty to apply to
the facts, but the law is good. So, I want to cover a few of the jury
instructions, and then I would like to look at the case through the
lens of the jury instructions that you should be following.
. . . .
Again, your verdict is important because it balances power. Sabal
Trail had the power to take the property. But it is our Constitu-
tion, and it’s the application of the law in making you . . . the
Jury . . . that makes them pay a fair and just price to the
Sunderman[s’]. And the Sunderman[s’], after today, will be the
party that will either find out that your verdict was sufficient or
that it wasn’t.195
4. Eleventh Circuit Appeal
The case of Sunderman Groves, Inc., is not yet completed. Follow-
ing the denial of a Motion for a New Trial196 and a Motion for Re-
hearing or Relief from Judgment,197 Sabal Trail has filed an appeal
to the U.S. Eleventh Circuit.198
Specifically, Sabal Trail appeals the trial court’s rulings regarding
the application of state substantive law rather than federal law to
the measure of compensation and the admissibility of the owner’s
testimony (with respect to the owner’s opinion of value in the “after”
condition and the quantification of severance damages). As of the
195. See Transcript of Trial, Doc. 130, at 136–38, 171, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v.
3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-00178-
JSM-PRL (M.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2018).
196. See Transcripts of Hearing, Doc. 132, 134, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921
Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-00178-JSM-PRL
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2018; Apr. 3, 2018).
197. See Motion for Rehearing or Relief from Final Judgment (Plaintiff), Response to
Motion for Rehearing or Relief from Final Judgment, and Order Denying Motion for Re-
hearing or Relief from Final Judgment, Docs. 144, 152, 154, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC
v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.), No. 5:16-cv-00178-
JSM-PRL (M.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2018; Apr. 15, 2018; May 29, 2018).
198. Sabal Trail v. 3.921 Acres of Land in Lake County, Florida (Sunderman Groves, Inc.),
No. 18-11836-G (11th Cir. 2018).
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writing of this article, briefs are complete, and the parties await oral
argument.
C. Thomas Trust and Ryan Thomas
The two other Sabal Trail cases that proceeded to jury trial in
Florida were tried together the week of November 5, 2018, and are
styled Sabal Trail v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida
(Thomas Trust),199 and Sabal Trail v. 2.468 in Levy County, Florida
(Ryan Thomas).200
Lee Thomas was a pharmacist that always wanted to be a farmer.
His son, Ryan, grew to love farming at a young age but didn’t much
like high school. Lee let Ryan know that, if he finished high school
and then went to college and earned a degree, Lee would buy a
farm. Ryan did just that, graduating with a B.S. degree in food and
resource economics. Lee made good on his promise to Ryan. In 2003,
Lee created a trust that went on to purchase and assemble an 837-
acre farm in Levy County where Ryan could grow watermelons and
peanuts, tend cattle, and board horses. In 2006, Ryan purchased his
own 40-acre tract immediately adjacent to the Thomas Trust farm
where Ryan and his two children live in an updated “Florida cracker”
cabin. Ryan’s home is surrounded by a grove of mature live oaks and
overlooks a twenty-acre pond, a surviving piece of old Florida. Ryan
has worked the Thomas Trust land now for over ten years under the
name RBT Farms. It is a beautiful plot of land, a family farm.
On June 7, 2016, Sabal Trail was given “immediate possession”
to a fifty-foot-wide permanent natural gas pipeline easement with
temporary easements of twenty-five feet on either side to be used for
initial stage construction, running a total length of 5,643 lineal feet
through the middle of the Thomases’ family farm, also known as
RBT Farms. On one end of the farm, the pipeline cut diagonally
through a grove of mature live oaks, causing the removal of twenty-
five oak trees. On the other end of the farm, the pipeline cut diago-
nally through fields. The pipeline is located three hundred feet from
Ryan’s back porch overlooking the pond.
199. No: 1:16-cv-00093-MW-GRJ (N.D. Fla. 2016).
200. No: 1:16-cv-00095-MW-GRJ (N.D. Fla. 2016) (Honorable Paul C. Huck, presiding). The
complete transcript of the trial can be found on the federal ECF as Docs. 202, 203, 204, 205,
206, 207, 208, Transcripts of Trial, Sabal Trail v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida
(Thomas Trust), No: 1:16-cv-00093-MW-GRJ (N.D. Fla. Nov. 5–9, 2019).
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Figure 8. Ryan Thomas—Before Taking
Figure 9. Ryan Thomas—After Taking
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Figure 10. Thomas Trust—Before Taking
Live Oak Trees 1–19
Figure 11. Thomas Trust—Before Taking
Live Oak Trees 21–25
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Figure 12. Thomas Trust (Tenant: RBT Farms)
Temporary and Permanent Easement Takings
Sabal Trail stated that it required its temporary easements for a
period of 3.2 years to construct its pipeline. As it happened, Sabal
Trail constructed its pipeline on RBT Farms in early 2017, right
during the middle of the 2017 watermelon season. In exercising its
rights as an easement holder, Sabal Trail is not required to coordi-
nate with the underlying fee owner regarding either the location of
its pipeline or the time of its construction. RBT Farms had a loss of
production and yield within the fields cut by the pipeline for the
2017 growing season; Ryan had to plant peanuts instead of water-
melons, a less productive crop.
1. Appraisal Testimony
At trial, through its appraiser’s testimony, Sabal Trail contended
that the landowners, Thomas Trust and Ryan Thomas, should receive
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only $34,000 and $5,100, respectively.201 This consisted of payment
only for the property taken in both temporary and permanent ease-
ments with zero damages from fear or stigma. For the Thomas Trust,
Sabal Trail’s appraiser estimated $17,700 for the temporary ease-
ment and $16,300 for the permanent easement. For Ryan Thomas,
Sabal Trail’s appraiser estimated $2,600 for the temporary ease-
ment and $2,500 for the permanent easement.
In light of the extensive motion practice mounted by Sabal Trail
against the owner’s appraiser prior to trial, challenging the “reliabil-
ity” of his expert opinion under the Daubert standard, something
quite remarkable occurred during trial with the testimony of Sabal
Trail’s appraiser. In his paired-sales analysis, although considering
eleven pairs of impact and non-impact properties in Levy County,
Florida, he relied on only two pairs as a predicate for his opinion of
zero damages.202 Sabal Trail’s appraiser had an explanation.203 Al-
though a majority of his eleven pairs showed that the impact prop-
erty sold for less than the non-impact property, he testified that this
singularly reflected that the non-impact properties were “superior,”
in other respects, than the impact properties.204 In other instances,
where the impact properties sold for more than the non-impact
properties, he testified that this singularly reflected that the non-
impact property was “inferior,” in other respects, to the impact
property.205 He testified that the remaining two pairs, consisting of
four properties alone (two impact properties and two non-impact
properties), were “perfect pairs” because the price differential was,
in his opinion, solely reflective of the presence of the pipeline.206
Since these two “perfect pairs” showed no significant loss in value,
he ultimately concluded that there was zero damages to the remain-
ders of both the 837-acre farm and the 40-acre homesite with single-
family residence.207
201. See Transcript of Trial, Doc. 205, at 290–91, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 18.27
Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida (Thomas Trust), No. 1:16-cv-00093-MW-GRJ (M.D. Fla.
Nov. 6, 2018).
202. See id. at 282–88.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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Figure 13. Sabal Trail’s “Paired-Sales Analysis”
On cross-examination, Sabal Trail’s appraiser further explained
that, in his opinion, whether the indications from his pairs were
positive or negative was only a result of the fact that some people do
like pipelines and some people don’t like pipelines, similar to how
some market participants for residential homes respond to swimming
pools.208 In other words, the proposition was that, in accordance with
his study, there may not be a definitive trend toward pipelines being
a positive or a negative influence on value.
Cross-examination also showed that, in a prior instance of eminent
domain where the current Sabal Trail appraiser was then retained
by property owners in a petroleum-gas-pipeline project, regarding the
GATX Central Florida Pipeline, at that time he found substantial
damages relating to fear and stigma.209 Additionally, as part of the
appraisal services rendered for that project, the appraiser admitted
that he traveled the country to study the impacts of properties
proximate to such a pipeline subsequent to the pipeline incidents,
including ruptures in California, Nevada, and Texas.210 In dismissing
the notion that his opinions regarding pipelines were influenced by
whichever party retained his appraisal services, Sabal Trail’s ap-
praiser clarified that he had worked for both condemnors and con-
demnees in eminent domain pipeline takings cases.211 Nevertheless,
208. See Transcript of Trial, Doc. 205, at 501–06, Sabal Trail v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy
County, Florida (Thomas Trust), No: 1:16-cv-00093-MW-GRJ (N.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2018).
209. See Transcript of Trial, Doc. 205, at 320–23 Sabal Trail v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy
County, Florida (Thomas Trust), No: 1:16-cv-00093-MW-GRJ (N.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2018).
210. Id.
211. See Transcript of Trial, Doc. 203, at 297–98, 318–20, Sabal Trail v. 18.27 Acres of Land
in Levy County, Florida (Thomas Trust), No: 1:16-cv-00093-MW-GRJ (N.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 2018).
2019] NATURAL GAS PIPELINE EASEMENTS 195
he admitted that his acceptance of work in this regard was on a
“first-come, first-served basis.”212
Finally, cross-examination also showed that—with regard to the
Sabal Trail Pipeline—although preparing almost 130 appraisals on
an unwritten contract, there were only two instances where Sabal
Trail’s appraiser found severance damages due to the remainder
property because of takings of temporary and permanent easement
for a natural gas pipeline project.213 By considering only two pairs
to support his zero damages opinion, it seemed to underscore an
industry bias. Sabal Trail paid its appraiser $2.4 million for ap-
praisal services, which, in large measure, was only to collect market
data for a paired-sales analysis.214
By contrast, the owners’ appraiser prepared a paired-sales analy-
sis in which he considered fifty-four pairs of similarly situated
impact properties with pipelines and compared them to non-impact
properties without pipelines.215 The appraiser’s testimony included
presented exhibits that consisted of photographs of all of the proper-
ties considered within his paired-sales analysis and respective
qualitative charts to show how he considered each pairing of impact
and non-impact properties.216
In a final reconciliation, the appraiser also presented a chart,
using a technique that appraisers refer to as bracketing, which
showed where he opined the subject property should fall within a
range of damages from each of his pairings.217 Although the range
of indicated damages varied from a 28% to 	92%, the owners’
appraiser testified how he considered the particular property char-
acteristics between pairs, such as (a) highest and best use, (b) size
of property, (c) size of pipeline, and (d) location of the pipeline and
determination of where within the subject property it should fall.218
On the pages that immediately follow, the trial exhibits prepared
by the owner’s appraiser to summarize his conclusion of severance
212. Id.
213. See id. at 326–34.
214. See id. at 337–38.
215. See Transcript of Trial, Doc. 206, at 649–55, Sabal Trail v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy
County, Florida (Thomas Trust), No: 1:16-cv-00093-MW-GRJ (N.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2018).
216. Id.
217. See Transcript of Trial, Doc. 205, at 722–28, Sabal Trail v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy
County, Florida (Thomas Trust), No: 1:16-cv-00093-MW-GRJ (N.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 2018).
218. Id.
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damages for the two subject properties, derived from his paired-
sales analysis, are shown.
Figure 14. Owner’s “Paired-Sales Analysis”
Marion County Pair No. 9: Impact and 
Non-Impacted Properties219
219. The owner’s appraiser presented photographs of all properties considered in his
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Figure 15. Owner’s “Paired-Sales Analysis”
Thomas Trust Bracketing Chart220
“paired-sales analysis” together with qualitative charts to show how he considered each pair-
ing of impact and non-impact properties. From this, he derived from each pairing an in-
dication of percentage difference attributable to the encumbrance of a natural gas pipeline.
220. The owner’s appraiser presented a summary chart, using a bracketing technique, which
showed the range of indications of percent damage from each of his pairs, vertically from greatest
to least. The chart also identified where, according to the appraiser, the subject property should
fall with respect to any percent damage attributable to the encumbrance of a natural gas pipeline.
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As set forth on the previous page, based upon his paired-sales
analysis, the owners’ appraiser testified to an 8% severance damage
applied to the entire remainder property of the 837-acre family farm
owned by the Thomas Trust.
Figure 16. Owner’s “Paired-Sales Analysis”
Ryan Thomas Bracketing Chart
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As set forth on the previous page, based upon his paired-sales
analysis, the owners’ appraiser testified to a 45% severance damage
applied to the entire remainder property of the 40-acre homesite
and single-family residence owned by Ryan Thomas.
Figure 17. Owner’s “Paired-Sales Analysis”
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Because the sizes of the respective properties was given consid-
erable weight in the paired-sales analysis, the owners’ appraiser
prepared the above array of data to reconcile with the subject 837-
acre Thomas Trust property and subject 40-acre Ryan Thomas
property.
In light of the foregoing, for the 837-acre family farm owned by
the Thomas Trust, the owner’s appraiser testified to a value of $23,520
for the temporary easement, $61,836 for the permanent easement,
and an 8% severance damage or $692,211, for a total compensation
of $777,566.221
Additionally, for the 40-acre homesite and single-family residence
owned by Ryan B. Thomas, the owner’s appraiser testified to a value
of $3,140 for the temporary easement, $8,654 for the permanent
easement, and a 45% severance damage or $406,489, for a total
compensation of $418,274.222
2. Owners’ Testimonies
At trial, both Lee and Ryan Thomas also testified as to both the
before and the after value of the property, quantifying severance
damages based on their own knowledge of the property and personal
experience. In some regards, the owners’ testimonies highlighted
certain aspects of their compensation claims more than their own
appraiser. These aspects included the following:
• Specific to the particular facts and circumstance of their
case, in putting to use the acquired temporary and perma-
nent easements, Sabal Trail removed twenty-five mature oak
trees that were part of a grove of trees that the owners paid
a premium price for upon assemblage of the property. After
the taking, the grove of trees reflected a cleared lineal corri-
dor through its center, reducing its aesthetic contribution to
the value of the remainder property.
• Specific to the particular facts and circumstances of their
case, Sabal Trail’s temporary and permanent easements
were located diagonally through fields used for farming row
221. See id. at 734.
222. See id. at 735–36.
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crops, not along the property lines or fenced borders between
fields. This impaired and diminished the utility of the land
for farm use both temporarily and permanently.
• The evidence presented at trial also showed how the owner’s
improvements over the years following their original pur-
chase and assemblage of the 837-acres, in their opinion, made
the property more valuable than considered by either ap-
praiser who testified at trial.
More specifically, Lee Thomas testified, on direct examination, that
he was now seventy-four years old and that his primary profession
was as a pharmacist working in a pharmacy he owned in Williston,
Florida.223 He also testified that, early on, before going to pharmacy
school, he was an appraiser trainee for a Florida bank, which em-
ployed him for four years before pharmacy school to analyze long-
term loans of twenty or thirty years on farm properties.224 While
working as a pharmacist, Lee testified that he had experience buy-
ing and selling farm properties in Levy County (“it seemed like that’s
the only thing to do around Williston was buy real estate”).225
At one point in time, he owned several farm properties of different
sizes: 200 acres, 80 acres, 40 acres, and 340 acres. In the early 2000s,
with land prices rising, Lee testified that he sold the 200 acres and
the 340 acres, the latter of which sold for three million dollars.226 He
further testified that it was from the sale of these two farm proper-
ties that he applied a 1031 Exchange, which led to his initial pur-
chase of farm properties and from which he assembled the subject
property’s 837 acres.227 In buying and selling farm properties, Lee
testified that he would seek farm properties for both their aesthetic
value and for their productivity, with opportunity for improvement
by a farmer with knowledge.228 In light of these factors, he purchased
the individual farm properties, which he assembled into the 837
acres, at different prices.229
223. See id. at 818–21.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See id. at 823–29.
228. See id. at 828–32.
229. Id.
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Lee then testified that the basis for his opinion—that the loss in
value resulting from the taking was 12% and greater than his own
appraiser’s opinion of 8%—was due to the loss of aesthetics and
productivity resulting from the pipeline.230 He also testified that the
reasons for his 12% loss determination included concern over security
on the property, the greater potential for the introduction of disease
in growing crops, the loss of privacy during family gatherings, and the
anticipation of danger; all associated, in his opinion, with a resulting
stigma based upon the encumbrance of a pipeline easement.231 
Figure 18. Thomas Trust Property—After Taking
To further support his quantification of loss, Lee explained how
losing eighteen of the twenty-five mature oak trees on the 837-acre
farm, in particular, diminished the aesthetic value for the portion of
the property with the grove of trees. He also explained how the lo-
cation of the pipeline through the farm fields diminished productivity
230. See id. at 836–38.
231. Id.
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on the remaining portion of the farm. He added that—for the por-
tion of the 837 acres that he purchased with the grove of trees,
which now had Sabal Trail’s pipeline running through it—he paid
a premium price of $20,000 per acre because of its aesthetic value.
Finally, Lee summarized his own opinion of value as to the 837-
acre family farm owned by the Thomas Trust.232 He agreed with his
own appraiser’s opinion on both the value of the temporary ease-
ment at $23,520, and also for the permanent easement at $61,836,
but differed with his appraiser on the percentage of severance dam-
ages.233 Instead of an 8% severance damage of $692,211, Lee testi-
fied to a 12% severance damage of $955,250.234 Thus so, instead of
a total full compensation of $777,566, Lee testified to a total full
compensation of $1,040,606 for the 837-acre farm owned by the
Thomas Trust.235
Turning to Ryan Thomas, he testified, on direct examination, that
he proceeded to attend college because his father made him go to
school rather than continue working on his grandfather’s farm.236
Nonetheless, he graduated from the University of Florida with a BS
degree in food and resource economics, and he currently is desig-
nated as a Certified Crop Advisor (“CCA”) by the American Society
of Agronomy and actively consults on approximately forty thousand
acres of farmland.237 He also testified that he began farming water-
melons by himself in the tenth grade in 1991.238
Based on his familiarity with the property and, perhaps, on a
better memory than his father, Ryan testified about the purchase
and assembly of the farm properties, making up the 837 acres, from
2003 to 2006.239 He also testified in greater detail concerning the
substantial improvements he made to the property, since their pur-
chase, to make it a working farm with cattle, horses, and row crops
such as peanuts and watermelons.240
232. See id. at 837–41.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See id. at 849–50.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See id. at 853–55, 857–60.
240. Id.
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Significantly, Ryan testified that his intended use of the subject
property changed due to the pipeline because of the type and kind
of crop that could be grown in the farm fields where the pipeline tra-
versed diagonally during the initial stage of construction.241 The use
of the easement area by the easement holder is contemplated to be
more intense during the initial construction stage of the pipeline
than the use once the pipeline is in operation underground.242
In Ryan’s opinion, he also agreed with his own appraiser on the
value of the permanent and temporary easements taken from the
837-acre family farm owned by the Thomas Trust but differed with
his own appraiser’s opinion of the 8% damage; testifying that there
was 12% damage to the land value, from $10,000 per acre for the
“before” condition of the lot to $8,800 per acre for the “after” condi-
tion. In support of his having a higher opinion of damage than his
appraiser, Ryan further elaborated that he considered the more
intense use of the lot by Sabal Trail at the initial stage of construc-
tion—particularly because Sabal Trail did not advise property
owners of its schedule for using the easement area—would further
decrease the price that would have been negotiated between a willing
buyer and a willing seller on the date of value, June 7, 2016.243
Additionally, Ryan explained that, in his opinion, the anticipated
crop yield, or productivity, in the area of the temporary and perma-
nent easements was diminished because Sabal Trail’s use of the
property compromised the hardpan—making the water retention
characteristics in the easement areas different from the surrounding
farm field.244 This, too, served as a basis for his opinion of the 12%
damages.245 Of significance, his opinion in regards to damages was
based upon his actual experience with Sabal Trail’s easements dur-
ing the 2017 and 2018 growing seasons.246 The difference in the
coloration of growing crops is clearly seen between the area of the
easements and the area of neighboring farm fields.
241. See id. at 861–65.
242. See id. at 866–67.
243. See id. at 871–72.
244. See id. at 872–75.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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Figure 19. Thomas Trust—After Taking
Finally, Ryan, too, summarized his opinions as to the 837-acre
family farm owned by the Thomas Trust.247 He agreed with his own
appraiser’s opinion on the value of the property taken for the perma-
nent easement at $61,836 and the temporary easement at $23,520,
but differed on the percentage of severance damages.248 Instead of
an 8% severance damage of $692,211, Lee testified to a 12% sever-
ance damage of $955,250. Instead of a total full compensation of
$777,566, Ryan testified to a total full compensation of $1,040,606.249
Ryan additionally testified as to his own 40-acre homesite and
single-family residence. He testified how Sabal Trail, in putting to use
the acquired temporary and permanent easements, removed seven
of the twenty-five mature oak trees that were part of a grove of trees
that framed the entrance to his homestead property. He testified
247. See id. at 878–80.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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how, when he bought his homesite, he cleared a portion of the
property to gain a better view of the neighboring twenty-acre pond
and how he totally remodeled the existing single-family residence,
including the roof, siding, and everything inside and out. He also
testified how Sabal Trail located its natural gas pipeline easement
within three hundred feet of his single-family residence. His con-
cerns over the loss of trees, the loss of privacy, and the loss of con-
trol of the area proximate to his home served as a basis for his
opinion of a 60% damage even though his own appraiser testified to
45% damage.
Figure 20. Ryan Thomas—After Taking
Ryan, then, summarized his opinions as to his 40-acre homesite
and single-family residence.250 He agreed with his own appraiser’s
opinion on the value of the property taken for the permanent ease-
ment at $8,645 and the temporary easement at $2,600, but differed
250. See id. at 880–82.
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on the percentage of severance damages. Instead of a 45% severance
damage of $406,489, Ryan testified to a 60% severance damage of
$541,989.251 Instead of a total full compensation of $418,274, Ryan
testified to a total full compensation of $553,230.252
3. Jury Verdict
After considering the respective lawyers’ closing arguments and
completing their own deliberations, for the 837-acre family farm
owned by the Thomas Trust, the jury responded by rendering an in-
terrogatory verdict of $55,661 for the permanent easement, $23,520
for the temporary easement, and $782,083 for severance damages
to the remainder (reflecting a ±9% damage), for a total full compen-
sation of $861,264.253
Additionally, for the 40-acre homesite and single-family residence
owned by Ryan Thomas, the jury responded by rendering an inter-
rogatory verdict of $8,645 for the permanent easement, $3,140 for
the temporary easement, and $451,656 for severance damages to the
remainder (reflecting a ±50% damage), for $663,439 as the total of
full compensation.254
Once again, considering both jury verdicts, it was apparent that
Sabal Trail’s assertions of zero damages from fear or stigma do not
motivate the jury to simply “split the difference;” instead the juries
returned a verdict in favor of the property owners against the pipe-
line company.
In deciding whether the jury’s verdicts regarding the Thomas Trust
and Ryan Thomas cases are “just” or “fair,” consider how the debate
over the measure of compensation was framed by defense counsel in
closing argument for these cases:
Sabal Trail is using the government’s sovereign power of emi-
nent domain. The king used to say: That’s my property. The Magna
Carta long ago was a property right’s reformation. It was those
that owned property telling the king: You need to respect our
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See Jury Verdict, Doc. 189, Sabal Trail v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida
(Thomas Trust), No: 1:16-cv-00093-MW-GRJ (N.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 2018).
254. See Jury Verdict, Doc. 146, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 2.468 Acres of Land in
Levy County, Florida (Ryan Thomas), No. 1:16-cv-00093-MW-GRJ (N.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 2018).
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property rights. See, it’s a limitation on power. It provides people
the expectation of having a liberty.
And that’s important in these cases, because Sabal Trail does
want you to see the good that they’re doing. They’re bringing a
fuel to the State of Florida, and they’re powering our homes. And
when we turn on the light switch, in part it’s probably power you
get from natural gas. That’s a public good. But you see, it’s the
nature of the Constitution that provides the owner whose prop-
erty is taken for such public good the expectation that they will
receive just, fair, full compensation. The public need is met, but
no one private property owner pays more for the public good
than anyone else because they are made whole by the measure
of compensation that’s paid.
The Thomas family—Ryan Thomas, the Lee Thomas Trust—
they don’t want your sympathy. They just want justice, and that’s
what your job is.
. . . .
Do you see the irony here? Warning, pipeline, Sabal Trail. But
it’s buried, so it doesn’t affect the value because nobody sees it.
If you can’t see it, then i. . . you know, market participants don’t
really discount it. Some pay even more for properties with pipe-
line[s]. They’re like swimming pools. Some people like them;
some people don’t. They’re like electrical power lines, you know,
the little ones. Not the big ones but the little ones, you know.
Nothing to see here. It’s underground.
. . . .
These are instances of eminent domain where severance dam-
ages are created on the remaining property. That’s why we have
this law that the use of the property taken is to be considered by
you. It’s not like we bury it and we don’t think about it. It’s [for]
you [to] consider what the impact is on market participants. Please
understand this. This—this is really important. The Thomases
are not asking for your sympathy. It is emotional, but what the
Thomases deserve, the justice of it, [as] market participants—
yes, farmers are part of the marketplace. Do they pay less for
farmlands when the pipeline crisscrosses their field? Yes, people
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who buy homes, some will buy land and build a house next to a
pipeline, but they pay less for the land and they could pay less
for the house. Don’t abandon your common sense. Sabal Trail
wants to make it [so] no one gets any compensation unless you
have some kind of analysis, some kind of data.
. . . .
And then the buyer that comes to the property is amongst those
in the buying marketplace that’s okay with it. We’ll accept it.
But they’re still . . . looking for a bargain. They’re bargain hunt-
ers more than anything else. But think about this. What about
the people that wouldn’t buy a property with a pipeline in it if
there was another property like it that didn’t have a pipeline in
it? It’s just off the list. I don’t want that. I love the farm, but it’s
got a pipeline in it. Love your house, but I’m not comfortable
living next to a pipeline, not one that big. Are there such people
in the marketplace[,] because it makes common sense? But
here’s what’s amazing: That data set isn’t amongst those people
that buy and sell pipelines. That data set is over here of people
that chose not to buy the pipeline property. Now, let’s look at a
little simple economics. Last time I understood things, supply
[and,] demand. Property in supply, property in demand. Equal
[price]. But if demand drops because something happens to your
property and people don’t like it as much and would actually
choose not to buy it, when you have less demand, less desirabil-
ity, the perception might not be a good thing, the price is going
to be affected somewhat. That’s not sympathy.255
4. Eleventh Circuit Appeal
The Thomas Trust and Ryan Thomas cases are not yet completed.
Following the denial of a Motion for a New Trial in both cases,256
Sabal Trail has filed separate appeals to the U.S. Eleventh Circuit.257
255. See Transcript of Trial, Doc. 208, at 1056–57, 1067–71, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC
v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida (Thomas Trust), No. 1:16-cv-00093-MW -GRJ
(M.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2018).
256. See Order Denying Motion for New Trial, Doc. 224, Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v.
18.27 Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida (Thomas Trust), No. 1:16-cv-00093-MW-GRJ
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2019); Order Denying Motion for New Trial, Doc. 183, Sabal Trail
Transmission, LLC v. 2.468 Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida (Ryan Thomas), No. 1:16-
cv-00093-MW-GRJ (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2019).
257. Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy County, Florida
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Specifically, Sabal Trail appeals the trial court’s rulings of the
application of state substantive law over federal law regarding the
measure of compensation, the admissibility of the owner’s opinion
of value in the “after” condition and the quantification of severance
damages, and the evidentiary rulings of the district court over nu-
merous issues preserved in Sabal Trail’s extensive motion practice.
As of the writing of this article, these cases are yet in their briefing
stage of the appeals.
(Thomas Trust), No. 19-10705 (11th Cir. 2019); Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 2.468 Acres
of Land in Levy County, Florida (Ryan Thomas), No. 19-10722 (11th Cir. 2019).
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATIVELY 
IMPOSED EXACTIONS
JAMES S. BURLING*
Where once government was closely constrained to increase the
freedom of individuals, now property ownership is closely con-
strained to increase the power of government. Where once gov-
ernment was a necessary evil because it protected private property,
now private property is a necessary evil because it funds govern-
ment programs.1
INTRODUCTION
The ownership of property encompasses a variety of rights, in-
cluding the right to possess, occupy, devise, sell, rent, and, most
importantly, the right to use. As John Locke explained, we live in an
organized society in order to better protect our property.2 In order
to effect an ordered and prosperous state of affairs, citizens have
entrusted their government with certain powers. The most relevant
power for the purposes of this Article is the ability of government to
regulate the use of private property in order to protect the larger
community from nuisance-like impacts that would otherwise be
caused by particular uses of property.3 Thus, government can prevent
land uses that would otherwise cause flooding to neighbors, create
noxious odors, or directly injure others. No takings-related just com-
pensation is due in such cases because the rights inherent in the
* Vice President for Legal Affairs, Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, California. An
abbreviated and earlier version of this outline was submitted to the 2019 ALI-ABA Con-
ference on Eminent Domain and Land Valuation Litigation.
1. San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 27 Cal. 4th 643, 692 (2002)
(Brown, J., dissenting).
2. And ‘tis not without reason, that [man] seeks out, and is willing to joyn in
Society with others who are already united, or have a mind to unite for others
who are already united, or have a mind to unite for the mutual Preservation of
their Lives, Liberties and Estates, which I call by the general Name, Property.
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 150 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1988) (1690).
3. This is the principal justification for zoning. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (“A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong
place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.”).
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ownership of property do not include the right to injure neighbors.4
However, the right to restrict nuisances does not give government
carte blanche to define nuisances out of whole cloth: “Any limitation
so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensa-
tion), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that back-
ground principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already
place upon land ownership.”5 Despite these limitations, government’s
power to freely regulate land use to prevent nuisances is broad. And,
indeed, governments have generously interpreted the power to regu-
late land use well beyond the traditional understandings of nuisances.
The demands on modern government are many. They include the
demand of the people that government do far more with the regula-
tion of property than simply prevent nuisances and similar palpable
external harms. Thus, we not only have areal-use restrictions, height
restrictions, and density restrictions, we also have aesthetic-review
boards. We have overlays for various endangered and not so endan-
gered species. We have riparian and other ecological setbacks. And
we have wetlands and sensitive-habitat zones, airport corridor re-
strictions, and a myriad of other land use restrictions maintaining
the status quo. Suffice it to say, many of these land use restrictions
go far beyond the prevention of traditionally understood nuisance-
like impacts that affect neighbors and the community.6
Some of these regulations—when they go “too far,”7 deny all use
or value,8 or fail to meet the Penn Central balancing test9—may give
rise to a compensable taking, especially when they are not grounded
in a meaningful nuisance-preventing rationale.10 But to the extent
4. Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). There are, however, differing opin-
ions on whether such land use restrictions are effective and worth the cost. See, e.g., BERNARD
H. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING (1972).
5. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
6. Euclid, 272 U.S. 365, involved only areal use and size restrictions on buildings.
7. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“[W]hile property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”).
8. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 (“[W]hen the owner of real property has been called upon to
sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his
property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.”).
9. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (“The
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant
considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental action.” (citation omitted)).
10. The legitimacy of the nuisance-preventing rationale must be emphasized. Simply
saying that a land use is a nuisance does not make it so. Otherwise, this would come down to
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that a governmental body can make a plausible case that a land
use–permit denial serves a legitimate nuisance-prevention rationale,
the denial is likely to be upheld by a deferential court against a tak-
ings challenge under the background-principles rationale of Lucas.
Government regulators usually have more options than simply
denying the offending land use. They can, under the right circum-
stances, suggest and approve an alternative land use that can meet
the landowner’s objectives while avoiding negative externalities. Or,
as will be examined in much more detail below, regulators can impose
conditions on the land use, including the condition that the permit-
seeking landowner ameliorate the project’s adverse impacts with an
exaction, such as restoring wetlands, improving traffic infrastruc-
ture, or engaging in habitat restoration.
At the same time that they are regulating to prevent noxious land
uses, democratically elected officials are under pressure to provide
more goods and services to their voters. It is all the better if the
officials can provide these amenities with as few new taxes as feasi-
ble. The public wants better roads, affordable housing for all,11 bigger
parks, and prettier communities. The public wants to live in Eden,
and it wants someone else to pay the rent.
Thus, there is a match made in heaven for an elected official here:
the public’s desire for free amenities married to the government’s
ability to control land use with its concomitant power to demand ex-
actions. Permit-seeking property owners can be forced to pay for
many of the amenities desired by the public. But an elected official’s
heaven can be a landowner’s hell.
Unchecked, excessive regulations can destroy all use and value in
a property. It can result in a regulatory taking. Similarly, unchecked
demands for exactions in place of permit-denying regulations can
lead to violations of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
Thus in the context of land use, the doctrines of regulatory takings
a mere test of whether the legislative body had a “stupid staff” that could not concoct a harm-
preventing rationale for a land use restriction. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1025 n.12. For a contrary
view, see John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings
Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1298 (1996) (contending that in the colonial era “legislation
was a principal source of nuisance law”).
11. This is ironic considering that the regulatory constraints imposed on homebuilding are
a chief cause of the escalation of home prices. For more on inclusionary zoning, see James S.
Burling & Graham Owen, The Implications of Lingle on Inclusionary Zoning and Other
Legislative and Monetary Exactions, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397 (2009).
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and unconstitutional conditions are inextricably intertwined. And
when avoiding a regulatory taking caused by a permit denial, gov-
ernment cannot simply substitute the permit denial with whatever
set of exactions it desires. A town’s land use–permitting department
is not its ATM. There are constraints on the ability of government
to demand exactions in exchange for land use permits.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CONDITIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF LAND USE PERMITTING—FROM
NOLLAN TO KOONTZ
A. The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions
A governmental body may be tempted to demand some action or
something of value in exchange for the receipt of a government benefit.
Often, the demand can be legitimate, as when the benefit carries with
it certain inherent duties and responsibilities. For example, the grant
of an unpatented mining claim carries with it the duties to expend
resources on the development of the claim’s minerals and to prop-
erly register the claim on an annual basis.12 And, of course, any
development of the minerals on the claim must be done in a manner
consistent with applicable environmental laws and regulations.13
But sometimes government demands too much—as when govern-
ment requires the sacrifice of a constitutional right in exchange for
some government benefit or discretionary permit. In one of the ear-
liest cases invoking the doctrine, the Supreme Court held that the
purpose of the doctrine is to enforce a constitutional limit on govern-
ment authority:
[T]he power of the state . . . is not unlimited, and one of the
limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require
relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the state may compel
the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its
favor, it may, in like manner, compel surrender of all. It is incon-
ceivable that guarantees embedded in the Constitution of the
United States may thus be manipulated out of existence.14
12. See Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. § 28 (2019) (specifying a one-hundred-dollar annual
work requirement); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985) (noting an annual registration
requirement).
13. See, e.g., 36 C.F.R. § 228.8 (2019).
14. Frost v. R.R. Comm’n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 593–94 (1926) (The state legislation
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In Perry v. Sindermann, the Court considered whether due pro-
cess protections would attach to the decision not to rehire a junior
college professor who had criticized the school’s administration. The
Court noted,
For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because
of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his ex-
ercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhib-
ited. This would allow the government to “produce a result which
(it) could not command directly.” Such interference with consti-
tutional rights is impermissible.15
Similarly, in F.C.C. v. League of Woman Voters, the government
conditioned the receipt of federal money on an agreement that public
radio station operators forego their First Amendment right to edito-
rialize.16 The government argued that there was “some risk that
these traditionally independent stations might be pressured into
becoming forums devoted solely to programing and views that were
acceptable to the Federal Government.”17 But the Court found that the
danger posed by “the bewitching power of governmental largesse”18
could not justify the ban because the statutory scheme had structural
protections against such co-option.19 Because the danger inherent in
the funding statute was insufficient to justify the ban on first amend-
ment expression, the Court held that the “no-editorializing” condi-
tion was unconstitutional.20
These and other cases fall under the rubric of the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions.21 While the first cases employing the
conditioned the right to use public highways on the dedication of personal property to the
State for public uses.).
15. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (citation omitted).
16. F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 370, 398 (1984).
17. Id. at 386.
18. Id. at 388.
19. Id. at 388–89.
20. The Court rejected the justifications for the prohibition, saying, “The risk that local
editorializing will place all of public broadcasting in jeopardy is not sufficiently pressing to
warrant § 399’s broad suppression of speech.” Id. at 391 (citing 47 U.S.C.A. § 399 (West,
Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-5)).
21. Burling & Owen, supra note 11, at 416 n.86 (collecting cases decided on the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions). But note that whether a case falls within that doctrine can be
debated. See, e.g., League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 408 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]his
case [is] entirely different from the so-called ‘unconstitutional condition’ cases, wherein the
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doctrine as an analytical tool did not involve land use, that changed
in 1987 with Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.22
The regulation of land use is not new.23 As governments developed
land use–permitting regimes, they also understood the advantages
in asking for something in exchange for those permits. Sometimes
such demands were appropriate, other times not. In time, a fairly
robust set of standards developed in the state courts for the imposi-
tion of an exaction that is a condition for the granting of a permit.24
But some agencies were outliers, demanding more than could be
justified even under the generous standards of their jurisdictions.
B. Nollan Applies the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions to
Land Use Permitting
The California Coastal Commission was one such outlier. Patrick
and Marilyn Nollan sought to replace a run-down, one-story bunga-
low with a two-story home along Faria Beach in Ventura County.
The Nollans owned their property to the mean high tide line. For
the Coastal Commission, this was a problem. The agency was on a
mission to provide maximum access to and use of the beaches, and
to do so it wanted a piece of every parcel above the mean high tide
line for a lateral public easement.25 In time, theoretically, there
would be public access easements parallel to every private beach-
front home along the California coast.
To achieve its goal, the Coastal Commission demanded a lateral
easement (land parallel to the coast seaward of their home) consti-
tuting about one-third of the Nollans’ lot in exchange for a permit
to rebuild their home. As the Supreme Court noted, if the Commis-
sion had simply taken the property, it would have had to pay just
compensation.26 If the Commission could have legitimately denied
the permit because of adverse nuisance-like impacts, it would have
Court has stated that the government ‘may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that
infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially his interest in freedom of speech.’”
(quoting Perry, 408 U.S. at 597)).
22. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
23. See Hart, supra note 10, at 1257.
24. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 839–40 (collecting cases).
25. The Commission’s guidelines required an access easement in exchange for develop-
ment permits. Id. at 857–58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 831.
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been the end of the inquiry.27 But the Commission did something else.
It used its power to deny the permit as a means to acquire some of
the Nollans’ property—for free. In effect, the Commission required
the Nollans to buy their permit. The Commission went too far. The
case eventually reached the Supreme Court where a majority de-
scribed the scheme as “an out-and-out plan of extortion.”28 The Court
held that unless the Commission could demonstrate that giving up
the portion of the property had a nexus to and would ameliorate an
impact caused by the permitted activity, the Constitution could not
countenance the exaction.
The Commission tried to justify the exaction with the suggestion
that travelers along Highway 1 looking in the direction of the sea
would see a two-story house where a one-story house once stood.
When neighboring owners similarly built two-story homes, members
of the travelling public would encounter a “psychological barrier” to
realizing the existence of the coast.29 Taking that claim at face value,
the Court could not see the connection between that impact and the
dedication of the land on the seaward side of the Nollans’ home—
land that could not be seen by the travelling public. The exaction
lacked a “nexus” to any impact caused by the development and was
thus unconstitutional.30
C. Dolan Adds a Rough Proportionality Test
The Court in Dolan v. City of Tigard31 amplified the nexus test.
In Dolan, the owner of a hardware store near Fanno Creek in Tigard,
Oregon, sought permission from the City to expand the store and
pave thirty-nine parking spaces. Here, too, the City agreed to give
the permit—but only upon the condition that the owner dedicate a
public easement over her riparian property in the flood-plain and
build a bicycle path. Presumably there was a nexus between these
demands and the adverse impacts caused by the project. Because
the paving of thirty-nine parking spaces would create an imperme-
able surface, it could increase the risk of flooding, thus justifying the
27. This is true “unless the denial would interfere so drastically with the Nollans’ use of
their property as to constitute a taking.” Id. at 836.
28. Id. at 837.
29. Id. at 838.
30. Id.
31. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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public easement on the riparian area. Similarly, a larger store could
create traffic impacts, which could be alleviated with the bike path.
The owner, however, did not agree, not understanding how allowing
the public onto her private property could ameliorate any threat of
flooding. Nor did she think many people would visit the store on
bicycles to buy hardware and plumbing supplies.32 But the City did
have a plan for bicycle paths and a public greenway park along the
creek, so it could not resist the opportunity presented by the permit
request to demand these public goods at no cost to the City.
While an argument could be made that there was at least some
plausible nexus between the project impacts and the demands, the
owner considered the connection too attenuated. And the Supreme
Court agreed, holding that the City has the burden to demonstrate
some level of “rough proportionality” between the project’s impact
and the exaction.33 For example, asking for a bike trail to ameliorate
traffic impacts from a new apartment building might be roughly
proportional if the new apartment dwellers were likely to use the
bike path for transportation, but asking for the same bike trail in
exchange for a plumbing store expansion might not be.
In Dolan, Justice Rehnquist made a passing remark in dicta that
has given rise to attempts to circumvent the holding. In assuring gov-
ernments that the decision would not affect the general, run-of-the-
mill land use regulation, the Court distinguished the Dolan facts:
First, they [acceptable land use regulations] involved essentially
legislative determinations classifying entire areas of the city,
whereas here the city made an adjudicative decision to condition
petitioner’s application for a building permit on an individual
parcel. Second, the conditions imposed were not simply a limita-
tion on the use petitioner might make of her own parcel, but a
requirement that she deed portions of the property to the city.34
32. Justice Scalia did not think so either as he remarked at oral argument, “People are
going to go to the hardware store on their bike? . . . There are a lot of bike paths around
Washington, and I’ve never seen people carrying shopping bags on their bikes.” Transcript of
Oral Argument at *27, Dolan, 512 U.S. 374 (No. 93-518), 1994 WL 664939.
33. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (“We think a term such as ‘rough proportionality’ best encap-
sulates what we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No precise mathematical
calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that
the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
development.”).
34. Id. at 385.
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As will be shown below, this passage has given rise to the argument
that legislatively imposed exactions are not subject to analysis under
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
Another misconception following both Nollan and Dolan was the
idea that only conditions demanding land are subject to the cases’
logic. Under this theory, government demands for land invoke the
doctrine because land cannot be taken without paying just compen-
sation. But the taking of money doesn’t comfortably fit the doctrine
because compensating the taking of money with money seems circu-
lar. However, if a demand for money were not subject to the doctrine,
then it would be relatively easy to circumvent the doctrine’s logic.
For example, what if the California Coastal Commission had not
asked for the easements from the Nollans but instead asked for
enough money to condemn the beach (and paid the Nollans the fair
market value of the easements with using the money it had exacted
from the building permit exchange)? What if the City of Tigard had
demanded that Mrs. Dolan give the City enough money to condemn
the flood-plain easement and build the bicycle path? Would asking
for money instead of interests in land be any different in the consti-
tutional sense?
For some years after Dolan was decided, the lower courts were
mixed on this question. Some courts found that demands for money
were exempt from the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions while
other courts found that any demand for any sort of property, includ-
ing money, was subject to the doctrine.35
D. Koontz Applies the Doctrine to Monetary Exactions
The Court resolved this conflict in 2013 with its decision in Koontz
v. St. Johns River Water Management District.36 This saga began in
1972 when Coy Koontz Sr. applied for a permit to develop a small
shopping center on a portion of a 14.9-acre parcel near the intersec-
tion of two major roadways near Orlando, Florida.37 After obtaining
the requisite local town permits, all Koontz needed was a wetlands
permit from the St. Johns River Water Management District, which
he applied for in 1994. After some negotiations he reached a deal: in
order to develop 3.7 acres, he would dedicate the remaining 11 to open
35. See cases cited in Burling & Owen, supra note 11, at 399 n.7.
36. 570 U.S. 595 (2013).
37. Id. at 599.
220 PROPERTY RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 8:211
space in order to mitigate for some of the wetlands he would touch
with the project. But when it came time to sign the permit documents,
he learned the District wanted more. Apparently, the 11 acres didn’t
satisfy the District’s aspiration of a 1:10 ratio of developed land to
wetlands. To make up for the difference, the District demanded that
Koontz finance the drainage improvement of some district-owned
property over five miles away, at a cost of up to $150,000.38 Koontz
refused, and the permit was denied.
Coy Koontz then sued, arguing that the demand constituted a
taking in violation of Nollan and Dolan. The litigation outlasted Coy
Koontz Sr. His son, Coy Koontz Jr., carried on with the litigation.
After an initial trial court victory, the case eventually wound up at
the Florida Supreme Court where Koontz lost on two theories. First,
the court found that because the permit had been denied, no condi-
tion had actually been imposed. It would be premature and counter-
productive to subject the denial to an analysis under Nollan and
Dolan. Second, because Koontz was objecting to a monetary demand
and not one demanding land, Nollan and Dolan were not apposite.39
The Supreme Court reversed. All members of the Court agreed that
a governmental body cannot avoid scrutiny under Nollan or Dolan
simply through the expedient of denying a permit when the owner
refuses to accede to the demanded exaction. The majority opinion put
it this way: “The principles that undergird our decisions in Nollan
and Dolan do not change depending on whether the government
approves a permit on the condition that the applicant turn over prop-
erty or denies a permit because the applicant refuses to do so.”40
The dissent agreed with this formulation:
I think the Court gets the first question it addresses right. The
Nollan-Dolan standard applies not only when the government
approves a development permit conditioned on the owner’s
38. Id. at 601–02; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *4, Koontz, 570 U.S. 595 (No. 11-1447),
2012 WL 1961402.
39. St. Johns River Water Mgt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1230 (Fla. 2011) (“Accord-
ingly, we hold that under the takings clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions,
the Nollan/Dolan rule with regard to ‘essential nexus’ and ‘rough proportionality’ is applica-
ble only where the condition/exaction sought by the government involves a dedication of or
over the owner’s interest in real property in exchange for permit approval; and only when the
regulatory agency actually issues the permit sought, thereby rendering the owner’s interest
in the real property subject to the dedication imposed.”).
40. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 606.
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conveyance of a property interest (i.e., imposes a condition sub-
sequent), but also when the government denies a permit until
the owner meets the condition (i.e., imposes a condition prece-
dent). That means an owner may challenge the denial of a permit
on the ground that the government’s condition lacks the “nexus”
and “rough proportionality” to the development’s social costs that
Nollan and Dolan require.41
Where the majority and dissent parted ways on this point was
whether there had actually been a permit denial based on the failure
to accede to the conditions, as opposed to a breakdown in negotia-
tions.42 Put another way, the dissent thought that the permit was
denied because of the adverse impacts that could follow the develop-
ment and that any exactions were merely suggestions in negotiations
that broke down—and were not the official reason for the permit de-
nial. Be that as it may, the critical takeaway here is that everyone
on the Court agreed that in the right factual circumstances a demand
for an exaction can lead to a violation of the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions even if the permit applicant is denied a permit.
There was less agreement on the second question—whether a mone-
tary exaction qualified for the Nollan and Dolan treatment. The
majority held that “‘monetary exactions’ must satisfy the nexus and
rough proportionality requirements of Nollan and Dolan.”43 The Court
distinguished cases like Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,44 finding that
in the case of Coy Koontz, the monetary exaction was tied to the use
of a specific parcel of land—his 3.7-acre development proposal.45
Again, the dissent disagreed, arguing that “a requirement that a
person pay money to repair public wetlands is not a taking,”46 in
part because the demand “does not affect a ‘specific and identified
propert[y] or property right[ ]’; it simply ‘imposes an obligation to
41. Id. at 619–20 (Kagan, J., dissenting). The dissent continues to suggest that the proper
remedy for such a permit denial is the invalidation of the condition but not compensation.
42. Id. at 621 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 612.
44. Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998). The Court found that the retroactive
application of a levy on coal companies to pay for black lung disease was unconstitutional.
Four Justices would have found this levy constituted a taking. Justice Kennedy, concurring,
found that it violated due process. Justice Kennedy and the four dissenters agreed that this
levy was not a taking because there was no identifiable property interest tied to the monetary
demand. Id. at 540 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
45. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 613.
46. Id. at 624 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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perform an act’ . . . that costs money.”47 Whatever the import may
be of this semantic disagreement, it is clear from the holding of
Koontz that a monetary exaction, including an exaction that demands
payment to perform some task, is now subject to the constraints of
Nollan and Dolan.
The dissent also suggested that the holding would destroy land
use permitting as we know it or, at least, that the decision would
“threaten[ ] significant practical harm,”48 even threatening the
“flexibility of state and local governments to take the most routine
actions to enhance their communities.”49
Lastly, the Court dismissed the dissenters’ argument that this
holding would open up the floodgates to tax challenges, based on the
theory that taxes are really invalid monetary exactions, finding that
“teasing out the difference between taxes and takings is more diffi-
cult in theory than in practice.”50 Nor, the majority found, would the
“decision . . . work a revolution in land use law by depriving local
governments of the ability to charge reasonable permitting fees.”51
The Koontz decision, along with its siblings Nollan and Dolan,
have evoked marked differences in reactions. Some suggest that it
stands for a simple proposition that should be uncontroversial:
developers can be required to pay the full external costs of their
projects—but no more.52 To property rights advocates, this proposi-
tion seems eminently fair. But others have been nearly apoplectic
in their criticism of Koontz, calling it the “worst” ever Supreme Court
takings decision.53
E. Are the Criticisms of Koontz Justified?
Despite the dissent’s prognostications, Koontz has not augured
the end of land use planning as we know it. This is not surprising.
47. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 626 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 627 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 616 (majority opinion).
51. Id. at 618.
52. See, e.g., Christina M. Martin, Nollan and Dolan and Koontz—Oh My! The Exactions
Trilogy Requires Developers to Cover the Full Social Costs of Their Projects, But No More, 51
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 39 (2014).
53. Not one to mince words, John Echeverria claims, “Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Management District is one of the worst—if not the worst—decision in the pantheon of
Supreme Court takings decisions.” John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings
Decision Ever?, 22 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1 (2014) (footnote omitted).
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Citing United States v. Causby,54 in an earlier takings case, Justice
Ginsburg wrote that “[t]ime and again in Takings Clause cases, the
Court has heard the prophecy that recognizing a just compensation
claim would unduly impede the government’s ability to act in the
public interest. . . . The sky did not fall after Causby, and today’s
modest decision augurs no deluge of takings liability.”55 The same
can be said of Koontz for several reasons.
First, Justice Kagan’s criticism of Koontz in the dissenting opin-
ion belies the Justice’s limited experience with land use permitting.
Permitting agencies and developers are well versed in the give and
take of negotiations over land use planning. It is an intensely dynamic
process with proposals, citizen input, counter-proposals, agreements,
disagreements, and—when all goes well—resolution. That’s not to
say that the process works smoothly or well. Sometimes it doesn’t,
especially in regulation-happy states like California.56 With the pos-
sible exception of communities dominated by a “Not In My Backyard”
attitude, it remains in the interest of both developers and regulators
to work together. Most communities recognize there is a need for new
homes and businesses, and most developers are willing to work with
the community and trade a few extra amenities for permits. It is only
when one side or the other is unreasonable that the process can
break down. But Koontz does little to alter these dynamics. More
significantly, in the postrecession, post–Koontz years, there has not
been an explosion of unfettered and unregulated development. It
just hasn’t happened.
Second, how could Koontz, as a practical matter, make life that
much tougher for permitting agencies? Before Nollan was decided,
many jurisdictions already required some justification when demand-
ing exactions from landowners.57 Nollan didn’t change the calculus
of land use permitting; neither did Dolan. Indeed, before Dolan was
decided, a number of states required some show of reasonableness
54. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 275 (1946).
55. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 36–37 (2012).
56. RICHARD F. BABCOCK & CHARLES L. SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED 293 n.4
(1985) (“California has always been notorious for being the first jurisdiction to sustain ex-
treme municipal regulations. Practitioners in other states have joked about why a developer
would sue a California community when it would cost a lot less and save much time if he
simply slit his throat.”).
57. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 839–40 (1987) (listing several string
citations to state court decisions that do not treat permit conditions as mere exercises of land
use power).
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in assessing permit conditions. Nor will Koontz change the calculus.
Prior to the decision in Koontz, several states required the same sort
of nexus justification for cash exactions.58 Surprisingly, California
has required a showing of a nexus and rough proportionality for
monetary exactions since 1994,59 but no one has ever seriously com-
plained that developers have free reign to trample on the public in-
terest in California. Now the long-standing rules of these states apply
in all jurisdictions.
Third, it’s hard to imagine how any of these decisions could con-
ceivably tie the hands of regulators trying to act in the public inter-
est. These decisions simply require the regulators to demonstrate
that the required exaction, whether it be land or money, is roughly
proportional to a harm caused by the proposed development—a harm
that could otherwise justify denying the project. But shouldn’t regu-
lators do that as a matter of course? Regulators do not, in theory,
write down a list of community wants on slips of paper, put them
into a hat, and pull one or more out whenever a developer walks in
the door seeking a permit. Rather the regulator must have some
conception that the exaction will relate in some way to the develop-
ment. So why not prove the relationship is real? Consultants abound
who can and do perform such studies. Coy Koontz agreed to give up
eleven acres because his development had some plausible connec-
tion to the wetlands affected by the actual development. However,
he surely considered the $150,000 in additional costs to fix a distant
district property to be from the “pulled out of the hat” variety of
exactions. So why not require the St. Johns River Water Management
District to show nexus and rough proportionality? It was Koontz’s
money, after all, that the District was demanding.
Perhaps some of the criticism is based on the idea that the de-
mand of money in Koontz was inchoate—that it was only a sugges-
tion.60 There was, so the argument goes, no final take-it-or-leave-it
offer. Instead of saying no to a $150,000 demand (or “suggestion”),
maybe Koontz should have countered with one for only one hundred
thousand dollars. Or maybe he should have agreed to paint the
58. See also Burling & Owen, supra note 11, at 429 (including a survey of state decisions
on this matter).
59. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 12 Cal. 4th 854, 881–85 (1996) (applying Nollan and
Dolan to monetary exactions).
60. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 570 U.S. 595, 621 (2013)
(Kagan, J., dissenting).
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District’s headquarters. But that’s beside the point. As far as the
majority was concerned, the permit was denied because Koontz re-
fused to pony up the amount demanded by the District. To the Court,
Koontz had a take-it-or-leave-it offer before him, and he left it. Future
cases will have to resolve the question of whether a particular ex-
action is too indefinite to be considered a reason for a permit denial
or if it is the clear reason for the denial. In the case of Koontz, the
Court thought it was the latter.
This won’t have any real world, practical impact on the ability of
government agencies to negotiate over permits—so long as agencies
make plain the distinction between negotiating positions and final
demands. But what is different is that the agencies inclined to demand
money in lieu of land, or the regulators that give the permittee the
choice of paying with land or money, must now justify what is being
demanded after all the give and take of negotiations are completed.
This doesn’t prevent developers and permitting agencies from en-
tering into voluntary development agreements—even when the devel-
oper agrees to give up more than could be constitutionally justified.
Indeed, ever since Nollan, developers have often acceded to requests
for greater exactions than could be justified under the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions, from a sense of civic duty, a desire to
grease the permitting process, or a combination of both.61 This will
not change.
Some have argued that Koontz could have avoided the permit
demand if he agreed to a much smaller project (but that was still
large enough to avoid a clear taking). This misses the point. The
project he sought a permit for was the project that led to the de-
mand for cash. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions doesn’t
require permit applicants to seek lesser permits. When that doctrine
is applied in other constitutional contexts, there is no demand that
the permittee attempt to get other permits until the unconstitutional
condition is reduced. For example, if a person seeking a parade per-
mit is told she can only get the permit if the marchers agree not to
carry signs criticizing a war, there is a clear violation of the doctrine
61. See David L. Callies & Julie A. Tappendorf, Unconstitutional Land Development Condi-
tions and the Development Agreement Solution: Bargaining for Public Facilities After Nollan and
Dolan, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663 (2001); Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & Scott A. Edelstein, Develop-
ment Agreement Practice in California and Other States, 22 STETSON L. REV. 761 (1993); John
J. Delaney, Development Agreements: The Road from Prohibition to “Let’s Make a Deal!”, 25
URB. LAW. 49 (1993).
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of unconstitutional conditions. The permit seeker need not go back
and negotiate for another permit for a shorter parade, fewer marches,
or perhaps one with smaller signs. Coy Koontz had every right to
challenge the demand that was required for the development permit
he wanted.
One scholar proposes that until an exaction is imposed, it should
not be subject to review under the doctrine of unconstitutional con-
ditions.62 This is unmoored from the actual doctrine of unconstitu-
tional exactions. If, for example, an unlawful condition is demanded
for a parade permit, no one could seriously suggest that the condi-
tion must be complied with before a challenge could be brought. Nor
is the suggestion practical: if landowners were forced to first convey
property (land, money, or whatever) to receive their permit, the ability
to sue to recover that property later would entail unnecessary com-
plications and potentially lead to greater injustice. Some states, like
California, hold that a permittee who pays the exaction and proceeds
with the permit is barred from challenging the condition.63 Better is
the formula that is employed by statutory procedures such as Califor-
nia’s Mitigation Fee Act wherein landowners can receive a permit and
pay the freight under protest while pursuing judicial remedies.64 But
even where that procedure is available, it is quite possible that the
developer cannot afford an exorbitant permit condition—to pay it
and hope that a challenge may succeed before facing bankruptcy.
II. CAN THE DOCTRINE BE AVOIDED THROUGH LEGISLATIVELY
IMPOSED CONDITIONS?
One issue looms large over the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions in the context of land use exactions: what if a condition is im-
posed by a legislative body rather than through the ad hoc permitting
process? The dissent in Koontz raised this as a possible way out of
the Koontz requirement,65 and some jurisdictions have adopted this
distinction.66
62. Timothy M. Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 277 (2011).
63. Pfeiffer v. City of La Mesa, 69 Cal. App. 3d 74 (1977).
64. CAL. GOVERNMENT CODE § 66020, et seq. (West 2019). This applies, however, only to
conditions imposed by local governments in California not the State or state agencies.
65. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 628 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
66. See Burling & Owen, supra note 11, at 429–38 (listing states that have adopted this
formulation).
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This is a curious notion. In other contexts of the doctrine’s appli-
cation, it matters not whether a condition is imposed by a bureaucrat
or a legislature. Indeed, even in land use cases, the Supreme Court
has struck down exactions that were merely the applications of legis-
lative schemes—in Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz. Yet the myth of a
legislative exception persists. The basis of this misunderstanding is
often traced to dicta in Dolan, where Chief Justice Rehnquist noted
that area-wide zoning regulations would not be subject to the rough
proportionality requirement.67
Traditionally, when courts, including the Supreme Court, have
considered the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, it matters
little how the condition was imposed—whether by a bureaucrat, an
elected official, or a legislative body, courts have routinely stricken
conditions that force people to give up a constitutional right in order
to obtain a government permit or benefit.
Nor is there a good reason to treat legislatively imposed exactions
with more leniency than ones imposed administratively. As Justice
Thomas put it, “A city council can take property just as well as a
planning commission can.”68 What matters is the exercise of govern-
ment power, not the source of that power. To a landowner being
forced to exchange a right for a permit, it doesn’t matter who wields
67. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (Zoning cases “involved essentially
legislative determinations classifying entire areas of the city, whereas here the city made an
adjudicative decision to condition petitioner’s application for a building permit on an individual
parcel. Second, the conditions imposed were not simply a limitation on the use petitioner might
make of her own parcel, but a requirement that she deed portions of the property to the city.”).
68. Parking Ass’n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1116 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari, joined by O’Connor, J.) See also Amoco Oil Co. v. Vill. of
Schaumburg, 277 Ill. App. 3d 926, 942, 661 N.E.2d 380, 390 (1995) (“Certainly, a municipality
should not be able to insulate itself from a takings challenge merely by utilizing a different
bureaucratic vehicle when expropriating its citizen’s property.”); J. David Breemer, The
Evolution of the “Essential Nexus”: How State and Federal Courts Have Applied Nollan and
Dolan and Where They Should Go from Here, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 373, 401–07 (2002)
(arguing against the legislative-adjudicative distinction); Brian T. Hodges, Are Critical Area
Buffers Unconstitutional? Demystifying the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 8 SEATTLE
J. ENVTL. L. 1, 26 (2018) (arguing that “there is simply no basis in the U.S. Supreme Court’s
unconstitutional conditions case law to conclude that conditions imposed pursuant to an act
of generally applicable legislation are exempt from the nexus and proportionality require-
ments”). But see Glen Hansen, Let’s Be Reasonable: Why Neither Nollan/Dolan Nor Penn
Central Should Govern Generally-Applied Legislative Exactions After Koontz, 34 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 237, 242 (2017) (arguing that “the Nollan/Dolan test should not apply to legislatively
imposed exactions, provided that such exactions satisfy two key criteria: (1) the exaction is
generally-applied; and (2) the exaction is applied based on a set legislative formula without
any meaningful administrative discretion in that application”).
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the enforcement power. What matters is that power is being wielded
to take a constitutionally protected right.69
Given this doctrinal background, many legal scholars find “little
doctrinal basis beyond blind deference to legislative decisions to limit
[the] application of [Nollan or Dolan] only to administrative or quasi-
judicial acts of government regulators.”70
In fact, in the context of land use exactions, a number of lower
courts have held that the intermediate scrutiny of Nollan, Dolan, and
Koontz applies, although some have not.71 Because of a split among
the lower courts, and indeed the split within the courts in California
and Maryland, there is a significant chance that the Court will review
the issue of legislatively imposed exactions.
There have been several recent petitions for writ of certiorari to
the Supreme Court asking it to resolve this question. So far, these
have been unsuccessful.
A. Post–Koontz Exaction Challenges
1. Development Impact Fees in Dabbs v. Anne Arundel County
A recently denied petition came out of the case Dabbs v. Anne
Arundel County.72 In Dabbs, the Anne Arundel County Commission
69. Not all agree. Professor Hansen argues, for example, that the “Nollan/Dolan test
should not apply to legislatively imposed exactions, provided that such exactions satisfy two
key criteria: (1) the exaction is generally applied; and (2) the exaction is applied based on a
set legislative formula without any meaningful administrative discretion in that application.”
Glen Hansen, Let’s Be Reasonable: Why Neither Nollan/Dolan nor Penn Central Should Govern
Generally-Applied Legislative Exactions After Koontz, 34 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 242 (2017).
70. David L. Callies, Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court: How Perspectives on
Property Rights Have Changed from Penn Central to Dolan, and What State and Federal
Courts Are Doing About It, 28 STETSON L. REV. 523, 567–68 (1999). See also Steven A. Haskins,
Closing the Dolan Deal—Bridging the Legislative/Adjudicative Divide, 38 URB. LAW. 487, 514
(2006) (describing the difficulty in drawing a line between legislative and administrative
decision-making in the land use context).
71. As noted in the Dabbs v. Anne Arundel Cty. petition for certiorari,
The Texas, Ohio, Maine, Illinois, New York, and Washington Supreme Courts
and the First Circuit Court of Appeals do not distinguish between legislatively
and administratively imposed exactions, and apply the nexus and proportion-
ality tests to generally applicable permit conditions.
On the other hand, the Supreme Courts of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California,
and Colorado, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, limit Nollan and Dolan
to administratively imposed conditions.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *31, Dabbs v. Anne Arundel Cty., 139 S. Ct. 230 (2018) (No.
18-54), 2018 WL 3377056 (citations omitted).
72. Dabbs v. Anne Arundel County, 182 A.3d 798 (Md. 2018).
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imposed a development-permitting scheme wherein all development
permits were subject to a predetermined impact fee, untethered to
analysis of any actual impacts. As stated in the petition:
Dr. Dabbs was required to pay a large “development impact fee”
to the County as a condition of receiving a permit to build a new
single-family home. Despite the County’s claim that the fees are
necessary to mitigate for the impacts that a new home may have
on school, transportation, and public safety infrastructure, the
County never explained how it calculated his or any of his neigh-
bors’ impact fees. Thus, after years of community frustration
that the money was exacted without a sufficient nexus or propor-
tionality to its alleged purpose, Dr. Dabbs agreed to act as a class
representative in a lawsuit seeking an explanation for the fees
and/or a refund of fees.
. . . .
. . . The amount of the fee is determined at the time a property
owner applies for a development permit based on a legislatively
determined fee schedule. The ordinance requires that landown-
ers pay all impact fees in full as a condition on the issuance of an
approved building permit. Alternatively, the property owner
may satisfy the condition by dedicating land or buildings to the
County in lieu of the fee.
The stated purpose of the impact fee ordinance is to ensure that
project proponents “pay [their] proportionate fair share of the
costs for land, capital facilities, and other expenses necessary to
accommodate development impacts on public schools, transpor-
tation, and public safety facilities.” Despite this nod toward the
nexus and proportionality requirements of Nollan and Dolan,
the ordinance does not require the County to make any project-
specific determination regarding actual impacts. Instead, “[t]he
legislatively imposed development impact fee is predetermined,
based on a specific monetary schedule, and applies to any person
wishing to develop property in the district.”73
Dr. Dabbs challenged the impact fees, alleging that their blanket
imposition, without an individualized analysis of the actual impacts
73. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *4–5, Dabbs v. Anne Arundel Cty., 139 S. Ct. 230
(2018) (No. 18-54), 2018 WL 3377056 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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caused by a particular development, violated the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. The Maryland Court of Appeals disagreed, cre-
ating a per se rule that legislatively imposed fees are exempt from
the intermediate scrutiny established in Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz.
The question presented thus was: “Whether legislatively proscribed
monetary conditions exactions on land use development are subject
to scrutiny under the unconstitutional doctrine as set out in Koontz
v. St. Johns River Water Management District; Dolan v. City of Tigard;
and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.”74
The Supreme Court denied the petition of certiorari, as it did the
petitions in the affordable housing–mandate cases, discussed next.
That’s not an affirmation of these decisions by the Court.75 It only
means that property advocates will have to wait another day to bring
the issue of legislatively imposed conditions to the Court’s attention.
2. Traffic Impact Fees and American Furniture Warehouse Co.
v. Town of Gilbert76
In American Furniture Warehouse, a developer challenged a traf-
fic impact fee as an unconstitutional taking. As the Arizona Court
of Appeals saw it, “The issue, then, is whether a challenge to the
application of a generally applicable, legislatively imposed fee is a
challenge to an adjudicative act for purposes of [American Furniture
Warehouse’s] claim that the fee imposed was an unconstitutional
taking.”77 The court found the fee was legislative and as such not
subject to the Nollan/Dolan analyses. Moreover, it expressly found
that “[w]hat Koontz did not do was replace, negate or (given the
facts) even address Dolan’s legislative/adjudicative dichotomy . . . .
As a result, Koontz did not hold that Dolan applied to generally
applicable legislative development fees like those imposed in the traf-
fic signal [System Development Fee].”78
74. Id. at *I (citations omitted).
75. The denial of certiorari in a particular case does not imply anything about the merits
of the case. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
respecting denial of certiorari) (“[D]enial carries with it no implication whatever regarding
the Court’s views on the merits of a case . . . .”). See also Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 226
(1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[D]enial means that this Court has refused to take the
case. It means nothing else.”).
76. 425 P.3d 1099 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018).
77. Id. at 1103.
78. Id. at 1106.
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Of course, Koontz was silent on whether such a distinction re-
mains the law because that issue was not before it; but it was not an
affirmation of the distinction. Indeed, in other contexts where the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has been applied, the Court
has routinely struck down legislatively imposed conditions.79
Nevertheless, the Arizona court aligns itself with those holding
that legislatively imposed exactions are immune from scrutiny under
Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz.80
B. Affordable Housing Mandate Cases
Other recent examples of petition for writ of certiorari denials have
arisen in California out of affordable housing mandates. In those
cases, developers of market-rate housing have been forced to build
and sell housing units at subsidized prices for qualifying lower-income
buyers.81 When challenged under a doctrine-of-unconstitutional-
conditions claim, the California courts have held that because the
exactions were imposed via a legislative act or formula, they are
merely land use or zoning regulations, not subject to Nollan, Dolan, or
Koontz. So far, the Court has declined to accept such cases for review.82
Affordable housing mandates, also called “inclusionary zoning,”83
is the practice where local communities conscript developers to build
or pay for “affordable” housing units in exchange for permits to
build market-rate housing.84 While the ordinances vary from com-
munity to community, they all have some common elements:
79. See Burling & Owen, supra note 11.
80. For more context on the arguments before the Arizona court, see Brief for Pacific Legal
Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, American Furniture Warehouse v. Town
of Gilbert, 425 P.3d 1009 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018) (No. 1 CA-CV 16-0773), 2017 WL 4867274,
available at https://pacificlegal.org/AmericanFurniture.
81. For an extended discussion of legislative exactions and affordable housing mandates,
see Burling & Owen, supra note 11.
82. See, e.g., 616 Croft Ave., LLC v. City of West Hollywood, 3 Cal. App. 5th 621 (2016),
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017); California Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 61 Cal.
4th 435 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016).
83. Calling these programs “inclusionary zoning” presupposes that they are zoning measures
in the first place—a key assumption that goes to the heart of their legitimacy. For that reason,
I will call them by the less conclusory term “affordable housing mandates” in this Paper.
84. “Affordable housing mandate” is a preferable term to the more common “inclusionary
zoning” term because California cities use the tactic of calling this practice “inclusionary zoning”
in order to escape the holdings of Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz.
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a. The affordable housing requirements go into effect once a
certain threshold is met—usually when a developer seeks to
build at least ten to fifteen units of market-rate housing.85
b. Sometimes, however, an affordable housing fee is imposed on
every land use permit—from large subdivisions to single-
parcel-lot splits.86
c. The builder may be required to build an “affordable” unit that
roughly matches the size of the neighboring market-rate units
d. The affordable units must usually be placed within the same
development as market-rate units, although ordinances can
have options for placement elsewhere.
e. Alternatively, a builder may have the option of paying an in-
lieu fee, with the fee set by a formula.
f. The units must be sold to buyers who meet certain income
criteria, often hovering around of fifty to seventy percent of
the area’s average income.
g. The units must be sold at a price that the lower-income
resident can afford—based on a formula where mortgage
payments will amount to roughly one-third of the typical
lower-income resident’s take-home pay.
h. The units must have deed restrictions attached—so the
lower-income buyer can sell only to other lower-income buy-
ers at a controlled price. Excess profits (fair market value
over a controlled sales price) cannot be recognized by lower-
income owners.
1. California Building Industry Association v. City of San Jose87
In this case from California, the City of San Jose required and still
requires developers of fifteen or more residential units to set aside
ten percent of their units for sale to lower-income buyers, with a
price based on the buyer’s ability to afford mortgage payments,
calculated on a percentage of their income. Alternatively, developers
85. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass’n of N. Cal. v. City of Napa, 90 Cal. App. 4th 188 (2001)
(describing the ten unit threshold).
86. See, e.g., Cherk v. Cty. of Marin, No. A153579, 2018 WL 6583442, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
Dec. 14, 2018) (review denied Mar. 13, 2019) (describing the $39,960 that was demanded in
exchange for dividing a single parcel into two lots). A petition for writ of certiorari was dock-
eted on June 13, 2019 (Case No. 18-1538).
87. 61 Cal. 4th 435, 351 P.3d 974 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016).
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may pay several hundred thousand dollars per unit into a low-income-
housing fund. The City has not tried to justify these conditions with
any showing that the development of market-rate housing causes
any need for more affordable housing (although other cities have
attempted to make such a showing with nexus studies).88
Instead, the City argues that the exactions are simply zoning man-
dates and, as legislative actions, not subject to Nollan, Dolan, or
Koontz. Such affordable housing mandates have been criticized in
the past89 and upheld by a California court of appeal.90 In California
Building Industry Association v. City of San Jose, the California
Building Industry Association (“CBIA”) decided to take another run
at the problem, alleging that the conditions violated the California
Constitution’s analogous law on regulatory exactions.91 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court upheld the ordinance that required developers
to build affordable housing units.
The court found that the Nollan, Dolan and Koontz standards for
unconstitutional conditions did not apply
because there is no exaction—the ordinance does not require a
developer to give up a property interest for which the govern-
ment would have been required to pay just compensation under
the takings clause outside of the permit process. This condition
does not require the developer to dedicate any portion of its prop-
erty to the public or to pay any money to the public. Instead, like
many other land use regulations, this condition simply places a
restriction on the way the developer may use its property by
limiting the price for which the developer may offer some of its
units for sale.92
88. See, e.g., Barbara Ehrlich Kautz, In Defense of Inclusionary Zoning: Successfully
Creating Affordable Housing, 36 U.S.F. L. Rev. 971, 1020 (discussing the nexus study in Santa
Monica). For a contrary view, see Benjamin Powell, “The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning
Reclaimed”: How Effective are Price Controls?, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 471, 474 (2005).
89. See Burling & Owen, supra note 11.
90. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass’n of N. Cal. v. City of Napa, 90 Cal. App. 4th 188 (2001)
(upheld as unripe challenge).
91. California Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 61 Cal. 4th at 442–43, 351 P.3d at 978. For strategic
reasons, CBIA at first eschewed any federal constitutional arguments, only bringing them in
on the appeal, and after Koontz was decided and new counsel joined the case. The absence of
federal claims at the outset may have been a factor in the ultimate denial of the petition for
writ of certiorari (Although the California Supreme Court interpreted federal law in reaching
its decision, making the case a possible, albeit imperfect, vehicle for Supreme Court review.
California Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 61 Cal. 4th 435, P.3d 974, cert. denied, 136
S. Ct. 928 (2016)).
92. California Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 61 Cal. 4th at 461, 351 P.3d at 991.
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The court surmised that the program did not impose an exaction
but was simply a type of zoning ordinance with price controls and
that municipalities have “broad discretion to regulate the use of real
property to serve the legitimate interests of the general public and
the community at large.”93
But demanding money or forcing the sale of some units at below-
market prices is not the mere “regul[ation of] the use of real prop-
erty.”94 Just saying this is not an exaction, doesn’t make it “not an
exaction.” Owners are forced to give up money or the right to sell
homes at full price in order to get a permit. To the extent that Dolan
carved out a “legislative zoning” exception to the rule against unjus-
tified exactions, that rule doesn’t apply in this case. When the
Supreme Court referred to “essentially legislative determinations
classifying entire areas of the city” in Dolan,95 it was referring to
regulations such as zoning, height restrictions, and the like. The
Court was certainly not contemplating the forced construction or
creative financing of low-income housing, even if those exactions
were imposed via ordinance rather than the planning department’s
permitting desk.
Moreover, this rationale misunderstands the logic of Nollan, Dolan,
and Koontz. Nollan involved a California Coastal Commission policy
wherein the right to build a home was conditioned on allowing the
public to access a portion of the Nollans’ property. Dolan addressed
the City of Tigard’s policy to condition development on public access
and dedication conditions. Koontz challenged the water district’s
policy of not allowing development unless an owner agreed to give
up a combination of land and cash equivalent (in this case, the cash
to fix a district property). And in California Building Industry Asso-
ciation, the City of San Jose has a policy allowing development only
if a developer allows some units to be occupied by the public at a
reduced price or the owner pays a cash equivalent. The distinction
between forcing Coy Koontz to spend money to fix district property
and forcing San Jose developers to spend money to subsidize lower-
income housing is elusive at best. What matters is that the property
owner is being forced to sacrifice property in exchange for a permit
to develop. It does not matter if the means to accomplish the forced
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994).
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sacrifice is through a zoning bureaucrat following local law or a city
council enacting local law. The rights are violated just the same.96
While concurring with the denial of certiorari in this case because
of questions concerning the case’s procedural history, Justice
Thomas noted that the treatment of legislatively imposed exactions
remains unresolved:
For at least two decades, however, lower courts have divided over
whether the Nollan/Dolan test applies in cases where the al-
leged taking arises from a legislatively imposed condition rather
than an administrative one. That division shows no signs of abat-
ing. The decision below, for example, reiterated the California
Supreme Court’s position that a legislative land-use measure is
not a taking and survives a constitutional challenge so long as the
measure bears “a reasonable relationship to the public welfare.”
I continue to doubt that “the existence of a taking should turn on
the type of governmental entity responsible for the taking.”97
2. 616 Croft Ave., LLC v. City of West Hollywood98
In this case, husband-and-wife entrepreneurs, Shelah and Jonathan
Lehrer-Graiwer, purchased two adjacent homes in West Hollywood in
the early 2000s with a plan of building an eleven-unit condominium
complex on the lots. The City of West Hollywood praised the “superior
architectural design” of the project, and noted that it would provide
“11 families with a high quality living environment” while “helping
the City achieve its share of the regional housing need.”99
Then the City demanded a $540,000 fee—to be used for “afford-
able housing.”100
To avoid losing their permits, the Lehrer-Graiwers paid the fee
under protest and sued the City, claiming that the fees were a
96. This is essentially what Justices Thomas and O’Connor said in dissenting from the denial
of certiorari in Parking Ass’n of Georgia v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116 (1995). “The distinc-
tion between sweeping legislative takings and particularized administrative takings appears
to be a distinction without a constitutional difference.” Id. at 1118 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
97. California Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928, 928 (2016) (Thomas,
J., concurring in denial of writ of certiorari) (citations omitted).
98. 3 Cal. App. 5th 621 (2016).
99. City of West Hollywood Resolution No. 05-3268, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 616
Croft Ave., LLC v. City of West Hollywood, No. 16-1137, 2017 WL 1090008, at 4 (U.S.).
100. Id.
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violation of their property rights. Ultimately the Lehrer-Graiwers
lost their case in the California courts, which relied on California
Building Industry Association v. City of San Jose and stated, among
other reasons, that exactions imposed through legislation are not
subject to the tests of Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz.
The California court of appeal ruled against the Lehrer-Graiwers,
finding:
[A]s in San Jose, the purpose of the in-lieu housing fee here is not
to defray the cost of increased demand on public services result-
ing from Croft’s specific development project, but rather to combat
the overall lack of affordable housing. This type of fee is not “for
the purpose of mitigating the adverse impact of new develop-
ment but rather to enhance the public welfare by promoting the
use of available land for the development of housing that would
be available to low- and moderate-income households.”101
In other words, because the court was able to transform the ex-
actions into mere land use regulations, there was absolutely no reason
to require the City to show any kind of relationship between the
construction of new units and the need for more affordable housing.
Not surprisingly, the California Supreme Court denied review.
Despite the U.S. Supreme Court asking the City to file a response
to the petition and holding onto the case after the first conference,
the Court ultimately denied certiorari.102
Property rights advocates continue to hope that the Court will
someday take such a case. Exactions and other impact fees have a
severe negative impact on housing affordability.103 Adding more fees
and costs won’t make homes any cheaper. The law of supply and
demand has not been repealed. Without the constraints of the doc-
trine of unconstitutional conditions, such exactions will only in-
crease because there is simply no additional source of new money
available to cash-strapped governments, other than politically un-
palatable taxes.
101. Id. at 629 (citations omitted).
102. 616 Croft Ave., LLC v. City of W. Hollywood, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017), cert. denied.
103. Vicki Been, Impact Fees and Housing Affordability, 8 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES.
139 (2005), https://www.huduser.gov/periodicals/cityscpe/vol8num1/ch4.pdf.
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III. WHAT ABOUT TAXES?
One of the criticisms of Koontz in both the dissent and academia
is that it could threaten the ability of governments to collect prop-
erty taxes because taxpayers would claim that taxes were, in fact,
monetary exactions.104 As such, a taxpayer could subject his or her
property tax to an intermediate scrutiny test, requiring the govern-
ment to justify the impositions with a showing of adverse impacts
caused by the ownership or use of the property. That presumably
would unduly constrain the ability of government to collect taxes.
The Koontz Court pretty quickly dismissed the dissent’s criticism,
noting first that “property the government could constitutionally
demand through its taxing power can also be taken by eminent do-
main.”105 Second, it just isn’t that difficult to distinguish an exaction
imposed on the use of property from a tax, stating that “teasing out
the difference between taxes and takings is more difficult in theory
than in practice.”106 Indeed, since Koontz was decided there has not
been a significant number of cases arguing that taxes are unlawful
exactions.
But Justice Kagan and Professor Echeverria suggest that the ability
to make an easy distinction breaks down when it comes to legisla-
tively imposed exactions that are assessed according to a formula.107
The critics, however, are not suggesting that ordinary property
taxes might be mistaken for unlawful exactions, and a property
owner’s attempt to recast a property tax as an exaction would not be
fruitful. There is a long and storied tradition of imposing property
taxes. They are broadly applicable to all properties within a district
and usually determined equally across the board, according to location
and use. While they may not always be popular, they are ordinary
and accepted. And they are far cry from the type of exactions im-
posed in cases like Dabbs or with the affordable housing mandates.
What makes these monetary exactions in cases like Koontz, Dabbs,
or the affordable housing–mandate cases controversial and subject
104. See, e.g., Koontz v. St. John’s River Water Mgt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 627 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he majority’s distinction between monetary ‘exactions’ and taxes is so hard
to apply.”); Echeverria, supra note 53, at 47 (suggesting a difficulty in distinguishing taxes
from monetary exactions, especially legislatively imposed exactions).
105. 570 U.S. at 616 (majority opinion).
106. Id.
107. See Koontz, 570 U.S. at 621 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Echeverria, supra note 53.
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to attempts to bring them under the constraints of the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine is that they do not behave like ordinary
property taxes. Property taxes generally are assessed on an annual
basis; exactions only upon the occasion of a permit. Property taxes
are assessed in an amount related to the value and use of the under-
lying property; exactions are usually unrelated to a property’s value
but are based on the nature of the activity (e.g., filling in a wetland
or building homes). Property taxes usually support general funds;
exactions are tied to a particular government program (e.g., restor-
ing wetlands or building low-income housing). In short, property
taxes can be conceptualized as a more passive imposition whereas
an exaction is triggered by an action.
In the wake of California’s property tax–limiting Proposition 13,
cities in California have developed creative ways to finance new initia-
tives. The most “successful” have been the adoption of new fees and
exactions. These are not property taxes. If they were, they would be
limited by Proposition 13.108 With California’s Propositions 13 and
218, most new taxes and fees require a two-thirds-majority vote.
Development exactions do not. And because the developers and future
residents of the new homes are not likely to live in a community at
the time an exaction is imposed, we have a regime uniquely suscep-
tible to majoritarian abuse.
Exactions are often designed to ameliorate pre-existing problems—
and not ones necessarily caused by the development subject to the
exaction scheme.109 The decisions in San Jose and 616 Croft do not
deny this reality; they embrace it. Whether it be an affordable hous-
ing shortage or lack of beach access, these problems are usually the
result of past political failures.
For example, California’s long-standing exclusionary zoning prac-
tices (large-lot subdivisions, rural greenbelt zoning, and the like)
108. In fact, the creative use of fees led to the subsequent Proposition 218, which requires
a supermajority for new fees. See, e.g., 1996 California Proposition 218, WIKIPEDIA, https://en
.wikipedia.org/wiki/1996_California_Proposition_218 (last visited Mar. 20, 2019). See CAL.
CONST. art. XIII(A) (Proposition 13), XIII(C) (Proposition 218).
109. This, of course, is not compatible with the requirements of Nollan, Dolan, or Koontz.
Exactions are supposed to be related to the property not other general or preexisting municipal
needs unrelated to a development’s impact. See, e.g., Rohn v. Visalia, 214 Cal. App. 3d 1463,
1475 (1979) (determining that the City cannot demand that the developer fix a pre-existing
traffic intersection alignment flaw); Amoco Oil Co. v. Vill. of Schaumburg, 277 Ill. App. 3d 926,
942, 661 N.E.2d 380, 390 (1995) (finding that the gas station remodel permit was improperly
conditioned on land dedication to fix pre-existing traffic congestion).
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combined with extraordinarily severe environmental-review proce-
dures have made it impossible for the state to build anywhere near
the number of new units necessary to keep pace with demand.110
Indeed, the difficulty in building in California has led to some par-
ticularly macabre black humor.111 While California politicians haven’t
loosened the choke hold on market-rate development, they have
acknowledged that the spread of the tent cities of the homeless is a
problem. And since politicians realize “something must be done”—
but without raising taxes—they have turned to imposing the burden
on those few hardy souls who try to develop at least some market-
rate housing. These affordable housing exactions are not taxes; they
are a substitute for taxes born of political cowardice. Putting them
to the tests of Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz won’t threaten the scheme
of property taxation in any state, but it might hasten the day when
politicians understand that in order to combat a housing shortage,
we must either build more homes or raise the taxes on the citizens
who so zealously fight new development.
It is an unfounded complaint that requiring some governments to
justify their legislatively imposed monetary exactions and fees under
Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz will adversely impact their ability to collect
property taxes. These fees and exactions are with us because it’s too
difficult to raise taxes. Political expediency and tax-avoidance are not
adequate reasons to avoid the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions serves an important
function in land use cases by preventing government from using its
power over land use permitting to extort amenities from developers.
While developers are often more than willing to contribute their fair
110. On average between 1980 and 2010, the state built about 120,000 new housing
units per year, when up to 230,000 were needed to keep pace with growing
population and changing demand, such as the desire to live in cities near jobs
and transit. That demand has risen sharply over the past 10 years. The state
now needs 180,000 new housing units per year, according to state housing
officials, and it is building less than 80,000 annually on average.
Angela Hart, How California’s Housing Crisis Happened, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 22, 2017,
https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article168107042.html. See
also Why are Housing Costs So High?, L.A./VENTURA CHAPTER BLDG. INDUS. ASS’N OF S. CAL.,
https://bialav.org/why-are-housing-costs-so-high/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2018).
111. See, e.g., BABCOCK & SIEMON, supra note 56, at 293 n.4.
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share to the public good, there are limits to their largesse. The Con-
stitution does not allow government to take property from individu-
als—whether that property be interests in land or in money—without
justification. Taxes broadly and uniformly imposed is one such jus-
tification for separating citizens from their money. Another can be
an exaction that serves to ameliorate an adverse impact that a land
use development might cause—so long as the exaction is roughly
proportional to that impact.
When the doctrine is applied in the context of free speech or other
constitutional rights, it does not matter whether the restriction is
imposed on an ad hoc basis or pursuant to a legislative mandate.
The exaction can burden a constitutionally protected right just the
same, and be just as unconstitutional. Neither theory nor practice
provides any good reason why exactions in the context of land use
permitting should be any different.
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Friends, let’s think back to September 1787. Our country’s Consti-
tutional Convention was nearing its end in Philadelphia when a
formidable woman encountered Benjamin Franklin, a delegate to the
Convention.1 She braced him with this question: “Well[,] Doctor[,]
what have we got[,] a republic or a monarchy[?]”2 The wise, old, battle-
tested Franklin replied simply: “A republic . . . if you can keep it.”3
So, friends, we have a republic if we can keep it. We have a free so-
ciety if we can keep it.
Just what role do property rights—the freedom to acquire and
govern our assets—play in nurturing our republic and our society?
It is the rare American these days who doesn’t feel that our coun-
try’s civic life and democratic institutions have gotten pretty ragged,
and our political and social fabric dangerously frayed. This feeling
runs across the political and cultural spectrum from citizens who
find Donald Trump and Fox News the “be all and end all” to those who
sit at the feet of Nancy Pelosi or Bernie Sanders, aided and abetted
by CNN and MSNBC. Perhaps the citizens most concerned about
the sad state of our political and social fabric are those who fall be-
tween these two poles, hoping everyone will take a deep breath, cool
the invective, and get on with the work at hand.
* Warm thanks to Mason Shefa, William & Mary Law School ’19, for his excellent work
on citations to these remarks.
1. See Papers of Dr. James McHenry on the Federal Convention of 1787, 11 AM. HIST.
REV. 595, 618 (1906), reprinted in U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFF., DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF
THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES 952 (1927).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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Now, by no stretch of the imagination is this the first time Ameri-
cans have been alienated from one another. The Revolutionary War
was as much a struggle that pitted colonists against colonists, rebels
against loyalists, as it was a conflict with Great Britain. During the
presidential election of 1800, the supporters of John Adams and
Thomas Jefferson were frenzied, fearing that if the election went
against them, the fledgling nation would be strangled in its crib. To
press their respective cases, Jefferson’s partisans called Adams a “hid-
eous hermaphroditical character, which has neither the force and
firmness of a man, nor the gentleness and sensibility of a woman.”4
Adams’ adherents, in turn, termed Jefferson “mean-spirited, . . . an
atheist, a libertine, and a coward.”5
The Civil War, when it came early in the republic’s life, again pitted
Americans against Americans in a struggle of catastrophic dimen-
sions. The Great Depression of the 1930s, Vietnam, Watergate, and
the civil rights movement all led to serious internal disputes and
strife. Americans have disagreed over immigration repeatedly since
the colonists first set foot in America. Issues rooted in race, religion,
gender, sexual orientation, and economics have all taken their toll
on our national harmony and unity.
In short, internal strife is nothing new for our country. But that
fact makes all the clearer our need for countervailing forces that bring
us together and help sustain our republic, time and again. A Holo-
caust survivor and resistance fighter whom I know likens America
to a cat with many lives—in the end, the United States always lands
on its feet.
So let’s think together about how property rights are vital in en-
abling our country to keep landing on its feet. Turn the matter of how
property rights do this deed over in your own minds as I offer my
own ruminations about the matter.
At the threshold, it is always telling for me to remember that one
of the first things a totalitarian regime usually does is interfere with
property rights.6 It seizes the property of people actively opposed to
4. ED WRIGHT, HISTORY’S GREATEST SCANDALS 11 (2006).
5. Kerwin Swint, Founding Fathers’ Dirty Campaign, CNN (Aug. 22, 2008), http://www.cnn
.com/2008/LIVING/wayoflife/08/22/mf.campaign.slurs.slogans (last visited March 20, 2019).
6. See, e.g., Vladimir Lenin, Dekret o Zemle [Decree on Land], IZVESTIIA TSENTRAL’NOGO
ISPOLNITEL’NOGO KOMITETA SOVETOV RABOCHIKH I KRESTIANSKIKH DEPUTATOV SSSR [IZV.TSIK]
[Bulletin of the USSR Central Executive Committee of the Councils of Workers’ and Peasants’
Deputies] 1917, http://www.hist.msu.ru/ER/Etext/DEKRET/o_zemle.htm. For a full translation,
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the regime and the property of groups whom the regime singles out
for special persecution (such as Jews under Hitler and Kulaks under
Stalin), and it relentlessly grows the role of the state in the general
acquisition and disposition of property.7 Indeed, if the regime is com-
munist, it quickly eliminates all significant sources of private prop-
erty,8 demonizes those who once owned it, and murders millions of
them.9 Lenin, Stalin, and Mao intuitively understood that property
rights are antithetical to tyrannical government.
To quote a leading lawyer in the first half of the twentieth century,
John W. Davis, “History furnishes no instance where the right of
man to acquire and hold property has been taken away . . . without
the complete destruction of liberty in all its forms.”10 Past experience
does make clear that there is a strong link between the right to pos-
sess property and the existence of personal freedom.
It is always invigorating to recall the words of Justices of the
United States Supreme Court when what they say strikes kindred
chords with us (less invigorating to quote them, of course, when their
words rattle our cages). In 1897, Justice Harlan said, “Due protection
of the rights of property has been regarded as a vital principle of
republican institutions.”11 In 1921, Justice McKenna wrote, “The secu-
rity of property next to personal security against the exertions of gov-
ernment is the essence of liberty.”12 In 1972, Justice Stewart declared
that the dichotomy between personal liberties and property
rights is a false one. Property does not have rights. People have
rights. . . . In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between
see Report on Land, MARXISTS INTERNET ARCHIVE, https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin
/works/1917/oct/25-26/26d.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). See generally Adam J. Macleod,
Strategic and Tactical Totalization in the Totalitarian Epoch, 5 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 57
(2016) (discussing the legal theories behind interference with property rights by totalitarian
regimes abroad).
7. See, e.g., Calvin B. Hoover, Dictatorship and Property, 13 VIRGINIA Q. REV. 161 (1937).
8. Id. at 163–64.
9. See Stephen W. Carson, A Property-Rights Theory of Mass Murder, FOUND. ECON. EDUC.
(Sept. 1, 2008), https://fee.org/articles/a-property-rights-theory-of-mass-murder (last visited
March 22, 2019).
10. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HIS-
TORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 133 (3d ed. 2008) (quoting WILLIAM H. HARBAUGH, LAWYER’S LAWYER:
THE LIFE OF JOHN W. DAVIS 347 (1973)).
11. ELY, supra note 10, at 3 (quoting Justice Harlan in Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235–36 (1897)).
12. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 165 (1921) (McKenna, J., dissenting).
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the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property.
Neither could have meaning without the other. That rights in
property are basic civil rights has long been recognized.13
A few years earlier, in 1958, a judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, the august Learned Hand, sounded the same
theme. Let me quote what James W. Ely, Jr., wrote about the great
Judge Hand. Ely said that Judge Hand
questioned whether there was a principled distinction between
personal and property rights. He observed that “it would have
seemed a strange anomaly” to the framers of the Fifth Amend-
ment “to learn that they constituted severer restrictions as to
Liberty than Property.” Hand added that there was “no constitu-
tional basis” for asserting greater judicial supervision over personal
freedom than over economic liberty.14
Now let’s see what the Constitution has to say about the matter.
This entails a look at the historical context out of which the property
provisions of the Constitution arose and then a look at the intentions
of its framers and ratifiers, to the extent those intentions can be di-
vined from very fragmentary records. Next comes the text of the
Constitution itself and what it actually says about property. Finally,
there is actual practice—how these provisions of the Constitution have
been interpreted in real life, no matter what the historical context out
of which the Constitution arose, no matter what the intentions of the
constitutional fathers, and no matter what the pertinent words of
the Constitution say. Days could be spent on these four intertwined
inquiries. Let your hearts be at rest, I will be mercifully brief.
First, the historical context. A desire to escape the aristocratic,
quasi-feudal ways of property ownership in England and Scotland
was one of the motivating forces that led colonists to crowd aboard
small, unsafe vessels; take their chances crossing a vast sea; and
land, if successful, on a mysterious continent, then largely wilder-
ness.15 In the mid-1600s in England and Scotland, to quote a distin-
guished property scholar, “land use was far from free, because it was
13. ELY, supra note 10, at 150–51 (quoting Justice Stewart in Lynch v. Household Finance
Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972)).
14. ELY, supra note 10 at 150 (quoting LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 50–51 (1958)).
15. Id. at 12.
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always intimately connected with services owed to a higher lord, all
the way up to the monarch.”16 American colonists, however, wanted
to be able to acquire property, possess it outright, and use it as they
thought best. They sought the personal freedom that is rooted in
property rights.17
As American society grew and prospered, evolving from Jamestown
in 1607 and Plymouth Rock in 1620, the colonists became increas-
ingly eager to control their own economic future and make their own
laws with minimal interference from the mother country.18 In the
last quarter of the eighteenth century, they became heavily influ-
enced by the thoughts of the philosopher John Locke and the Whig
party in Parliament.19
Jim Ely captured the essence in his seminal book entitled The
Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of Property
Rights. Ely wrote:
The colonial attachment to property ownership was powerfully
reinforced by intellectual currents in the mother country. For
England, the seventeenth century was a time of political and
16. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY § 7.1, at 300 (3d ed. 2010).
17. See, e.g., Samuel Adams, The Rights of the Colonists, a List of Violations of Rights and
a Letter of Correspondence, 18 BOS. REC. COMMISSIONERS’ REP. 94 (1772), reprinted in 2 THE
WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS, PROJECT GUTENBERG (Harry Alonzo Cushing ed., Project
Gutenberg compilation 2000), http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2092/pg2092-images.html
[hereinafter THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS] (“Among the Natural Rights of the Colonists are
these[:] First. a Right to Life; Secondly to Liberty; thirdly to Property; together with the Right
to support and defend them in the best manner they can—Those are evident Branches of,
rather than deductions from the Duty of Self Preservation, commonly called the first Law of
Nature . . . .”).
18. See ELY, supra note 10, at 15; THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS, supra note 17 (“The
natural liberty of Men by entring into society is abridg’d or restrained so far only as is
necessary for the Great end of Society the best good of the whole . . . .”).
19. See ELY, supra note 10, at 16–17; see also David L. Wardle, Reason to Ratify: The In-
fluence of John Locke’s Religious Beliefs on the Creation and Adoption of the United States
Constitution, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 291, 296–97 (2002) (“Of all of Locke’s works, his Essay
was by far the most widely distributed in America at the end of the eighteenth century. One
study shows that the height of Locke’s popularity, as judged by the percentage of libraries car-
rying his books, was from 1777 to 1790, a critical period for the Constitution. Locke’s political
philosophy was important to these early Americans . . . .” (footnotes omitted)); Donald L.
Doernberg, “We the People”: John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and Standing to
Challenge Government Action, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 52, 57–59 (1985) (“It would be difficult to over-
state John Locke’s influence on the American Revolution and the people who created the gov-
ernment that followed it.”); David N. Mayer, The English Radical Whig Origins of American
Constitutionalism, 70 WASH. U. L. Q. 131 (1992).
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religious upheaval, culminating in the Glorious Revolution of
1688. Seeking to justify these events, English political thinkers
analyzed the nature of government. The most significant of these
Whig theorists was John Locke, who asserted . . . that legitimate
government was based on a compact between the people and their
rulers. The people gave allegiance to the government in exchange
for protection of their inherent or natural rights. Deviation by the
rulers from this fundamental agreement provided grounds for
their overthrow.
Of particular importance was the theory of property rights in
Locke’s political philosophy. According to Locke, private property
existed under natural law before the creation of political author-
ity. Indeed, the principal purpose of government was to protect
these natural property rights, which Locke fused with liberty.
Thus, he asserted that people organized government to preserve
“their Lives, Liberties and Estates.” Because the ownership of
property was a natural right, the powers of government were
necessarily limited by its duty to safeguard property. Locke
argued that the legislature could not arbitrarily take property
and that the levy of taxes without popular consent . . . “subverts
the end of Government.”20
According to Ely, “It is difficult to overstate the impact of the Lockean
concept of property. Strongly influenced by Locke, the eighteenth-
century Whig political tradition stressed the rights of property owners
as the bulwark of freedom from arbitrary government. Property own-
ership was identified with the preservation of political liberty.”21
But eighteenth-century Whig political theory was not the only
factor at play. King George III and Parliament fell deeply into debt
during The Seven Years’ War of 1756 to 1763.22 This was a struggle
waged around the world, with Britain and France as the prime com-
batants. The conflict came to North America as what the British
colonists called the French and Indian War.23 When England’s gov-
ernment sought to have the colonists help retire its huge war debt
by levying new taxes on Americans and interfering in other ways
with their property, smoldering resentment against the mother
20. ELY, supra note 10, at 16–17.
21. Id. at 17.
22. See JUSTIN DU RIVAGE, REVOLUTION AGAINST EMPIRE: TAXES, POLITICS, AND THE ORIGINS
OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 77–79, 91–92 (2017).
23. Id. at 11.
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country for many reasons finally caught fire, and the American Revo-
lution broke out.24 The cry “no taxation without representation”
fueled the conflagration.25 American property was not to be trifled
with, even by Parliament and King.
After the Revolution, during a dangerous time of feckless national
government under the Articles of Confederation, states began to
tread on property rights as they sought revenue.26 Concern to stem
this trend was an impetus, among many, to the Constitutional Con-
vention;27 it met in secret, behind closed doors and drawn curtains,
from May to September 1787,28 often in stifling heat.
The need to safeguard property against arbitrary action by gov-
ernment was very much on the minds of the constitutional fathers.
To quote Ely again:
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention were an able
and experienced group, most of whom had participated in public
affairs during the revolutionary era. Harboring little faith in the
people, the framers were not democrats in any modern sense.
Indeed, they viewed popular government as a potential threat to
property rights. . . .
Despite their differences over particular economic issues, the
right to acquire and own property was undoubtedly a paramount
value for the framers of the Constitution. Following the Lockean
philosophy, John Rutledge of South Carolina advised the Phila-
delphia convention that “Property was certainly the principal
object of Society.” Similarly, Alexander Hamilton declared, “One
great obj[ective] of Gov[ernment] is personal protection and the
security of Property.” These sentiments were widely shared by
other delegates. Consistent with the Whig tradition, the framers
did not distinguish between personal and property rights. On the
contrary, in their minds, property rights were indispensable be-
cause property ownership was closely associated with liberty.
“Property must be secured,” John Adams proclaimed in 1790, “or
liberty cannot exist.” Indeed, the framers saw property ownership
as a buffer protecting individuals from governmental coercion.
24. See ELY, supra note 10, at 27.
25. Id. Additionally, the cry “Liberty and Property” became “the motto of the revolutionary
movement.” Id. at 25.
26. See id. at 41.
27. See id.
28. Id. at 42.
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Arbitrary redistributions of property destroyed liberty, and thus
the framers hoped to restrain attacks on property rights.29
Now, one form of property—the ownership of human beings by
other human beings, that is, the institution of slavery—occasioned
the most bitter and divisive debates during the constitutional delib-
erations and came close to wrecking the Convention.30 Compromise
was finally reached on slavery in ways that satisfied no one except
that the compromise permitted the formation of a viable national
government.31 This was crucially important if our fledgling nation
was to have a chance to survive infancy and to begin to gather
strength at a time when Britain, France, Spain, and even Russia still
occupied parts of North America and waited expectantly and hun-
grily for the failure of the new republic and the territorial opportuni-
ties this would provide them.
The right to own slaves did emerge, with strong protections, from
the drafting and ratifying of the Constitution, though the words
“slave” and “slavery” were never used in the document written and
ratified in 1787–88.32
Property rights in other people, however, are flatly inconsistent
with another, more basic property right, that of self-ownership—the
priceless right to possess ourselves free of anyone else’s claim on our
bodies, our time, our talent, and our labor.33 It took a hideous Civil
War and a constitutional amendment to vindicate self-ownership,
though in the twenty-first century self-ownership seems the most
basic property right of all.34
Now, against the background just sketched, let’s look at the pro-
visions of the Constitution that deal with property. They exist in
29. Id. at 42–43 (first quoting 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
534 (Max Farrand, ed., rev. ed. 1937); then quoting THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN-
TION OF 1787, supra, at 302; and then quoting 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 280 (Charles
Francis Adams, ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1851)).
30. See ELY, supra note 10, at 46.
31. See id. at 46–47.
32. David S. Reynolds, The Fuse the Founders Lit, WALL STREET J., Nov. 24–25, 2018, at
C7; see U.S. CONST. arts. I–VII.
33. See Reynolds, supra note 32 (“[T]he most basic property right was that of self-owner-
ship, a right possessed by every human being.”).
34. See Carole Pateman, Self-Ownership and Property in the Person: Democratization and
a Tale of Two Concepts, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 20, 20 (2002) (describing an increase in scholarly in-
terest in the concept of self-ownership in the 1990s).
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great profusion. Why am I going to lay each and every one on you?
Two main reasons: First, their cumulative weight speaks eloquently.
It tells us something important, and we should take heed. Property
was obviously a primal concern of the framers, ratifiers, and later
the amenders of the Constitution. Second, I believe Continuing Legal
Education credit may be given for this lecture. In my experience,
getting enough CLE annually to keep our law licenses often entails
a bit of boredom, even some suffering. I proceed in that spirit.
Constitutional provisions pertaining to the legislative branch in-
clude Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 (“[D]irect Taxes shall be appor-
tioned among the several States . . . according to their respective
Numbers . . . .”), Article I, Section 8, Clauses 1–8 (establishing Con-
gress’s power to set taxes, borrow money, regulate commerce, establish
uniform bankruptcy laws, coin money, and secure copyright protec-
tion for inventors and authors), Article I, Section 9, Clauses 1 (stating
that “[t]he Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohib-
ited . . . prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but
a Tax or duty may be imposed . . . not exceeding ten dollars for each
Person [, that is, each slave]”), Article I, Section 9, Clauses 3–8 (pro-
hibiting bills of attainder, a capitation tax other than one in propor-
tion to the census, the preference of the ports of one state over
another, and the granting of titles of nobility), and Article I, Section
10, Clauses 1–2 (prohibiting states from printing money, passing
bills of attainder, impairing the obligation of contracts, granting no-
bility, or charging tariffs on imports from other states).35
The property provision relevant to the judicial branch is in Article
III, Section 3, Clause 2: “The Congress shall have Power to declare
the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work
Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the
Person attainted.”36
A property provision dealing with the relation of states to one
another can be found in Article IV, Section 2, Clause 3:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, [that is, a slave,],
under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Conse-
quence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from
35. U.S. CONST. art, 1, § 2, cl. 3, § 8, cl. 1–8, § 9, cl. 1, 3–8, § 10, cl 1–2.
36. Id. at art. 3, § 3, cl. 2.
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such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the
Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.37
And a provision dealing with national debts appears in Article VI,
Section 1, Clause 1: “All Debts, contracted and Engagements en-
tered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid
against the United States under this Constitution, as under the
Confederation.”38
Then there are the property provisions of the amendments to the
constitutional text. The Third Amendment states: “No Soldier shall,
in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of
the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by
law.”39 The Fourth Amendment: “The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”40 The Fifth Amend-
ment: “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”41 The Thirteenth Amendment:
“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”42
Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
. . . .
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized
by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and
bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion,
shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any
37. Id. at art. 4, § 2, cl. 3.
38. Id. at art. 6, § 1, cl. 1.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
40. Id. amend. IV.
41. Id. amend. V.
42. Id. amend. XIII.
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State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid
of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim
for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obli-
gations and claims shall be held illegal and void.43
So what should we make of these constitutional metaphysics—the
historical context out of which the property provisions of the Consti-
tution arose, the intentions of their framers and ratifiers, and the
actual language of these provisions? If we could find someone who
is aware of context, intent, and text, but who is wholly innocent of
actual practice—how text has been interpreted since the U.S. gov-
ernment began under the Constitution in March, 1789—that inno-
cent being would marvel at how little primacy property rights seem
to have enjoyed in the United States in recent generations.
Now some loss of primacy for early property rights was inevitable.
When the Constitution took effect 230 years ago, property rights
were largely the preserve of white males of means. Even their wives
and daughters had extremely limited rights. And ownership of
slaves constituted an enormous source of wealth. As was recently
written about Thomas Jefferson:
Property in land and property in slaves were the engines that
drove Virginia society from its earliest days, giving Jefferson and
those in his class wealth, independence, and liberty—their sense
of identity. It was the dividing line between those who could parti-
cipate in republican society by voting and those who could not,
between those who were respectable and those who were not.44
All this was bound to change as American society changed, with
gains in property rights for people who were not privileged, white
43. Id. amend. XIV, §§ 1–4. Many more constitutional amendments pertain to property,
including the Second Amendment (“[T]he right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not
be infringed.”), the Eighth Amendment (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed . . . .”), the Sixteenth Amendment (“The Congress shall have the power to lay
and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among
the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”), the Eighteenth and
Twenty-first Amendments (prohibiting intoxicating liquors and then repealing Prohibition,
respectively), and, finally, the Twenty-fourth Amendment (“The right of citizens of the United
States to vote . . . shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state by reason
of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.”).
44. See ANNETTE GORDON-REED & PETER S. ONUF, “MOST BLESSED OF THE PATRIARCHS”:
THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE EMPIRE OF THE IMAGINATION 20 (2016).
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males and losses for those males—especially when it came to owner-
ship of other people and to control of marital property.
It was also true that, given the evolution of American society toward
greater civil rights and greater redistribution of wealth, it was not
politically feasible for the federal judiciary to continue giving prop-
erty rights the same constitutional primacy accorded them during
our government’s first century and a half. The United States Su-
preme Court came slowly to this realization when it struck down
much of the New Deal legislation on property rights grounds during
Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency but shifted its stance under the
hammer blows of the Great Depression and political furor.45
Of course, too, there have always been constraints on property
rights. These constraints become most pronounced during major
wars, but to a lesser degree they are ever present. Today these con-
straints exist in multitudinous profusion and, at times, seem to
breed like rabbits.
Joseph William Singer, a Harvard Law School Professor, wrote an
important article entitled Property as the Law of Democracy in which
he stresses that “[p]roperty is more than the law of things; property is
the law of democracy.”46 This entails, in Singer’s view, a rich flower-
ing of constraints.47 “In a free and democratic society,” Singer says,
owners have rights, but they also have obligations. Restaurants
and shops cannot exclude patrons on the basis of their race or
religion. Nor can public accommodations refuse to make reason-
able accommodations to make their services available to persons
with disabilities. Owners are not free to ignore longstanding occu-
pation of their property if they want to protect themselves from
loss of their property by adverse possession. Owners cannot vote
to pass zoning laws that unduly inhibit the ability of religious
institutions to operate in their communities. Landlords cannot
fail to provide tenants with heat or hot water. Owners are not
free to interfere with the quiet enjoyment of neighboring owners,
nor are they free to saddle buyers with covenants that unreason-
ably impede the alienability of land. Owners are not free to sell
property without reducing the transaction to writing and recording
45. See ELY, supra note 10, at 126.
46. Joseph William Singer, Property as the Law of Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J. 1287, 1291
(2014).
47. See id. at 1301.
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the documents in the registry of deeds. Nor are they free to build
without complying with local building and construction codes.
The number of obligations the law imposes on owners is far too
numerous to mention. And determining what obligations owners
have requires attention to our deepest norms and values.48
“Property law is designed,” wrote Singer, “to spread freedom, oppor-
tunity, security, and wealth, but it is also designed to prevent owners
from inflicting harm on others and from acting in a manner that is
incompatible with norms of propriety.”49 Singer elaborated:
Property law . . . entails substantive choices about the type and
scope of property rights that a free and democratic society can
recognize without violating its deepest values. We have, for exam-
ple, abolished feudalism, slavery, primogeniture, male control of
marital property, racial segregation, the fee tail, and debtors’
prisons. We have abolished self-help in landlord–tenant relations;
we prohibit landlords from putting the tenant’s belongings on
the street if a rent check is a day late. . . . We have abolished strict
foreclosure of mortgages. We have abolished racially restrictive
covenants. We have enacted zoning and environmental laws and
we have protected consumers from unfair and deceptive business
practices. The host of regulations we see both in state and fed-
eral law establishes minimum standards for social relationships
compatible with our choice to live in a democracy and to promote
freedom and equality.50
Inevitably, there will be conflicts between protecting the ownership
and use of property, including enforcing contractual rights, on the
one hand, and advancing other interests such as the redistribution
of wealth, the allocation of land for public enjoyment, and economic
redevelopment, on the other. As ever with constitutional interpreta-
tion, hard cases defy easy answers. Conflict is most acute, perhaps,
when eminent domain is used to take land and buildings from un-
willing private owners so as to transfer it to other private owners for
their entrepreneurial projects, purportedly to enhance the larger
social good. This is especially the case when the compensation for
48. Id. at 1323–24.
49. Id. at 1324.
50. Id. at 1304.
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the seized property seems disproportionately small compared to the
harm done to the erstwhile owner.
The reaction, especially at the state level, against the Supreme
Court’s 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New London51 suggests a re-
newed appreciation of the role of property rights in ensuring the
health of our republic. The Court in Kelo split 5–4.52 In dissent,
Justice O’Connor was in full cry: “Under the banner of economic
development,” she wrote, “all private property is now vulnerable to
being taken and transferred to another private owner . . . .”53 She
argued that nothing now prevents states “from replacing any Motel
6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall,”54 and she
said the Court eliminates “any distinction between private and public
use of property—and thereby effectively . . . delete[s] the words ‘for
public use’ from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”55 Jus-
tice Thomas, also in dissent, said: “Something has gone seriously
awry with this Court’s interpretation of the Constitution. Though
citizens are safe from the government in their homes, the homes
themselves are not.”56
States have not warmed to Kelo, viewing it more as anathema
than panacea.57 Both legislatively and judicially, they have limited
eminent domain of the sort permitted by the majority opinion in
Kelo.58 President George H. W. Bush pushed back against the opinion,
as did many U.S. Senators.59 On the whole, the public was appalled
by the decision.60 It did, however, receive modest editorial support
from The New York Times and The Washington Post.61
51. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 503.
55. Id. at 494.
56. Id. at 518 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
57. See Ilya Somin, The Political and Judicial Reaction to Kelo, WASH. POST (June 4,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/04/the-political
-and-judicial-reaction-to-kelo/?utm_term=.ee3e2d7d81f0.
58. Id.; Patricia H. Lee, Eminent Domain: In the Aftermath of Kelo v. New London, a
Resurrection in Norwood: One Public Interest Attorney’s View, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 121,
134–37 (2006).
59. See Lee, supra note 58, at 131–34.
60. Adam Liptak, Case Won on Appeal (to Public), N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2006), https://www
.nytimes.com/2006/07/30/weekinreview/30liptak.html?n=Top%2FReference%2FTimes+Top
ics%2FSubjects%2FP%2FPublic+Opinion (last visited March 22, 2019); Somin, supra note 57.
61. See Editorial, The Limits of Property Rights, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2005), https://www
.nytimes.com/2005/06/24/opinion/the-limits-of-property-rights.html (“The Supreme Court’s
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In 1955, Justice Felix Frankfurter, when talking about constitu-
tional interpretation, wrote, “Yesterday the active area in this field
was concerned with ‘property.’ Today it is ‘civil liberties.’ Tomorrow
it may be ‘property’ again.”62 If Frankfurter were still above ground—
still on this side of the Great Divide—he might well see signs that
property rights are coming back into their own as a focus of consti-
tutional understanding, along with civil liberties.
Against this background, let’s ponder for a moment just how prop-
erty rights do contribute to the strength of our republic.
In my view, tenure for professors and lifetime appointment for
federal judges are instructive. Tenure for college and university profes-
sors gives them a stake in the success and strength of their colleges
and universities. The security of position that’s inherent in tenure
also provides them with the freedom to probe and challenge estab-
lished dogma, to think and create robustly, and to speak freely—all
of which are essential to intellectual progress. Without tenured profes-
sors’ security of position, their universities would be less likely to be
powerful generators of new knowledge for the common good.
By the same token, the lifetime appointment of federal judges gives
them a vital stake in the strength and success of the judicial enter-
prise. Because of their life tenure, they are also freer than they would
otherwise be to decide cases based on the facts and the law, resisting
political, economic, or social pressure to do otherwise. Because federal
judges possess lifetime appointments, they are more able to see to
the integrity and legitimacy of the third branch of government.
It seems to me that property rights work for citizens, as a whole, in
much the same way that tenure does for professors and life appoint-
ments do for federal judges. When people have governmentally pro-
tected rights to acquire and to use property in ways conducive to their
pursuits of happiness, they become more interested in the strength
and success of their government and civil society. They have a stake
in the well-being of both. And the possession of property gives them
the security and influence to express their views and participate in
civic and political life more freely and effectively. In a very funda-
mental sense, property does precede and undergird liberty.
ruling . . . was a welcome vindication of cities’ ability to act in the public interest.”); Editorial,
Eminent Latitude, WASH. POST (June 24, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con
tent/article/2005/06/23/AR2005062301698.html?noredirect=on (last visited March 22, 2019)
(“[T]he court’s decision was correct.”).
62. ELY, supra note 10, at 3 (quoting FELIX FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN 19 (1956)).
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Property rights also undergird a vibrant market economy. These
rights—in an economy governed by the rule of law—enable people
to plan, invest, exchange goods and services, take entrepreneurial
risks, and generally act in all the ways crucial to creativity, competi-
tion, and productivity. A robust national economy has the potential to
lift all boats and ensure the stability and effectiveness of government.
Then, too, property rights also undergird people’s capacity to be
well-educated. Higher education in particular has become quite ex-
pensive. It takes property to pay the bills, either through family as-
sets, taxpayer receipts, or funds philanthropically given by others
to provide scholarships. To quote a former university president, now
head of the Phi Beta Kappa Society, “Higher education increases vol-
unteerism, political knowledge and participation, electoral turnout,
and democratic attitudes. . . . Political theorist and Professor Danielle
Allen . . . put it well: ‘. . . [L]evel of education is an even stronger
predictor than income of whether one will vote on Election Day.’”63
And there is the enormous role that property plays in most peo-
ple’s daily lives. Having at least a modest amount of property lifts
burdens that would otherwise drain a person’s capacity to be an
effective citizen. Without sufficient property, transportation can be-
come a huge issue—so can acquiring shelter and lodging, reliably
feeding your children and meaningfully educating them, as well as
ensuring health care for the family. Without a basic amount of prop-
erty, people have little capacity to participate in civic life or political
activity. Their time and energy must go towards trying desperately
to keep a nostril above the waves of daily existence. Without prop-
erty, people have little capacity to thrive as citizens of our republic.
During the bicentennial of the United States in 1976, much
celebratory material appeared. I collected a lot of it at the time. One
piece that has survived in my hands is a calendar distributed by
Exxon to its travel club members. This 1976 calendar celebrated the
principal rights that Americans enjoy and cherish, starting in
January with “The Right to Freedom of Religion.”64 When April 1976
came around, the bicentennial calendar celebrated “The Right to
Own Property” with a caption saying:
63. Frederick M. Lawrence, Preparation for an Engaged Civic Life, KEY REP. (Dec. 3,
2018), http://www.keyreporter.org/PbkNews/PbkNews/Details/2614.html (quoting Danielle
Allen, The Future of Democracy, 37 HUMAN. 61, 61 (2016)).
64. 1976 Exxon Travel Club Calendar (on file with author).
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[T]o the rural American [of a bygone era] his new barn was a
source of pride and joy, as well as visible evidence that he was a
successful independent farmer. Today, in this Bicentennial era,
Americans own more property of various kinds than any people
in the history of the world.65
On New Year’s Day 2019, the newspaper in Richmond, Virginia,
where my family lives, laid out eleven principles on which its editori-
als are based.66 Among them was property rights.67 The paper said:
We believe in the right to property. Individuals are granted a lim-
ited time on Earth, and they spend much of that time in arduous
toil. They offer their labor in consensual exchange for money,
which they then offer in consensual exchange for goods. To divest
them of their money and property without profound justification
is to rob them of their labor—and hence a portion of their lives.68
I had a torts professor in law school who used to say money isn’t
everything, but it is everything else. The same can be said for prop-
erty rights; they are not everything, but they are everything else.
Property rights are a condition precedent to a flourishing civil so-
ciety and a healthy polity for our republic.
Let me end with this thought. For centuries, lawyers in our
country have had a special responsibility to nurture the public good.
We lawyers are unusually able by dint of our training and experi-
ence to bring people together to work out their differences, to seek
compromises, and to ensure our country deals with its difficulties
and seizes its opportunities. We lawyers are especially charged to
protect and nurture the rule of law in America, and the rule of law
is flatly essential to our continued national success. So I think law-
yers, as a species, are thinking very seriously these days about just
what it is that holds our country together and sustains its capacity
to flourish. Property rights are surely part of this equation. We
lawyers have a special responsibility to see that property rights
have their proper place in our country’s constitutional understand-
ing of what it takes to preserve a free society.
65. Id.
66. See Our Creed, RICH. TIMES–DISPATCH, Jan. 1, 2019, at A8.
67. See id.
68. Id.
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“What could be more satisfying than to be engaged in work in
which every capacity or talent one may have is needed, every lesson
one may have learned is used, every value one cares about is fur-
thered.”69 These words from John W. Gardner are compelling. When
these words characterize our work as lawyers, we make a serious
difference for the better for our country.
It is a delight to be with you.
69. John W. Gardner, U.S. Sec’y of Health, Education, and Welfare, Address at the 13th
Annual Career Service Awards Banquet (April 21, 1967), in 113 CONG. REC. 10, 610 (1967)
(statement of Sen. Carlson).
